Federal Homeland Security: A Progress
Report
After September 11, the immediate focus of
the Bush Administration was to protect the country from further
terrorist threats, to assess the resources available for protecting
the homeland, and to establish a budget for homeland security.
Since the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security last
October, the Administration and Congress have sought to address a
number of serious concerns. The President included innovative
proposals in his first homeland security budget, for example, to
improve the way Washington assists first responders and improve the
nation's stockpile of medications. New customs initiatives and
agreements with America's trade partners sought to improve
commercial security. State and local governments were integrated
more fully into federal security strategies for everyday concerns
and special events. And a new warning system was developed to
communicate information about potential terrorist threats.
It
is President Bush's proposal for the creation of a Department of
Homeland Security, however, that will have the greatest effect by
funneling federal resources more effectively to the mission of
homeland defense. Consolidating most of the 100 federal agencies
with homeland security responsibilities into one department
represents the most massive restructuring of the federal government
since World War II. The Office of Homeland Security, which has
become an important advisory body for the President on reorganizing
the government, should continue to serve this function, working
independently from and cooperatively with the new department to
coordinate federal homeland security policy among the remaining
agencies. Nevertheless, until Congress
addresses the specific details of such a reorganization, it remains
to be seen how successful the President's reorganization will be in
preventing other attacks on America.
Congress has also contributed to homeland
security. In the days after September 11, Members proposed scores
of bills, amendments, and resolutions related to the attacks, but enacted only a small
percentage of them. Congress passed and the President signed the
USA PATRIOT Act and the Aviation Security Act last fall, and the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (P.L. 107-173)
earlier this year. Each of these laws is designed to address
fundamental security challenges facing the country. The USA PATRIOT
Act gives law enforcement the ability to combat terrorists with
21st century technology. The Aviation Security Act and the Border
Security Act seek to make it more difficult for terrorists and
their weapons to enter the country.
Meanwhile, OHS Director Tom Ridge is
planning to deliver a national strategy for homeland security to
the President by early July, and Congress will soon begin to work
out the details of the new department proposed by the President.
But these efforts, as well-intentioned as they are, are still only
the first steps the federal government must take to improve
homeland security. Understanding what needs to be done next
requires a closer look at what has been done to date.
Coherent Budget Priorities for Homeland
Security
Last
February, before announcing his intention to create a new
Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, the President
released his fiscal year (FY) 2003 budget request, which included
funding for homeland security. This is the first budget proposal
ever submitted by a President that seeks to coordinate and
prioritize the homeland security policy, and it will be the
starting point against which future budgets are measured.
For
2003, the President has outlined four new initiatives to address
areas where federal policies before September 11 were particularly
weak:
- Using
21st century technology to secure the homeland of the future,
- Supporting first responders,
- Defending against bioterrorism, and
- Securing America's borders.
These four areas account for approximately
55 percent of the $37.7 billion homeland security budget request.
They include a tenfold increase in assistance for first responders
and a 319 percent increase in bioterrorism preparedness.
The
President's FY 2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations request
supports and accelerates the implementation of these initiatives.
He has requested $327 million for Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) first responder programs and over
$40 million for Department of Justice border security programs.
This type of planning and funding would begin to remedy the
traditional lack of resources or uniformity in these core
areas.
President Bush and OHS Director Ridge have
demonstrated their willingness to tackle the most difficult
homeland security problems facing the United States. For example,
over a half dozen federal agencies currently operate grant and
training programs to support first responders, but these programs
are neither coordinated nor driven by a common goal. As the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore
Commission) reported last December, this disjointed approach
reduces the effectiveness of federal assistance.
Rather than request more money for a
dysfunctional program, the President's First Responder Initiative
provides focus for federal first responder assistance. The
Administration wants to consolidate federal assistance for first
responders within FEMA. The Office of National
Preparedness has been created in FEMA to manage this initiative and
is in the process of developing guidelines for more efficient
implementation. The newly organized and improved FEMA would also
come under the authority of the new DHS, further consolidating and
streamlining federal assistance programs for first responders. The
President's proposal for DHS also recommends the transfer of the
Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) from the Department of
Justice to FEMA.
The
Department of Justice has not actively fought this proposal,
despite the potential loss of $3.5 billion in the FY 2003 budget.
