The 2009 Durban Review Conference (commonly referred to as
Durban II) was the follow-up to the 2001 United Nations World
Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance held in Durban, South Africa. The 2001
conference was hijacked by nations and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) that used it as a platform to criticize Israel
and the United States. After trying unsuccessfully to counter those
efforts, the U.S. delegation walked out of the 2001 conference.
Durban II was eerily similar to the 2001 conference on a number
of levels. As in 2001, the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), composed of 57 countries hostile to Israel and generally
unobservant of their own citizens' fundamental civil and political
rights, sought to twist the conference to serve their agenda.
Specifically, they sought to include in the Durban II outcome
document discriminatory references to Israel and statements
supporting efforts to constrain freedom of speech and expression to
prevent the "defamation of religions."
The Obama Administration determined that these and other
passages in the draft outcome document were too objectionable to
justify America's participation in Durban II and announced that the
U.S. would boycott the conference. Last-minute changes failed to
resolve U.S. objections fully, and the Obama Administration walked
away from the conference as the Bush Administration did in
In the end, Durban II did very little to advance efforts to
combat racism. It echoed the first conference by providing a
platform for repugnant statements that ran counter to its very
purpose. Both conferences saw abhorrent presentations, by Yasir
Arafat in 2001 and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, attacking Israel as
a racist, cruel regime guilty of committing atrocities against the
Palestinians. While NGOs were largely restrained in their actions
in 2009, they were complicit in the anti-Israel efforts in 2001,
stating in their conference declaration that Israel is an
"Apartheid regime" engaged in "institutionalized racism."
Aside from unjustly singling out Israel and providing a global
platform for racist comments by representatives of Iran and other
countries, the 2009 Durban Review Conference outcome document
actually endorses constraints on fundamental rights to freedom of
opinion, expression, and assembly to prevent "defamation of
religion." While the Durban II outcome document is nonbinding, it
will be referenced repeatedly in future U.N. documents, and various
human rights treaty bodies will cite it as a definitive
interpretation of the will of the international community.
Regrettably, it sets the stage for a retreat from, rather than an
advancement of, human rights.
The Durban II conference is a testament to a fundamental problem
of U.N. conferences and other U.N. efforts to advance human rights.
The U.N.'s universal membership allows the countries that are most
opposed to advancing human rights to blunt and undermine the
agendas of U.N. conferences and councils. This results in an
institutional adherence to moral equivalence, which elevates and
empowers the world's worst human-rights abusers by treating them as
morally equivalent to countries that truly observe and value human
rights. At best, the outcome is disappointing, and it is more
likely harmful to the advancement of human rights around the
The experience of Durban II should lead the Obama Administration
to revaluate its default position of supporting and participating
in U.N. conferences and bodies, such as the U.N. Human Rights
Council. The U.S. presence lends undeserved legitimacy to their
often destructive efforts by allowing them to claim that their
efforts reflect the will of the international community.
The Path to Durban II: Ample Warning
The 2001 United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban,
South Africa, became a platform for nations and NGOs to criticize
Israel and the United States. After trying unsuccessfully to
counter those efforts, the U.S. delegation walked out of the
conference at the direction of then-Secretary of State Colin
To the disappointment of many, Durban II followed in the
footsteps of the 2001 conference. The U.N. Human Rights Council was
appointed the Preparatory Committee for Durban II--a puzzling
decision considering the council's decidedly biased record against
Israel and the role that anti-Israel sentiment played in
undermining the 2001 conference.
The council elected Libya as chair of the Bureau of the
Preparatory Committee, which sets the agenda and objectives for the
Review Conference, and elected Iran as one of the 19 vice-chairs.
Both countries are members and strong supporters of the 57-nation
Organization of the Islamic Conference, which has historically been
hostile to Israel. Libya is also a member of the League of Arab
States, which has called for the elimination of "Zionism" in its
Arab Charter on Human Rights. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
has infamously stated that Israel "must be wiped off the map" and
that "Zionists are the true manifestation of Satan."
Unsurprisingly, the early drafts of the outcome document for
Durban II singled out Israel through a number of biased references
to Israel's alleged mistreatment of Palestinians. For example, an
early draft text:
Expresse[d] deep concern at the plight of Palestinian refugees
and other inhabitants of the Arab occupied territories as well as
displaced persons who were forced to leave their homes because of
war and racial policies of the occupying power and who are
prevented from returning to their homes and properties because of a
racially-based law of return.
