I.
Introduction
Tax distribution tables
have become the predominant tool for analyzing the
distributive effects of tax burdens and benefits from proposed
changes in tax law. However, the use of tax tables for tax policy
analysis is a time-intensive and complicated process that can
be more art than science.
The different economic
assumptions and presentations of data used by the various
groups that release distribution tables have the inherent
consequence of providing the public with numerous tables that are
often used as political ammunition to influence debate. Scholars
have argued that many tax distribution tables are
"tailor-made" to produce a particular result in distribution
tables.[1] At best, the current practice or use of
distribution tables typically provides a misleading sense of
accuracy and an incomplete picture of the actual nature of a
change in tax distribution as a result of a change in tax
policy.
The debate surrounding
President George W. Bush's tax plan of 2001 is one example of how
the use of tax distribution tables can provide an incomplete and
distorted picture. For this proposal, numerous distribution
tables were prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation of the U.S.
Congress, the Office of Tax Analysis of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, advocacy groups, and think tanks. These tables were
routinely published in major newspapers around the country.[2]
However, without a proper understanding of what these
distribution tables show, many important issues were misinterpreted
or ignored altogether. These same issues are sure to rise again as
tax policy proposals are debated in the future.
By comparing
distribution tables that provide alternative perspectives on
President Bush's tax plan of 2001, this analysis examines how tax
distribution tables often can provide misleading results about
the impact of pending tax legislation. These tables rely
excessively on comparisons of various income groups and are
typically used to oppose broad income tax relief and foster
class-warfare notions in tax policy. However, tax distribution
tables typically are defective in several ways that, once
recognized, raise serious questions about their value to
policymakers and the public.
This review is
organized as follows. Section II provides detailed examples of
actual distribution tables that analyzed President Bush's tax plan
as it developed and discusses the problems associated with the
presentation of data in the tables.[3] Section III describes how
averages are improperly used in distribution analysis. Section IV
demonstrates how many taxpayers are misclassified when assigned to
income categories. Section V briefly discusses how distribution
tables ignore the importance of income mobility. Section VI
provides policy recommendations, including 10 useful guideline
questions that users of distribution tables should ask when
evaluating the presentation of distribution tables. Section
VII offers concluding remarks that discuss the implications for
policymaking.
II. Differences in
Distribution Tables
The official sources of
tax distribution data are the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) of the
Department of the Treasury; the Congressional Joint Committee
on Taxation (JCT); and, to a lesser extent, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO).[4] All of these organizations apply different
assumptions and methodologies to the analysis of tax
legislation. In addition, various interest groups and think
tanks release unofficial distribution tables to influence the
policy process and the debate over particular aspects of tax
legislation.
Distribution tables are
constructed based on data sources that sample segments of the
population in order to make inferences about the
population at large, not data sources that count the entire
population like a census. Furthermore, many economic,
incidence, and mathematical assumptions are relied upon in order to
fashion distribution tables. The end results are tables that often
consist of numbers expressed with a high degree of
specificity-down to one or even two decimal places. This
specificity projects a false sense of precision that hides larger
problems just below the surface.
It is well-known to
most taxpayers that tax liabilities often differ among
families with the same income; e.g., most taxpayers know different
families with the same income will experience different tax
liabilities. Differences can occur due to family size, filing
status, whether a taxpayer itemizes deductions or takes the
standard deduction, whether a taxpayer owns or rents, the nature of
a family's income, number of children, and other factors.
Additionally, some families reduce their tax liabilities more
aggressively than others. For example, tax liability can be reduced
legally by contributing to a 401(k) plan, an individual retirement
account, or a medical savings account. However, this is not the
image portrayed by distribution tables.
Distribution tables are
not all created equal.[5] Much information is necessary to
effectively evaluate the distributional change of proposed tax
legislation, such as what items are included in income, what types
of taxes are included/excluded, and over what time horizon the
effects are being measured, among other things. Producers of these
tables use different methodologies, definitions, and presentations
to convey the results of their analyses. Additionally, the concept
of "fairness" is as highly subjective a concept as "income." What
might be fair to some is considered unfair to others. It is
possible to bias the debate on a proposed change in tax policy by
focusing an analysis and presentation of data in a manner that
provides an incomplete or distorted perspective. Research published
in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee studies has
demonstrated that a lack of complete and necessary information is
prevalent with virtually all of the actual distribution tables
released into the public domain.[6]
The following four
distribution tables are real examples of tables released into the
public domain that analyzed various aspects of President Bush's tax
plan as it developed.[7] Though the tables were not all prepared at
the same time, the methodologies and presentations of data are
consistent with those routinely used by the various groups and
provide a useful illustration of the role distribution tables play
in the tax policy process.
-
Table 1 is a copy of a
distribution table prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation
of the U.S. Congress (JCT);
-
Table 2 was prepared by
the Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis (OTA 2000)
under former President Clinton;
-
Table 3 was prepared by
the Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis (OTA 2001)
under President Bush; and
-
Table 4 was prepared by
Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ), a labor-backed advocacy
group.




The point of this
section is not to focus on the numbers and outcomes of the analyses
per se, but on what information is and is not presented and
how the presentation of the information can alter perspectives on
the burdens and benefits of the same plan. [8]
Through this
presentation, the Joint Committee on Taxation shows how much each
income group would benefit in dollars, the amount of tax each group
currently pays, the amount of tax each group would pay in 2006
under the proposed legislation, and the effective tax rate
under current law and under the proposed changes.
Most taxpayers think of
income solely in terms of their wages. Some other taxpayers might
think of income as what they report on their income tax returns.
The JCT uses a relatively easy-to-understand income concept
called expanded income. Of all the income concepts used by the
various producers of distribution tables, the JCT's would be
the most familiar to the public, as it closely relates to income
reported on a federal individual income tax return. Expanded income
includes adjusted gross income (AGI), taken right from the federal
income tax return, plus some government transfers and some
employer-provided benefits. Additionally, the JCT uses as its
unit of analysis a tax-filing unit. The tax-filing unit roughly
corresponds to the filing status of federal income tax
returns.
The data as presented
in the JCT table indicate that the proposed changes are
distributionally neutral. That is, each income group would pay
roughly the same percentage of the tax burden after the proposed
tax change as before. However, see footnote 3 in the table. Here,
the JCT discloses that it has excluded the effects of the estate
and gift taxes, as well as the corporate tax, from their
analysis due to uncertainty over the incidence or who actually
bears the burden of these taxes. Though not completely precise,
excluding any tax from a distributional analysis for which the
incidence is uncertain can actually be more accurate because
including taxes where the incidence is uncertain requires
subjective conjecture by an analyst that can end up distorting the
results.
