[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000030","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/31\/presentment-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EPresentment Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 7, Clause 2\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEvery Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Presentment Clause is commonly viewed\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eas a provision that protects the President\u2019s veto power, an association reinforced by the clause\u2019s name. Yet, the Presentment Clause has a broader function: The clause prescribes the exclusive method for passing federal statutes, indicating that all bills must pass both houses of Congress and be subject to the President\u2019s veto. Thus, with some justification, one might call the provision the Lawmaking Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Presentment or Lawmaking Clause was often debated during the Founding, but the discussions generally focused on issues not relevant to current interpretive controversies. In the Constitutional Convention, the principal focus was on how difficult it should be for Congress to override the President\u2019s veto and on whether the President should possess the veto alone or should share it with the judiciary in a council of revision. During the ratification debates, the Federalists sought to justify the veto and bicameralism as devices for restraining the legislature from invading executive power and for limiting the enactment of hasty and unwise legislation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Presentment Clause ultimately drafted by the Convention was one of the most formal provisions in the Constitution. The Framers apparently feared that factions would attempt to depart from the constitutional method for passing laws and therefore they spelled out that method in one of the document\u2019s longest provisions. The clause describes the specifics of the lawmaking process, including that the President\u2019s veto can be overridden by two-thirds of both houses. In the Pocket Veto Clause that immediately follows (Article I, Section 7, Clause 2) the President has ten days to decide whether to veto a bill and congressional adjournments may not deprive the President of his ability to veto measures. The Framers even mentioned (in the Pocket Veto Clause) that Sundays should not be counted in the ten day period, and James Madison had the phrase \u201cafter it shall have been presented to him\u201d inserted into the clause to \u201cprevent a question whether the day on which the bill be presented, ought to be counted or not as one of the ten days.\u201d Moreover, to preclude Congress from bypassing the President by calling a bill by another name, Madison also persuaded the Convention to take the extraordinary step of adding a second Presentment Clause that required submission to the President of \u201cEvery Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary.\u201d (Article I, Section 7, Clause 3.) Clearly, the Framers believed that lawmaking was so important that they could not take any chances that the Congress might try to circumvent the President\u2019s role in the legislative process.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere are two ways that the Presentment Clause might be violated. First, Congress might pass statutes that authorize the legislative Houses or the President to take legislative-type actions without conforming to bicameralism and presentment. Second, Congress or the President might take legislative type actions on their own initiative without statutory authority. The Framers\u2019 efforts have largely proved successful in preventing this second type of Presentment Clause violation. Thus, Congress has rarely if ever attempted to pass laws without either the approval of both houses or presentment to the President. In addition, the President\u2019s assertions of the constitutional authority to take legislative-type actions in the domestic sphere have been relatively rare and, when they do occur, have often been restrained by the courts. Youngstown \u003Ci\u003ESheet \u0026amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer \u003C\/i\u003E(1952); but see\u003Ci\u003E In re Debs \u003C\/i\u003E(1895).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Constitution has been less successful, however, in preventing Congress from authorizing departures from bicameralism and presentment through the enactment of legislation, such as through statutory delegations of administrative discretion to the executive. These statutes raise complex questions and therefore may sometimes be constitutional. Still, as a general matter, it seems unlikely that the Framers would have allowed Congress to bypass the bicameralism and presentment requirements simply by passing legislation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOne important statutory departure from the traditional lawmaking process was the legislative veto, in which Congress usually granted each house the authority to nullify administrative actions taken by the executive. One might view the legislative veto from several different perspectives, but in each case the veto is unconstitutional. If the legislative veto is conceptualized as executive power, then it is unconstitutional because the legislators who wield it are not executive officials. If the veto is viewed as involving the power to pass legislation, then it clearly violates the Presentment Clause, because the veto does not conform to the requirements of bicameralism or presentment. Finally, the veto might be viewed as an exercise of the power of an individual house, but such powers are either mentioned in the Constitution, such as the power of each house to pass legislative rules, or might be inferred because they are traditionally possessed by legislative houses, as with the power of investigation. The legislative veto, however, falls under neither category. The Supreme Court has largely conformed to the Constitution\u2019s original meaning and held legislative vetoes to be unconstitutional. \u003Ci\u003EINS v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EChadha \u003C\/i\u003E(1983);\u003Ci\u003E Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise \u003C\/i\u003E(1991).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe most common departure from bicameralism and presentment has involved the statutory delegation to the executive of administrative discretion. Although such delegations certainly do not conform to the Presentment Clause, there is a plausible originalist argument that these delegations are constitutional either under the Necessary and Proper Clause or because they confer executive power rather than legislative power. Nonetheless, many originalists reject these arguments and conclude that broad delegations are constitutionally problematic because they give to the executive either legislative or nonexecutive power. The Supreme Court, however, currently holds that these delegations are constitutional, based in part on the nonoriginalist argument that the modern administrative state requires them. \u003Ci\u003EMistretta v. United States \u003C\/i\u003E(1989).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EMore recently, the Supreme Court has reviewed a different departure from the traditional lawmaking process\u2014the conferral of cancellation authority on the executive\u2014and held it to be unconstitutional as a violation of the Presentment Clause. \u003Ci\u003EClinton v. City of New\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EYork \u003C\/i\u003E(1998). In 1995, Congress enacted the Line\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EItem Veto Act, which despite its name, did not provide the President with veto authority, but instead authorized him to cancel certain spending provisions. This cancellation authority was similar to an ordinary delegation of administrative authority in that it conferred discretion on the executive, subject to a statutory standard, to take certain actions. Cancellation authority, however, differs from an ordinary delegation since it is generally narrower. Whereas an ordinary delegation allows the executive to promulgate a rule of his choosing, cancellation authority permits him only to accept or reject a statutory rule. For example, in the appropriation law area, ordinary delegations under traditional appropriation laws permit the President to spend any sum between the amount appropriated and zero, whereas cancellation authority only permits him the choice to spend the appropriated amount or to cancel the appropriation and spend nothing.