The U.S. auto industry is in dire need of a shakeup. All of the
Big Three are beset by plummeting sales and market share, high
labor costs, aging fleets, and a surfeit of innovative automobiles
in the pipeline. With General Motors, and perhaps Ford after it,
facing looming liquidity crises, staying the course is no
longer an option.
But rather than face facts, the auto industry is seeking
yet another government lifeline: a $25 billion bailout on top of
the billions in subsidized loans already approved by lawmakers.
While a bailout promises continued stagnation and decline,
reorganization is the only chance that automakers have to
rebound and survive in the global marketplace.
Rather than throw even more money at the problem to little
effect, Congress and the Administration should let the automakers
take advantage of the same legal process to reorganize that
thousands of other businesses use each year. The bankruptcy process
is designed to address exactly the kind of challenge that the
automakers now face: realizing the full value of assets and
organizations that have been mismanaged and kept from reaching
their potential. Conversely, outside of the bankruptcy process, the
automakers will lack the legal ability, as well as the proper
incentives, to confront their problems, restructure their
operations, and return their assets and employees to productive
service.
A Failing Industry
The auto industry's collapse has been decades in the making. The
combined market share of the Big Three U.S. automakers has been in
decline for more than 35 years, when the oil crisis provided an
opening for more fuel-efficient Japanese cars. In the 1980s, with
the price of oil down, foreign carmakers gained market share
on the strength of their quality, reliability, and prices and
quickly took advantage of the profitable luxury segment of the
market. More recently, foreign automakers simply out-innovated
their American competitors, investing heavily in smart,
fuel-efficient vehicles that Detroit is now struggling to
duplicate.
Those failures in management and leadership have been compounded
by bad operational and governmental policy. Years of protectionism,
such as import restrictions, complex fleet requirements, and
regulations that raise costs for foreign producers, shielded
the Big Three from competition in vital markets but allowed their
creative juices to evaporate. Meanwhile, fat years and government
interference allowed the automakers and their workers to put off
restructuring their labor agreements even as foreign
competitors opened U.S. plants that could produce cars of higher
quality with fewer workers and at less cost.
These "legacy costs" largely remain on the balance sheets
of U.S. automakers, which spend $20 to $30 more per hour on labor
than their competitors, even following minor concessions by
the unions, and, due to inflexible work rules, continue to require
more hours to produce a vehicle. Well aware of the writing on the
wall, the Big Three and the United Auto Workers union have
demonstrated their cynicism in signing on to untenable labor
agreements, under which the companies lose money on most small car
sales, under the assumption that the taxpayers will eventually
shoulder much of the burden.
The Big Three are also burdened with obsolete and expensive
business structures. All are top-heavy with management and
bureaucracy, compared to other manufacturing industries. They
are also bogged down by too many nameplates that, due to state
franchising laws, cannot easily be folded into other brands.
General Motors, for example, currently manufactures and
markets automobiles under eight brands in the U.S., including
Chevrolet, Saturn, Pontiac, and Buick, in a market where few
customers perceive any significant difference among them. When
the company did shut down one underperforming and duplicative
brand (Oldsmobile) in 2004, it had to pay dealerships over $1
billion in "financial assistance" to avoid lawsuits, and four years
later, it is still embroiled in litigation from former Oldsmobile
dealers who declined to accept assistance or settle their claims.
Their antiquated dealership structures also prevent the Big Three
from instituting modern and more flexible inventory-management
practices and selling cars over the Internet.
Already weakened by years of bad business decisions, the
Big Three were hit hard by high fuel prices and the economic
slowdown. Though sales are down across the industry, buyers'
interest in the Big Three's fleets has plummeted. For the first
time in history, Detroit's share of the U.S. market dipped below 50
percent earlier this year, and it has fallen further since
then.
The result has been to bring nearer the day of reckoning for
Detroit. General Motors executives, trolling for a federal
infusion, say that the company has enough cash on hand to last out
the year -- barely -- and Ford has about $25 billion in the bank that
it expects to burn through sometime in 2009. Chrysler, meanwhile,
is majority owned by a private equity fund that may be willing to
reach into its deep pockets, but the automaker's sales are down
sharply over the past year. In sum, the U.S. auto industry's
long-term failure to adjust to market realities has finally
pushed it into a state of crisis.