Missing from the JCT
analysis is the number of units associated with each income class.
Without this information, it is impossible to determine the number
of taxpayers that would receive the benefits listed in the table.
The JCT table does provide information pertaining to the
percentage of federal taxes each income group is estimated to bear
both before and after the proposed change in taxes. The
inclusion of tax shares is an improvement in the
presentation of distribution analysis and provides needed
context, since a complete analysis of the costs and benefits of a
tax change should not be made without an understanding of the
current tax burden. This information illustrates that many tax
relief proposals effectively keep the burden of taxation
relatively the same, even if upper-income groups might receive
a greater nominal dollar benefit.
The JCT table does not
include an average or median amount of tax benefit that taxpayers
in corresponding income groups would expect to receive as a result
of a change in tax policy. Regardless of the JCT's reasoning
for excluding average tax benefits, many opponents of tax relief
legislation favor highlighting the average tax cut that
various income groups can expect to receive. This is because,
due to the very nature of our progressive tax system, even a tax
cut that is a disproportionately smaller percentage for
upper-income taxpayers can result in higher-income groups
(which pay a higher percentage of total federal taxes) receiving a
higher nominal dollar amount of benefit. Opponents of tax
relief legislation, therefore, prefer comparisons of average tax
cuts because they can almost invariably show by such comparisons
that the rich benefit more dollar-for-dollar from even a
proportionate tax cut, enabling "class warfare"
assertions.
Table 2 was prepared by
the OTA under the Clinton Administration and during the
presidential campaign of 2000. Unlike the JCT, OTA prefers to
categorize the units of analysis as families, not taxpayers,
and place them into quintiles based on economic income, not
dollar income levels. This has the effect of broadening the unit of
analysis and lumping together as "families" many taxpayers that
traditionally are not considered families, such as single
taxpayers.
The OTA's use of
families as an income concept groups together tax units with very
different tax liabilities and different abilities to pay.
For example, the OTA aggregates the income of all tax filers in a
household into a single-family unit. This means that the income of
dependents that file tax returns is added to the income of the
primary taxpayers. Therefore, a single "family" taxpayer
with $50,000 of income would be categorized in the same group
as a family with both spouses earning $20,000 and a dependent child
earning $10,000, for a combined "family" income of $50,000.
Obviously, even though these two "families" have similar
incomes, they have much different abilities to pay and, therefore,
to bear a tax burden.
Though this critique
can also partly be applied to the JCT unit of analysis (tax filing
unit), the impact is much greater with the use of "families" as the
unit of analysis. This use of "families" further makes it difficult
to judge both the horizontal and vertical equity of the proposed
changes in tax policy on individual taxpayers.[9]
The main columns of
interest in the 2000 OTA table are the "Average Tax Change" and the
two columns under "Total Tax Change." The 2000 OTA analysis shows
lower-income groups receiving what looks like a pittance in
income tax relief while upper-income groups receive what appears to
be a disproportionate amount of tax relief. The perception that the
income tax relief is skewed toward the rich is further emphasized
in the last column relating to the percent change in after-tax
income.
The 2000 OTA analysis
shows that lower-income groups would receive substantially less of
a change in their after-tax income than higher-income groups.
However, this is due primarily to the current progressive nature of
the U.S. income tax system, whereby lower-income groups pay
little or no federal income taxes.[10] In fact, an estimated
50.6 million tax returns, or 35.6 percent of all tax returns, had
zero or negative income tax liability in 2001.[11]
Though an OTA paper released under the Clinton Administration
states that "the only tax burden measure with some theoretical
basis is the percentage change in after-tax income,"[12]
focusing solely on changes in after-tax income can be misleading
because it implies that the amount of taxes currently paid is
irrelevant to judging the equity of a proposed tax cut.
For example, Chart 1
shows that the entire bottom half (bottom 50 percent) of
taxpayers who reported positive AGI paid 3.97 percent of all
individual federal income taxes in 2001. This means that the
top half of all taxpayers paid 96.03 percent of all individual
federal income taxes. Moreover, the top 1 percent of taxpayers
paid 33.89 percent, the top 5 percent paid 53.25 percent, and the
top 10 percent paid 64.89 percent (almost two-thirds of all federal
individual income taxes paid by taxpayers). It is virtually
impossible to provide a federal income tax cut that does not
benefit the top half of taxpayers, since they account for
virtually all federal income taxes paid. The bottom half of
taxpayers pay almost no federal income taxes; therefore, it is
difficult to provide meaningful tax cuts to this group of
taxpayers.

Unlike the JCT
analysis, the distribution table by the 2000 OTA presents the
proposed tax plan as disproportionately skewed to the
wealthy, thereby reducing the progressivity in the current tax
system. However, without information on how much in income tax
each income group currently pays, it is impossible to assess the
fairness or equity of the tax plan fully. The 2000 OTA estimate
omits such necessary information.
It is important to note
another key difference between the JCT analysis and the 2000 OTA
analysis. The 2000 OTA uses a very broad measure of income
that is unfamiliar to most Americans and even to many legislators.
The "Family Economic Income" (FEI) concept used by the 2000 OTA is
a theoretical attempt to measure income based on a concept
that economists refer to as the Haig- Simons income concept. The
Haig-Simons income concept defines income as the "total value of
rights exercised in the market, together with the accumulation
of wealth in that period."[13] Unlike tangible dollar amounts-such
as wages, dividends, and capital gains-that make up adjusted gross
income, theFEI concept is measured by adding to AGI such items as
in-kind income (e.g., cash transfers and food stamps);
imputed income from durable goods consumption (e.g., imputed
rental income from an owner-occupied home); and accrued (i.e.,
unrealized) capital gains.
The idea behind the
Family Economic Income concept is to impute a cash measure
including as income all forms of value that are not received in
monetary form and are therefore not subject to taxation. In
essence, the economic theory behind the imputation of income under
the Haig-Simons income concept includes as "income" any flow of net
value attributable to the consumption of all durable goods, such as
houses, cars, and washing machines. Under Haig-Simons, "the value
of leisure and unpaid work (such as food grown for home use)"
is also imputed as income to individuals and families.[14]
Besides the imputed value of owner-occupied housing, the
Haig-Simons income concept includes an imputation for personal
interest income, "which includes the benefits of banking services
provided free to customers in lieu of interest."[15] The Clinton OTA
includes some types of imputed income in FEI (e.g., imputed rental
income from owner-occupied housing) but not others (e.g., the value
of leisure).