In addition to the biased focus on Israel, the early drafts
contained numerous troubling statements supporting efforts to
constrain freedom of speech and expression to prevent "defamation
of religions." For example, the draft text claimed:
[A] most disturbing phenomenon is the intellectual and
ideological validation of Islamophobia.... [W]hen it is expressed
in the form of defamation of religions, it takes cover behind the
freedom of expression.... [A]ssociation of terrorism and violence
with Islam or any other religion, including through publication of
offensive caricatures and making of hate documentaries, would
purposely complicate our common endeavours to address several
contemporary issues, including the fight against terrorism and the
occupation of foreign territories and peoples.
The proponents of defamation-of-religions laws desire to
restrict such speech in the U.S. and the rest of the world. Yet in
the United States, controversial cartoons and films, however
repugnant to adherents of a particular religion, are protected
speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Faced with the question of whether or not to continue the Bush
Administration's policy of boycotting Durban II, the Obama
Administration sent a delegation to the February 2009 preparatory
meetings on the draft outcome document. It announced that, pending
progress on addressing problems with the text, the U.S. would
consider attending Durban II in April 2009. However, after
participating in the February meetings, the Obama Administration
[T]he document being negotiated has gone from bad to worse, and
the current text of the draft outcome document is not salvageable.
As a result, the United States will not engage in further
negotiations on this text, nor will we participate in a conference
based on this text. A conference based on this text would be a
missed opportunity to speak clearly about the persistent problem of
The Administration said it would participate in the April 2009
Durban II conference only if the outcome document was "shortened
and [did] not reaffirm in toto the flawed 2001 Durban Declaration
and Program of Action" (DDPA); did not "single out any one country
or conflict, nor embrace the troubling concept of 'defamation of
religion'"; and did "not go further than the DDPA on the issue of
reparations for slavery."
Shortly after the U.S. announcement, Italy similarly decided not
to attend and other European counties were rumored to be
considering skipping the conference. (Canada and Israel had already
announced their boycott months earlier.) To avoid a broader boycott
by Western countries, the OIC and other countries pressing for the
more objectionable parts of the declaration relented and agreed to
remove overt references to "defamation of religions," Israel, and
reparations. However, they did not remove the unqualified
endorsement of the 2001 Durban Declaration, which contains
provisions with which the U.S. strongly disagrees, including
negative references to Israel.
With its conditions not fully met, the U.S. announced on the eve
of the conference its final decision that it would not attend
Durban II, noting that the draft outcome document "still contains
language that reaffirms in toto the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action...which the United States has long said it is
unable to support [and] singles out one particular conflict and
prejudges key issues that can only be resolved in negotiations
between the Israelis and Palestinians." The U.S. also stated that
it "has serious concerns with relatively new additions to the text
regarding 'incitement,' that run counter to the U.S. commitment to
unfettered free speech."
The Durban II Debacle
The conference proceedings on April 20-24 confirmed the wisdom
of the U.S. decision to boycott. The first country representative
to speak on racism was Iranian President Ahmadinejad, the world's
most prominent Holocaust denier and anti-Semite. Seemingly unfazed
by two young men wearing rainbow-striped clown wigs who rushed the
podium, Ahmadinejad unleashed attacks on Europe and the U.S. for
slavery and oppression and for using the U.N. Security Council as a
means for imposing racism and "discrimination, injustice, violation
of human rights and belittling the majority of nations and
Ahmadinejad questioned the Holocaust overtly in his prepared
remarks and implicitly in his speech by referring to the "pretext
of Jewish suffering." He accused the U.S. and Europe of
establishing a "most cruel and repressive racist regime in
Palestine" and of continuing to support Israel while it commits
"atrocities," "brutality," and even "genocide" against the
Palestinians. He called on the international community to combat
Zionism, calling it "a kind of racism which has tarnished the image
of humanity at the beginning of the third millennium. World Zionism
personifies a racism that falsely resorts to religion, and abuses
religious sentiment, to hide its hatred and ugly face."
All European delegates present walked out in the middle of the
speech when Ahmadinejad made his anti-Semitic remarks.