The bankruptcy Process
The bankruptcy process, as recognized by the Framers of our
Constitution, is an essential piece of the nation's commercial
fabric.[1] It is the means by which competing claims
on assets by creditors are resolved and so is essential to the
operation of credit markets.
Competing claims as a result of insolvency are the prototypical
situation in which bankruptcy occurs. When individuals or entities
reach the point where they are unable to pay bills as they become
due or are, on an accounting basis, insolvent -- that is, their
debts exceed their assets -- they may petition for bankruptcy. The
federal Bankruptcy Code contains several "chapters" under
which one may file. Under Chapter 7, the filer's assets are sold to
pay creditors' claims. This is known as liquidation and, in the
case of a business, results in its demise.
Chapter 11, however, is usually used to reorganize a
business that, but for insolvency, is potentially profitable.
It embodies the recognition that, in some cases, creditors fare
better when a business continues as a going concern rather than
being liquidated. These businesses are likely to be able to
pay off more of their debts if they are reorganized to address
their problems instead of being picked apart by creditors. What
they need is breathing room from the threat of debt collection and
broad power to rearrange their operations. The Big Three, though
they could stand to shed some assets, surely fall into this
category.
Though General Motors is probably not the largest in terms of
assets (Lehman Brothers took that trophy when it entered Chapter 11
in September), its bankruptcy would probably be the most
complex ever to hit the courts.[2] To begin with, the company
has over 250,000 employees, over 300,000 retirees and covered
spouses, a dozen divisions, and operations around the globe. But
with the sale of a majority stake in its financing arm, GMAC, in
2006, and with a 2007 deal to shift tens of billions in unfunded
health benefits to a voluntary employees' beneficiary association
(VEBA) overseen by the United Auto Workers union, several of the
thornier issues have already been removed from contention.
The chief complication will be the number of parties at the
table in any automaker bankruptcy proceeding. In addition to
secured and prioritized creditors, the unions, retirees, dealers,
and even customers could seek to form committees to further
their interests and block concessions that cost them money.
But the bankruptcy process is flexible enough even to
accommodate these clashing interests. Especially in the districts
were large bankruptcies are often brought, such as Delaware and the
Southern District of New York, bankruptcy judges are generally
adept at managing complex cases and wrangling parties.
There would also be several incentives for speed: All parties
would be eager to see a reorganization plan in place quickly, and
the corporation itself would have only an 18-month window of
exclusivity in which to file a plan before the gates are flung
open to others. While that deadline would be a major challenge, it
would also inject some urgency into the proceedings and focus all
of the factions on getting a plan approved and exiting bankruptcy.
In any case, reaching discharge does not require complete
consensus among creditors.
The Benefits of bankruptcy
bankruptcy is not, as some would have it, the end of the road;
it is, rather, a new beginning. Under Chapter 11, it affords
companies that have hit hard times a fresh start and a chance to
reorganize to take better advantage of their assets.
For this reason, dire claims that bankruptcy is somehow
equivalent to the end of a business -- for example, some have stated
that bankruptcy would imperil the employment of all of an
automaker's workers -- are simply incorrect. Instead, the
reorganization process provides unique flexibility to unlock
the fundamentally sound productive capabilities of a faltering
business by freeing it of many obstacles to success, such as
unviable contracts, crushing debt, and poor management.
Reorganization is the right tonic for businesses like the Big
Three that need to adjust quickly to new economic realities but
are, at their cores, sound, productive, and potentially
profitable.
Breathing Room. The benefits of reorganization would
begin immediately with the automatic stay obtained at the moment of
filing. Once a company has filed for bankruptcy, it may suspend
payment of all debts, giving it breathing room to take stock of its
assets and situation.
For a company like General Motors, the stay would put to rest
fears that the company would be unable to meet its current expenses
as they arise. Thus, a filing might actually ease relations with
suppliers who may now be wary of sending parts on
credit -- especially given that Ford and GM's bond ratings entered
junk territory in 2005 and haven't looked back. Further, those who
have contractual duties to the company are required to
fulfill them; thus, an automaker's suppliers and contractors
could not cease dealing with it simply because it has filed
bankruptcy and is undergoing reorganization.