Additionally, FEI
excludes in-kind transfers such as Medicare and Medicaid,
which often benefit middle- and lower-income groups, even
though the payroll taxes to fund these benefits are
included in the 2000 OTA analysis of tax burden. The OTA's
justification for excluding Medicare and Medicaid is based on
"the difficulty of assigning a value of benefits to the recipient,
and the difficulty of properly identifying recipients."[16]
The OTA faces similar, if not more difficult, problems with
imputing values for unreported income, income from people who
do not file tax returns, and rental income from owner-occupied
housing, but these items are included in the OTA FEI
concept. Many of the imputed additions to income that are included
in the FEI concept consist of non-monetary items that have never
been-and could not logistically be-included in the tax base. If
these items cannot be included in the tax base, it is questionable
why such a measure is used at all for purposes of analyzing tax
policy.
In short, the OTA
Family Economic Income concept and methodology used in the 2000
analysis inflates the income amounts for those families
primarily included in the middle- and upper-income brackets while
lowering their average tax rate. The opposite effect holds for the
lower-income groups. Hence, virtually any broad-based income tax
reduction proposal, as viewed under the 2000 OTA approach to tax
distribution analysis, would leverage the already skewed
presentation to show even greater disproportionate benefits to
the "wealthy" and even less progressivity of any proportional
change.
The table produced by
the OTA in 2001 takes an approach that is markedly different from
the table produced by the 2000 OTA. The FEI concept and quintiles
were replaced by a cash-income concept and dollar-income ranges
similar to those utilized by the JCT. Additionally, this table
presents some new information. For starters, the last column of the
2001 OTA table presents the "Percent Change in Individual Income
Taxes." This column shows that the proposed tax cuts fall as a
percentage of income as income rises. Therefore, in percentage
terms, the lower-income groups would benefit substantially relative
to the higher-income groups. As opposed to emphasizing the average
tax benefit that would result for each income group, the 2001 OTA
table shows the percentage reduction in taxes each group will pay
after the tax change. As with the JCT tables, the inclusion of
income tax shares is an advancement in distributional
analysis.
Also, in the
second-to-last column, the table provides the estimated average
amount of individual income taxes that would be paid under the
proposed tax plan. Presenting the data in this manner, as opposed
to showing only the average tax cut, shows that a member of the
lowest-income group would actually receive a negative tax- mainly
due to the refundable portions of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) and proposed changes in the Child Tax Credit-while a member
of the highest-income group would pay on average more than
$100,000.
Like the JCT analysis,
and as explained earlier, the 2001 OTA analysis excludes estate and
gift taxes from the analysis due to the uncertainty of their
incidence. Also, the 2001 OTA analysis excludes other federal taxes
from the analysis, such as payroll taxes paid by employees, though
it adds the portion of payroll taxes paid by employers to
employee income to place cash on a pre-tax basis. Some economists
believe that all forms of taxes (income, payroll, excise, etc.)
should be included in any analysis of tax policy in order to get a
total understanding of the burden of taxation, since many
lower-income earners pay more in payroll taxes than they pay in
income taxes. However, other economists have argued that
payroll taxes should be excluded from income tax analysis
because payroll taxes and excise taxes are designed to pay for a
present or future benefit to the payer that is not reflected in the
analysis, whereas income taxes finance general
expenditures.
In any event, if
payroll taxes are included in the income tax analysis, then, at the
very least, an estimate of the benefits associated with social
insurance programs should be included in any distribution analysis,
either as income or as a net against payroll taxes paid. As Michael
J. Graetz writes:
As tax-policy analysts
know, when viewed in isolation the social security payroll tax is
regressive, but when benefits are taken into account, the social
security system is quite progressive. Nevertheless, estimates of
the existing tax burden and of changes in tax burdens since 1977
(frequently used as a baseline by CBO) or since 1980 (which marks
the beginning of the Reagan administration) routinely include
payroll taxes without indicating the benefits that they finance.[17]
The table produced by
the OTA in 2000 makes the tax plan appear to overly benefit the
wealthy and give virtually nothing to the lower-income groups. In
contrast, the presentation of the data in the 2001 OTA table
counters opponents of President Bush's tax plan who contend
that it overly and unfairly benefits the wealthy. Even though it
continues to release OTA distribution tables, the Bush
Administration has publicly questioned the limitations of
distribution tables and has noted that a one-year snapshot of the
distributional effects of proposed tax legislation can be
misleading.[18]
The tables produced by
many advocacy groups and think tanks exhibit problems similar to
those discussed above. The table produced by Citizens for Tax
Justice easily tilts in the direction of biasing any debate toward
"class warfare" assertions focusing only on which groups would get
how much while completely ignoring the distribution of the current
tax burden. From the data in Table 4, the CTJ table clearly shows
that upper-income groups would receive a hefty tax break while the
lower-income groups get virtually nothing. However, the tables
produced by CTJ and often cited in major newspapers routinely
fail to discuss or disclose the distribution of taxes under
current law. The omission of data relating to the distribution of
taxes under current and future law makes it impossible to
judge the merits of any tax change and the progressivity of the tax
system. For example, any tax change that actually results in a
proportional 10 percent reduction in taxes for each income group
would appear in a CTJ table as a windfall for the wealthy and a
pittance for the poor, even though all groups would receive an
equal 10 percent reduction in taxes.
Further, CTJ fails to
disclose in this table the income concept used in its analysis and
whether families or tax returns are the unit of analysis. Although
the CTJ table is categorized by quintiles or percentage groupings,
since the total number of taxpayers is not presented, the number of
taxpaying units per income class cannot be determined. There
is also no disclosure on which existing taxes are included in the
analysis (i.e., income, payroll, estate and gift, etc.). The lack
of disclosure in this table should serve as a warning that the
presentation of the data is designed more to support CTJ's
political viewpoints than to illuminate the nuances of the tax plan
and add to the general debate.
III. Misuse of
Averages
Michael Graetz, former
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, argues that "The
current practice of fashioning tax legislation to achieve a
particular result in a distribution table creates the illusion of
precision when such precision is impossible."[19] It is
statistically possible, even probable, based on averages, that some
taxpayers in a given income class would receive no tax cut or even
face a tax increase regardless of the average tax change for their
income group. Furthermore, not only is precision impossible, but
the use of averages misrepresents the central tendency of the
data.
However, it is often
necessary to describe data using a single number. The central
tendency of the distribution of data is a point estimate or single
number that corresponds to a typical, representative, or
middle score for a given set of data. Examples of such
measures are the mean, the median, and the mode.