The Czech Republic announced that it would not return to the
conference because of the comments. Immediately following the
speech, Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre declared
that Iran was making itself the "the odd man out." U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay similarly criticized the
I utterly deplore the speech of the President of Iran delivered
this afternoon at the Durban Review Conference against racism....
Much of his speech was clearly beyond the scope of the Conference.
It also clearly went against the long-standing U.N. position
adopted by the General Assembly with respect to equating Zionism
Ahmadinejad was not the only outrageous speaker at Durban II.
While not as bombastic as Ahmadinejad and eschewing the term
"Zionist," other delegates echoed his sentiments at the podium:
- The Palestinian representative attacked Israel as a racist
state that violates international humanitarian law and human rights
law, calling its occupation of Palestinian territories the "worst
violation of human rights and the ugliest face of racism and
- Syria included "foreign occupation" (an oblique accusatory
reference to Israel) among the primary reasons for holding the
Durban II conference, ranking it above racism, xenophobia, and
intolerance. The Syrian representative recited a litany of alleged
crimes perpetrated by Israel, including the ethnic cleansing of
Palestinians and throwing them "into the sea."
- Cubalaunched an attack on Western countries for the
transatlantic slave trade and colonialism and demanded that Western
countries provide reparation and compensation for those acts. Cuba
went on to state that racism and racial discrimination "has a
greater impact and impunity in the countries from the rich and
industrialized North." After the obligatory attack on Israel as an
"occupying power that does not recognize the limits of justice,
moral[s], or the international law," the Cuban delegate reached
back to the 1970s for a solution to racism and inequality, calling
for a "new international economic order...based on equality,
solidarity, and social justice."
- Sudan--the regime that has committed massive human rights
atrocities in Darfur that rise to the level of genocide in some
people's judgment-- implausibly claimed that Sudan opposes all
forms of racism and discrimination, rejected accusations of
continued slavery in Sudan, and accused Israel of conducting a
racist military campaign in Gaza.
During the week, Durban II provided a forum for such human
rights luminaries as Belarus, China, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea,
Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe to profess their "dedication" and
"commitment" to fundamental human rights and to combating racism
while congratulating each other on their "contributions" to the
Durban II process.
To stanch the embarrassing news coverage following Ahmadinejad's
speech and to preclude additional boycotts, the attending countries
agreed, in an unusual move, to adopt the outcome document on the
second day of the five-day conference. Thus, the Durban II
conference achieved its primary purpose--agreement on the text of
an outcome document--on Tuesday. Speeches by governments, U.N.
human rights experts, NGOs, and other groups continued for three
more days to no real purpose, giving their input for a document
that had already been signed.
Unworthy of U.S. Support
In their speeches during the conference, U.N. officials, country
delegates, and human rights groups repeatedly chastised the 10
countries that chose to boycott Durban II. The final Durban
II outcome document was hailed by its supporters as a triumph of
compromise that, unlike earlier drafts, did not disparage Israel or
undermine fundamental human rights. Boycotting nations were accused
of being stubborn in failing to recognize the significance of the
diplomatic achievement of the outcome document.
While the final document was relatively better than earlier
drafts, it was improved only because the U.S. and other countries
announced their intention to boycott unless the document was
fundamentally changed. However, even the improved document does not
merit U.S. support because it makes significant references--overt
and implicit--that run counter to U.S. policy regarding Israel and
the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and assembly.
On the matter of Israel, the first paragraph of the Durban II
outcome document reaffirms without reservation the 2001 Durban
Declaration and Program of Action. Under a section titled
"Victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance," the DDPA states: "We are concerned about the plight
of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation."
The DDPA's direct implication that Palestinians were victims of
Israeli racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, or related
intolerance was a key reason that the Obama Administration included
support for that document in toto as one of the redlines
that, if crossed, would lead it to boycott Durban II.
While specific references to combating "defamation of
religions," which would have serious implications for freedom of
speech and expression, were removed from the Durban II outcome
document, at least six paragraphs in the final outcome document
call for constraints on the freedoms of speech and assembly:
- Paragraph 13 states that "all dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination
as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts shall be
declared an offence punishable by law."
- Paragraph 39 "[u]rges States parties to the [International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD)] to withdraw reservations contrary to the object and
purpose of the Convention and to consider withdrawing other
reservations." This provision is unacceptable because U.S.
reservations to ICERD relate to protecting the free speech rights
of Americans, which would have been abridged if the treaty had been
ratified without reservation.
