North Korea has
decided to rejoin the six-party nuclear-disarmament talks it walked
out of last year. The world should welcome this decision but also
recognize that it is only an initial step toward North Korea's
denuclearization.
It is important to
keep in mind that the six-party talks are a means to an end, which
is the complete and verifiable removal of Kim Jong-il's nuclear
program. North Korea has made clear through its rhetoric and
actions that it wants to keep its nuclear program. To accomplish
its goals, North Korea has played one country against another using
two strategies: belligerence and negotiation.
The Belligerence
Strategy
For the past year,
Kim Jong-il has tried belligerence, most notably by testing a
long-range Taepodong-II, among other missiles, on July 4 and
conducting a nuclear test on October 8. Kim Jong-il likely sought
to raise the stakes and damage the six-party coalition. If one or
more of America's international partners in the six-party talks
(China, South Korea, Japan, or Russia) blinked in response to the
tests, he believed he could drive a wedge in the coalition.
His belligerent
behavior, however, had the opposite effect and drove the
international coalition closer together, further isolating North
Korea. Moreover, he also angered his closest, and possibly only,
ally-China. Reports indicate that in September, Beijing cut off
crude oil sales to North Korea.
The Negotiation
Strategy
Kim Jong-il failed
at his belligerence strategy and so he now appears ready to return
to the bargaining table. His aim in negotiations will be to
transform the confrontation from its current state-Kim Jong-il
versus an international coalition committed to his country's
denuclearization-to one perceived as being between North Korea and
the United States.
Kim Jong-il almost
succeeded in transforming this standoff into one perceived as being
only between the United States and North Korea by insisting on
one-on-one talks. The Bush Administration resisted both
international and domestic requests to engage in these talks. Now,
Kim Jong-il will try to accomplish his goal by claiming the United
States is being unreasonable on various issues at the bargaining
table.
During
negotiations, North Korea will raise contentious issues-such as
financial sanctions, the sequencing of benefits for North Korea
should it choose to abandon its nuclear program, and the
verification procedures that will be put in place once it makes
that decision-in the hope of splintering the international
coalition.
The issue of
financial sanctions provides a good example of how North Korea
hopes to implement its negotiating strategy. Financial sanctions
are not a part of the nuclear issue. A number of countries-such as
the United States, Japan, Australia, and China-have placed
financial sanctions on Kim Jong-il because he illegally
counterfeits American currency, and likely other currencies. Kim
Jong-il has claimed he will consider denuclearization if these
financial sanctions are lifted.
In other words,
Kim Jong-il wants the world to concede that he has the right to
counterfeit foreign currency; only with that concession will he
consider giving up his nuclear weapons. Some countries, especially
China, see counterfeiting as a minor issue compared to Kim
Jong-il's nuclear program. In China's eyes, an American concession
on this fundamental issue of national sovereignty would be
worthwhile. America, however, should remain firm on this issue and
must make clear to the Chinese and all other countries that North
Korean illicit activities will not be tolerated. Any perception of
weakness in the American resolve on this position could have the
harmful consequence of allowing Kim Jong-il to successfully make
financial sanctions a wedge issue in the U.S.-China approach to
North Korea.
Conclusion
Kim Jong-il has a
lot to gain from negotiating. If he denuclearizes, the
international community would provide him significant direct
financial assistance, which would offset the sources of revenue he
has lost due to the crackdown on his illicit activities, namely
counterfeiting, narcotrafficing, small arms smuggling and so
forth.
Because of his
past actions, however, he must prove that he is serious about
negotiating with the international community and becoming a
responsible national leader. To do so, he needs to take steps such
as withdrawing troops from the Demilitarized Zone, standing down
missiles, and, most significantly, freezing his nuclear materials
and allowing international inspections.
Kim Jong-il's
decision to return to the negotiating table proves that with the
right amount of pressure, he can be forced to change his strategy.
The risk is that the international community will weaken its
strong, multi-country approach aimed at forcing him to
denuclearize. For the process to be successful, China, South Korea,
Japan, Russia, and the United States must work together to keep the
pressure on North Korea.
Michael A.
Needham is Director of the Asian Studies Center at The
Heritage Foundation.