The mean, commonly
referred to as the average, is the most recognized and easily
understood measure of central tendency. To calculate the
average, the value for each observation in the data is added
together with the others and the sum is then divided by the total
number of observations. Some common uses of averages are batting
averages in baseball and student grade point averages.
The use of averages is
simple and easy for people to understand. However, the use of
averages may not be appropriate if the data exhibit large
variability, there are many outliers in the data, or the data
do not fit the pattern of a normal distribution. This is because
the average as a measure of central tendency can be highly
influenced by extreme values. For example, if all humans were
either 10 feet tall or two feet tall and divided equally between
the two, it would not be helpful to describe humans, on
average, as six feet tall and build all homes and cars as if
all humans were six feet tall.
In the context of tax
distribution analysis, the average is actually the least
representative measure. Chart 2 details the dispersion of 1999
federal income tax returns around the average federal income tax
liability. The unit of analysis is federal income tax returns for
1999, grouped into quintiles by adjusted gross income.[20]
The data are further grouped into three categories: "More than '25%
Above the Average'"; "Within +/- 25% of the Average"; and
"Below '25% Less than the Average.'"[21]

The average federal
income tax liability for the first quintile (the lowest ranked by
AGI) is -$240. (See Table 1.) The amount of tax liability is
negative because so many taxpayers in the first
quintile either have zero tax liability or receive a net
transfer from the government due to the refundable
portion of the Earned Income Tax Credit. Hence, many of the
returns in the first quintile do not actually pay federal income
taxes and, due to the refundable portion of the EITC, many do
not effectively pay payroll taxes.
Additionally, in the
first quintile, only 2.9 percent of all returns reported federal
income tax liability within plus or minus 25 percent of the
average. The most representative grouping in the first
quintile is "More than '25% Above the Average.'" At first
glance, it might be surprising that 78.8 percent of returns in
the first quintile report a tax liability that is greater than
the average. However, as stated earlier, the average as a measure
of central tendency can be highly influenced by extreme
values. Extreme values can be either positive or
negative. For tax year 1999, the maximum refundable credit (or
maximum transfer from the government) was $3,816 or a federal
income tax liability of -$3,816.[22]
Approximately 3.4
million tax returns in the first quintile received a net transfer
of more than $1,000 from the government in 1999, while 12.2 million
reported zero tax liability and 7.0 million reported positive tax
liability. Though 78.8 percent of returns in the first quintile
have tax liabilities more than 25 percent above the average, the
3.4 million tax returns with negative tax liability over $1,000
skew the average. Hence, the average is an inappropriate measure of
central tendency in the first quintile.
Similar to the first
quintile, the average tax liability for the second quintile is
also negative (-$110) and the most representative grouping is
returns with tax liability more than 25 percent above the average.
The average is even less representative in the second quintile
and, therefore, a more inappropriate measure of central tendency,
with only 0.1 percent of tax returns reporting tax liability within
plus or minus 25 percent of the average. Such a small
representation is due partly to the small magnitude of the
average tax liability for the second quintile and the fact
that returns with zero or very little positive tax liability will
be just above the average. The average for the second quintile is
-$106. This equates to a range of plus or minus 25 percent around
the average of -$132 to -$79. Under such a tight range, only 20,000
returns fall into this category-0.1 percent of the
approximately 25.4 million tax returns in the second
quintile.
Though the most
representative grouping in the third quintile is still "More than
'25% Above the Average,'" the dominance declines. Only 43.8
percent of returns fall into this category, and those returns
falling within plus or minus 25 percent of the average increase to
23.9 percent. The fourth quintile exhibits the most normal
statistical distribution, with 43.5 percent of returns
reporting tax liability within plus or minus 25 percent of the
average.
The distribution around
the average becomes skewed once again in the fifth quintile. The
existence of extreme outliers in the fifth quintile raises the
average tax liability to $27,310. The top 1 percent of returns
alone reported an average tax liability over $250,000.[23]
However, and not surprisingly, many taxpayers in this quintile pay
less than 25 percent below the average. In the fifth quintile,
75.2 percent fall into this category. Therefore, the average is an
inappropriate measure of central tendency in the fifth quintile as
well.
Table 5 displays the
average federal income tax liability for all returns and by
quintile. The table also displays the corresponding dollar cutoff
amount for the three groupings used in the analysis for Chart
2. It is interesting to note that many returns up through the third
quintile received net transfers from the government (i.e., reported
a negative income tax liability).

As shown in Table 6,
for tax year 1999, 25.6 percent of all tax returns reported zero or
negative federal income tax liability. This amounts to 32.5 million
tax returns. The 32.5 million returns with no federal income tax
liability is less than the 50.6 million (35.6 percent) with
zero or negative federal income tax liability identified in
calendar year 2001 by the JCT.[24] The difference is based on
the different years under analysis but is due mostly to the fact
that the JCT's estimated number of tax units (142.0 million)
includes both filing and non-filing units. Non-filers are
generally individuals with incomes below the amount necessary to
file a tax return. However, the data used for this analysis are
based only on taxpayers that file income tax returns and do not
include "non-filers." Therefore, the estimated number of taxpayers
with no federal income tax liability is less than the JCT estimate
of 50.6 million.

It is also interesting
to note that there are actually taxpayers in each quintile who
reported zero tax liability on their federal tax returns in 1999.
Table 6 further places into context how the use of averages in
distribution analysis is an inappropriate measure to represent
all taxpayers in a given group. Table 6 displays the number of
federal income tax returns that reported zero or negative
income tax liability in 1999. The data are categorized by quintile
and show the number of returns as well as the percent of returns
for each category.
As previously stated
and shown in Table 6, for 1999, there were over 32.5 million
returns that reported zero or negative federal income tax
liability-25.6 percent of all returns. In the first
quintile, 18.4 million returns, or 72.3 percent, reported zero
or negative income tax liability. The number of returns with zero
or negative tax liability declines to 39.5 percent in the
second quintile and 14.4 percent in the third quintile. In the
fourth and fifth quintiles, there are no returns with negative
income tax liability, but 1.6 percent of returns in the fourth
quintile and 0.2 percent in the fifth quintile reported zero tax
liability.
Note also the number of
returns that receive a net transfer from the government of $1,000
or more. Not only did the returns in this category pay zero federal
income taxes, but many also effectively did not pay any
payroll taxes, as the check from the government canceled the
payroll tax liability for many. For all returns in 1999, 11.1
million, or 8.8 percent, received a net transfer from the
government of $1,000 or more. In the first quintile, almost 3.4
million returns, or 13.3 percent, received a check of $1,000
or more. Notice that more than 6.5 million, or 25.8 percent, of
returns in the second quintile received a net transfer from
the government of $1,000 or more. The greater number of returns
receiving $1,000 or more from the government in the second quintile
over the first quintile is due to the many people in the second
quintile with earned incomes that qualify for the Earned
Income Tax Credit.
