April 6, 1989

April 6, 1989 | Backgrounder on National Security and Defense

The Competitive Strategies Concept: Giving the U.S. A BattlefieldEdge


(Archived document, may contain errors)

No. 698 I The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002-4999 (202) 54&44 0 April 6,1989 THE COMPEXTITW SIRATEGIES CONCEFR GmG THE US. A BA EDGE INTRODUCIION NATOs commander General John R. Gale estimates that, if the Warsaw Pact invaded Western Europe today, United States and allied forces within two weeks would have to use n u clear weapons or suffer defeat.This is the horrifying dilemma confronting U.S. military commanders. A new planning concept developed by the Pentagon, however, called Competitive Strategies, could strengthen NATOs conventional defense greatly over the next decade and consequently reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Competitive Strategies is a Pentagon policy-planning strategy for determining which forces the U.S. and its allies should buy and how they should be deployed and used in combat.The basic premise of C ompetitive Strategies is straightforward: structure U.S. and NATO forces so that Western strengths compete against Soviet weaknesses. In practice this often means fielding weapons that exploit Western technological superiority in ways that cannot be count e red easily or cheaply by Moscow. Example: radar evading stealth technology can make U.S. planes and missiles virtually invisible tosoviet air defense rad Countering U.S. stedth air&aft-&h more and new kinds of air defense systems could cost Moscow tens of billions of rubles.

Sophisticated Weaponry. A Task Force of the Competitive Strategies Council, a Pentagon advisory group established by former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, applied the Competitive Strategies method to the conventional (non-nuclear ) defense of Europe and tested its recommendations through computer war games. It discovered that, by using Competitive Strategies guidelines, NATO could deploy forces by the mid-1990s that would be far more capable than they are now of withstanding Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. a Warsaw Pact assault.The new NATO force would include sophisticated electron i c surveillance and communication systems and accurate long-range missiles for striking deep behind enemy lines at military command posts and even tanks Pentagon Opposition. George Bush endorsed Competitive Strategies during his presidential campaign. Stil l, the idea has critics within and outside the Pentagon. They allege that the Competitive StrategiesTask Force did not pay sufficient attention to potential high costs or possible Soviet responses.

The strongest critics within the Pentagon have been the Jo int Chiefs of Staff who question Competitive Strategies on these grounds and also because they fear that Pentagon civilian planners will use the concept to challenge the military services decisions about which weapons to buy.

Despite this criticism, Compe titive Strategies is a sound idea, which could improve U.S. and NATO defense. As a new method, however, it needs refinement. What is very important, moreover, is that a place be found for it in the Pentagon bureaucracy. Bush and Secretary of Defense Richa r d Cheney should proceed with Competitive Strategies and improve the program. They should Revive the Competitive Strategies Council within the Pentagon. The Council has been in limbo since Defense Secretary Carlucci decided to put Competitive Strategies on hold during the final weeks of the Reagan Administration. Cheney should resurrect the Council and define clearly its role in defense policy Give the Competitive Strategies Council a limited but independent role in the Pentagons Planning, Programming and B u dgeting System PPBS), the bureaucratic procedure by which the Defense Department decides which weapons to buy. The Council should provide advice on weapon procurement directly to the Pentagons top decision-making body, the Defense Resources Board (DRB How e ver, Competitive Strategies should supplement the existing planning process of the military services, not substitute for it This review should ask whether the Soviets could counterTask Force recommendations with new military tactics and new weapons of the ir own.

The review also should analyze in detail the costs and potential savings of Competitive Strategies Continue to field strong armored forces and battlefield nuclear weapons, since even the advanced weapons advocated in Competitive Strategies cannot g uarantee NATO an airtight defense. Because of these other priorities in the defense budget, some of the expensive Competitive Review the work of the Competitive Strategies Task Force on Europe 1 See John M. Broder, Joint Chiefs Held Trying to Scuttle Plan Backed by Bush, Los AngeIes limes December 10,1989, p. 28 2 Strategies programs will not be able to move as quickly as theTask Force on Europe may have envisioned Establish a NATO-wide Competitive Strategies Council within the framework of the NATO Conven t ional Armaments Planning System (CAPS CAPS is a NATO program that helps coordinate allied weapons development and procurement decisions. A NATO-wide Competitive Strategies effort perhaps anchored within the CAPS framework, would improve the military retur n on NATOs defense investment by reducing duplication in national weapon programs and encouraging each ally to focus its military efforts on what it does best Use Competitive Strategies to design arms control negotiating positions Competitive Strategies id e ntifies weapons that can improve U.S and NATO military performance. One of these, the land-based conventionally armed cruise missile, was traded away in the 1987 intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which banned ground-launched ballistic and cr u ise missiles with ranges between roughly 300 and 3,400 miles. If Competitive Strategies had been part of the NATO planning process, the military requirement for a ground-launched conventional cruise missile would have been evident, and this mistake might n ot have been made Formulate a NATO-wide strategy for using capital and technology transfers to the Soviet bloc in ways that advance Western interests and do not jeopardize the Wests critical edge in military technology Advanced technology is the Wests pri mary competitive advantage over the Soviet bloc.