One reason may be the role OHS Director Tom Ridge is providing in
advising the President on homeland security. Many skeptics had
predicted that the entrenched federal bureaucracies and their
Senate-confirmed leaders would resist initiatives developed by a
presidential appointee who lacks statutory authority. Even critics
now admit, however, that Ridge "has had his greatest success in the
budget and personnel process," the very
areas where they thought he would fail. While the creation of DHS
may foster fierce turf battles in Washington, the end result may
demonstrate that the OHS Director can effectively direct federal
homeland security money as well as the efficient reorganization of
the federal government to enhance security.
The
FY 2003 budget request for homeland security also illustrates the
Administration's priorities, such as working with state and local
governments to address the concerns of America's communities. While
the federal government can do many things to make the nation more
secure, many essential tasks remain the responsibilities of state
and local governments and the private sector. Instead of dictating
what they must do, the Administration is encouraging an active
partnership based on cooperation.
This
focus on state and local partnerships should result in tighter
implementation, more innovation, and long-term attention to the
mission. The establishment of a division within the Department of
Homeland Security that is committed to working with state and local
governments, as the President proposes, would encourage this
process, giving communication across the levels of government a
high priority. It would facilitate first responder exercises,
strategic planning, vulnerability assessments, prevention, and
other homeland security efforts.
Stockpiling Pharmaceuticals
In
the wake of the September 11 and anthrax attacks, the
Administration made clear that America's lack of preparedness for
biological terrorism is an unacceptable vulnerability. In less than
two months, the Administration requested an additional $1.5 billion
for FY 2002 to decrease that vulnerability. These funds are being
used to build up federal and state pharmaceutical stockpiles,
expand America's smallpox vaccine supplies, expedite the Food and
Drug Administration's pharmaceutical development activities,
increase bioterrorism preparedness at the local level, expand the
response capabilities of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), and improve food safety. The
Administration should be applauded for quickly laying the
groundwork in this important area.
Stockpiling vaccines is a vital part of
the nation's anti-bioterrorism strategy. Early treatment is vital,
as the anthrax strike showed. The Administration has been most
successful thus far in building up the nation's stockpile of
smallpox vaccine.
On
September 11, the national stockpile contained 15.4 million doses,
which is woefully inadequate for a population of nearly 300 million
people. In November 2001, HHS awarded a contract of $428 million to
Acambis Inc. to produce 209 million doses by the end of 2002. On
March 28, 2002, HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson announced that the
existing U.S. supply of the vaccine could be diluted up to five
times and still retain its potency--essentially expanding the
existing vaccine supply from 77 million doses to up to 150 million
doses. The next day, the French firm of Aventis Pasteur announced
that it would donate more than 75 million doses stockpiled in its
Pennsylvania facility for the past 30 years.
Thus, thanks to the establishment of
reducing America's vulnerability to smallpox as a national
priority, by the end of 2002 there will be more than enough vaccine
available to protect all Americans from a smallpox attack.
In
the event that future terrorists use contagious agents such as
smallpox, such an approach will be instrumental in limiting the
outbreak. The new Department of Homeland Security must play an
important role in executing such a strategy for early treatment, as
well as maintaining pharmaceutical stockpiles.
Strengthening America's Borders
The
old axiom that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans secured the United
States from many foreign threats was disproved on September 11. The
19 terrorists involved that day were able to enter the United
States legally (though three had overstayed their visas). It became
clear that the U.S. border is porous not only to terrorists wishing
to enter, but to their weapons, including weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). One easy mode of entry has been the nation's
seaports: As of early this year, less than 2 percent of the over 11
million cargo containers entering the United States every year were
inspected.
The
United States cannot completely close its borders, and stifling
immigration and travel contradicts the free and open nature of
America's democracy. Moreover, conducting comprehensive inspections
of every person and cargo container entering the United States
would be extraordinarily expensive and damaging to the economy. The
Administration has faced a daunting task in making the borders more
secure against those wishing to cause the country harm while
remaining open to legitimate travel and trade. It has adopted a
multi-pronged approach, relying on both traditional means (such as
new immigration regulations and additional border security
officers) and innovative approaches (such as using advanced
technology, signing new international agreements, and establishing
public-private partnerships on security issues).
One
of the hallmarks of the Administration's border security policy
since September 11 is the signing of Smart Border Agreements with
Canada and Mexico in December 2001 and March 2002, respectively.
These agreements, negotiated in large part by Governor Ridge,
include all of the traditional and innovative measures mentioned
above and serve the unique economic and security relationships that
the United States has established with its two neighbors.
Immediately after September 11, economic relations with these North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners--valued at nearly $1
trillion--appeared in jeopardy as long lines grew at America's
ports of entry. In fact, since September 11, Mexico has seen a 20
percent decline in trade with the United States.
