[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000010","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/11\/impeachment\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EImpeachment\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 2, Clause 5\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe House of Representatives...shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn the debates in the Constitutional Convention, the delegates were attempting to craft a mechanism that would allow for the disciplining of a President who abused his constitutional responsibilities without creating a weapon by which the President would be prevented from carrying them out. At bottom, it was a question of how to refine and make effective the separation of powers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003EArticle II, Section 4 states that the President, Vice President, and \u201call civil Officers of the United States\u201d\u2014which includes judges\u2014can be impeached. Members of Congress can be expelled by their own respective body. (\u003Ci\u003ESee\u003C\/i\u003E Article I, Section 5, Clause 2.)\n\n\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEarly on, some delegates expressed the apprehension that those serving in the federal government would be disinclined to monitor each other. Accordingly, John Dickinson proposed \u201cthat the Executive be made removeable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of individual States.\u201d James Madison opposed the idea because it would subject the executive to the \u201cintrigues\u201d of the states. After defeating Dickinson\u2019s proposal, the members of the Convention also turned aside George Mason\u2019s and Gouverneur Morris\u2019s initial fears that the impeachment power might render the executive the servant of the legislature. Instead, the Framers opted for the procedure that had been followed by the English and by the constitutions of most of the states. The appropriate place of bringing charges of impeachment, which power is analogous to the bringing of criminal charges by a grand jury, is in the lower house of the legislature. Just as the grand and petit juries are popular institutions, so it made sense to have the branch closest to the people charged with this indictment-like power.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Constitution does not specify how impeachment proceedings are to be initiated. Early in our history, a Member would rise on the floor of Congress and propose an impeachment, which would then be assigned to a committee. In recent years, Members of the House Judiciary Committee have initiated the proceeding and then made recommendations for the whole House\u2019s consideration. If the House votes an impeachment resolution, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee recommends a slate of \u201cmanagers,\u201d whom the House subsequently approves by resolution, and who then become prosecutors in the trial in the Senate.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFor a time there was legislation enabling the Attorney General to appoint a \u201cspecial prosecutor\u201d with the power to recommend impeachments to Congress, but dissatisfaction with the power of such an unchecked independent counsel led to the expiration of the authorizing statute. Even the most famous \u201cindependent counsel,\u201d Judge Kenneth Starr, who recommended the impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton to Congress, had consistently argued against the practice of appointing such independent counsels.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere have not been many instances of impeachment over the years\u2014a few dozen in all, mostly of corrupt federal judges. The most notable impeachments\u2014Justice Samuel Chase, and Presidents Andrew Johnson and William Jefferson Clinton\u2014have ended in acquittals by the Senate. There were proceedings and hearings at the House Judiciary Committee and a bill of impeachment reported to the House against President Richard M. Nixon. Nixon resigned before the full House could vote on the impeachment charges against him.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe near-unanimous view of constitutional commentators is that the House of Representatives\u2019 \u201csole power\u201d of impeachment is a political question and therefore not reviewable by the judiciary. The House is constitutionally obligated to base a bill of impeachment on the standards set out in Article II. (\u003Ci\u003ESee\u003C\/i\u003E Article II, Section 4.) However, the fact that the Constitution\u2019s text grants the House the \u201csole power,\u201d and the fact that such a review is not clearly within the Article III power of the federal judiciary, indicate that this responsibility is the House\u2019s alone. The Supreme Court has found that the Senate\u2019s \u201csole power\u201d to try impeachments is not justiciable. \u003Ci\u003ENixon v. United\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EStates \u003C\/i\u003E(1993).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThat leaves the question of whether the clause imposes an affirmative duty on the House to monitor the conduct of those subject to impeachment, and, when evidence of impeachable offenses is manifest, to initiate proceedings. It has been the general American practice regarding criminal law to grant considerable discretion to prosecutors, so that by analogy one could argue that the House has complete discretion to decide whether to initiate impeachment proceedings. On the other hand, Alexander Hamilton argued in \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 77 that the nation would find \u201crepublican\u201d safety from a presidential abuse of power by the mode of his election and by his \u201cbeing at all times liable to impeachment.\u201d There is no doubt that the Framers saw impeachment as a part of the system of checks and balances to maintain the separation of powers and the republican form of government. The implication is that when the President (or other impeachable official) has committed an impeachable offense, the Members of the House, bound by the oaths they take to uphold the Constitution, are under a particular obligation to deal with the miscreant\u2019s offenses, irrespective of whether their bill of impeachment may or may not lead to a conviction in the Senate.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Stephen_Presser.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.law.northwestern.edu\/faculty\/profiles\/stephenpresser\/\u0022\u003EStephen B. Presser\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000010-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000010-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000010-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000010-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis (2d ed. 2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael J. Gerhardt, \u003Ci\u003ERediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeachments after Nixon\u003C\/i\u003E, 44 Duke L.J. 231 (1994)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStephen B. Presser, \u003Ci\u003EWould George Washington Have Wanted Bill Clinton Impeached?\u003C\/i\u003E, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 666 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERonald D. Rotunda, \u003Ci\u003EAn Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment\u003C\/i\u003E, 76 Ky. L. Rev. 707 (1988)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJonathan Turley, \u003Ci\u003ECongress as Grand Jury: The Role of the House of Representatives in the Impeachment of an American President\u003C\/i\u003E, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 735 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000010-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000010-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000016\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ETrial of Impeachment\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000017\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPunishment for Impeachment\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000021\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EExpulsion Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000099\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EStandards for Impeachment\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]