Filing also makes it easier and cheaper for a company to finance
its operations with debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing, which is
given priority over other debts and so presents a low risk of
default. Even in today's relatively tight credit markets, DIP
financing remains available, though rates have risen somewhat.
Nameplates and Dealer Networks. The filing company,
however, does gain the flexibility to reconsider its own
contractual obligations, and this may be the major benefit of
reorganization for automakers. As described above, many of the Big
Three's legacy problems are manifest in contractual relations
governed by unfavorable legal regimes. Among them are excessive and
overbearing dealer networks that are nearly impossible to reform
because of state franchise laws and unrealistic labor agreements
struck under federal labor law. In bankruptcy, however,
everything is on the table.
This power would allow an automaker to reorganize its
dealer network without facing tens of billions of dollars in
potential expenses. To begin with, this means terminating
relationships with unprofitable and underperforming
dealerships. According to Steve Girsky, a former General Motors
consultant, the automaker could stand to drop about 60 percent of
its more than 6,000 dealers.[3] Perversely, this is one reason that there
will be organized opposition to bankruptcy and reorganization, even
though it is in the best interest of an automaker and its
remaining dealers. But the fact of this opposition -- that
dealers believe that, given the option, an automaker would reduce
its dealer network -- simply proves the value of the bankruptcy
process.
Further, an automaker could negotiate new contracts with
remaining dealers to permit more flexibility, such as Internet
sales, integrated inventory management, better customization
programs, and other consumer-driven practices. These changes alone
could dramatically cut expenses while improving focus and
execution.
Cutting down on dealerships also opens the door to consolidation
of nameplates. Out of General Motors' bevy of brands, only two or
three are needed to differentiate, according to Wall Street
Journal Detroit Bureau Chief and industry observer Paul
Ingrassia.[4] A brand stable reduced to just Cadillac on
the high end, Chevrolet in the middle and low end, and perhaps GMC
for trucks would reduce expenses throughout the company and, again,
provide more focus for management, especially regarding
the composition of the company's fleet.
labor Contracts. The bankruptcy Code contains special
provisions for collective bargaining agreements to ensure that
a company's union employees are treated fairly and that the
reorganizing company has the needed flexibility to operate as an
ongoing, profitable business. For the Big Three, downsizing is
inevitable as they adjust to take advantage of automated
technologies, eliminate duplicative and unnecessary functions, and
shrink operations to fit their current market shares, but labor law
and agreements have made doing so impractical. Detroit is
notorious, for example, for its automaker-funded "job bank"
programs that pay unneeded employees not to work, reducing or
eliminating the benefit of closing unprofitable operations.[5]
Without the flexibility to deploy its workforce efficiently,
Detroit has no hope of survival.
Recognizing the great importance of labor relations, the
bankruptcy Code addresses it specifically. Unlike with other
contracts, a business undergoing reorganization cannot simply
reject a collective bargaining agreement. Instead, it must
propose to the union modifications to the agreement that are
necessary for it to achieve a successful reorganization and
that "assure[] that all creditors, the [business] and all of the
affected parties are treated fairly and equitably."[6] In addition, the
business must provide the union with relevant financial information
so that it is able to evaluate the modified agreement.
The parties must then negotiate in good faith in an attempt to
reach a satisfactory agreement. If that proves impossible, the
bankruptcy court may hold a hearing and allow termination of a
collective bargaining agreement if the union unreasonably
rejected the modified agreement and "the balance of the
equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement."[7]
Thus, the bankruptcy judge has significant discretion and
power to push the parties toward an agreement that is mutually
acceptable, conforms to the economic realities, and ensures that
the business is able to return to profitability. For a company in
Chapter 11, and especially one whose unionized employees enjoy
untenable pay and benefit packages, a reduction in labor expenses
is the likely result.[8]
debt Restructuring. One of bankruptcy's chief functions
is to free a potentially profitable business from crushing debts.
