On
September 17, President Bill Clinton announced a significant
upgrading of relations between the United States and communist
North Korea. The move considerably eased the strict trade embargo
that has been in place since 1950, when the North's invasion of
South Korea ignited the three-year Korean War. The conciliatory
gesture comes on the heels of a September 12 pledge by North Korea
that it would postpone test flights of its intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
In
announcing the new trade measures, the Clinton Administration
unveiled the results of a U.S.-Korea policy review mandated by
Congress late last year. The review, conducted by former Secretary
of Defense William Perry (the so-called Perry report), calls for a
comprehensive approach to easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula
by offering trade and political benefits to the North in return for
positive, reciprocal steps from the regime in Pyongyang. A
comprehensive policy based on a strict reciprocity requirement is
indeed the most effective way to deal with the North, which has
acted with belligerence toward South Korea in the past. But for
nearly five years, U.S. policy has not followed a comprehensive
approach, and, as a result, tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain
high.
Executed wisely, easing trade sanctions
against North Korea has merit. Although such a move is of little
immediate, tangible value to Pyongyang because the ravaged North
Korean economy offers few attractive business opportunities to
American companies, over time, expanding trade ties could help to
pry open the North's tightly sealed society.
It
is unfortunate, however, that the Clinton Administration announced
this sanctions move in a way that appeared to be yet another hasty
reaction to Pyongyang's saber rattling. Moreover, the White House
did little to garner congressional support in advance of the move,
and hence undermined bipartisan support for the changes. The
announcement smacks of yet another tactical move to pacify the
belligerent North Koreans rather than to implement a comprehensive
strategy for dealing with North Korea. It is time for the United
States to consider alternative measures that would prod North Korea
into taking tangible steps toward lasting peace.
THE CONTINUING THREAT
The
Korean Peninsula is the most heavily militarized spot on earth, and
the only place where an outbreak of war would result the swift and
heavy loss of American lives. Despite a tattered economy and
rampant starvation, North Korea maintains one of the world's
largest standing armies--one million strong. To contain this threat
to peace on the Peninsula, 37,000 U.S. troops are stationed in
South Korea at a cost to American taxpayers of about $3 billion per
year.
Nearly a decade after the end of the Cold
War, Pyongyang's belligerent stance continues unabated. Despite the
Clinton Administration's proclivity toward treating Pyongyang with
flexibility and conciliation, the North regularly has perpetrated
such provocations as military intrusions into the South by land and
sea and attacks on South Korean officials and civilians. Lingering
concerns remain over the North's nuclear weapons development
program. Moreover, the North rapidly is developing intercontinental
ballistic missiles that may soon be capable of reaching the United
States. It also has sold its missile technology to other nations,
including Iran and Pakistan. And, in recent years, Pyongyang has
used its missile capability aggressively to extort assistance from
the international community.
In
the past, the Clinton Administration regularly surrendered to the
North's bribery diplomacy. The latest example is Washington's
recent exchange of trade concessions for a verbal commitment from
the North that it would postpone suspected plans to test fire an
intercontinental ballistic missile. That pledge was first issued on
September 12 during talks between U.S. and North Korean officials
in Berlin.
In
keeping with past maneuvering, however, the North quickly began to
backpedal on its commitment. Addressing the U.N. General Assembly
on September 25, North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun
qualified the pledge, saying the missile test moratorium would
remain in place only "for the present." The testing freeze is
subject to continuation of "high-level talks for the settlement of
pending issues between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
and the U.S."
On
September 29, a statement by the North Korean Communist Party's
newspaper essentially annulled the pledge: "The issue of missile
launch is a matter wholly pertaining to our sovereignty and North
Korea will launch a missile any time it feels necessary." Pyongyang has now
positioned its so-called pledge in such a way that it can be used
as leverage to pressure Washington for further trade, aid, and
political concessions. This is in keeping with a pattern of North
Korean brinkmanship and broken promises in talks with the United
States over the past five years.
WASHINGTON'S FLAWED POLICIES
The
cornerstone of the Administration's policies toward the North is a
pact signed nearly five years ago--the "Agreed Framework"--to
"freeze" Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development program. After
many months of tedious negotiations, the first-ever U.S.-North
Korea political agreement was concluded in October 1994. This
framework marked a sharp break with the established policy that had
governed relations with North Korea for decades. With the
framework's signing, the United States entered a major agreement
with Pyongyang that did not include the South. Such direct
political ties with the United States had been a key North Korean
diplomatic goal for years.