The
Smart Border Agreements attempt to alleviate that pressure. First
and foremost, both agreements include new intergovernmental customs
standards and public-private partnerships to speed non-threatening
people and products across the border and allow border security
officials to focus on less secure travelers and goods. Companies
that enter the program will be permitted on the accelerated
inspection lanes at enhanced ports of entry. They must first
satisfy the government that their entire supply chain, from
manufacturing to the showroom floor, is secure. The first such
operational port is in Detroit near the border with Windsor,
Ontario. At least 100 companies have already applied to be part of
this program.
While improved security at points of entry
will make transporting personnel or material over the northern and
southern borders more difficult, terrorists can still use points
along America's unguarded borders. To address this, the Smart
Border Agreements also include provisions for sharing intelligence
and immigration information and coordinating visa and asylum
policies.
The
specific provisions of these agreements are in varying degrees of
implementation, but significant progress has been made, and
Governor Ridge continues to work with his Canadian and Mexican
counterparts. Having a similar security standard in all three
countries will make it more difficult for terrorists and their
weapons to enter each one.
The
Smart Border Agreements also can serve as a model for securing
global trade and commerce. Point-of-origin inspections of cargo and
travel documents that cannot be easily forged will help secure
trade and travel with all of America's friends and allies. The U.S.
Customs Service recently unveiled the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) to provide similar advantages to
security-minded foreign companies from nations that trade with the
United States. C-TPAT rewards companies that ensure the security of
their supply chain, regardless of their location, by accelerating
processing of their products at Customs inspections stations at the
ports of entry. This enhanced point-of-origin inspection system
would allow Customs inspectors to focus on cargo originating from
sources that are a greater risk because their security measures are
not known.
The
Administration also has sought to strengthen federal agencies
responsible for securing the border. The President's FY 2003 budget
request seeks a substantial increase in border security personnel
(1,160 Immigration and Naturalization Service inspectors and 570
Border Patrol agents) as well as a tenfold increase in the federal
investment in developing an entry-exit monitoring system.
Congress has made border security a
priority as well after September 11. The USA PATRIOT Act, passed
last October, provides additional personnel for securing the
northern border, includes a sense of Congress that a mechanism is
needed to monitor entry and exit of visa holders, requires the FBI
to share more information with the Department of State, and makes
it more difficult for terrorists to enter the country and easier to
deport them by redefining the definition of terrorist activity for
immigration purposes.
On
May 14, the President signed the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Reform Act of 2002, which takes the next step in improving border
security. Specifically, it authorizes appropriations for additional
border security personnel and technology, requires that the law
enforcement and intelligence community better share terror-related
information with the Consular Affairs division of the State
Department and INS, establishes additional requirements for INS
implementation of an entry and exit monitoring system, restricts
visas to citizens of countries designated as state sponsors of
terrorism, reforms the visa waiver program, and establishes a
program for monitoring foreign students studying in the United
States.
Consolidating all agencies responsible for
securing the nation's borders--including the services of the Border
Patrol, INS, the new Transportation Security Agency, and Visa
Processing--under a new DHS would help to ensure that border
security personnel are more adequately prepared and better
organized to deal with terrorist incidents.
Developing a Partnership with State and
Local Governments
As
noted above, both the President and the OHS Director consider the
involvement of state and local governments in the development of a
coherent homeland security strategy a priority.
Improving communications between local,
state, and federal authorities, as well as the private sector, will
foster the development of a coherent national strategy and educate
officials about what each sector can expect of the other. How a
fireman in Nebraska views homeland security may be quite different
from how a Washington bureaucrat sees it. An agreed upon, or at
least a recognized, vision or definition is necessary before a
strategy can be implemented across all jurisdictional
boundaries.
To
facilitate communication and coordination among the federal, state,
and local governments, the Administration has established the
Office of National Preparedness under FEMA. This is an important
first step in creating the framework by which local authorities can
consult with and receive support from the federal government. A key
component of the President's proposed Cabinet-level DHS is an
intergovernmental affairs office that would consolidate and
streamline relations and coordinate federal programs with state or
local governments. Having one primary contact at the federal level
would greatly facilitate the dissemination of information to the
states and local authorities.
Such
lines of communication are already being put in place. FEMA
recently sought input from state and local authorities, for
example, on how it should spend the $3.5 billion set aside for the
First Responder Initiative. It held a listening session with over
50 representatives from the first responder community and relevant
federal agencies.
In a
similar outreach effort, the OHS had provided a 45-day comment
period to get feedback for its terror alert system. The office has
held less formal meetings with members of the homeland security
community and also has addressed numerous state and local
associations, such as the National Governors' Association and the
U.S. Conference of Mayors.
