[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000018","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/19\/election-regulations\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EElection Regulations\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 4, Clause 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe purpose of this provision of the Constitution was twofold. First, it made clear the division of responsibility with respect to the conduct of the election of federal Senators and Representatives. That responsibility lay primarily with the states and secondarily with Congress. Second, the clause lodged the power to regulate elections in the respective legislative branches of the states and the federal government, not with the executive or judicial branches.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOpponents to the Constitution hotly contested the clause during the ratification debates. The concern of the Anti-Federalists was that the default prerogatives to Congress would result in Members of Congress manipulating election laws so that they could stay in office indefinitely. Alternatively, Congress might alter the times and places of elections so as to make it extremely difficult to vote, undermining the franchise. On the other hand, defenders of the clause argued that if Congress did not retain residual power to control federal elections, state officials might effectively destroy Congress by failing to make rules for the election of its Members. As Alexander Hamilton remarked in \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 59, \u201cevery government ought to contain within itself the means of its own preservation.\u201d Hamilton argued that the provision was a reasonable compromise that gave Congress default powers that would be exercised \u201cwhenever extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition necessary to its safety.\u201d In addition, the fact that Congress as a whole, and not any single house of Congress, was authorized to make or alter regulations under the clause meant that a national consensus between the people\u2019s or \u201cdemocratic\u201d branch of the legislature and the Senate, representing the states, would have to take place before any changes could occur.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Framers of the Constitution drew upon British precedents and state practices in their understanding of what constituted the \u201cTimes, Places and Manner of holding Elections,\u201d but in a more precise way. British and state practice had subsumed the qualifications of electors and candidates, and the times and places of elections, in the phrase \u201cmanner of elections.\u201d The Framers, on the other hand, thought the elements of elections should be more particularly delineated. As Hamilton\u2019s discussion in \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E Nos. 59\u201361 made clear, the \u201cTimes, Places and Manner\u201d provisions of the Election Regulations Clause were to be taken literally. They referred to states having the primary power of determining the dates, the locations, and the conditions under which elections for federal Senators and Representatives would be held. Congress had only a secondary power in this regard and had no power to alter the location states chose for selecting Senators. This last, James Madison argued at the Constitutional Convention, was reserved to the state legislatures, which alone had the sovereign right to determine where to convene to elect Senators.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EHowever, there were some additional restrictions. In response to the complaint that the federal government might attempt to manipulate the places elections took place to benefit \u201cthe wealthy and the well-born,\u201d Hamilton remarked in \u003Ci\u003EThe\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EFederalist \u003C\/i\u003ENo. 60 that securing the rich such a\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Epreference could only be done by \u201cprescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the \u003Ci\u003Etimes\u003C\/i\u003E, the \u003Ci\u003Eplaces\u003C\/i\u003E, and the \u003Ci\u003Emanner\u003C\/i\u003E of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESince ratification of the Constitution, there have been many legal developments that have altered the provisions of Article I, Section 4, the most significant of which came after the Civil War. The Fifteenth Amendment (1870) prohibited voter discrimination on the basis of race. The Enforcement Act of 1870 had some beneficial effect in curbing the abuse of the electoral process, particularly in the South, but with its evisceration in \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Reese\u003C\/i\u003E (1875) and \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Cruikshank \u003C\/i\u003E(1876), Southern\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Estates were able effectively to disenfranchise black citizens.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Voting Rights Act of 1965 resurrected tough legal prohibitions on racial discrimination in voting and transformed Southern politics and American politics in the process. The most important and controversial of the act\u2019s original provisions, Sections 4 and 5, required states predominantly in the South (covered by Section 4) to seek \u201cpreclearance\u201d (under Section 5 from the federal Department of Justice or U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for any new voting practices or procedures postdating November 1, 1964. The constitutionality of these provisions was upheld in \u003Ci\u003ESouth Carolina v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EKatzenbach \u003C\/i\u003E(1966). The 1970 Voting Rights Act\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eproposed to reduce the voting age in national, state, and local elections to eighteen. In \u003Ci\u003EOregon v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EMitchell \u003C\/i\u003E(1970), the Court upheld this provision\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eas it applied to national elections but disallowed it as it applied to state and local elections. The Twenty-sixth Amendment effectively overruled this latter holding. The scope of the Voting Rights Act\u2019s coverage has increased over the decades and continues to impose significant constraints on states covered by the act, particularly when it comes to redistricting.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn addition to statutory constraints, Congress and the people have altered the electoral process through the amending process. The Seventeenth Amendment altered the manner of conducting the elections of Senators by requiring their popular election. The Nineteenth Amendment prohibited voter discrimination on the basis of sex. The Twenty-fourth Amendment prohibited poll taxes in federal elections, and as mentioned above, the Twenty-sixth Amendment gave eighteen-year-olds the right to vote.