Last year, the
Bush Administration and Congress missed an opportunity to
strengthen the Navy's attack submarine fleet when they failed to
appropriate funds that had been authorized for the long lead-time
items necessary to start procuring the Virginia-class attack
submarine at the rate of two per year in fiscal year 2009. As a
result, the Navy will not start procuring two Virginia-class
submarines per year until 2012, and the attack fleet will fall
below the 48 submarines required for meeting operational
requirements at an acceptable level of risk for a 16-year period.
[1]
Without action from Congress, this problem will not solve
itself.
Attack submarines
provide invaluable capabilities to the Navy and the nation. These
ships can gather intelligence, provide surveillance and
reconnaissance, support special operations forces, conduct covert
strikes against land targets with cruise missiles, conduct
offensive and defensive mine operations, and counter enemy
submarines and surface ships. Today, some 40 percent of the
requests for submarine missions from the military's combatant
commanders go unfulfilled.[2]
The Navy, however,
has resisted proposals to advance the higher procurement rate for
the Virginia-class submarines because it believes such a step will
upset its established ship-building plan.[3] Leaving aside the fact that
the higher production rate will reduce the per-unit cost of the
submarines, this argument is valid only if the Navy's long-term
ship building budget is inadequate-a revelation that should not
come as a surprise. The Heritage Foundation calculates that the
Bush Administration's overall defense budget is roughly $400
billion below appropriate levels in the period from FY 2009 through
FY 2012.[4] If an initiative to move to begin the
procurement of the Virginia-class submarines at the rate of two per
year requires the Navy to curtail other elements of its ship
building plan in later years, Congress should provide additional
resources to fund the overall plan.
Several Courses of
Action for Attack Submarine Procurement
Congress and the
Navy have several options for narrowing the forecasted shortfall in
attack submarines, though not all would be equally effective. Given
the severity of the shortfall, some combination of these options
should be explored. The following five options, ranked in order of
the relative contributions they make in addressing the shortfall
problem, are available to Congress and the Navy:
Option #1:
Start the procurement of the Virginia-class submarines at two per
year in FY 2010. Congress would do this year what it failed to
do last year. Last year, Congress had the option to fund the
Virginia-class program to reach the two-per-year construction rate
in FY 2009. Now, the best it can do is to raise construction rate
in FY 2010. This would make the largest contribution toward closing
the attack submarine shortfall. It also promises the largest
reduction in the per-unit cost of procurement.
Option #2:
Provide funding in FY 2008 for "ship sets" that are not tied to
construction of a specific boat. Ship sets are the long-lead
procurement items for the construction of a nuclear-powered attack
submarine like the Virginia-class submarine. A ship set mostly
consists of the nuclear power plant, but also includes additional
components. Industry has proposed to Congress that it provide
roughly $470 million for the procurement of these components in FY
2008 but not tie the procurement to funding for an additional
submarine in FY 2010.[5] This approach would preserve the option of
procuring the second submarine in FY 2010, which Congress could
decide to fund at a future date. If Congress chooses not to fund
the second submarine, the ship set would remain in the inventory
for application to future submarine procurements. This would allow
Congress to preserve the option to increase submarine procurement
rates without committing a path that could destabilize the Navy's
broader ship-building plan.
Option #3:
Shorten the construction timelines. Currently, it takes 72
months to build a Virginia-class submarine. The Navy has stated
that this time can be reduced to 60 months.[6] Shortening the
construction time would allow the same overall production rate to
result in a greater operational capability within a specific
timeframe. Ultimately, it will reduce the time that the Navy's
inventory of attack submarines is below the appropriate level.
Option #4:
Extend the service lives of the existing Los Angeles-class
submarines. The Navy has also suggested this option as an
alternative to increasing the production rate of Virginia-class
submarines.[7] This would entail having some of the Los
Angeles-class submarines enter a service life extensive program.
Such a program would include refueling the boats, which costs about
$200 million per submarine.[8] Extending the service lives of some of the
Los Angeles-class submarines would shorten the time during which
the Navy will field too few attack submarines. These ships,
however, will not be as advanced as the Virginia-class
submarines.
Option #5:
Increase the operational tempo of the attack submarine fleet.
The Navy has suggested extending the deployment time for some
submarines from six to seven months.[9] The idea is that the extended
deployments would allow a fleet of equivalent size to meet more of
the mission requirements imposed on it. This is really a stopgap
measure only practicable for a limited time, under limited
circumstances. Increasing the operational tempo permanently would
impose undue wear on both men and material. If increasing the
operational tempo of the attack submarine fleet did not carry
significant risks, the Navy would be taking this step now.
Conclusion
The Navy faces a
critical shortage of attack submarines, and no single step will
fully mitigate the effects of this shortfall. Congress should not
allow critical mission requirements go unmet. This means that
Congress will have to instruct the Navy to take several steps, the
most powerful of which is to increase the rate of production of the
Virginia-class submarines to two per year starting in 2010. The
Navy is rightly concerned that this may destabilize its broader
ship-building program. Preserving the ship-building program will
likely require Congress to increase the Navy's procurement budget.
Nevertheless, exercising the option to purchase ship sets and other
steps suggested by the Navy will serve to limit these destabilizing
effects. What Congress should not do is assume that the Navy is not
facing a serious shortfall in attack submarines or that the problem
will solve itself.
Baker Spring is F.M.
Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas
and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.