The West needs a well-considered strategy for restricting the transfer of militarily significant technology to the Soviet Union and its allies in ways that do not jeopardize Western security. This strategy c ould include specific demands for political and economic liberalization in exchange for economic assistance from the West WHAT IS COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES The concept of Competitive Strategies is not new. About two and a half thousand years ago, Chinese gen e ral and now legendary military philosopher SunTzu advised: Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.2 Through Competitive Strategies, Penta g on planners have attempted to apply SunTzus maxim in a comprehensive and disciplined way to U.S. defense policy 2 Sun Tzu, The Alt of War (New York Dell Publishing, 1983 p. 29 3 t A need for more competitive thinking among American strategists was recogni z ed in the late 1960s by Andrew Marshall, who since 1972 has directed the Pentagons Office of Net Assessment, responsible for evaluating the U.S.-Soviet military balance. Marshalls idea.has been that the U.S. could gain an edge in the long-term East-West m ilitary competition by capitalizing more effectively on such natural competitive advantages as advanced technology and efficient and productive economic performance?

West include powerful navies and well-trained troops capable of taking the initiative in b attle By contrast, Soviet competitive advantages over the U.S are short lines of transportation and communication to its allies in Eastern Europe and numerical superiority in such key elements of offensive land warfare as tanks and artillery.

According to the theory of Competitive Strategies, investment in military forces should be designed to push the East-West military competition into areas in which the U.S. has the advantage. Marshall cites investment in the U.S. strategic bomber fleet, including such planes as the B-52, B-lB, and radar-evading B-2 stealth bomber, as a good example of a successful Competitive Strategy. He argues that, by continually adding new planes and cruise missiles to the U.S. arsenal over the past three decades, the U.S. has forc e d Moscow to invest heavily in such purely defensive weapons as anti-aircraft missiles. Over the years this investment has been expensive for the Soviet Union, and at the same time, it is less threatening to the U.S. than Soviet investment in tanks, ballis tic missiles, or other offensive weapons.

Pentagon Task Forces. Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was impressed with Marshalls ideas about competitive thinking and in May 1987 established a Competitive Strategies Council and Steering Group within the Pentagon, headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense WilliamTaft IV.Two months later a Competitive StrategiesTask Force headed by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Dennis Kloske was created to recommend how the U.S and NATO could defend Western Europe bett er with conventional weapons.

In September 1988, the Task Force presented its classified findings to Secretary Carlucci, and the outlines of t he report were made public! A second Task Force has been considering new ways in which the U.S. could use conventional weapons to threaten Soviet territory in the event of war. It has completed most of its work, but its conclusions have not yet been relea s ed Pressing the U.S. Advantage. Other competitive advantages enjoyed by the 3 Authors discussion with Andrew Marshall. For a summary of Marshalls Views, see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Procurement and Milita r y Nuclear Systems testimony of Andrew W. Marshall, March 2,1989 4 See John G. Roos and Benjamin F. Schemmer, Revolution in NATOs Conventional Defense Looms from Competitive Strategies Initiative, Amied Forces Jounial Inteniutional, October 1988, and John D. MOITOCCO Pentagon Officials to Push Ahead on Competitive Strategies Doctrine,Aviution Week and Space Technology October 3,19

89. Additional information on EuropeanTask Force Report was provided to the author by Task Force officials 4 COMPETITIW STRATEGI ES AND THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE Competitive Strategies came to public attention with the release of Dennis Kloskes European Task Force findings, which proved controversial within and outside the Pentagon. The Task Force concluded that NATO could reve r se Moscows military advantage in Europe by deploying weapons based on advanced technologies that the underdeveloped Soviet economy could produce only at enormous cost, if at all. These include sophisticated electronic surveillance systems to locate such c ritical targets as tanks and command posts deep in enemy territory and accurate new long-range weapons to attack them.