The
burden of preparedness ultimately falls to the political leaders of
each city and state in the United States. Leaders such as those in
Baltimore and New York who have taken the initiative to increase
the security of the citizens they represent have found that there
are federal tools available to help them. The new department, once
established, would be able to improve these tools and make them
more available, in addition to facilitating communication among all
levels of government.
Securing America's Public Gatherings
In
1998, President Bill Clinton issued a presidential decision
directive (PDD 62) to, among other things, address "National
Special Security Events." These are high-profile events
of national interest that attract national and international media
and often thousands of people and are considered high security
risks. The presidential directive established a framework for the
coordination of federal, state, and local counterterrorism efforts
at these events. Once an event is assigned this designation, the
Secret Service becomes the lead federal agency working with local
and state authorities to develop and execute a security
strategy.
Since September 11, the "Special Event"
designation has taken on new importance. In two recent cases, the
Administration has had success in working with local and state
authorities to ensure the public safety. The 2001 Super Bowl and
the 2002 Winter Olympics provided especially complex security
environments. In both instances, good planning, willing
cooperation, and proper training resulted in safe events. A total
of 5,000 to 7,000 local, state, and federal security personnel were
on duty at the Winter Olympics, while at the Super Bowl, about
3,000 individuals, including representatives of
the National Football League, the FBI, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
the Louisiana State Police, the Louisiana National Guard, the New
Orleans police, and private individuals, cooperated on security. By all accounts, security was
stellar.
These successes show the homeland security
community, across all levels of government and the private sector,
how to train and prepare for large-scale events. Further, they
demonstrate the importance of having a guiding framework, such as
PDD 62, that delegates responsibilities among the agencies
involved. The creation of a Cabinet-level Department of Homeland
Security would streamline this framework by placing the Secret
Service under the direct authority of the Secretary of Homeland
Security. The Secret Service would retain its primary mission--the
protection of the President and key government leaders--while
allowing its unique and highly specialized expertise to complement
the activities of the new DHS.
Improving Communication and Warning
The
new Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) announced by Governor
Ridge in March should greatly improve communication between the
federal government, state and local officials, and the public once
it is fully implemented. Though frequently ridiculed, this system
will fill a major communications void once it is tied to specific
actions.
The
warnings themselves highlight the need for such a well-defined
categorization of threats. Late last year, the FBI issued a warning
to Governor Gray Davis of California that it had uncovered a
"credible" threat to a number of bridges in that state. The
governor took the threat warning to be more severe than the FBI had
intended and, in the view of some observers, overreacted. The
failure was not in Governor Davis's response, but in the
miscommunication. Similarly, in April, after the FBI had warned
banks in the Northeast of potential terrorist attacks, the response
was not uniform; some banks closed while others remained open. The
FBI failed to coordinate its warning to the banks with a public
relations strategy to ensure that the public knew what was
happening and how seriously the warning was to be taken. The HSAS
should provide detailed mobilization plans and a coordinated public
relations strategy when it considers releasing a general
warning.
The
FBI, in coordination with OHS, should continue to work on this
system. However, with its specific homeland security mission, the
new Department of Homeland Security would be better positioned to
operate it. The system should be incorporated into DHS operations,
and a permanent office should be established to manage it.
Top Priorities for the Remainder of
2002
Improving the Dissemination of
Intelligence
The
intelligence community has been the object of increased scrutiny
since September 11, with criticism focused largely on the inability
of the agencies to predict the attacks. However, even if
substantial information were available, unless agencies within the
intelligence community can share information across departmental
and agency boundaries, an accurate assessment of threats to
national security is not possible.
Before September 11, various intelligence
agencies had identified specific al-Qaeda operatives as possible
terrorists. But the breakdown in interagency communication allowed
two people on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) watch list to
board commercial planes and hijack them. The CIA's intelligence on
Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi was not collated with that of
other agencies (Alhazmi was in the United States on an expired
visa) or made available to the end user, in this case the airline
reservation system. None of this information was linked because no
single agency was tasked with piecing together the bits of
information on potential terrorists into a single recognizable
picture.
There are numerous agencies and
departments at the federal level that either monitor terrorist
activity or respond to terrorist attacks. The Department of Justice
controls the FBI, INS, and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
At the CIA, there is an all-source intelligence collection agency,
the Counter Terrorism Center (CTC), which is restricted to
collecting foreign intelligence. FEMA and the CDC in HHS are
essential first responders in the event of an attack. The
Department of the Treasury and the Coast Guard also have pieces of
the counterterrorism intelligence puzzle.
