[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000021","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/22\/rules-and-expulsion-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EExpulsion Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 5, Clause 2\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEach House may ... punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAlthough the original proposal to give each\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ehouse of Congress the power to expel lacked a supermajority requirement, James Madison, pointing out the danger that a majority faction could abuse its power by expelling Members of the minority, successfully moved to insert the two-thirds rule. Unlike the exclusion power of Article I, Section 5, Clause 1, there are no judicially enforceable constitutional standards limiting the use of the expulsion power other than the supermajority requirement. \u003Ci\u003EIn re Chapman\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/i\u003E(1897). Moreover, the courts generally regard disputes arising from the procedural rules of Congress as nonjusticiable (not amenable to judicial review), unless Congress \u201cignores constitutional restraints or violates fundamental rights.\u201d \u003Ci\u003EUnited\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EStates v. Ballin \u003C\/i\u003E(1892).\u003Ci\u003E Powell v. McCormack \u003C\/i\u003E(1969), for example, assumed that the case would be nonjusticiable if two-thirds of the House had \u201cexpelled\u201d Congressman Adam Clayton Powell instead of \u201cexcluding\u201d him.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Expulsion Clause stands as the analog to the impeachment clauses. It is the only constitutional mechanism by which a sitting Member of Congress can be removed from office. Alexander Hamilton assumed that Members of the legislature could be impeached, and some comments in the ratifying conventions presumed the same. Some scholarly commentary suggest that the various ways in which the Constitution refers to the term \u201cofficer\u201d may indicate that Members of the legislature could be impeached, but historical practice has been to the contrary. In 1797, the Senate expelled William Blount, but it later refused to convict him on a bill of impeachment because it concluded that there was a lack of jurisdiction. Subsequent interpretation of the Senate\u2019s action, supported in particular by Justice Joseph Story, has found the Senate\u2019s action dispositive: Members of Congress may be expelled by their own respective body, but they cannot be impeached. Story\u2019s position is supported at least in part by the text of the Constitution. The existence of the specific removal provisions for Members of Congress negates any inference that impeachment exists as an alternative removal mechanism.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESince 1789, the Senate has had nine expulsion proceedings out of which fifteen Senators were expelled, most of them early in the Civil War on grounds of supporting the rebellion. The House has also proceeded against twenty-nine of its Members but has expelled only five, two for corruption and three for supporting the rebellion.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EMore frequent have been instances when each house has punished its respective Members by a simple majority. Punishments have included censure (or the somewhat lesser \u201cdenouncement\u201d), reprimand, loss of seniority, removal from committee or subcommittee chairmanship, and fine. Each house sets its own procedures for punishments less than expulsion. Conviction is by a simple majority. There have been a total of nine Senators and twenty-three House members censured. Censure in the House is more formal. The censured Member must rise while the Speaker reads aloud the actions for which he is being rebuked. In addition, when a Member of Congress is convicted of a crime, he is expected to refrain from voting unless and until his conviction is overturned or he is reelected.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOne important recent development is the establishment of the Office of Congressional Ethics, an internal entity charged with reviewing allegations of misconduct and recommending action to the House Ethics Committee. The Senate has not taken similar action.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/David_Forte.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/facultyprofile.csuohio.edu\/csufacultyprofile\/detail.cfm?FacultyID=D_FORTE\u0022\u003EDavid F. Forte\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000021-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000021-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000021-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000021-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EIttai Bar-Siman-Tov, \u003Ci\u003ELawmakers as Lawbreakers\u003C\/i\u003E, 52 WM. \u0026amp; MARY L. REV. 805 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EANNE M. BUTLER \u0026amp; WENDY WOLFF, UNITED STATES SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION, AND CENSURE CASES, 1793\u20131990 (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJosh Chafetz, \u003Ci\u003ELeaving the House: The Constitutional\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EStatus of Resignation from the House of Representatives\u003C\/i\u003E, 58\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EDUKE L. J.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E177 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJosh Chafetz, \u003Ci\u003ECongress\u2019s Constitution\u003C\/i\u003E, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELaura Krugman Ray, \u003Ci\u003EDiscipline Through Delegation:\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ESolving the Problem of Congressional Housecleaning\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E55 U\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJohn C. Roberts, \u003Ci\u003EAre Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process\u003C\/i\u003E, 52\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ECASE W. RES. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E489 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERonald D. Rotunda, \u003Ci\u003EAn Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment\u003C\/i\u003E, 76\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EKY. L.J. 707(1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000021-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ci\u003EIn re \u003C\/i\u003EChapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPowell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000021-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000020\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EQualifications and Quorum\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]