In
the Agreed Framework, the Administration offered improved trade and
political ties that eventually would end the U.S. economic embargo
against the North and lead to the beginning of formal diplomatic
relations. More important, for the first time, the United States
pledged economic aid to the North, including $50 million per year
for fuel oil and the construction of two nuclear reactors valued at
about $5 billion. Together with a consortium of about a dozen
nations, the United States is raising funds to support this
process, although Seoul pledged to pick up most of the tab. Since
then, the Administration has spent nearly half a billion dollars on
various forms of aid to North Korea, making it one of the largest
recipients of U.S. foreign assistance in the world.
The
Clinton Administration hailed the Agreed Framework as an historic
opportunity to achieve peace on the Peninsula, but tensions have
not subsided. In fact, tensions between the North and South have
only increased in recent years. The framework has failed to achieve
its intended goals in four key areas:
-
It has not provided any assurance that
the North has suspended covert efforts to continue its nuclear
weapons program;
-
It has not reduced the North's threats
and use of extortion against the South and the international
community;
-
It has not led to productive
North-South dialogue; and
-
It has not reduced the North's growing
military threat.
PROMOTING LONG-TERM PEACE, NOT
APPEASEMENT
With
a clear record of failure and growing resistance in Congress to its
increasingly expensive policies toward North Korea, the Clinton
Administration should move quickly to formulate new policy
initiatives. It should take its cues from the newly released Perry
report and impose a strict reciprocity yardstick on future dealings
with Pyongyang. In close consultation with Seoul, Washington should
take the following steps:
-
Promote discussions with South
Korea, Japan, and other concerned nations on a substantial package
of trade and aid offers for North Korea.
For example, a significant portion of the billions of
dollars pledged for the decade-long reactor construction project
should be used now as leverage in negotiating with the North.
Serious consideration should be given to scrapping the light-water
nuclear reactor project in favor of a more practical and viable
approach to solving the North's energy needs, such as the
construction of conventional non-nuclear power-generating
facilities. These facilities are not only less expensive to build,
but also more appropriate, given the state of the North's energy
distribution infrastructure.
-
Make future aid to North Korea
dependent on real concessions.
In return for the new assistance package, the
Administration should call on the North to reduce military
tensions, to abandon its intercontinental ballistic missile
program, and to resume peace talks with the South. A new package of
aid, which North Korea desperately needs, must be conditioned on
the termination of its ballistic missile development and its
proliferation efforts. North Korean missiles soon could be capable
of reaching the United States, and Pyongyang's trafficking in
missile technology is allowing rogue states to pose a growing
threat to their adversaries.
-
Insist that the North engage in
serious, high-level peace talks with Seoul.
In the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang pledged to resume substantive
dialogue with Seoul, but nearly five years later it remains in
violation of this obligation. The baseline for those talks should
be the Basic Agreements ratified by the North and South Korean
governments in 1992. Long ignored by the Clinton Administration,
these pacts--negotiated by both sides' prime ministers--outline
specific and practical steps toward easing political and military
tensions, including expansion of North-South trade, citizen
exchanges, a pullback of troops from both sides of the border, and
phased reductions in armaments and troops.
-
Discuss with the South and its
allies the benefits of forming a "peace corps" for North
Korea.
As part of this package deal, and with the goal of sparking
systemic North Korean reforms, Seoul and its allies should consider
creating a "peace corps" type of program for North Korea. The North
has an enormous need for social and economic infrastructure
revitalization, beginning with its agricultural sector. A
consortium of concerned and interested nations should offer
technical assistance in areas ranging from farming to health care,
telecommunications, transportation, electricity generation, and
business development. A "peace corps" organization could ensure
that such future assistance helps the North Korean people and is
not siphoned off by the North Korean government or military.
-
Appoint a senior U.S.
negotiator as a special envoy to Pyongyang to oversee these policy
adjustments and to coordinate policy among the United States, South
Korea, Japan, and other concerned nations.
The United States and Seoul will have to move decisively
to sell this new arrangement to Pyongyang. A high-level envoy is
necessary to convince North Korean leaders that the package deal
serves the interests of all parties concerned and that Seoul and
its allies solidly resolve to end the threat to peace posed by
Pyongyang's military machine.
CONCLUSION
The
Cold War has ended, and North Korea no longer has China and the
Soviet Union standing ready to support its military aggression
toward the South. But even as its economy crumbles, the North poses
a daily threat to the security of South Korea, as well as to the
interests of the United States and South Korea's other allies. The
recent easing of the trade sanctions will not be enough to promote
lasting peace.
The
time has passed for the allies to simply offer reasonable
incentives to Pyongyang; they must now press the North for
substantive efforts and rapid progress toward peace and stability
on the Korean Peninsula.
Daryl M. Plunk is a former Senior Fellow in the
Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.