[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000007","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/8\/allocation-of-representatives\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EAllocation of Representatives\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 2, Clause 3\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn Philadelphia, the Framers spent untold\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ehours discussing the basis of representation for the new government and then fell to haggling over the number of Representatives to be elected from each state for the House of Representatives. A majority of delegations set the initial size of the House at a modest sixty-five Members, defeating James Madison\u2019s wish to have it doubled. They wished to leave Congress the flexibility to set numbers in the future, making sure that Congress would not allow for more than one Representative for every 30,000 persons, a last-minute modification of the original floor of 40,000 persons.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAt the ratifying conventions, the Anti-Federalists were extremely exercised over the clause. George Mason, for example, inveighed against the small number of Representatives during the debates at the Virginia ratifying convention. James Madison accurately summarized their objections in \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 55:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003E[F]irst, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents; thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression of the many; fourthly, that defective as the number will be in the first instance, it will be more disproportionate, by the increase of the people, and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent increase of the representatives.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EMadison spent much time rebutting these objections. \u201cNothing can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles,\u201d he declared. He assured his audience that Congress would increase the number of Representatives as the population grew; that the Senate would not stand in the way; that there was more danger in a cabal of the few forming in a large assembly than in a small one; that there were sufficient checks against corruption within the Constitution; and that Representatives needed knowledge only over subjects they could legislate upon, namely, commerce, taxation, and the militia.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBehind the debate between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists lay different understandings of the future course of American republicanism. The Anti-Federalists did not believe that the country could grow and still remain republican, a proposition rebutted in Madison\u2019s classic argument in \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 10. At the Constitutional Convention, Madison resisted any built-in increase to the numbers of Representatives, arguing that population growth would \u201crender the number of Representatives excessive.\u201d Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts responded, \u201cIt is not to be supposed that the Gov\u2019t will last so long as to produce this effect. Can it be supposed that this vast Country including the Western territory will 150 years hence remain one nation?\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn response to Anti-Federalist objections, Congress sent twelve amendments to the states for ratification, the first of which changed the method of calculating the number of Representatives. Instead of there being no more than one Representative for 30,000 people, the amendment would have required at least one Representative for 30,000, or later, 40,000 and 50,000 as the population grew. But the amendment failed to achieve ratification, the only one of the original twelve never to have been approved by the states. The Federalist vision of the Union prevailed.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIt was not clear whether the Allocation of Representatives Clause required the \u003Ci\u003Enational average \u003C\/i\u003Edistrict population to be not less than 30,000,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eor whether a state\u2019s average district population had to be at least that number. Interestingly, President George Washington vetoed Congress\u2019s first apportionment plan because eight states would have had average district populations of less than 30,000, which he thought in violation of this Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ETrue to Madison\u2019s prediction, Congress nonetheless dutifully increased the number of Representatives as the population grew. By 1833, Justice Joseph Story would write in his \u003Ci\u003ECommentaries on the Constitution of the United States \u003C\/i\u003Ethat\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ethe dire predictions of the Anti-Federalists \u201chave all vanished into air, into thin air.\u201d After the Civil War, Southern representation increased with the ending of slavery and the three-fifths rule. Congress, however, failed to enforce Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, written to compel the Southern states to enfranchise blacks or lose representation. Finally, in 1929, after being unable to make a reapportionment of seats among the states after the census of 1920, Congress decided to cap the number of Representatives at 435.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESince 1790, Congress has applied five different methods of apportioning Representatives among the states. The present \u201cHill Method,\u201d with its complex formula determining when a state may gain or lose a seat, has been in use since 1940. It has been twice challenged before the Supreme Court. In \u003Ci\u003EFranklin v. Massachusetts\u003C\/i\u003E (1992), the Court upheld the inclusion of federal military and civil personnel and their dependents in the apportioned populations. In \u003Ci\u003EUnited States Department of Commerce v. Montana \u003C\/i\u003E(1992), the Court\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eunanimously approved the \u201cHill Method\u201d in the face of a challenge by Montana, which had lost one seat in favor of Washington after the 1990 census.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the population for each Congressional district \u003Ci\u003Ewithin\u003C\/i\u003E each state must be the same, \u003Ci\u003EWesberry v. Sanders\u003C\/i\u003E (1964), populations of districts \u003Ci\u003Eamong\u003C\/i\u003E the states do not have to be. State average district populations vary considerably from the national average. For example, after the 2000 Census, Wyoming had an average district population that was 23.44 percent smaller than the national average while Montana\u2019s was 39.94 percent larger.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA federal court turned aside claims that, under this clause, allocating seats by voting age population, rather than numerical population, should be required. \u003Ci\u003EKalson v. Paterson\u003C\/i\u003E (2008). And the clause does not compel the government to treat Puerto Rico as a state for purposes ofm representation, for the clause only applies to actual states, not territories\u003Ci\u003E. Igart\u00faa v. U.S.\u003C\/i\u003E (2010).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/David_Forte.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/facultyprofile.csuohio.edu\/csufacultyprofile\/detail.cfm?FacultyID=D_FORTE\u0022\u003EDavid F. Forte\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000007-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000007-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000007-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000007-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDavid P. Currie, \u003Ci\u003EThe Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress 1791\u20131793\u003C\/i\u003E, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 606 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EPaul H. Edelman, \u003Ci\u003EGetting the Math Right, Why California Has Too Many Seats in the House of Representatives\u003C\/i\u003E, 59\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EVAND. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E297 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDavid B. Goldin, \u003Ci\u003ENumber Wars: A Decade of Census Litigation\u003C\/i\u003E, 32 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJeffrey W. Ladewig, \u003Ci\u003EOne Person, One Vote, 435 Seats:\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EInterstate Malapprortionment and Constitutional Requirements\u003C\/i\u003E, 43\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ECONN. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E1125 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000007-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFranklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIgart\u00faa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000007-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000002\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EHouse of Representatives\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000170\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EEqual Protection\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000171\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EApportionment of Representatives\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]