- Paragraph 60 "[u]rges States to punish violent, racist and
xenophobic activities by groups that are based on neo-Nazi,
neo-Fascist and other violent national ideologies."
- Paragraph 68 "[e]xpresses its concern over the rise in recent
years of acts of incitement to hatred, which have targeted and
severely affected racial and religious communities and persons
belonging to racial and religious minorities, whether involving the
use of print, audio-visual or electronic media or any other means,
and emanating from a variety of sources."
- Paragraph 69 "[r]esolves to, as stipulated in art. 20 of the
ICCPR [International Convention on Civil and Political Rights],
fully and effectively prohibit any advocacy of national, racial, or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence and implement it through all necessary
legislative, policy and judicial measures." This is a serious
matter because Article 20 instructs parties to constrain freedom of
opinion and expression to prohibit "[a]ny propaganda for war" and
"[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence."
When it ratified the ICCPR, the U.S. made a specific reservation
limiting Article 20 based on the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, which protects freedom of speech and expression.
- Paragraph 99 "[c]alls upon States...to declare illegal and to
prohibit all organizations based on ideas or theories of
superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic
origin, or which attempt to justify or promote national, racial and
religious hatred and discrimination in any form."
No reasonable person wishes to be in the position of defending
ignorant, intolerant, or racist speech or any individuals endorsing
such sentiments. Yet freedom of speech and assembly mean very
little unless they apply equally to everyone, even hate groups that
are political or social pariahs. Noncontroversial ideas or
organizations do not need to fear constraints on the rights to
freedom of speech and assembly. A society's true adherence to these
rights is measured by the extent to which highly objectionable
ideas and organizations are afforded protection.
For this reason, America's Founding Fathers included such
protections in the Bill of Rights. The U.S. worked hard to ensure
that they remained protected and affirmed in the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, and the U.S. has insisted on
expressing reservations in any treaty that would infringe these
In the closing moments of Durban II, Pillay expressed her hope
that the nations boycotting Durban II would eventually endorse the
outcome document. The U.S. should ignore this request.
While the Durban II outcome document is nonbinding, it will be
referenced repeatedly in future U.N. documents, and various U.N.
treaty bodies will cite it as a definitive interpretation of the
will and consensus of the international community. Regrettably, it
sets the stage for a retreat on human rights rather than for
advancing those standards. Endorsing the outcome document would
serve neither U.S. interests nor international efforts to advance
fundamental human rights and combat racism.
A Triumph of Disengagement
There is ample blame to go around for the embarrassment that was
Durban II. Following the 2001 racism conference, the late
Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) observed:
To many of us present at the events at Durban, it is clear that
much of the responsibility for the debacle rests on the shoulders
of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, who, in her
role as secretary-general of the conference, failed to provide the
leadership needed to keep the conference on track. It must be added
that the Bush administration also shares some responsibility for
the meltdown. Six months of unilateralist foreign policies had
created such a climate of hostility and mistrust toward the United
States that marshaling support among our allies to prevent the
conference from being taken over and abused became an almost
impossible mission. The majority of blame for the failure of
Durban, however, must be laid at the feet of several members of
[the] Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). These regimes,
some U.S. allies, proved unwilling to yield in their campaign to
scuttle the noble agenda of the conference and to turn it into a
forum to shun, isolate and de-legitimize Israel, America's key
democratic ally in the Middle East.
Lantos concluded that the debacle occurred because the U.S. was
not sufficiently engaged in the process. This is a common refrain
and was often heard at Durban II. For instance, while High
Commissioner Pillay criticized Ahmadinejad's racist speech, she
simultaneously criticized the boycotting states for abandoning the
conference to him and his allies: "The best riposte for this type
of event is to reply and correct, not to withdraw and boycott the
Conference." Other country representatives continually
voiced similar entreaties for boycotting countries to return to the
But to what purpose? The writing was on the wall well before
Ahmadinejad's speech at the opening of the conference. The Durban
II draft outcome document contained provisions that denigrated
Israel and were hostile to the freedoms of speech, expression, and
assembly. Attempts to remove objectionable provisions in the final
days before the conference failed, and it is highly unlikely that
they would have been fixed even if the U.S. and other countries had
attended. The best outcome the U.S. and other states could have
hoped for was to prevent further deterioration of the outcome
document. Since the draft was unworthy of endorsement, the
situation amply justified abandoning the conference. The Obama
Administration rightly concluded that the process was beyond
The time to fix the Durban II outcome document was in the early
stages. Critics of the Bush Administration's decision to skip the
early negotiations over Durban II argue that stronger U.S.
participation could have salvaged the conference. This is unlikely.
