[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000028","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/29\/incompatibility-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EIncompatibility Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 6, Clause 2\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E...no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Constitution establishes several limitations on a person\u2019s ability to serve in Congress. For example, Article I, Sections 2 and 3 limit the class of persons eligible to serve in Congress by imposing age, citizenship, and residency requirements. The Incompatibility Clause of Article I, Section 6 imposes a further limitation: it forbids federal executive and judicial officers from simultaneously serving in Congress.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Framers of the Constitution understood the Incompatibility Clause primarily as an anti-corruption device. Painfully familiar with the system of \u201croyal influence,\u201d whereby the English kings had \u201cpurchased\u201d the loyalty of members of Parliament with appointment to lucrative offices, the Framers sought to limit the corrupting effect of patronage and plural office holding in the new Republic. Drawing on examples provided by the bans on plural office holding contained in contemporaneous state constitutions and in the Articles of Confederation, the Framers crafted a ban on dual office holding, which Alexander Hamilton described in \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 76 as an important guard \u201cagainst the danger of executive influence upon the legislative body.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIt is easy, in modern times, to underestimate the importance of the Incompatibility Clause. There has been very little litigation involving its meaning, perhaps because its commands are relatively clear. Yet the clause serves a vital function in the American system of separated powers. By preventing joint legislative and executive office holding, the clause forecloses any possibility of parliamentary government in America, and thus preserves a hallmark of American constitutional government: the independence of the executive and the Congress.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBeyond this vital structural function, what is perhaps most interesting about the clause is what it does not, by its terms, prohibit. Neither the clause itself nor any other constitutional provision expressly prohibits joint service in the federal executive and judiciary, or joint service in federal and state office. The latter issue is largely handled as a matter of state constitutional law, which generally forbids most forms of dual federal\u2013state office holding. As for the question of simultaneous service in federal executive and judicial offices, the constitutionality of the practice might be suggested not only by the lack of a textual prohibition, but by a few prominent examples of such service in the early days of the Republic, such the simultaneous service of Chief Justices John Jay, Oliver Ellsworth, and John Marshall in judicial and executive posts. Nonetheless, examples of joint service in the executive and the judiciary have been rare in American history, and a strong tradition has developed disfavoring the practice. Moreover, some might argue that general separation of powers principles render the practice constitutionally suspect.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhat little litigation the clause has generated has centered on two questions: its justiciability and its application to service by Members of Congress in the military reserves. In \u003Ci\u003ESchlesinger\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ev. Reservists Committee to Stop the War \u003C\/i\u003E(1974), the\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ESupreme Court held that citizens who had filed a civil action to challenge the reserve membership of some Members of Congress were asserting only \u201cgeneralized grievances about the conduct of government\u201d and therefore lacked standing to sue.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ci\u003ESchlesinger \u003C\/i\u003Edid not, however, decide that the\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EIncompatibility Clause could never be enforced in court. Instead, one might read the case to leave open the possibility of judicial enforcement if a sitting Member of Congress who was also an Officer of the United States were to take official action that adversely affected an individualized private interest. On this view, it was only the plaintiff\u2019s lack of a sufficiently concrete and particularized injury that led to the result in \u003Ci\u003ESchlesinger\u003C\/i\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Lane\u003C\/i\u003E (2006), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces adopted this view. \u003Ci\u003ELane\u003C\/i\u003E was an appeal of a recusal motion filed by an airman who had been convicted by court martial of a cocaine offense. Senator Lindsay Graham, a lieutenant colonel in the Air Force Reserves, sat on the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals that reviewed the airman\u2019s conviction. The airman filed a motion to recuse Senator Graham on the ground that his service on the court violated the Incompatibility Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EApplying Article III standing principles, the Armed Forces Court of Appeals held that the airman had standing. The court reasoned that the \u201cfact that a Member of Congress sat as a judge in this criminal case\u201d carried \u201cdirect liberty implications\u201d for the airman that distinguished his case \u201cfrom other abstract circumstances where the Incompatibility Clause might be implicated.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe court in \u003Ci\u003ELane\u003C\/i\u003E also rejected a theory under which the Incompatibility Clause would always be nonjusticiable, no matter who the plaintiff. On this theory, compliance with the clause is only a condition for service in Congress, not a disqualification from service in the other branches; and enforcement of this condition rests with Congress alone. This was the litigating position of the United States in \u003Ci\u003ESchlesinger.