If
U.S. intelligence gathering is to be effective, the federal
government must be able to look at all available pieces of the
terrorist puzzle and provide the President with a comprehensive and
timely analysis. Intelligence fusion for the country is currently
the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
who has the resources of a Community Management Staff (CMS), a
dedicated Deputy for Collection, and a dedicated Deputy for
Production. Although the CMS is responsible for making
organizations share intelligence, before September 11, the CMS and
the primary agencies of the intelligence community (the CIA, the
FBI, and the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Energy, and State)
failed to ensure intelligence sharing. With the Office of Homeland
Security, the proposed DHS would be responsible for ensuring that
homeland security-related intelligence is shared.
The
President has proposed a number of new policies to promote such
information sharing. The most important is a new center to fuse and
analyze terrorism-related intelligence within the Department of
Homeland Security. The fusion aspect of this center would remedy
part of the problem of compartmentalization that still
characterizes the collection of intelligence. The fusion center
should ensure that intelligence is not only collected and analyzed,
but also disseminated to appropriate federal, state, and local
agencies with homeland security missions, including the FBI and
CIA. If DHS's intelligence office does not further the sharing of
information, it will likely create another stovepipe that further
compartmentalizes the intelligence.
Other steps taken after September 11
include daily briefings of the President by FBI Director Robert
Mueller and DCI George Tenet. Each now knows what is at the top of
the other's agenda. In addition, federal intelligence agencies
conduct two secure videoconferences each day to discuss information
related to terrorist threats.
These are good first steps that will
improve information sharing at a number of levels. However, they do
not ensure that all necessary information will reach all
decisionmakers in a timely fashion. Mid-level officials in the
agencies frequently decide whether or not to pursue the
recommendations of field agents and whether it is an issue that
deserves a director's attention. This was the case with FBI Agent
Kenneth Williams's July 2001 memo to FBI headquarters on the
potential threat of terrorists attending American flight schools.
To
ensure that all federal terrorism officials have access to the full
scope of government information related to cases they are
investigating, an institution that pulls together information from
all pertinent intelligence agencies and makes it accessible on a
need-to-know basis must be established. Such an institution must be
independent of the intelligence community and free from the
cultural limitations of the existing bureaucracy within these
agencies. The establishment of an intelligence fusion center within
the new DHS should serve this purpose.
Conducting First Responder Exercises
While the federal government has done a
commendable job of laying the foundations for terrorism response
capabilities, it should expand this effort to reach all levels of
government. The funding of these initial activities is targeted to
122 of America's most vulnerable cities. The time has come to make
sure that every American community is prepared to recognize and
respond to terrorist attacks.
Part
of the $3.5 billion in anti-terrorism grant funding in the
President's FY 2003 budget request has been earmarked to fund first
responder exercises. What is lacking is a coherent strategy to get
all appropriate elements of the local, state, and federal
governments and the private sector involved. The proposed new
department could clear up the confusion about the appropriate roles
and responsibilities of the local, state, and federal governments
in first responses by establishing a national policy and guidelines
for states and local governments. The DHS should direct training
exercises and drills for federal, state, and local response teams
in case of an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) weapons. A mechanism in DHS will be needed for
reporting on the lessons learned from each exercise that can be
shared with all communities. Conducting such exercises will be one
of the most important aspects of domestic security.
First responder exercises will force
authorities at all levels to analyze their capabilities, identify
where their responsibility lies, and critique the weaknesses in
their response structure. When this information is juxtaposed with
their goals and performance indicators, local, state, and federal
authorities will establish more accurate baselines of preparedness
that can be used to identify where future federal grant dollars
should be focused.
Although last year's attacks were
devastating, they were miniscule in comparison to what would occur
during a chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological event in
which the entire first response community of a metropolitan area
could be killed as well. Were that to occur, it will be up to the
surrounding suburban and rural first response units to react.
Cross-jurisdictional exercises must be included in the preparedness
planning.
Establishing a Health Surveillance
Capability
The
community of health providers, including doctors, nurses,
veterinarians, and public health workers, may be the first people
in a position to detect an environmental contaminant or biological
weapons attack using smallpox, anthrax, or some other agent. The
damage of an attack could be reduced significantly if these
officials know how to recognize, diagnose, and treat the early
symptoms of an outbreak associated with those agents known to be
possessed by terrorists and rogue states that support them. Such educated individuals
would provide the basis for a national health surveillance
network.