The Obama Administration, bolstered by a vastly higher level of
goodwill among other delegates than the Bush Administration
enjoyed, was unable to salvage the document during the negotiations
in February 2009. Similarly, repeated efforts by many other Western
countries to amend the document to address their concerns were
rebuffed by OIC members and other nations with highly questionable
human rights records. If High Commissioner Pillay had been more
forceful in trying to excise these problematic passages from the
draft document in the preparatory meetings instead of publicly
defending the flawed process and lashing out at those who
criticized Durban II, she might have helped to secure the changes
that would have led the boycotting countries to change their
Ironically, only the U.S. decision to announce its likely
boycott of the conference succeeded in changing the draft outcome
document in a positive way-- albeit not as much as the U.S. wished.
This might be called a triumph of disengagement. If the U.S. and
other countries had not decided to boycott unless specific redlines
were met, the draft outcome document almost certainly would not
have been changed.
Indeed, even agreeing to participate in the conference after the
draft document was changed would have been counterproductive
because it would have legitimized a flawed process and signaled
that the U.S. will settle for less than it says it will in future
forums. Worse, nothing would have prevented the OIC and others from
amending the document during the conference to reinsert the
objectionable provisions. Once locked into the conference, the
European countries would likely not have rejected the outcome
document even if the objectionable provisions were included. This
conclusion is bolstered by the experience of the 2001 conference,
from which only the U.S. and Israel walked out, and by continued
European participation in the U.N. Human Rights Council despite its
biased mistreatment of Israel and willful refusal to confront dire
human rights problems around the world.
In the end, the fear that more countries might walk out forced
U.N. officials and the nations in charge of the conference
proceedings--specifically, Pillay and the countries serving on the
Main Committee--to adopt the outcome document prematurely. Indeed,
as conference president Amos Wako of Kenya hailed the final outcome
document as a triumph of engagement, he refused to recognize
Libya's boisterous effort to be recognized and, purportedly,
express its desire that the outcome document include more
condemnatory language on Israel.
What the U.S. Should Do
The Durban II experience should serve as a valuable lesson that
criticism of the Bush Administration's alleged lack of commitment
to multilateral negotiations was often off-target. Multilateralism
is only a means to an end, and participation in multilateral
negotiations is no guarantee of beneficent outcomes. On the
contrary, sometimes U.S. participation only lends credibility to a
process that deserves none.
This lesson applies both to Durban II and to the U.N. Human
Rights Council, which oversaw the Durban II debacle. Consequently,
the U.S. should:
- Refuse to endorse the Durban II outcome document. In the
closing moments of Durban II, High Commissioner Pillay expressed
her hope that the nations boycotting the conference would
eventually endorse the outcome document. Germany has already done
so. The document is unworthy of support, and
the U.S. should not lend the outcome document the legitimacy that a
U.S. endorsement would convey. While the Durban II outcome document
is nonbinding, it will be referenced in future U.N. documents, and
various U.N. treaty bodies will cite it as a definitive
interpretation of the will and consensus of the international
community. Endorsing the outcome document would serve neither U.S.
interests nor international efforts to advance fundamental human
- Reevaluate America's default position of supporting and
participating in U.N. conferences and bodies. The U.S. presence
lends undeserved legitimacy to the often destructive efforts of
U.N. conferences such as Durban I and Durban II and human rights
bodies such as the Human Rights Council by allowing them to claim
that they reflect the will of the international community. The
Obama Administration should heed the lessons of Durban II and
participate in a U.N. conference only if the outcome is likely to
support U.S. interests and America's commitment to basic civil and
political rights and fundamental freedoms. If a conference appears
to undermine those principles, the Administration and Congress
should work together to oppose funding for such conferences through
the U.N. regular budget as the Bush Administration attempted with
Durban II. Similarly, Congress should withhold the
U.S. portion of the cost of such conferences from its appropriation
for the U.N. regular budget.