This is the "fresh start" that reorganization promises: Pre-filing
debts become unenforceable except to the extent that they are
incorporated into the reorganization plan. A business that can
be run on a positive-cash-flow basis, after all, has a greater
chance of making debtors whole, or nearly so, than one that is
unable to operate due to existing debt.
The automakers are awash in debt. General Motors, for example,
has over $40 billion in long-term debt, while Ford has about $163
billion. Both rely on billions in short-term debt to finance
ongoing operations and have faced soaring interest rates on
short-term and long-term borrowing in recent months due to fear
that they may default.
That fear would be realized in a bankruptcy proceeding, as
some debtors would inevitably face a "cram-down" -- that is, they
would receive less than they are currently owed. It comes with the
territory when making unsecured loans and is compensated by the
risk premium. Much of the companies' unsecured bond debt could be
converted into equity during reorganization.
The reorganization plan, which is usually proposed by the
business, must lay out all of the business's assets and debts
and state how each will be treated under the reorganization. It
must be approved by a vote of at least one class of impaired
creditors -- those who would not be made whole under it. Finally, the
bankruptcy judge must find that the plan is feasible, proposed in
good faith, and in compliance with the bankruptcy Code. These
safeguards ensure that that the approved plan is the best possible
in the situation with respect to creditors' rights and has a high
likelihood of actually succeeding.
New Leadership. A bankruptcy filing is a signal that a
business's leadership has failed those whom it is meant to serve:
the shareholders. Because shareholders lose their equity stake in
most bankruptcy proceedings, the corporation's new owners (its
creditors) are able to revisit the question of board and executive
leadership and frequently to make extensive changes.
For years, America's automakers have been operated without
vision by managers more focused on their ties to Washington than on
their relationship with consumers. Reorganization would provide the
opportunity for the automakers' new owners to choose a different
course and select more entrepreneurial board members from
outside the Big Three establishment. In particular, the Ford family
would stand to lose its controlling minority stake in Ford, which
it has used in recent years to pursue objectives other than
satisfying consumers and achieving sustainable profitability.
The Objections
For all of the debate over a taxpayer bailout for the Big Three,
the bankruptcy option has received very little criticism, even from
bailout proponents. Instead, their arguments address a hypothetical
"do nothing" option in which the Big Three cease operations
within the next year,[9] something that the bankruptcy process would
actually prevent.
To an extent, however, that hypothetical has been conflated with
bankruptcy, and this is both regrettable and misleading. Although
industry insiders are adamant that bankruptcy "is not an option,"[10]
they have offered only a single objection to it. That objection,
and the "do nothing" hypothetical, simply do not undermine the
case for letting our bankruptcy laws run their course.
Consumer Fear. The chief objection voiced to allowing any
of the Big Three to slide into bankruptcy is that consumers
would be unwilling to purchase vehicles made by a corporation that
they fear could not honor warranties or supply parts.[11]
But no automaker that hopes to rebuild a sustainable business
would turn its back on its customers, so there is no reason to
expect that one undergoing reorganization would ignore its
customer's valid claims and expectations, which would be a
recipe for certain failure. There is no incentive, then, for
parties to a bankruptcy to take steps like reneging on warranties
that would undermine the company's business.
Further, the Big Three are advertising dynamos and some of the
biggest media buyers in the country, able to get out the
message that they are on the path to recovery and expect to remain
in business for a long time.[12] A fast reorganization that
restores profitability could even leave potential customers more
confident about an automaker's future than they are today -- perhaps
even more so than a bailout that does little to bolster
confidence.
Shareholder Loss. "Bankrupt" is just another word for
"insolvent," which means that one's assets are insufficient to
cover one's debts. Because most corporations that enter bankruptcy
are already insolvent, shareholders have already effectively lost
their stake in the company -- that is, their shares are worth nothing
or nearly nothing.
The legal bankruptcy process serves, in other words, not to aid
shareholders but to ensure a fair outcome for creditors, who are
competing for shares of a pot of money that is worth less than
their claims. The bankruptcy process, then, usually wipes out
shareholders' stakes and recognizes that the creditors now own the
corporation. While this may be a great psychological loss to
shareholders, it is rarely a significant financial one because, in
most cases, the value of the corporation has declined prior to
filing and most shareholder value has already evaporated.