The existence of 32.5
million returns-or one-quarter of all federal income tax
returns-that pay zero or negative income tax skews the average and
makes the use of the average misleading. Further, since tax
distribution tables focus predominantly on the "average tax cut"
that each income group would expect to receive, the debate over the
benefits of a tax cut is clouded when one-quarter of tax
returns cannot receive a federal income tax cut because they do not
pay federal income taxes.
Using the same data
that appear in Chart 2, Chart 3 presents a pie chart for the third,
or middle, quintile. As Chart 3 demonstrates, when these categories
are analyzed, the category of "Within +/- 25% of the Average"
is the least representative category.

Regrettably, many
disseminators of tax distribution tables continue to use
averages in their distribution tables despite the inherent
problems with the use of averages. For example, focusing on a claim
that an Administration tax proposal would result in an average
tax cut of $1,083, authors in a Tax Notes article
illustrated how the use of averages can be misleading by pointing
out that "under the administration's proposal, 78.4 percent of
income tax filers and 71.1 percent of income tax payers would
receive less than $1,000."[25]
Shortly thereafter,
these authors released a tax distribution table in the same
publication using the average as the sole measure of central
tendency to characterize taxpayers and purport to show the average
tax cut resulting from the benefits of the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.[26] Presumably, the same
authors that criticized the use of an average tax cut
amount as misleading in one article would similarly be aware
that they were misleading in their subsequent article by focusing
on average tax cut amounts. Many groups, however,
consistently misuse the average in reporting the results of
their distributional analyses.[27]
Tax distribution tables
ultimately focus on how much more or less in taxes income groups
will pay under a change in tax law. As Graetz has also
stated:
All that a
distributional table can show is the total impact on all the
families or couples within the same income classification. This
rather obvious and important point often seems to be lost to policy
makers.[28]
In other words, the use
of averages alone is inappropriate because averages cannot
accurately show the impact on most taxpayers within the same income
classification. Hence, because the majority of distribution tables
that are released focus on the average as a measure of central
tendency, they give the false impression that the average
properly typifies each taxpayer.
As the graphs in this
analysis have demonstrated, using the average as the measure
of central tendency when analyzing or discussing tax policy
initiatives is quite misleading, but this is the basis for
computing projected tax changes in distribution tables. The
use of averages when displaying distribution data for income and
tax liability can mislead the public and cloud the transparency
necessary for the public to evaluate the merits of any proposed tax
plan.
But the use of averages
is only part of the story. Not only is the use of averages as a
measure of central tendency misleading, but so is the use of
quintiles or income categories based on AGI or any other
measure of income. These arbitrary categories imply that the
taxpayers grouped into these categories are similar in economic
status and pay similar taxes. This assumption is far from the
case.
IV. Misclassification
of Taxpayers
It is well known to
most taxpayers that tax liabilities often differ among
families with the same income. This can be because of family size,
filing status, whether a family itemizes their deductions or elects
to take the standard deduction, whether a family pays a mortgage on
their home and deducts the interest expense or rents, the nature of
a family's income, and many other factors. Additionally, some
families are more aggressive than others in reducing their tax
liabilities. For example, this can be done legally by contributing
to a 401(k) plan, an individual retirement account, or a medical
savings account, and in many other ways as well.
The use of averages is
further misleading by the grouping of taxpayers by income measures,
which could suggest that there exists horizontal equity, or close
similarities, among these taxpayers with respect to the amount of
federal tax liability. The suggested correlation that higher-income
taxpayers always have higher tax liabilities is not
necessarily the case. As former Congressional Budget Office
Director Rudolph G. Penner discusses, tax distribution tables
"obscure very large differences in the tax treatment of individuals
within any income group."[29]
While it seems
counterintuitive that a taxpayer in a lower income category can pay
more in taxes than a taxpayer in a higher category, this is
possible because millions of taxpayers have more in common
with each other based on tax liability than they do based on
income. This important fact is ignored in typical tax distribution
tables. It could be suggested that incidents of taxpayers in a
lower income quintile paying more in taxes than taxpayers in a
higher quintile are outliers and should be discarded from the
sample. Not only would discarding these observations fail to
highlight these cases in our tax system, but it would also
fail to enlighten the public that taxpayer misclassification
is actually a problem involving millions of taxpayers, not
just a few extreme cases.
The focus of Chart 4 is
on all tax returns that paid over $1,000 in federal income tax in
1999, ranked by AGI and grouped into quintiles. As the chart shows,
there are millions of taxpayers in the third quintile who pay more
in taxes than is paid by millions of taxpayers in the fourth
quintile. Similarly, there are millions of taxpayers in the fourth
quintile who pay more in taxes than is paid by millions of
taxpayers in the fifth quintile.
Based on Chart 4, Chart
5 shows that there are 4.6 million tax returns in the third
quintile that paid $3,000 or more in federal income taxes,
compared with 5.6 million tax returns in the fourth quintile
that paid less than $3,000, even though these taxpayers are in a
higher income quintile.
Chart 6 sheds light on
a similar story between the fourth and fifth quintiles. Even though
they are in a lower income quintile, 3.3 million tax returns in the
fourth quintile paid more than $7,000 in federal income tax in
1999, compared with almost 4.1 million tax returns in the fifth and
"richest" quintile that paid less than $7,000.
For tax year 1999,
there were roughly 127.1 million federal tax returns. This amounts
to about 25.4 million tax returns per quintile. Chart 5
suggests that, based on a tax liability of $3,000, over 5.6
million taxpayers in the fourth quintile (approximately 22 percent
of returns in the fourth quintile) might have more in common with
20.8 million taxpayers in the third quintile than they do with the
other members of the fourth quintile. Similarly, Chart 6 suggests
that 4.1 million taxpayers in the fifth quintile
(approximately 16 percent of returns in the fifth quintile) might
have more in common with 22.1 million taxpayers in the fourth
quintile than they do with the rest of the taxpayers in their own
quintile.



Ultimately, since tax distribution tables are concerned with
the amount of tax that is currently paid and the amount of tax that
is to be paid after proposed tax legislation is enacted, it is
questionable whether policymakers and the public are best
served by classifying taxpayers into rigid income categories. It is
especially questionable when, based on income measures alone,
millions of taxpayers have less in common with taxpayers of
their own income quintile because the amount of tax they pay is
more similar to the amount paid by taxpayers in other income
quintiles.