The
Bush Administration has taken a few important steps to educate the
public health community. Its FY 2003 budget request includes over
$500 million for preparing hospitals to respond to CBRN events and
another $100 million to train and prepare health care professionals
for terrorism responses. However, the President's
proposal for establishing the Department of Homeland Security fails
to mention this important element. The new department would be a
logical place to house such a surveillance system, since it would
also have the important communication link with state and local
governments mentioned above. Congress should include such a health
surveillance system in the legislation establishing the Department
of Homeland Security and give the health community the proper
recognition as a key component of preparedness for CBRN
attacks.
Early detection and treatment is vital to
mitigate the consequences of a biological attack. A biological
incident, unlike other terrorist incidents, is not likely to be
marked by a visible or audible event because the delivery of a
biological agent does not rely on explosives or other
distinguishable means of delivery. Instead, a biological attack is
more likely to occur by nondescript means, such as through the mail
or covert release of an aerosol agent. In fact, in 28 percent of
the previous terrorist attacks using chemical or biological
agents, the means of dissemination
was not identified. Recognition that an attack
has occurred happens only after a significant number of people
start to become sick and an investigation is begun. By this time,
many Americans may have been exposed to the pathogen.
To
be able to recognize early on that such an attack has occurred, a
number of states, cities, and communities have established
municipal or regional health surveillance networks. Kansas City,
Missouri; Baltimore, Maryland; Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; and
the states of Florida and New Mexico all have established or are
developing monitoring and reporting systems. But there is no
effective way to connect all of these systems into a single
national network, and even if there were, there is no guarantee of
compatibility. Each system is based on different techniques of data
collection and distribution. It is
therefore essential that the federal government develop monitoring
standards for state and local health agencies and the health care
community.
While governors and mayors should
designate a top public health official to oversee development of
health surveillance networks in their communities, the
Administration, working with the CDC, should develop and implement
a strategy to link existing systems and establish a national system
to collect and analyze relevant data. Once established, the
Department of Homeland Security should be given the authority to
oversee this system jointly with CDC and ensure its effectiveness
and communication between the federal, state, and local levels of
government and among all members of the health community.
Improve Enforcement of Immigration
Laws
Though all 19 terrorists involved in the
September 11 attacks had entered the United States legally, a
number of them were on federal terrorist watch lists or had
overstayed their visas. Since the attacks, the beleaguered
immigration system continues to prove that it is not up to the task
of monitoring those who cross our borders. Incredibly, in March
2002, the INS sent notification to two of the dead hijackers,
Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, that their student visas for
flight training had been approved. By September 11, both men not
only had completed that training, but had used their new skills to
attack the World Trade Center.
To
correct such glaring problems, Congress, the Department of Justice,
and the Administration are all seeking to restructure the INS. The
centerpiece of all three reorganization proposals is a separation
of the INS's enforcement and service functions, which all INS
officers perform simultaneously at this time. INS Commissioner
James Ziglar has begun implementing internal reforms to streamline
management and communications. His reforms will create two new
bureaus for Immigration Services and Immigration Enforcement.
Ziglar would still oversee both bureaus, but INS field offices
would report directly to the appropriate bureau at headquarters
instead of to dual-hatted district and regional directors.
Removing layers of bureaucracy should
increase the INS's ability to act more swiftly. Last November,
Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) offered legislation that
would create a more dramatic distinction between immigration
enforcement and services. The Immigration Reform and Accountability
Act of 2002 (H.R. 3231) would abolish the INS and transfer its
responsibilities to a Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services and Bureau of Immigration Enforcement within the
Department of Justice. A new Associate Attorney General for
Immigration Affairs would supervise these bureaus. Meanwhile, OHS
Director Ridge has offered a proposal that would go even further.
Governor Ridge has proposed removing immigration enforcement
responsibility from the INS and establishing a border security
agency composed of the Border Patrol, the U.S. Customs Service, and
the U.S. Coast Guard. President Bush and Attorney General John
Ashcroft have voiced their support for the Immigration Reform and
Accountability Act.
The
President's proposal for the new Department of Homeland Security
calls for "an immigration services organization that would
administer our immigration law in an efficient, fair, and humane
manner" and "assume the legal authority to issue visas to foreign
nationals and admit them into the country." This
important federal consolidation effort would help to improve
communication and efficiency in the important task of issuing visas
while maintaining a separation between immigration services and
enforcement, consistent with Commissioner Ziglar's restructuring
plan. As details emerge as to how the proposed INS reorganization
will function once inside the new department, it will be important
to make sure that the service cooperates and communicates with the
State Department, which will continue to play a critical role in
administering the visa application and issuance process.
