Health economists have long considered changing the tax
treatment of health insurance a key component of any serious health
care reform. A relic of the World War II era, the federal tax code
currently excludes, without limit, the value of employer-sponsored
health insurance from an individual's taxable income for the
purposes of both income and payroll taxes. This tax exclusion is a
huge, but hidden, tax subsidy. The Joint Committee on Taxation
recently estimated that in 2008 this tax expenditure amounted to
$226.2 billion in forgone tax revenues.[1]
Aside from its sheer size--and the unfairness inherent in the
fact that it only offers tax relief to those with employer-based
coverage--if the tax exclusion's goal is covering the uninsured,
then it is poorly targeted. While the exclusion does encourage
individuals to buy coverage by lowering the after-tax price of
employer-sponsored health insurance, it also provides the largest
tax subsidies to those who need them least and little or nothing to
millions of middle-income families who need help buying health
insurance.Under current law, more than 45 percent of these income
tax expenditures go to households with incomes above $100,000,
while only roughly 10 percent go to households with incomes below
$40,000.[2]
Fortunately, health reform proposals recently introduced in
Congress--such as the Patients' Choice Act of 2009, sponsored by
Senators Tom Coburn (R-OK) and Richard Burr (R-NC) and
Representatives Paul Ryan (R-WI) and Devin Nunes (R-CA)--seek to
replace the current income tax exclusion with a fairer, flatter
form of tax relief for all Americans regardless of job status.
Tax Relief for All Americans
Under the Patients' Choice Act, tax-paying households would
receive tax credits to offset the cost of a significant portion of
a health plan's premium. These tax credits would offset some, but
not all, of a taxpayer's income tax liability so that no taxpayer
would be removed from the tax rolls. The credit component of the
proposal is combined with a voucher to provide assistance to
households with limited or no tax liability in order to help them
purchase their own private health insurance just as their
counterparts in taxpaying households.
This voucher component would function much like a traditional
refundable tax credit, except that it would not be financed by
changes in the tax treatment of health insurance but rather through
reductions in spending by the federal government. The revenue
raised by ending the current income tax exclusion would be used
exclusively to finance health care tax credits for taxpaying
households. Any excess tax revenue generated in the process of
replacing the exclusion with tax credits would be dedicated to
supporting broader tax reform efforts in the future.
With the Patients' Choice Act, almost all households with
incomes under $100,000 would benefit from replacing the current
income tax exclusion with a health insurance tax credit. The tax
credits under the plan--worth $2,290 for individuals and $5,710 for
families--would represent a net tax reduction for these households
and, in effect, increase their after-tax incomes. Although
compensation in the form of health insurance would now be subject
to the federal income tax, the tax credits that would replace the
exclusion would, in most cases, more than offset any new federal
income tax liability resulting from this change in the tax
treatment of health insurance.
If the tax exclusion were replaced with tax credits, those who
would potentially pay more in federal income taxes would do so
because of the high value or cost of their health insurance.
However, these individuals and families would likely be able to
purchase a more basic health plan to avoid any new tax liability
while demanding more compensation in the form of wages from their
employers, or if they like their current coverage they could always
keep it and pay more in federal income taxes.

Replacing the tax exclusion with a health care tax credit would
not only help the middle class buy insurance and extend coverage to
the uninsured; it would also set in place powerful incentives to
reduce the rapid growth in health care expenditures. Instead of an
open-ended tax subsidy tied to employer-sponsored insurance,
individuals and families will have the ability to choose the health
plan they want, own it, and take it with them from job to job. This
tax credit would also have the added benefit of allowing
individuals and families to decide how much of their compensation
comes to them in the form of health insurance.[3]
Methodology
The Heritage Foundation's analysis of the percentage of
households that would be better off with a tax credit rather than
the current health insurance exclusion uses data from the 2008
Current Population Survey (CPS) as well as the Insurance Component
of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS-IC) from the years
2001 through 2003. An estimation of adjusted gross income for each
tax filing unit was constructed using data on individual income and
other tax information from the CPS so as to avoid top coding.
Health insurance premiums for individuals were simulated using data
on the distribution of health insurance from the MEPS-IC.
Furthermore, the analysis assumes that the tax exclusion is
replaced by a credit of $5,710 for a family plan and $2,290 for a
single plan.
Greg
D'Angelo is Policy Analyst in the Center for Health Policy
Studies, Rea
S. Hederman, Jr., is Assistant Director of and a Senior Policy
Analyst in the Center for Data Analysis, and Paul L.
Winfree is a Policy Analyst in the Center for Data Analysis, at
The Heritage Foundation.
[1]Estimate
includes forgone income and payroll tax revenues. See "Background
Materials for Senate Committee on Finance Roundtable on Health Care
Financing," Joint Committee on Taxation, Senate Committee on
Finance, U.S. Senate, May 12, 2009, at /static/reportimages/2556AB6773AC0729A5223FB94C3783B8.pdf (July 1,
2009).
[3]Employers
should be indifferent to whether an employee chooses to receive
compensation in either health insurance or wages. If employers
provide less compensation in the form of health insurance, they
will provide more compensation in the form of wages. While the
forms of employee compensation might differ, in a competitive labor
market the overall level of employee compensation would not
change.
Show references in this report
[1]Estimate
includes forgone income and payroll tax revenues. See "Background
Materials for Senate Committee on Finance Roundtable on Health Care
Financing," Joint Committee on Taxation, Senate Committee on
Finance, U.S. Senate, May 12, 2009, at /static/reportimages/2556AB6773AC0729A5223FB94C3783B8.pdf (July 1,
2009).
[3]Employers
should be indifferent to whether an employee chooses to receive
compensation in either health insurance or wages. If employers
provide less compensation in the form of health insurance, they
will provide more compensation in the form of wages. While the
forms of employee compensation might differ, in a competitive labor
market the overall level of employee compensation would not
change.