[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000026","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/27\/speech-and-debate-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ESpeech and Debate Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 6, Clause 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E...for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe right of legislators to speak their minds\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ewith impunity while engaged in legislative work was acknowledged by the British Bill of Rights of 1689, written into the Articles of Confederation, and, after the Revolution, guaranteed by state constitutions as well as by the Speech and Debate Clause. James Wilson, one of the principal architects of the Constitution, explained in his \u003Ci\u003ELecture\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Eon Law \u003C\/i\u003E(1791) the purpose of the clause:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003EIn order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to discharge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn his \u003Ci\u003ECommentaries on the Constitution\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Eof the United States \u003C\/i\u003E(1833), Justice Joseph Story\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ewrote that in England the privilege was \u201cstrictly confined to things done in the course of parliamentary proceedings, and [did] not cover things done beyond the place and limits of duty.\u201d To illustrate this limitation, he noted that although a libelous speech delivered in the House of Commons was privileged, if a Member republished that speech elsewhere, the libeled party was free to bring him to court. He then added that \u201cthe same principles seem applicable to the privilege of debate and speech in congress.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough the only early case to deal with the privilege was concerned with a virtually identical provision of a state constitution, rather than the Speech and Debate Clause itself, the Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed that the privilege was limited to actions taken by a legislator \u201cin the exercise of the functions of [his] office.\u201d \u003Ci\u003ECoffin v. Coffin\u003C\/i\u003E (1808). This view of the scope of the privilege is consistent with that of another delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinckney, who later observed in remarks in the U.S. Senate that the Framers \u201cknew that in free countries very few privileges were necessary for the undisturbed exercise of legislative duties\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009they therefore not only intended, but did confine their privileges within the narrow limits mentioned in the Constitution.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOver the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the purpose of the clause is to protect the independence of Congress when exercising the legislative responsibilities assigned to it by the Constitution, \u003Ci\u003EEastland\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ev. United States Servicemen\u2019s Fund \u003C\/i\u003E(1975); and it\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ewill interpret the clause broadly to that effect. \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Johnson \u003C\/i\u003E(1966). The Court has\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ealso consistently limited its application to activities that are \u201cclearly a part of the legislative process.\u201d \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Brewster\u003C\/i\u003E (1972).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAn activity is deemed to be within the legislative sphere only if it is \u201can integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and\u0026nbsp;House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.\u201d \u003Ci\u003EGravel v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E (1972). Thus, the Court has held that the clause protects such acts as voting, the conduct of committee hearings, the issuance and distribution of committee reports, the subpoenaing of information required in the course of congressional investigations, and even the reading of stolen classified materials into a subcommittee\u2019s public record. \u003Ci\u003EDoe v. McMillan \u003C\/i\u003E(1973). Conversely, speech and\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Edebate immunity will not protect Members engaged (even in their official capacities) in such non-legislative activities as negotiations with federal agencies, the issuance of press releases and newsletters, and the delivery of speeches in their home districts. \u003Ci\u003EGravel v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E; \u003Ci\u003EHutchinson v. Proxmire \u003C\/i\u003E(1979).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIf a Member\u2019s actions meet the \u201clegislative process\u201d test, his immunity is absolute; and that is so even if he has acted contrary to law. Accordingly, although the government may prosecute a Member for a criminal act, such as accepting a bribe in exchange for a vote, it may not pursue the case if proof of the crime \u201cdepend[s] on his legislative acts or his motive for performing them.\u201d \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Brewster\u003C\/i\u003E. Thus, the government may not prove that the Member voted a particular way on the House floor in exchange for a bribe; the government, however, may prove (by other means) that the Member \u003Ci\u003Epromised\u003C\/i\u003E to vote a particular way in exchange for the bribe. The former (the vote) requires proof of what happened on the House floor whereas the latter (the promise to vote) does not.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EMembers must be shielded not only from the consequences of litigation, but from its burdens because engagement in litigation of any kind \u201ccreates a distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks.\u201d \u003Ci\u003EEastland v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EServicemen\u2019s Fund\u003C\/i\u003E. Consequently, a Member\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Emay immediately appeal a trial court\u2019s denial of a Member\u2019s motion to dismiss a case based on a claim of speech and debate immunity so that the Member may be spared the burden of a trial if his motion proves to be valid. \u003Ci\u003EHelstoski v. Meanor \u003C\/i\u003E(1979). Circuit courts are divided on\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ethe extent of the distraction that is prohibited by the clause. The District of Columbia Circuit put a stop to the FBI\u2019s non-consensual search of a Member\u2019s files containing legislative and non-legislative materials because such a search will \u201cdisrupt the legislative process\u201d irrespective of the use to which such documents may be put. \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg\u003C\/i\u003E. (2007). The Ninth Circuit disagrees, however, and it has ruled that the clause permits such searches. \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Renzi\u003C\/i\u003E (2011).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA circuit split also exists with respect to informally gathered information, such as that secured in meetings with constituents. The Tenth Circuit holds that such information is unprotected because it is not gathered \u201cin the course of a formal committee action.\u201d \u003Ci\u003EBastien v. Office of\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ECampbell \u003C\/i\u003E(2004). The Third and Ninth Circuits,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ehowever, conclude that such fact-finding is essential to the legislative process and therefore it is covered by the clause. \u003Ci\u003EGov\u2019t of Virgin Islands v. Lee\u003C\/i\u003E (1985); \u003Ci\u003EMiller v. Transamerican Press, Inc\u003C\/i\u003E. (1983). The Ninth Circuit notes in \u003Ci\u003ERenzi\u003C\/i\u003E that the clause\u2019s protection does not apply where the fact-finding involves criminal activities.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe limitations on the protections accorded Members of Congress by the Speech and Debate Clause prompted one Member also to assert the much broader privilege of \u201cqualified immunity\u201d from a common law defamation suit for activities he engaged in \u201cwithin the scope\u201d of his legislative duties. The D.C. Circuit, however, declined to accord Members of Congress the same kind of immunity for official acts as is enjoyed by members of the executive branch. \u003Ci\u003EChastain v. Sundquist \u003C\/i\u003E(1987).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough the Speech and Debate Clause speaks only of \u201cSenators and Representatives,\u201d in order to effect its purpose the Court in \u003Ci\u003EGravel\u003C\/i\u003E declared that it applies \u201cnot only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself.\u201d An aide who carries out congressional instructions that are found to be unlawful, however, is responsible for his acts even though the legislators who issued the instructions continue to be protected. \u003Ci\u003EPowell\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ev. McCormack \u003C\/i\u003E(1969);\u003Ci\u003E Doe v. McMillan\u003C\/i\u003E.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Ci\u003EEastland\u003C\/i\u003E, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the clause may shield Members from civil or criminal liability \u201ceven though their conduct, if performed in other than legislative contexts, would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes.\u201d The risk of such abuse, however, \u201cwas the conscious choice of the Framers\u2019 buttressed and justified by history.\u201d While state legislators may receive similar protection under state constitutions or common law, the clause does not protect them from prosecution for the commission of federal crimes. \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Gillock\u003C\/i\u003E (1980). Errant Members nevertheless remain subject to disciplinary action by their respective houses for \u201cdisorderly behavior\u201d\u2014and, of course, by their constituents on election day.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/James_Buckley.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.jameslbuckley.com\/home.asp\u0022\u003EJames L. Buckley\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000026-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000026-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000026-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000026-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E2 THE FOUNDERS\u2019 CONSTITUTION 318\u201345 (Philip P. Kurland \u0026amp; Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003E2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA \u0026amp; JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE \u00a7\u00a78.6 TO 8.9 (5th ed. 2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000026-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECoffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPowell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDoe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEastland v. United States Servicemen\u2019s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHelstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMiller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1983)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EGov\u2019t of Virgin Islands v. Lee, 775 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1985)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EChastain v. Sundquist, 833 F. 2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBastien v. Office of Campbell, 390 F.3d 1301 (10th\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px\u0022\u003ECir. 2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EUnited States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg, 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000026-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000001\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ELegislative Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000021\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EExpulsion Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]