As
the proposals for the new DHS, the INS restructuring plan, and the
Immigration Reform and Accountability Act all recognize, separating
immigration enforcement from immigration services makes sense.
Enforcing immigration laws is different from promoting citizenship
and requires unique skills. However, merely separating these two
functions is not enough. New policies and technologies are also
needed. For example, whether the INS Commissioner, a new Associate
Attorney General, or a new agency head is responsible for managing
immigration policy, accountability on the part of the enforcement
arm must be enforced, and new technology must be obtained to combat
terrorism more effectively.
One
of the hallmarks of a strengthened immigration regime must be a
mechanism to monitor the entry and exit of visa holders. Currently,
once visa holders have entered the United States, the INS has no
way to determine whether they leave the country before their visas
expire. In 1996, Congress required the INS to establish an
entry-exit monitoring system as part of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (P.L. 104-208). No such
system was ever implemented.
Last
year, Congress again called on the INS to establish an entry-exit
monitoring system in the USA PATRIOT Act and this year in the
Enhanced Border Security Act. The visa application and approval
process is a vital element in the effort to protect Americans
against terrorism. Properly empowered, consular affairs and
immigration officials can use this process to determine whether an
applicant may be a threat to national security. However, without
the means to monitor a visa holder's entry and exit, this system
can break down.
The
visa renewal process offers immigration officials an important
mechanism for continually checking that a visitor is not engaging
in terrorist activities. When a terrorist can circumvent this
process, appropriate law enforcement responses become more
difficult. The new DHS and OHS, working with the Attorney General
and Congress, should maintain active oversight of the INS or any
successor organization to ensure that a comprehensive entry-exit
monitoring system is implemented as swiftly as possible.
The
INS currently maintains over 80 computer networks that are poorly
connected with each other and rarely connected to other federal
agencies. INS's information technology failings complicate accurate
record-keeping on immigrants and visitors, as well as information
sharing among offices and agencies, and make enforcing immigration
law more difficult. INS enforcement officials frequently must sift
through large paper files, which in some cases must be transferred
between field offices before they can be reviewed.
Past
efforts to improve INS's computer systems have had only moderate
success. The U.S. General Accounting Office and the Office of the
Inspector General have been critical of how INS manages technology
upgrades. Further, the INS has not
taken measures to ensure that its staff are trained on and utilize
the available technology. For example, Glenn Fine, Inspector
General for the Department of Justice, testified before Congress
that the Office of the Inspector General had
found that the INS was not enrolling all
of the aliens apprehended along the U.S.-Mexico border into IDENT
[Automated Biometric Identification System] and had
virtually no controls to ensure the quality of the data entered....
INS had not adequately trained its employees on the system.
Quick, reliable access to information is
vital for making good decisions. INS must modernize and simplify
its computer networks, ensure that they are linked to an all-source
intelligence fusion center, and train employees in their uses to
meet this objective. Since establishment of the DHS would require
integrating over 20 unique federal networks, its creation presents
a unique opportunity for the government to upgrade INS's outdated
networks. Congress should authorize funds for this purpose as part
of the DHS founding legislation.
Defining the Department of Defense's
Role
The
Department of Defense has a critical role in protecting Americans
from foreign threats. Although reluctant to adopt the homeland
security mission, the Defense Department does have a role to play
in homeland security beyond fighting the war on terrorism. It
possesses the domestic infrastructure, equipment, and experience to
support and train state and local authorities to respond to
large-scale attacks on U.S. soil. In addition, the Pentagon
recently established a new force command structure to include the
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), giving it responsibility for
protecting North America from attack.
A
Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security would not take
homeland security responsibilities away from the Department of
Defense, which will play a crucial support role in the case of a
catastrophic terrorist attack.
Adequate communications between the two departments, however, will
be necessary.
The
primary military conduit to facilitate the Defense Department's
contribution will be the National Guard--the logical element of the
armed forces to act as lead military agency for homeland security.
By law and tradition, the Guard connects local communities to the
federal and state governments. Units are located in every American
community and have the capabilities, legal authority, and structure
to respond to attacks on the homeland. The Army National Guard has
over 3,000 armories around the nation, and the Air National Guard
has 140 units throughout the United States and its territories. The
close relationship between Guard units and their locales must be
leveraged to ensure that local units are prepared and able to
respond to an attack and that they help train other first
responders in their communities.