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EReviewing the cancellation authority provided by the Line Item Veto Act, the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional. In the Court\u2019s view, cancellation authority was similar to the power to repeal a law, because the authority could eliminate an appropriation. The exercise of cancellation authority therefore needed to conform to the Presentment Clause. Of course, if cancellation authority is similar to repealing an appropriation, then the executive\u2019s authority under a traditional appropriation to decide how much to spend is similar to enacting an appropriation, because the executive can \u201clegislate\u201d the amount that should be spent. Under the Court\u2019s reasoning, then, ordinary delegations may also logically violate the Presentment Clause, but the Court continues regularly to permit such delegations. The Court has yet to resolve this double standard whereby cancellation authority is unconstitutional even though such authority is generally narrower than ordinary delegations.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESeveral other matters raise questions under the Presentment Clause. First, some have argued that the clause defines a \u201cBill\u201d as a provision relating to a single subject; consequently, if Congress were to combine two separate subjects in a measure, that would really be two bills and the President could therefore exercise a kind of item veto by vetoing one of the bills, while approving the other. Historical and structural evidence reveals, however, that the original meaning of a \u201cBill\u201d was a measure that included whatever provisions Congress placed within it. Second, the Line Item Veto Act provided that the President would receive cancellation authority only as to bills that he signed but that he would lack such authority if he vetoed the bill, a provision that arguably places an unconstitutional burden on the President\u2019s veto power. Third, it has been argued that the Presentment Clause requires that Congress pass bills under a majority voting rule, but the clause\u2019s language, which simply refers to every bill \u201cwhich shall have passed\u201d the legislative houses, combined with its structure and history, indicates that each house can employ supermajority rules to govern the passage of bills.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFinally, in response to the recent practice of a President signing a bill but then ordering that a portion of it not be enforced, two arguments have been made. The broader one claims that the President has a duty to veto all unconstitutional laws, rooted in the Executive Vesting Clause (Article II, Section 1, Clause 1), the Presidential Oath of Office Clause (Article II, Section 1, Clause 8), and the Take Care Clause (Article II, Section 3).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA narrower argument maintains that, if the President asserts a claim strong enough to support not enforcing a provision as unconstitutional, then this claim will also require that he veto a law containing the provision.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Michael_Rappaport.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.sandiego.edu\/law\/academics\/faculty\/bio.php?id=727\u0022\u003EMichael B. Rappaport\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law, University of San Diego Law School\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000030-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000030-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000030-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000030-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDan T. Coenen, \u003Ci\u003EThe Originalist Case Against Congressional Supermajority Voting Rules\u003C\/i\u003E, 106\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ENW. U. L.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EREV. 1091 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGary Lawson, \u003Ci\u003EDelegation and Original Meaning\u003C\/i\u003E, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJohn O. McGinnis \u0026amp; Michael B. Rappaport\u003Ci\u003E, The Rights\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Eof Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Rules\u003C\/i\u003E, 47\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EDUKE L.J. 327\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESaikrishna B. Prakash, \u003Ci\u003EDeviant Executive Lawmaking\u003C\/i\u003E, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESaikrishna B. Prakash, \u003Ci\u003EWhy the President Must Veto\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EUnconstitutional Bills\u003C\/i\u003E, 16\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EWM. \u0026amp; MARY BILL\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EOF\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ERTS.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EJ. 81 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael B. Rappaport, \u003Ci\u003EThe President\u2019s Veto and the\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EConstitution\u003C\/i\u003E, 87\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ENW. U. L. REV. 736 (1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael B. Rappaport, \u003Ci\u003EThe Selective Nondelegation\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EDoctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for \u003C\/i\u003EClinton v. City of New York, 76\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ETUL. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E265 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMichael B. Rappaport, \u003Ci\u003EThe Unconstitutionality of\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003E\u201cSigning and Not Enforcing,\u201d \u003C\/i\u003E16\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EWM. \u0026amp; MARY BILL\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EOF RTS. J. 113 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMichael B. Rappaport, \u003Ci\u003EVeto Burdens and the Line Item\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EVeto Act\u003C\/i\u003E, 91\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ENW. U. L. REV. 771 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJ. Gregory Sidak \u0026amp; Thomas A. Smith, \u003Ci\u003EFour Faces of the\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EItem Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland\u003C\/i\u003E, 84\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ENW. U.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EL. REV. 437 (1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000030-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ci\u003EIn re\u003C\/i\u003E Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EYoungstown Sheet \u0026amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EI.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022text-align:justify\u0022\u003EMetropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp align=\u0022center\u0022 style=\u0022margin-right:25px; text-align:center\u0022\u003EClinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000030-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000001\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ELegislative Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000031\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPocket Veto\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000032\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPresentment of Resolutions\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000058\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ENecessary and Proper Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000075\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EExecutive Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000084\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EOath of Office\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000097\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETake Care Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]