The Clinton Administration, concerned about the
floundering Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations begun in Oslo,
Norway, in 1993, has issued an ultimatum to Israel and precipitated
an artificial crisis in the negotiations that may hinder efforts to
achieve a stable and lasting peace. On May 5, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright announced that the United States would convene
an Israeli-Palestinian summit in Washington on May 11 only if
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accepted the American
proposal--one he previously had rejected for security reasons--that
Israel withdraw from 13 percent of the disputed territories, revive
the dormant final status talks, and accept a new set of
U.S.-monitored Palestinian security measures. Netanyahu balked at
this precondition for a summit, but the Administration continues to
press him to acquiesce to its plan to hold an Israeli-Palestinian
summit in Washington later this month.
In its
rush for a new agreement, the Administration has glossed over the
Palestinian Authority's failure to comply with past agreements. If
the dying Oslo peace negotiations are to be revived, the
Palestinians must abide fully by their commitments. The
Administration should insist that Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat
rigorously comply with previous agreements before it asks Netanyahu
to accept additional risks to attain a future agreement.
Real Obstacles to Peace
The Administration has singled out Netanyahu as the
primary obstacle blocking the negotiating progress. By issuing a
summit invitation on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (after Arafat
reluctantly agreed to appear) and by warning that the United States
would "reexamine" its approach to the peace process if Netanyahu
did not fall into line, Albright made it clear that the
Administration was willing to risk damaging U.S.-Israeli relations.
In its obsession with advancing the peace "process," the
Administration tends to treat as moral equivalents both Israel, a
long-time ally, and Arafat's Palestinian forces that have been
responsible for numerous terrorist attacks against Americans.
Netanyahu considers peace to be a goal, not
a process. He is more concerned with where the peace process is
going than with how to keep it moving. More than 260 Israelis have
been murdered by Palestinian terrorists since the September 1993
signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles, compared with 209 in
the decade before that agreement was signed at the White House.
This begs the question of what kind of peace the Oslo negotiations
ultimately will yield.
Continued Palestinian terrorism, not
Netanyahu, is the primary obstacle to peace. Arafat has failed to
keep his Oslo commitments to fight terrorism by systematically
cracking down on radical Palestinian groups violently opposed to
the negotiations. Instead, the Palestinian police have
intermittently arrested Islamic militants after terrorist attacks
to placate the Israelis, and then quietly released them or allowed
them to "escape." The police force, expanded far beyond the 24,000
personnel permitted by the 1995 Oslo II agreement, contains an
estimated 150 members of extremist groups opposed to peace with
Israel; at least 25 are wanted by Israel for terrorist crimes.
Moreover, Palestinian police have been involved covertly in
terrorist attacks against Israelis since the 1993 Oslo accords. The
Palestinians have refused to extradite known terrorists accused of
murders on Israeli soil--another violation of the Oslo accords.
In
addition to his past record of violating the letter and spirit of
the Oslo accords, Arafat's bellicose rhetoric reinforces Israeli
doubts about his intentions. He has praised suicide bombers as
"martyrs" and has called repeatedly for a jihad (holy war) to
liberate Jerusalem. He has failed to purge the Palestinian
Covenant, the charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization, of
its calls for violence and the destruction of Israel, despite the
fact that he agreed to do so under the terms of the 1993 Oslo
agreement, the 1995 Oslo II agreement, and the 1997 Hebron
protocol. This obstinate refusal to fulfill his pledges fuels
Israeli suspicions that Arafat will revert to the "war process"
after he has extracted all he can from the "peace process."
A Better U.S. Policy
Given the long record of Palestinian violations of past
agreements, it is not surprising that Prime Minister Netanyahu is
reluctant to rush into a new agreement that will entail concrete
Israeli concessions of land in return for unreliable Palestinian
promises of security cooperation. Now that its gamble to jump start
the negotiations by issuing an ultimatum to Netanyahu has failed,
the Administration should:
-
Insist that Arafat fulfill his
past commitments before asking Netanyahu to take on new
commitments
Pushing for new agreements when old ones continue to be
violated with impunity makes no sense. The peace negotiations are
doomed unless Arafat complies with his agreements to halt
terrorism, cooperate with Israeli security forces, amend the
Palestinian Covenant, cease his inflammatory rhetoric, and stop
using political violence as a negotiating tactic.
-
Stretch out the negotiating
timetable
The Oslo accords established a
five-year period of Palestinian self-government that would allow
the two sides to build confidence in each other before tackling the
most contentious issues in the final status talks. The deadline for
concluding the final status talks should be extended past the
current May 1999 target date. Pressing the two sides to meet this
deadline when most other deadlines set by the Oslo accords have
been missed is unrealistic and could jeopardize chances for a
genuine peace.
-
Warn Arafat against
unilaterally declaring Palestinian statehood
Arafat has threatened to declare the establishment of a
Palestinian state if the Israelis do not agree to it by May 1999.
This would violate the Oslo accords and diminish the prospects for
a stable peace. Unfortunately, Hillary Clinton's May 6 statement
that it would be in the "long term interests of the Middle East for
Palestine to become a state" has reduced the perceived
repercussions of such a move. The Administration should scramble to
repair the damage inflicted by this gratuitous statement and make
it clear that a unilateral assertion of statehood is
unacceptable.
The
"land for peace" deal at the heart of the Oslo accords has turned
into a "land for the promise of peace" charade. Peace negotiations
are doomed unless Arafat delivers on his Oslo commitments; thus,
Washington should demand that Arafat comply fully with past
agreements before it asks Israel to take on further risks. As a
long-time ally, Israel deserves America's diplomatic support and
close cooperation, not an ultimatum for an unrealistic immediate
military withdrawal that will exacerbate terrorist threats to
Israeli security.
James A. Phillips is Director of Administration for
The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis International Studies Center at
The Heritage Foundation.