The
National Guard's State Area Commands (STARCs) are well-situated to
oversee its contribution to such training for WMD consequence
management. Currently, the Guard maintains approximately 30 Civil
Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) of 22 Guardsmen trained and equipped to
respond to CBRN events. These units could provide valuable training
to state and local first responders.
The
Guard also could help state and local authorities understand how to
maintain vital equipment and sustain operations in a CBRN
environment, and to plan for medical treatment after an attack
(combat triage). Local health authorities are not adequately
prepared to address the mass casualties that would result from CBRN
events; many would not know, for example, when to enter an
environment or stay away, or when to admit patients to a public
facility or send them to an off-site secure facility.
To
ensure the Guard's availability, however, its mission must be
refocused on homeland security. The active force relies heavily on
the National Guard and Reserves to carry out its missions. The
reserve components cannot easily be extracted from support duties
and redeployed for homeland security without expanding the active
force rosters to provide that support. To alleviate the operational
strain on the Guard, instead of deploying units to help active
forces to meet the operational tempo of continuous deployments for
nation-building and peacekeeping missions, President Bush should
commit U.S. forces only to missions that advance America's vital
national interests.
Crucially, the Defense Department's role
in homeland security will largely be one of supporting civilian
agencies and departments, so it must be able to work cooperatively
with state and local officials who must manage the response to an
incident. Defense assets will prove useful only if their inclusion
has been considered as part of the local response plans. The
federal government needs to approach homeland security with one
voice and one policy. The Defense Department, therefore, must
ensure that its activities complement those of the Office of
Homeland Security and the other federal civilian agencies with
homeland security roles.
The
Defense Department will have to work more closely with Canada and
Mexico, as terrorist threats against the United States are likely
to affect them as well, and vice versa. Such cooperation with
Canada has a long history of success in the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). However, this cooperation must
move beyond air attack and missile warning and into the areas of
homeland security, such as mutual responses to attacks, coastal
defense, and responses against weapons of mass destruction. Similar
arrangements must be made with Mexico.
As
NORTHCOM's structures, policies, and plans develop, these new
relationships must be addressed. The Coast Guard (USCG), which is
primarily responsible for defending the country's maritime
approaches, has done an admirable job of adapting to the
post-September 11 political environment. Its National Fleet Concept
has enabled it to complement and support the Navy. The USCG should
be recognized as the lead element in coastal security, with
Northern Command's naval component detailed to support it, which is
how the relationship has largely worked since the attacks.
Arrangements must be made now to define Canada and Mexico's role in
the Northern Command. Further, NORTHCOM must develop a close
relationship with the governors of each state, the Adjutants
General, and the State Area Commanders.
Since most states have designated an
official responsible for homeland security, NORTHCOM may want to
detail an official to each of those offices. But to ensure that
planning is complementary, and to avoid miscommunications,
divergent homeland security strategies, or overlapping
responsibilities, a liaison element of the Northern Command should
also be detailed to the new Department of Homeland Security.
Improving the Congressional Committee
System
No
one congressional committee has responsibility for homeland
security. Instead, responsibility is spread across 88 committees
and subcommittees. As a result, it is difficult for the
Administration to communicate its plans to Congress. OHS Director
Ridge and his staff have to spend too much time meeting with
committee staff, and the senior political leaders of the Cabinet
departments are too heavily burdened with demands to provide
testimony. With a new Department of Homeland Security on the
horizon, communication could worsen or homeland security efforts
languish, as many DHS officials would have to spend a significant
amount of time testifying before the various committees and
subcommittees. Congress should create standing committees in both
the House and Senate for homeland security.
Clearly, the time of the Secretary of DHS
and Director of OHS will be better spent developing solutions to
security problems than delivering the same message to each
congressional committee. The current structure needlessly slows the
legislative process; concurrent referrals of legislation to
multiple committees can keep bills from being brought to a
vote.
The
committee system in Congress complicates the development of
homeland security policy even more than the division of authority
for implementing policy among over dozens of federal agencies. Any
congressional committee can hold a comprehensive hearing on
homeland security budgets and policy, such as the one held recently
by one of Governor Ridge's most ardent opponents, Senator Robert
Byrd (D-WV). That two-day hearing included testimony from every
federal agency and department head on their offices' homeland
security programs. This model can work, but not if every committee
with jurisdiction holds such a hearing.
Congress must develop a system that will
allow agency heads and department secretaries to meet with just one
committee to discuss their involvement in homeland security. Once
the DHS is established, each house of Congress should create a
standing committee for homeland security, and that committee should
establish a subcommittee for each of the four missions described by
the President in his proposal.