\u003C\/i\u003E Brief of Petitioner, \u003Ci\u003ESchlesinger\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ev. Reservists Committee to Stop the War \u003C\/i\u003E(1974). The\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EOffice of Legal Counsel has also endorsed this view. 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 242 (1977) (\u201cexclusive responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the Incompatibility Clause rests with Congress\u201d).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough the United States advanced this \u201ccongressional commitment\u201d theory in \u003Ci\u003ELane,\u003C\/i\u003E the court was not persuaded. The court noted that if the government\u2019s position were accepted, \u201cMembers of Congress could serve as the heads of departments and regulatory agencies, simultaneously participating in the passage of legislation and in the execution of the laws\u201d and yet \u201cno citizen could cite the Incompatibility Clause in challenging a governmental decision bearing directly on the life, liberty, or property of the citizen.\u201d In other words, the court believed that leaving the clause to congressional enforcement alone posed too great a risk that the clause would go under-enforced.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOn the merits, the court in \u003Ci\u003ELane\u003C\/i\u003E held that the position of judge on the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals is an \u201coffice of the United States and cannot be filled by a person who simultaneously serves as a Member of Congress.\u201d The Court therefore concluded that the review panel was not properly constituted, invalidated the prior proceedings, and returned the trial record for a new review proceeding.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Joan_Larsen.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/web.law.umich.edu\/_facultybiopage\/facultybiopagenew.asp?ID=95\u0022\u003EJoan L. Larsen\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Counsel to the Associate Dean for Student and Graduate Activities, University of Michigan Law School\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000028-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000028-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000028-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000028-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMembers of Congress Holding Reserve Commissions, 1 Op. O.L.C. 242 (1977)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESteven G. Calabresi \u0026amp; Joan L. Larsen, \u003Ci\u003EOne Person, One\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EOffice: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?\u003C\/i\u003E, 79\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ECORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1994)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDaniel H. Pollitt, \u003Ci\u003ESenator\/Attorney-General Saxbe and\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ethe \u201cIneligibility Clause\u201d of the Constitution: An Encroachment upon the Separation of Powers\u003C\/i\u003E, 53\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EN.C. L. REV. 111 (1974)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ESaikrishna Bangalore Prakash, \u003Ci\u003EWhy the Incompatibility\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EClause Applies to the Office of the President\u003C\/i\u003E, 4\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EDUKE\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EJ. CONST. L. \u0026amp; PUB. POL\u2019Y 143 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EDavid J. Shaw, \u003Ci\u003EAn Officer and a Congressman: The\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EUnconstitutionality of Congressmen in the Armed Forces Reserve\u003C\/i\u003E, 97\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EGEO. L.J.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E1739 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ESeth Barrett Tillman, \u003Ci\u003EWhy Our Next President May\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EKeep His or Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution\u2019s Incompatibility Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 4\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EDUKE J.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ECONST. L. \u0026amp; PUB. POL\u2019Y 107 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ESeth Barrett Tillman \u0026amp; Steven G. Calabresi, \u003Ci\u003EThe Great\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EDivorce: The Current Understanding of Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of the Incompatibility Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 134 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERussell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000028-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESchlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) No. 72-1188\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Lane, 64 M.J.1 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000028-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000004\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EQualifications for Representatives\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000013\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EQualifications for Senators\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000027\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESinecure Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000078\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPresidential Electors\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000081\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPresidential Eligibility\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000172\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EDisqualification for Rebellion\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]