However, this analysis
is not suggesting that distribution tables should be
categorized by tax liabilities. Doing so would pose problems
as challenging as those posed by categorizing tax returns based on
income measures. The use of rigid income categories along with the
use of averages can suggest that there is similar ability to pay
and similar tax liability within an income category. This is
wrong.
The point is that
focusing on income measures alone contributes to the illusion of
precision and does not allow for a complete analysis of equity.
Without any understanding or discussion of wealth, debt, or budget
constraints, focusing on income as a measure of ability to pay can
be misleading. The use of income categories without detailed
descriptions of the limitations of the data misleads the public by
suggesting that tax distribution tables are accurate and precise
and that they completely reflect a correct picture of the American
taxpaying population.
V. Income
Mobility
Because distribution
tables are based on an annual period, they fail to account for
income mobility, or the dynamic nature of society where people move
in and out of income groups over the course of their lives. The
significant degree of income mobility is evident in data
released by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and provides
further evidence that tax distribution tables are misleading.
The CEA table is reproduced as Table 7.[30]

The tabulations
indicate a substantial amount of mobility between income
classes over a 10-year period. Taxpayers who remained subject to
the same statutory tax rate in both the beginning year of the study
(year 1) and the final year of analysis (year 10) are shown in bold
along the diagonal. For example, between 1987 and through
1996, 66.2 percent of taxpayers exited the bottom tax bracket (33.8
percent remained; subtracted from 100 percent, this equals 66.2
percent that exited). Over the same period, 76.0 percent
exited the 28 percent bracket, while 50.9 percent exited the top
tax bracket.
According to the
tabulations, 53 percent of taxpayers were in a different tax rate
bracket at the end of the 10-year period. These data show that over
half of all taxpayers studied during the 10-year period
eventually experienced changes in their lives that resulted in
changes in their incomes and moved them to a different income tax
bracket. This movement can be either upwards or downwards.
According to the CEA:
[A]bout 51 percent of
the taxpayers in the top bracket in the first year were in a lower
tax bracket after 10 years. Forty-seven percent of taxpayers in the
top two brackets in year 1 had moved down to at least the 28
percent tax bracket by year 10.[31]
By their very nature,
tax distribution tables show only a "snapshot" of taxpayers at one
specific point in time. They therefore fail to account for the
dynamic nature of income mobility in society. The result is tables
that mislead the public by cementing taxpayers into particular
income groups and failing to indicate "that tax burdens in a given
year may tell a very different story of the distribution of the tax
burden than do measures of tax burdens over longer horizons."[32]
VI. Policy
Recommendations
At this juncture, it is
important to mention a weakness in all distribution tables:
the failure to consider how tax changes alter the after-tax prices
and costs of goods and services, thereby adjusting the relative mix
of inputs used in production, the types of goods and services
businesses offer, and the amount of labor and capital. Tax changes
can alter the economy and can produce broad economic effects
that are not reflected in tax distribution tables, including
changes in economic growth, personal incomes, and consumption.
Therefore, attempts to ascertain the distributional impact of
proposed tax legislation should at least consider the possible
macroeconomic effects through some type of sensitivity
analysis.[33]
Further, although a
broader discussion of the use of the tax code for social policy is
beyond the scope of this review, it is important to note that
distribution tables also generally fail to account for the social
welfare benefits received by various income groups. Though some
producers of distribution tables will account for government
transfers as income, one could argue that they are another form of
redistribution of income that should be netted against tax
liability.
The Earned Income Tax
Credit is handled in this manner by the JCT: Instead of being added
to income, the refundable portion of the EITC is netted
against tax liability. The refundable portion of the EITC is why
many lower-income taxpayers actually have a negative tax
liability.[34] If other cash transfers were treated the
same way, the distribution tables would show lower-income
households receiving a much larger negative tax liability and
greater progressivity in the current tax system.
This analysis has
discussed how tax distribution tables are often presented in
manners that fail to provide a balanced and accurate perspective on
tax policy. Unless there is greater public recognition of both the
art and the science of distributional analysis, tax policy
will be unduly influenced by misleading tax distribution
tables. Although what is considered fair depends on philosophical
and ethical judgments over which people can disagree, the
presentation of tax data within distribution tables often hides or
omits much of the important information that is required if
the merits of any proposed tax legislation are to be
evaluated effectively.
Some scholars might
argue that tax distribution tables cannot accurately summarize the
complex and dynamic nature of income and wealth in the
economy.[35] Other scholars might argue that, due to
the current opaque nature of communicating even the simplest
facts about tax policy to the American public, tax distribution
tables should be abandoned as a basis for legislative
decision-making.[36] At the very least, the discussion
presented throughout this analysis demonstrates that the process,
development, presentation, and release of tax distribution tables
are in need of fundamental reform.
Given that it is highly
unlikely that the use of distribution tables will be abandoned, the
best recommendation is that the public should demand full
disclosure of any and all relevant data. Full disclosure includes,
at the very least, using income measures that are understood by the
public (like cash income or adjusted gross income), providing
median values as well as averages, fully describing any
imputations, conducting sensitivity analyses, disclosing measures
of variance, and fully explaining the limitations of the data
and subsequent distribution tables. But how is the public
supposed to know what questions to ask and what data to
demand?
Although not an
exhaustive list, the 10 questions listed below can serve as a
guide to help the reader unveil important information that is not
always revealed in tax distribution tables and better
illuminate the merits of proposed tax legislation. Anyone who
is unable to answer all 10 questions should ask the issuing group
to provide the missing information. Agencies or groups that release
tax distribution tables that withhold or omit the answers to these
questions, misuse the average as the sole measure of central
tendency, or are based on statistically compromised data sources
should be questioned on the issues of motive, transparency,
accuracy, and reliability.
Only when armed with
the answers to all of the following questions can readers make
informed decisions about the distributional merits of tax
proposals:
1. Is the median
presented as a measure of central tendency, or at least provided in
addition to the average?
2. What measure of
income is used (e.g., Adjusted Gross Income, cash income, or
Family Economic Income)?
3. What taxes are
included in the analysis, and are the taxes used in the analysis
both before and after the effects of a proposed tax change
identical (e.g., income taxes, payroll taxes, estate taxes,
etc.)?
4. How many taxpayers
reside within the displayed income categories?
5. What is the range of
income and tax liability associated with each category?
6. What are the current
and proposed levels of taxation (percent of total taxes paid to the
government) for each income category?
