[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_veuEhhb1658wti0_ZAig66JOyixENU-N9zhjLQSLfOQ.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000001","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/2\/legislative-vesting-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ELegislative Vesting Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 1\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMuch of the greatness of the United States\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EConstitution can be attributed to the elegant pen of Gouverneur Morris, who, as leader of the Committee on Style, fashioned the text into a coherent and practical symmetry. Because of his writing, the document\u2019s first three articles lay out the structure of the separation of powers, each dealing with the powers of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary respectively.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe economical wording of the Legislative Vesting Clause performs three critical constitutional functions. First, it defines the Congress as \u201ca Senate and House of Representatives.\u201d Thus, when the Constitution elsewhere refers to \u201cCongress,\u201d as it frequently does, it refers to a specifically defined institution consisting of two subsidiary houses or \u201cbranches.\u201d In establishing two legislative chambers, the House and the Senate, the Framers paid heed to a requirement championed by the respected voice of Baron de Montesquieu, who opined that liberty could be preserved only if two branches of the legislature, chosen from different constituencies, could check each other. Similarly, in his influential \u003Ci\u003EThoughts\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Eon Government \u003C\/i\u003E(1776), John Adams declared that\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E\u201c[a] single assembly is liable to all the vices, follies, and frailties of an individual.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003EThe clause thus reflects a particular suspicion of what James Madison called the \u201cimpetuous vortex\u201d of the federal legislative power. As Alexander Hamilton explained in \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 22, unlike the Congress under the Articles of Confederation, the Congress under the Constitution would have such greater powers that it was necessary that it be divided for the sake of the people\u2019s safety. In \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 62, Madison agreed, stating that having a Senate \u201cdoubles the security to the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one, would otherwise be sufficient.\u201d\n\n\u003C\/p\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThus, no bill can become a law without the assent of both branches of Congress, which respond to different constituencies. In sum, the Legislative Vesting Clause represents a kind of separation of power of the legislative houses within a larger separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial institutions.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESecond, and more substantively, the trio of clauses that begin each of the first three Articles of the Constitution\u2014the Legislative Vesting Clause, the Executive Vesting Clause (Article II, Section 1, Clause 1), and the Judicial Vesting Clause (Article III, Section 1)\u2014allocates classes of governmental power to different, and differently selected and responsive, federal actors. The \u201cexecutive Power\u201d is vested in the President, the \u201cjudicial Power\u201d is vested in the life tenured federal courts, and \u201c[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted\u201d are vested in Congress. By vesting different classes of power in different institutions, the Constitution clearly contemplates that there are types of governmental powers that, as Madison put it in \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 48, \u201cmay in their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary.\u201d This is not to say, however, that one can neatly and easily place every particular exercise of governmental power into a legislative, executive, or judicial category. Indeed, Madison, in \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 37, wrote that \u201c[e]xperience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces\u2014the legislative, executive, and judiciary.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009. Questions daily occur in the course of practice\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.\u201d Moreover, according to Madison, some overlap is necessary to make the separation of powers work. The \u201cpartial agency\u201d of one branch in the workings of the others was essential. \u003Ci\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/i\u003E No. 47.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThird, all legislative powers that are granted are vested in Congress, but Congress is not vested with all legislative powers. Rather, the Constitution vests in Congress only those particular legislative powers \u201cherein granted\u201d and directs us to the other provisions in the Constitution to determine the precise content of the federal legislative power. The Legislative Vesting Clause thus does not itself serve as a font of powers, but rather functions as a designation of who must exercise the legislative powers granted elsewhere in the Constitution. Once a particular substantive power is properly labeled legislative (for example, the power over interstate commerce), then the Legislative Vesting Clause makes clear that it is Congress that is to exercise that particular power.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Constitution, however, does not directly circumscribe the line that separates legislative from executive or judicial power. If a law is so precise and unambiguous that it leaves nothing to the discretion of executive or judicial actors, then enforcement by the executive and application by the judiciary are mechanical tasks, and no one could complain that executive or judicial actors are somehow exercising legislative power vested exclusively in Congress. But few laws are or can be crafted so precisely. It is commonplace for executive and judicial actors to need to \u003Ci\u003Einterpret\u003C\/i\u003E enacted laws in the course of their duties. Indeed, some measure of discretion in the interpretation and application of laws is the essence of the executive and judicial powers. But can the formal exercise of executive or judicial interpretation ever become so extensive in shaping the meaning of a law that the executive or judicial actor in reality becomes the lawmaker?