In the case of General Motors, as of November 13, the
corporation's market capitalization -- that is, the value of all of
its shares -- was well under $2 billion, while Ford's market
capitalization was under $4 billion. By contrast, Apple Inc., the
niche computer maker, was worth over $80 billion. A bankruptcy
filing would merely reflect the reality that these automakers are
in fact bankrupt and their shares therefore worthless.
Job Losses. Big Three and union representatives imply
that failure to provide government funding to the auto industry,
and thus delay its slide into bankruptcy, would cost millions of
jobs -- up to 5.5 million over three years.[13] This figure is misquoted
from an auto industry report that estimates the effect of a "100
percent reduction in Detroit Three U.S. operations" -- in other
words, that the Big Three cease operations within the next year,
which is far-fetched even as a worst-case scenario.[14]
Undoubtedly, reorganization under bankruptcy will result in some
layoffs, but these are necessary to ensure the long-term health and
survival of the industry and to allow it to create jobs in the
future.
It is also important to consider the alternative to
reorganization in bankruptcy: a taxpayer-funded bailout by the
government. By allowing automakers to delay making tough decisions
and restructuring their operations, a bailout would allow the
industry to continue to limp along, bleeding jobs, until
insolvency looms again. Another few years of this
listlessness, however, would leave the industry in an even
weaker state than it is in today, especially if the government uses
it as an outlet for industrial policy, as some lawmakers have
suggested.[15] At that point, even more jobs would be
vulnerable.
There is also the likelihood that a government bailout
would entail unintended consequences, such as those that have beset
AIG (American International Group) since the government rescued it
earlier this year over the objections of shareholders and insiders
who say that bankruptcy would have been a safer, more orderly
alternative.[16] More generally, any bailout will
come with conditions arising from political expediency, from salary
caps for executives to limitations on plant openings and
closings. These will reduce flexibility and, in the end, probably
jobs.
In contrast to the pitfalls of a bailout, reorganization,
while costing some jobs now, is the best option for the industry to
regain its footing and return to growth, including job gains, in
the future.
The End of the Industry. As millions of Americans
have experienced firsthand, bankruptcy is not the end, but a
beginning. The Big Three have highly skilled productive workers and
valuable assets but have struggled to organize them in a way that
results in profitability. This is exactly the kind of challenge
that Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy Code was designed to meet:
realizing the full value of assets and organizations that have been
mismanaged and kept from reaching their potential.
Reorganization, Then Resurgence
When a business reaches the point of insolvency and is unable to
meet its obligations as they become due, it no longer has any good
or easy options. Any path out of insolvency will require making
difficult decisions that affect some stakeholders' interests
and fundamentally alter the nature of the business. That has
nothing to do with the legal process of bankruptcy, but with
economic realities. That the Big Three are running out of cash
simply demonstrates that their business models have failed and that
they must chart a new course if they are to regain any of their
former glory.
The legal bankruptcy process is simply the way that this
imperative is carried out. Chapter 11 reorganization allows
businesses that have run up against adverse economic realities to
change course quickly, avoiding the legal shoals that so often
prevent radical changes outside of bankruptcy. Further,
Chapter 11 requires that this be done in a way that is likely to
succeed and that creates the right process and incentives to start
even the largest corporate reorganizations on their way.
Though they are larger than most businesses, the Big Three present
precisely the kind of scenario that Chapter 11 was designed to
address.
For the Big Three, staying the course -- which political realities
render the only alternative to reorganization in
bankruptcy -- guarantees failure, if not now, then in a few short
years. Outside of bankruptcy, the automakers will have neither the
legal ability nor the incentives or wherewithal to reform their
labor agreements, consolidate their brands, eliminate massive
redundancies, find new leadership, and rethink, from top to bottom,
how they produce and market automobiles.
Delaying these reforms will only lead to a reprise of the
current crisis, except that it will be a deeper crisis and one that
the automakers are less likely to escape. If the Big Three are to
survive and prosper, reorganization in bankruptcy presents their
greatest chance.
Andrew M. Grossman is
Senior Legal Policy Analyst in the Center for Legal and Judicial
Studies at The Heritage Foundation.