Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler rely heavily on an economic
impact study by the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) in making
their case for a financial bailout. This report claims that the
simultaneous failure of these three companies would result in a
loss of 3.3 million jobs nationally in the same year as the company
shutdowns.[1] However, this estimate is based on highly
dubious assumptions.
When these same questionable assumptions are run through a
widely understood and respected model of the economy, the dramatic
spin-off results are not produced.[2] Instead, only the Big Three
auto companies and their immediate suppliers suffer job losses in
the first year.
The Shortcomings of the CAR Model
The model used by CAR to produce its economic impact estimates
employs input-output analysis to predict how changes in one
industry--in this case the automotive industry--will affect
different areas of the economy. This specific economic model was
developed by the Regional Economic Modeling Institute (REMI) and
contains detailed information about the economy's industries,
including the values of what industries buy from each other, the
value of what each industry produces, the purchases by consumers
and government, the taxes collected, and the output by
government.
The REMI model, however, is essentially static. That is, it does
not mimic how consumers or producers would adapt to changes in
structure or policies or how the indirect employment effects may
play out over time. In other words, the model does not have a
feedback loop to take into account such changes at either the state
or the industry level.
Another shortcoming of the CAR model is its uneven treatment of
trade. It assumes the U.S. needs to import more vehicles and parts.
However, if imports are increased to the degree they suggest, this
should put downward pressure on the U.S. dollar. The lower dollar
should increase the volume of goods U.S. exporters are able to
sell, thus raising U.S. employment and incomes in exporting
industries.
It is common practice for firms to continue operations while
under the supervision of a bankruptcy court. Thus, the CAR
simulation assumptions are unrealistic. The estimates assume a 100
percent contraction of the auto industry in 2009, meaning all car
purchases will be imports. They assume this will result in an
immediate domino effect in 2009. Although they assume that this
raises the price of imports, they make no other assumptions
regarding the relative price changes of substitute goods in the
United States. For example, it does not appear that any price
effects were assumed about new cars versus used cars. Thus, the
model avoids including the first-year behavior of automobile
consumers when faced with higher prices.
Dynamic Analysis Estimates
Analysts at The Heritage Foundation ran dynamic simulations of
the effect on the U.S. economy of a reduction of automobile supply
due to the bankruptcy of the Big Three automakers. They used the
Global Insight Short Term U.S. Macroeconomic model, which is a
structural dynamic equilibrium model.
These simulations fail to confirm the 3.3 million jobs lost in
2009 found by the CAR model, because all of the indirect employment
and spin-off effects do not happen in the first year of bankruptcy.
Instead, companies and their employees adapt to the changing
conditions. For example, the loss of new car supply could drive
individuals to the used car market. This would open opportunities
for auto-body shops and car parts. The increase in imported cars
also lowers the value of the dollar, giving opportunities for
exporting industries to expand and absorb some of the lost
jobs.
Indeed, the assumptions employed by CAR are so unreasonable that
its "worst case" scenario is wholly impossible. They assume that
the Big Three simultaneously declare bankruptcy and shut down in
2009 and cease operations for a year. This assumption is divorced
from bankruptcy reality. The usual practice in large-scale
bankruptcies is for the petitioners to continue operations but at a
reduced level. Because the automakers have suggested that they are
at least 30 percent short of needed cash flow, a more reasonable
assumption would be to reduce Detroit production levels by that
percentage in 2009, 2010, and 2011 (the three years covered by the
CAR study).[3]
When the more realistic assumption is made, the estimate of
employment loss plummets to 453,000 jobs in the first year, a
figure 86 percent lower than CAR's estimate. In other words, the
CAR report inflates estimated job loss by a factor of more than
seven.
Responsible Estimates
It is not surprising that large employment losses should come
from a model that employs amazingly unreasonable assumptions and
permits virtually no adaptations by consumers or other producers.
Thus, Congress should be extremely careful in its use of the CAR
study. Responsible economists would not argue that simultaneous
bankruptcies by the Big Three would leave the economy unaffected,
but neither would they suggest that such an unfortunate development
would produce calamitous employment changes on the order claimed by
the CAR analysts. At a minimum, these employment effects would not
happen all in the same year. The longer it takes the effects to
play out, the more time there is for individuals to make
adjustments and absorb the capacity of laid-off workers and
capital.
Karen A. Campbell, Ph.D.,
is Policy Analyst in Macroeconomics and Paul L. Winfree is a Policy
Analyst in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage
Foundation.
[2]
Analysts at the Center for Data Analysis used the U.S.
Macroeconomic Model maintained by Global Insight, Inc. The
methodologies, assumptions, conclusions, and opinions in this CDA
Report are entirely the work of CDA analysts. They have not been
endorsed by and do not necessarily reflect the views of the owners
of the Global Insight (GI) model. The GI model is used by leading
government agencies and Fortune 500 companies to provide
indications to policymakers of the probable effects of economic
events and public policy changes on hundreds of major economic
indicators.
[3] One
argument put forward for a bailout is that consumers will not
purchase vehicles from bankrupt companies. We believe that the last
few months of negative press regarding the viability and quality of
the Detroit automakers has done more damage than bankruptcy would.
Indeed, a formal and organized restructuring would probably be a
positive signal to consumers that the Big Three can resolve their
financial difficulties.