7. What are the current
and proposed effective tax rates for each income
category?
8. What are the ranges
and medians of the amount of tax change that each income group is
estimated to receive after full enactment of the tax
legislation?
9. Are the estimates
presented free of imputations? If not, what imputations have
been made to arrive at the estimates presented in the tax
distribution tables?
10. Are the accuracy
and reliability of the estimates presented in the tax distribution
tables, and are data limitations disclosed?
VII.
Conclusion
In isolation, a tax
distribution table is a poor and incomplete tool with which to test
the merits and fairness of proposed changes in tax policy. A change
in tax policy should not be judged solely on the grounds of whether
or not it benefits one income group more than another.
No distribution table
can be perfect or present every nuance associated with estimated
changes in the distribution of taxes. It is possible to include
enough information so that the results are not presented in a
biased or misleading manner, although there is little assurance
they will not be interpreted and reported in a biased and
misleading manner. Until distribution tables are either abandoned
or reformed, the best defenses against misleading tables are
education and full disclosure of information.
A more transparent
dissemination of data and an insightful understanding of the
"tricks of the trade" will enable policymakers and the public to
achieve a better understanding of tax distribution tables, make
informed decisions about the merits of proposed tax legislation,
and promote a better understanding of tax policy. The result will
be more informed public debates and better tax policy
decisions.
Jason J. Fichtner is
a Senior Economist with the U.S. Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, under Representative Jim Saxton (R-NJ). All views
and opinions expressed in this analysis are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the Joint
Economic Committee, its members, or its staff.
Bibliography
Bradford, David F.,
ed., Distributional Analysis of Tax Policy. Washington,
D.C.: AEI Press, 1995.
Citizens for Tax
Justice, "House GOP Tax Plan: The Rich Get Richer," CTJ
News, released July 27, 1999.
Cordes, Joseph J.,
Robert D. Ebel, and Jane G. Gravelle, eds., The Encyclopedia of
Taxation and Tax Policy. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute
Press, 1999.
Cronin, Julie-Anne,
"U.S. Treasury Distributional Analysis Methodology," U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, OTA
Paper 85, September 1999.
Executive Office of the
President, Council of Economic Advisers, The Annual Report of
the Council of Economic Advisers, together with the Economic
Report of the President. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, February 2003.
Furchtgott-Roth, Diana,
"Abuses of Income Distribution Tables in Tax Policy," Tax
Notes, December 11, 1995.
Gale, William, and
Peter Orszag, "The President's Tax Proposal: Second Thoughts,"
Tax Notes, January 27, 2003.
Gale, William, Matthew
Hall, and Peter Orszag, "Future Income Tax Cuts From the 2001 Tax
Legislation," Tax Notes, February 17, 2003.
Graetz, Michael J.,
"Distributional Tables, Tax Legislation, and the Illusion of
Precision," in David F. Bradford, ed., Distributional Analysis
of Tax Policy. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1995.
Haig, Robert Murray,
"The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects," in Robert
Murray Haig, ed., The Federal Income Tax. New York,
N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1921.
Johnston, David Cay,
"Even for Wealthy, Tax Plan's Benefits Could Vary Widely," The
New York Times, May 15, 2001.
Kessler, Glenn,
"Treasury's Tax Cut Data Can Cut 2 Ways," The Washington
Post, March 9, 2001.
---, "Tax Cut Debate's
Division Problem," The Washington Post, May 17,
2001.
Lee, Andrew, and Joel
Friedman, "Administration Continues to Rely on Misleading Use of
'Averages' to Describe Tax-Cut Benefits," Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, May 28, 2003.
McIntrye, Bob, "Final
Tax Plan Tilts Even More Toward Richest," Citizens for Tax
Justice, May 22, 2003.
Murray, Shailah, and
David Rogers, "Democrats Attempt to Draw Rein as Republicans Study
Wish List," The Wall Street Journal, February 8,
2001.
Parisi, Michael, and
Dave Campbell, "Individual Income Tax Rates and Shares, 1999,"
Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division,
SOI Bulletin, Winter 2001-2002.
Pearlstein, Steven, and
Paul Blustein, "On the Class Warpath," The Washington
Post, February 7, 2001.
Penner, Rudolph G.,
"Searching for a Just Tax System," Discussion Paper No.
13, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, January 14,
2004.
Simons, Henry C.,
Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem
of Fiscal Policy. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago
Press, 1938.
Schlesinger, Jacob M.,
and John D. McKinnon, "Bush Plan Gives Rich Biggest Cut in Dollars
But Not in Percentage," The Wall Street Journal, November 5,
2000.
Sullivan, Martin, "Zen
and the Art of Reading Distribution Tables," Tax Notes,
March 26, 2001.
United States General
Accounting Office, Quantitative Data Analysis: An
Introduction, GAO/PEMD-10.1.11, June 1992.
United States Internal
Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Bulletin, Fall
2001.
United States
Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation, Updated Distribution of
Certain Federal Tax Liabilities by Income Class for Calendar Year
2001, JCX-65-01, August 2, 2001.
---, Distributional
Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1836, JCX-52-01,
May 26, 2001.
---, Methodology
and Issues in Measuring Changes in the Distribution of Tax
Burdens, JCS-7-93, June 14, 1993.
United States
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "A Guide to Tax Policy
Analysis: Problems with Distributional Tax Tables," January
2000.
---, "A Guide to Tax
Policy Analysis: The Central Tendency of Federal Income Tax
Liabilities in Distributional Analysis," May 2000.
---, "The Misleading
Effects of Averages in Tax Distribution Analysis," September
2003.
---, "A Comparison of
Tax Distribution Tables: How Missing or Incomplete Information
Distorts Perspectives," December 2003.
United States
Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, "Treasury
Releases Distribution Table for the President's Tax Relief
Plan," Treasury Press Release PO-79, March 8, 2001.
---, "Major Provisions
Passed by the House Ways and Means Committee," Released in a letter
to Congressman Bill Archer, July 17, 2000.
Urban-Brookings Tax
Policy Center, "Table 5.1-Conference Agreement on the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003: Distribution of
Income Tax Change by AGI Class, 2003," May 22, 2003.
Weber, Mike, United
States Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income
Division, "General Description Booklet for the 1999 Public Use Tax
File," January 28, 2003.
[1]See, for example,
Diana Furchtgott-Roth, "Abuses of Income Distribution Tables in Tax
Policy," Tax Notes, December 11, 1995.