\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe scheme of American constitutional government requires answers to the question where the legislative power ends and the executive and judicial powers begin, but those answers have been, and remain, notoriously elusive. For example, is it possible for Congress to enact a law so vague that, in substance, it impermissibly allows executive or judicial actors to usurp the legislative function that is vested exclusively in Congress? Or is the only purely \u201clegislative\u201d power vested in Congress simply the power to enact a law through the processes required by Article I, Section 7, so that all acts of interpretation, even \u201cinterpretation\u201d of an utterly vacuous enactment, is a permissible exercise of executive or judicial power so long as it is performed by an executive or judicial actor? These are chief among those questions that \u201cpuzzle the greatest adepts in political science\u201d\u2014 both in the eighteenth century and today.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThere are some contexts in which the Constitution specifically enumerates a congressional power to designate subsidiary lawmakers. The Territories and Property Clauses (Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2), which gives Congress power to make \u201call needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,\u201d has long been construed to give Congress general governmental power over federal possessions, including the power to create territorial legislatures with independent law-making authority, and the same reasoning might allow Congress to designate executive officers as the effective authorities over federal property. Similarly, the Enclave Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 17) has long been understood to grant equivalent power with respect to the District of Columbia. Outside of those contexts that specifically authorize delegation of legislative authority to non-congressional lawmakers, however, the question whether law interpretation can ever impermissibly morph into law making looms large.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court\u2019s first major encounter with this question, which is often described as the question of \u003Ci\u003Elegislative delegation\u003C\/i\u003E, remains among its most instructive. \u003Ci\u003EWayman v. Southard\u003C\/i\u003E (1825) involved a challenge, as an impermissible delegation of legislative power, to a congressional statute authorizing federal courts to make changes to the rules for such matters as serving process and executing judgments. Congress\u2019s enumerated legislative power, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, surely allows it to make laws \u201cfor carrying into Execution\u201d the judicial power by specifying forms of process and the manner of execution of judgments. In a lengthy \u003Ci\u003Edictum\u003C\/i\u003E, Chief Justice\u0026nbsp;John Marshall, for a unanimous Court, noted that \u201c[i]t will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.\u201d But, as the Chief Justice also noted, some powers are not, in their nature, exclusively legislative. The fact that Congress could properly legislate in the area of \u003Ci\u003Ejudicial\u003C\/i\u003E procedure did not mean that the \u003Ci\u003Ecourts\u003C\/i\u003E could not exercise it as well. This point is crucial to an understanding of the Constitution\u2019s essential structure and to the lines drawn by the document among the various governmental powers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Constitution divides and allocates governmental \u003Ci\u003Epowers\u003C\/i\u003E, not governmental \u003Ci\u003Efunctions\u003C\/i\u003E or \u003Ci\u003Eactions\u003C\/i\u003E. There may be some \u003Ci\u003Eactions\u003C\/i\u003E\u2014such as the passage of a bill, the direction of troops in battle, or the entry of a criminal judgment\u2014that are uniquely the exercise of legislative, executive, or judicial \u003Ci\u003Epowers\u003C\/i\u003E, respectively. But other \u003Ci\u003Eactions \u003C\/i\u003Ecan easily fall within scope of more than\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eone of the three vested constitutional \u003Ci\u003Epowers\u003C\/i\u003E. For example, Congress has the \u003Ci\u003Epower\u003C\/i\u003E of establishing in law the right of persons to present claims against the government. But it can vest the \u003Ci\u003Eaction\u003C\/i\u003E of adjudicating those claims in the courts (as part of its judicial power of deciding cases), or in the executive branch (as part of its power to execute the laws faithfully), or in itself as part of its own legislative power by passing private bills for the relief of individuals. Thus, in terms of the actions that fall within them, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers are thus partially overlapping rather than mutually exclusive categories.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EChief Justice Marshall\u2019s point was that so long as the action in question falls within the power vested in the actor who performs it, it is constitutional even if could also have been performed by some other actor under that actor\u2019s vested power. Thus, reasoned the Court in \u003Ci\u003EWayman\u003C\/i\u003E, if the courts could promulgate rules of procedure under their \u201cjudicial Power,\u201d it would not constitute a delegation of legislative power for Congress to channel that power through a statute, even if the statute provided no clear guidelines. Because this discussion was \u003Ci\u003Edictum\u003C\/i\u003E, it was not necessary for the Court to determine precisely which procedural rules had to be fixed by Congress and which could be set by courts under a vague authorization from Congress; as Marshall noted, \u201cthere is some difficulty in discerning the exact limits within which the legislature may avail itself of the agency of its Courts\u201d in such matters. Similarly difficulty arises when Congress seeks to \u201cavail itself\u201d of the aid of the executive in implementing statutes, perhaps by having agencies pass regulations or conduct adjudications to fill out the meaning of a statute, as when the First Congress provided for the payment of military pensions \u201cunder such regulations as the President of the United States may direct\u201d and required licensed Indian traders to be governed \u201cby such rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe.\u201d Marshall explained that \u201c[t]he difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAs for how to resolve this \u201cdelicate and difficult inquiry\u201d when necessary, Marshall wrote: \u201cThe line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions, to fill up the details.\u201d Moreover, the line may well need to be drawn in different places depending upon the subject matter of the legislation; more vagueness, for example, may be permissible when Congress grants authority to the President in military or foreign affairs than in other areas.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ECourts and scholars have spent two centuries trying to improve upon, or avoid, Chief Justice Marshall\u2019s distinction between \u201cimportant\u201d matters and matters of \u201cless interest\u201d as the touchstone for determining the kind and quality of discretion that Congress can permissibly vest in executive or judicial actors without crossing the line into a delegation of legislative authority. It is unclear whether there has been improvement. The more common solution has been avoidance.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EUntil the New Deal, there were many cases raising challenges to statutes as delegations of legislative authority. In all of those cases the Court treated the challenges as constitutionally serious, but in only two did it find a statute unconstitutional. Most of those cases involved so called \u201cconditional legislation,\u201d in which the effective date or precise terms of a statute depended upon factual or policy determinations by executive actors, such as making tariffs or tariff rates dependent upon findings by the President about the activities of other countries. For example, in \u003Ci\u003EJ. W. Hampton, Jr.Co. v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EUnited States \u003C\/i\u003E(1928), the Court upheld a statute\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eauthorizing the President to adjust tariff rates to \u201cequalize the\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009costs of production\u201d in the United States and the exporting country. In oft-quoted language, the Court set out what remains the governing standard, noting that a statute vesting even very broad discretion in executive or judicial actors is constitutional if \u201cCongress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009is directed to conform.\u201d The Court found the principle of equalizing costs of production to be intelligible, and its application therefore an exercise of executive rather than legislative power, because such an allocation of responsibility between the President and Congress was consistent with \u201ccommon sense and the inherent necessities of\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009governmental coordination.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESeven years later, in \u003Ci\u003EPanama Refining Co. v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ERyan \u003C\/i\u003E(1935) and\u003Ci\u003E A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States \u003C\/i\u003E(1935), the Court found an absence\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eof \u201cintelligible principle[s]\u201d in two provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and for the first and only times in the nation\u2019s history found statutes to be unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority. The sheer scope of power over national affairs granted by the statute was unprecedented, and many scholars have speculated that this feature of the statute played a role in the decisions.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESince 1935, the Court has never invalidated a statute on delegation grounds. A possible exception is \u003Ci\u003EClinton v. New York\u003C\/i\u003E (1998), which held that when Congress gave the President a limited line-item veto power, it violated the Presentment Clause (Article I, Section 7, Clause 2). While the majority opinion did not expressly rely upon delegation concerns, those issues were extensively briefed, were invoked by three dissenting Justices who thought the statute easily constitutional on delegation grounds, and may have shaped somewhat the majority\u2019s Presentment Clause holding. But in all other assertions of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the Court has found validating \u201cintelligible principle[s]\u201d in statutes requiring agencies to determine \u201cexcessive profits,\u201d to grant licenses as \u201cpublic interest, convenience, or necessity\u201d require, to set \u201cfair\u201d and \u201cequitable\u201d prices, and to prohibit corporate structures that \u201c\u2018unfairly or inequitably\u2019 distribute voting power among security holders.\u201d In \u003Ci\u003EMistretta v. United States\u003C\/i\u003E (1989), the Court all but declared the delegation doctrine nonjusticiable (that is, a dispute incapable of being resolved by the courts), when it upheld an open-ended grant of authority to the United States Sentencing Commission to set ranges for criminal sentences by explaining that \u201cour jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.\u201d Justice Antonin Scalia dissented on grounds narrowly tailored to the specific powers conferred upon the Sentencing Commission, but he agreed with the otherwise unanimous majority\u2019s view that courts should not generally try to place enforceable limits on the kind and quality of discretion that Congress grants to other actors.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIndeed, in 2001, Justice Scalia authored a unanimous opinion in \u003Ci\u003EWhitman v. American\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ETrucking Ass\u2019ns\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E Inc.\u003C\/i\u003E, which upheld, with relatively little discussion, a statute instructing the Environmental Protection Agency to set an ambient air quality standard \u201cwhich in the judgment of the Administrator\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009is requisite to protect the public health\u201d with \u201can adequate margin of safety.