- Press for serious reform of the Human Rights Council in the
2011 review. Although the U.S. won a seat on the council and
will soon participate fully in its deliberations, the U.S. presence
is unlikely to improve the effectiveness of the council
significantly. In the upcoming review of the council,
which must occur before April 2011, the Obama Administration should
press for adoption of serious membership criteria and other
reforms. To spur reforms, Congress should withhold
the equivalent of the U.S. share of the council's budget from its
appropriation for the U.N. regular budget until the General
Assembly adopts and implements more stringent membership
The Durban II failure is a testament to the fundamental problem
of permitting the United Nations to take the lead on human rights
issues. The U.N.'s universal membership and institutional adherence
to moral equivalence lead to a situation in which the "inmates run
the asylum." It elevates and empowers the world's worst human
rights abusers by treating them the same as it treats countries
that actually promote and protect basic human rights and
fundamental freedoms. It gives them a global stage to voice their
lies and hypocrisies as they mock the process and debase the
The lessons of the past 60 years amply demonstrate the
limitations of working through the U.N. to advance human rights. In
the end, perhaps the best the U.S. can hope for in these venues is
to maintain the disappointing status quo, confirming already
existing standards and human rights principles. Far more likely,
regrettably, is an outcome that actually retreats from existing
principles and harms the advancement of human rights around the
If the Human Rights Council proves immune to serious reform, the
U.S. should work with countries that are genuinely interested in
advancing fundamental human rights to establish an alternative
human rights forum independent of the U.N. and the institutional
constraints that impede its efforts in advancing this noble
Schaefer is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory
Affairs and Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas
Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "The World Without
Zionism," speech to the Islamic Student Associations conference,
Tehran, Iran, October 26, 2005, at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/weekinreview/30iran.html?_r=2
(March 4, 2009), and "Ahmadinejad in Sudan: 'Zionists Are the
True Manifestation of Satan,'" Haaretz (Tel Aviv), March 1,
2007, at http://www.haaretz
.com/hasen/spages/832229.html (March 4, 2009).
The prepared remarks differed slightly from
the delivered remarks. For a transcript of President Ahmadinejad's
remarks as delivered, see Jeremy R. Hammond, "Full Text of
President Ahmadinejad's Remarks at U.N. Conference on Racism,"
Foreign Policy Journal, April 21, 2009, at http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/04/21/full-text-of-president
-ahmadinejads-remarks-at-un-conference-on-racism (June 1,
2009). For a news story on the changes between the delivered and
prepared texts, see Bradley S. Klapper and Alexander G. Higgins,
"Ahmadinejad Dropped Holocaust Denial from Speech: UN Says Iranian
President Dropped Holocaust Denial Reference from UN Speech," ABC
News, April 21, 2009, at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7386880
(June 1, 2009).
Australia>, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, and
the United States.
Durban Review Conference, "Outcome Document
of the Durban Review Conference" (emphasis omitted).
During her closing press conference for
Durban II, Pillay stated that "some countries decided to boycott
it, although a few days earlier, they had actually agreed on what
is now the final text. I consider this bizarre. You agree [to] the
text on Friday evening, and walk out on Sunday. I think, it was
unfortunate that a few states disengaged from the process. Although
almost all of them had agreed [to] this text, they are not part of
the consensus that adopted it. I do hope they will come back into
the process now. They can still add their names to the list of 182
states that have adopted the outcome document." Navi Pillay,
opening remarks at closing press conference, Durban Review
Conference, April 24, 2009, at http://www.un.org/durbanreview2009/stmt24-04-09_pillay.shtml
(June 1, 2009).
Pillay, statement on speech by President of
Iran at Durban Review Conference.
Mark Wallace, "Explanation of Vote by
Ambassador Mark Wallace, United States Ambassador for Management
Reform, on Agenda Item 128: Questions Relating to the Proposed
Program Budget for the Biennium 2008-2009, in the Fifth Committee
of the General Assembly," U.S. Mission to the United Nations,
December 22, 2007, at http://www.usunnewyork
.usmission.gov/press_releases/20071222_387.html (June 1,
Kim R. Holmes, Liberty's Best Hope:
American Leadership for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The
Heritage Foundation, 2008), p. 122.