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EDespite Alexander Hamilton\u2019s assurance that Congress would regulate elections only in \u201cextraordinary circumstances,\u201d congressional intervention has been significant. In 1842, Congress required the election of Members of the House of Representatives by district. Repealed in 1929, the single-Member district rule was restored by Congress in 1967. Also, until 1929 Congress required that each district\u2019s territory be compact and contiguous with substantially the same number of inhabitants. \u003Ci\u003EWood v. Broom\u003C\/i\u003E (1932).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn recent decades, the Supreme Court has stepped into the electoral process. In \u003Ci\u003EWesberry v\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/i\u003E\u003Ci\u003ESanders \u003C\/i\u003E(1964), the Supreme Court determined\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ethat, despite congressional practice, Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 mandated that the \u201cone person, one vote\u201d formula be applied to each congressional district. Critics of the Court\u2019s decision have noted that it ignored the language of Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, which appeared to leave questions of reapportionment and redistricting to the legislative, not judicial, branch of government. Under the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Equal Protection Clause, the Court has also indicated that gerrymandered districts can be an indication of an unconstitutional, racially motivated redistricting plan. \u003Ci\u003EShaw v. Reno\u003C\/i\u003E (1993). However, the Court has not yet required, as a constitutional matter, that districts be compact and contiguous. \u003Ci\u003EShaw v. Reno \u003C\/i\u003Eand\u003Ci\u003E Miller v. Johnson \u003C\/i\u003E(1995) also\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ehighlighted the potential conflict between the demands of the Voting Rights Act for the creation of \u201csafe minority seats\u201d and the constitutional prohibition on redistricting in which race is the predominant factor motivating the redistricting. The passage of the 2006 Voting Rights Act has raised the further constitutional question of whether jurisdictions covered by Section 5 of the act should still have to seek preclearance from the federal Department of Justice for changes to their electoral practices, which the 2006 Voting Rights Act extended through 2031.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBeginning with the Tillman Act in 1907, Congress has imposed a growing number of restrictions on elections and campaign financing. The most significant piece of legislation has been the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act, amended in 1974. It was this legislation that was at issue in the Supreme Court\u2019s seminal decision, \u003Ci\u003EBuckley v. Valeo\u003C\/i\u003E (1976), which, in the face of a First Amendment challenge, set the ground rules for campaign finance legislation, generally disallowing restrictions on expenditures by candidates, but permitting restrictions on contributions by individuals and corporations. The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, which amended FECA, sought to impose further restrictions on \u201csoft money\u201d contributions and electioneering communications, such as issue advertisements by corporations and unions, but these latter provisions were deemed unconstitutional restrictions on political speech in \u003Ci\u003ECitizens United v. Federal Election Commission\u003C\/i\u003E (2010).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/politicalscience.usu.edu\/anthonypeacock.aspx\u0022\u003EAnthony Peacock\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Department of Political Science, Utah State University\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000018-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000018-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000018-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000018-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWard E.Y. Elliott, The Rise of Guardian Democracy: The Supreme Court\u0027s Role in Voting Rights Disputes, 1845\u20131969 (1974)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ERobert G. Natelson, \u003Ci\u003EThe Original Scope of the Con-gressional Power to Regulate Elections\u003C\/i\u003E, 13\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EU. PA. J.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ECONST. L. 1 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAnthony A. Peacock, ed., Affirmative Action and Representation: Shaw v. Reno and the Future of Voting Rights (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EBRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000018-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESmith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESouth Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPowell v. McCormack, 349 U.S. 486 (1969)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBeer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKarcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EShaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMiller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EUnited States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGeorgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMcConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ELeague of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ENorthwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ECitizens United v. Federal Elections Comm\u2019n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000018-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000003\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EElector Qualifications\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000004\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EQualifications for Representatives\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000013\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EQualifications for Senators\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000020\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EQualifications and Quorum\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000078\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPresidential Electors\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000170\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EEqual Protection\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000175\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESuffrage\u2014Race\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000177\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPopular Election of Senators\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000180\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESuffrage\u2014Sex\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000185\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPoll Taxes\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000187\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESuffrage\u2014Age\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]