\u201d Justice Clarence Thomas indicated a willingness to reconsider the Court\u2019s lax delegation doctrine in an appropriate case, but no other cur rent Justice has echoed those sentiments. Indeed, the votes on the merits in delegation cases in the Supreme Court from 1989 to 2012 were 53\u20130 against the challenges.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ENotwithstanding the strong signals from the Supreme Court that delegation challenges will not be well received, lower courts judges continue to find delegation problems with statutes at a rate that some might find surprising given the seeming clarity of the doctrine. Some Justices, on hard-to-predict occasions, invoke delegation concerns as a reason to construe statutes in order to avoid having those statutes raise constitutional issues, as did a plurality of the Court in \u003Ci\u003EIndustrial Union Dep\u2019t, AFL-CIO v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EAmerican Petroleum Inst\u003C\/i\u003E. (1980). Justices Scalia\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Eand Ruth Bader Ginsburg, neither of whom is noted for sympathy for delegation challenges, employed delegation concerns in this fashion in their dissent from the majority in \u003Ci\u003EReynolds v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EUnited States \u003C\/i\u003E(2012).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe consequences of the Court\u2019s reluctance to police the boundaries of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers cannot be overstated. In modern times, Congress routinely enacts statutes that place the vast bulk of responsibility for promulgating binding norms in administrative agencies (and derivatively in courts that review the decisions of administrative agencies), to the point that agencies are, by any relevant measure, far more important instruments of governance than is Congress.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhen he was an academic in 1980, then Professor Scalia urged courts to reinvigorate the delegation doctrine. As a Justice, he abandoned that position because, as he explained in his dissenting opinion in \u003Ci\u003EMistretta\u003C\/i\u003E, \u201cwhile the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts. Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a question of degree.\u201d Those who wish for the Court to take delegation concerns more seriously thus need to convince at least some Justices that a test for drawing the line among legislative, executive, and judicial powers can be found that is no more troubling than other tests employed by the Court in other contexts. A return to the first principles articulated by Chief Justice Marshall\u0026nbsp;in \u003Ci\u003EWayman v. Southard\u003C\/i\u003E might be a productive place to start.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Douglas_Ginsburg.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      Gary Lawson\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000001-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000001-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000001-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000001-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ELarry Alexander \u0026amp; Saikrishna Prakash, \u003Ci\u003EReports of the\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ENondelegation Doctrine\u2019s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated\u003C\/i\u003E, 70\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EU. CHI. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E1297 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDouglas H. Ginsburg, \u003Ci\u003EDelegation Running Riot\u003C\/i\u003E, 1 Reg. 83 (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGary Lawson, \u003Ci\u003EDelegation and Original Meaning\u003C\/i\u003E, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EGary Lawson, \u003Ci\u003EDiscretion as Delegation: The \u201cProper\u201d\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EUnderstanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine\u003C\/i\u003E Gary Lawson, \u003Ci\u003EDiscretion as Delegation: The \u201cProper\u201d\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EUnderstanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine\u003C\/i\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EEric A. Posner \u0026amp; Adrian Vermeule, \u003Ci\u003ENondelegation: A\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EPost Mortem\u003C\/i\u003E, 70\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EU. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMichael B. Rappaport, \u003Ci\u003EThe Selective Nondelegation\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EDoctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for \u003C\/i\u003EClinton v. City of New York, 76\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ETUL. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E265 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDavid Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility (1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000001-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EJ. W. Hampton, Jr. \u0026amp; Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPanama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022text-align:justify\u0022\u003EA.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EIndustrial Union Dep\u2019t, AFL CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022text-align:justify\u0022\u003EMistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co, 490 U.S. 212 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022text-align:justify\u0022\u003ESkinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co, 490 U.S. 212 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EClinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EWhitman v. American Trucking Ass\u2019ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EReynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000001-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000056\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EEnclave Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000075\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EExecutive Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000101\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EJudicial Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000125\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EProperty Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]