[2]See, for example,
Jacob Schlesinger and John McKinnon, "Bush Plan Gives Rich Biggest
Cut in Dollars But Not in Percentage," The Wall Street
Journal, November 5, 2000; Steven Pearlstein and Paul Blustein,
"On the Class Warpath," The Washington Post, February
7, 2001; Shailah Murray and David Rogers, "Democrats Attempt to
Draw Rein As Republicans Study Wish Lists," The Wall Street
Journal, February 8, 2001; Glenn Kessler, "Treasury's Tax Cut
Data Can Cut 2 Ways," The Washington Post, March 9,
2001; David Cay Johnston, "Even for Wealthy, Tax Plan's Benefits
Could Vary Widely," The New York Times, May 15, 2001; and
Glenn Kessler, "Tax Cut Debate's Division Problem," The
Washington Post, May 17, 2001.
[3]The debate
surrounding the 2001 tax plan, beginning with the 2000 presidential
campaign of George W. Bush and advanced under his presidential
Administration, was chosen because it offers a unique opportunity
to compare distribution tables released by a Democratic and
Republican Administration analyzing similar tax
proposals.
[4]For a more
detailed discussion of their respective roles, see Michael J.
Graetz, "Distributional Tables, Tax Legislation, and the Illusion
of Precision," in David F. Bradford, ed., Distributional
Analysis of Tax Policy (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1995), p.
20.
[5]Readers
interested in further exploring these important differences are
encouraged to review the following references: Martin A. Sullivan,
"How to Read Distribution Tables," Tax Notes, March 26,
2001; U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "A Guide to Tax
Policy Analysis: Problems With Distributional Tax Tables," January
2000; and Bradford, ed., Distributional Analysis of Tax
Policy.
[6]See, for example,
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "A Guide to Tax Policy
Analysis: Problems with Distributional Tax Tables," January 2000;
"A Guide to Tax Policy Analysis: The Central Tendency of Federal
Income Tax Liabilities in Distributional Analysis," May 2000;
"The Misleading Effects of Averages in Tax Distribution Analysis,"
September 2003; and "A Comparison of Tax Distribution Tables: How
Missing or Incomplete Information Distorts Perspectives," December
2003.
[8]The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) did not prepare any tax distribution tables
that were subsequently publicly released during this period. Hence,
CBO is not represented below.
[9]Horizontal equity
refers to a principle of judging the fairness of taxation, which
holds that taxpayers who have the same income should pay the same
amount in taxes. Vertical equity is another principle of judging
fairness and holds that, in a progressive tax system, taxpayers
with higher incomes should pay higher levels of taxes.
[10]Joint Committee
on Taxation, "Updated Distribution of Certain Federal Tax
Liabilities by Income Class for Calendar Year 2001," JCX-65-01,
August 2, 2001.
[12]Julie-Anne
Cronin, "U.S. Treasury Distributional Analysis Methodology," U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, OTA
Paper 85, September 1999, p. 34.
[13]Robert Murray
Haig, "The Concept of Income: Economic and Legal Aspects," in R. M.
Haig, ed., The Federal Income Tax (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1921), and Henry C. Simons, Personal Income
Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal
Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).
[14]Jane G. Gravelle,
"Imputed Income," in Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel, and Jane G.
Gravelle, eds., The Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1995), p. 168.
[16]Cronin, "U.S.
Treasury Distributional Analysis Methodology."
[17]Graetz,
"Distributional Tables, Tax Legislation, and the Illusion of
Precision," p. 66.
[18]Executive Office
of the President, Council of Economic Advisers, The Annual
Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, together with the
Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, February 2003), Chapter 5.
[19]Graetz,
"Distributional Tables, Tax Legislation, and the Illusion of
Precision," p. 18.
[20]The data used in
this study are from the Internal Revenue Service-Statistics of
Income Division Public Use File for tax year 1999, the most
recently available public use file at the time this research was
performed. For a full description of the IRS Public Use File,
including sampling error and disclosure avoidance procedures, see
Mike Weber, U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of
Income Division, "General Description Booklet for the 1999 Public
Use Tax File."
[21]For example, if
the average were $100, then "More than '25% Above the Average'"
would include returns with tax liability greater than $125; "Within
+/- 25% of the Average" would include $75-$125; and "Below '25%
Less than the Average'" would include returns with tax liability
below $75.
[22]Joint Economic
Committee estimates based on SOI Public Use File Tax Year
1999.
[23]Michael Parisi
and Dave Campbell, "Individual Income Tax Rates and Shares, 1999,"
Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, SOI
Bulletin, Winter 2001-2002. pp. 34 and 35. (Total income tax
reported for top 1 percent equals $317.4 billion divided by 1.26
million returns in the top 1 percent.)
[24]Joint Committee
on Taxation. "Updated Distribution of Certain Federal Tax
Liabilities by Income Class for Calendar Year 2001."
[25]William Gale and
Peter Orszag, "The President's Tax Proposal: Second Thoughts,"
Tax Notes, January 27, 2003, p. 607.
[26]William Gale,
Matthew Hall, and Peter Orszag, "Future Income Tax Cuts from the
2001 Tax Legislation," Tax Notes, February 17,
2003.
[27]See, for example,
Andrew Lee and Joel Friedman, "Administration Continues to Rely on
Misleading Use of 'Averages' to Describe Tax-Cut Benefits," Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, May 28, 2003; Bob McIntrye, "Final
Tax Plan Tilts Even More Toward Richest," Citizens for Tax Justice,
May 22, 2003; and Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, "Table
5.1-Conference Agreement on the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003: Distribution of Income Tax Change by
AGI Class, 2003," May 22, 2003.
[28]Graetz,
"Distributional Tables, Tax Legislation, and the Illusion of
Precision," p. 45.
[29]Rudolph G.
Penner, "Searching for a Just Tax System," Urban-Brookings Tax
Policy Center, Discussion Paper No. 13, January
2004.
[30]Council of
Economic Advisers, The Annual Report of the Council of Economic
Advisers, together with the Economic Report of the
President, February 2003, p. 199.
[33]A sensitivity
analysis is used to ascertain how the output results of a model
depend upon input parameters, including the time period under
analysis and the measurement of variables. A sensitivity analysis
is necessary to check whether the results are sensitive to the
assumptions upon which the model is based and is an important
method for assessing the quality, consistency, and reliability of
an analysis.
[34]Joint Committee
on Taxation, "Updated Distribution of Certain Federal Tax
Liabilities by Income Class for Calendar Year 2001."
[35]See, for example,
Furchtgott-Roth, "Abuses of Income Distribution Tables in Tax
Policy."
[36]See, for example,
Graetz, "Distributional Tables, Tax Legislation, and the Illusion
of Precision," pp. 75 and 76.