Massive Soviet Numbers. TheTask Force began its work by identifying Soviet strengths and weaknesses in Europe and exploring ways for NATO to offset the strengths and capitalize on the weaknesses. Soviet military superiority in Europe is based on massive numerical advantages in offensive weapons: even if Mikhail Gorbachev carries out the force cuts he announced at the United Nations on Dece m ber 7,1988, the Soviet Union and its allies will retain advantages over NATO of roughly 2 to 1 in tanks; 2.5 to 1 in artillery; and 3 to 2 in fighter aircraft? Further, the Soviet Union continues to produce modern tanks at a rate of roughly 3,400 per year -four times U.S planned production for fiscal 1990, and %nough to replace all the tanks cut by Gorbachev in about a year and a half weaknesses. TheTask Force found that Moscow lags significantly behind the West in such advanced military technologies as se n sors, microcircuitry, and miniaturization. These technologies are critical components of the new generation of advanced weaponry now beginning to reach the battlefield. The Task Force also found that, once NATO begins to field these advanced weapons, new S oviet weaknesses will be created. Example: Soviet command posts and tanks will become more vulnerable to attack even far behind the battlefront. Survivable command posts are critical to the Soviet ability to coordinate its attacks, and tanks are the heart of Moscows offensive strategy.

With these targets more vulnerable to attack, NATOs chances for successful defense would increase dramatically.

New NATO Systems. The advanced weapons that theTask Force proposes for this mission now are beginning to enter service with U.S. and allied military forces. According to theTask Force, by the mid-1990s enough of The Soviet force posture in Europe, however, also has inherent 5 For an excellent assessment of how these advantages have grown over the past two decades, see Anthony H.

Cordesman, Alliance Requirements and the Need for Conventional Force Improvements, in Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thornson, Conventional Ams Control and llae Security of Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988 pp 88-

89. Ratios in text derived from official NATO figures in Enhancing Alliance Collective Security, A Report of NATOs Defense Planning Conintittee, December 1988 6 See General John R. Galvin, The NATO Alliance: A Framework for Security, Wmhington Qumedy, Winter 1989, pp. 85-94 5 these systems can be deployed for NATO to make a qualitative leap in its conventional defense capabilities. These new systems include New Radars and Communications Systems be able to locate targets deep behind enemy lines and communicate this information fast e n ough to order rapid attacks against them by precision long-range weapons.The nerve center of this system will be the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS an airborne radar now being tested by the Army and Air Force, which would spot a n d track tanks and other moving targets at long range and transmit this information to field commanders Also urged by Competitive Strategies advocates are sophisticated electronic warfare systems to jam and confuse enemy radars and communication systems An example is the Integrated Electronic Warfare System under development for the Air Forces radar-evading stealth Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF a fighter aircraft expected to enter service in the mid-1990s Super-Accurate Long-Range Non-Nuclear Missiles thes e non-nuclear weapons will be able to strike deep behind enemy lines destroying much of an adversarys fighting force even before it reaches the battlefront.These systems also will attack Warsaw Pact air defenses to clear the skies for NATO aircraft and wil l strike key communications posts to disrupt the Soviet chain of command Two weapons that will help fulfill these missions are the Armys Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS a rocket artillery battery with a range of up to almost 20 miles, and the ArmyTacti c al Missile System (ATACMS which also will be launched from MLRS batteries and will have a range of almost 100 miles. Both will be highly accurate and able to attack such stationary targets as airfields and mobile targets such as tanks Weapons Entering Ser v jce. The Air Force and Navy also have weapons that have been emphasized by the Competitive StrategiesTask Force on Europe. The Task Force reportedly recommended expanding procurement of specialized missiles like the Tacit Rainbow, which is about to enter service.

This missile flies over enemy forces while its sensor homes in on the electronic signals emitted by air defense radars and command posts. The missile follows these signals to their source, destroying the target. Also figuring in Competitive Strate gies is a long-range air-launched cruise missile armed with a conventional warhead. The Air Force is considering building this missile, which could be launched at distances up to 1,000 miles to attack rail yards, bridges, or other key targets in the Sovie t Union or Eastern Europe. The Navy could support Competitive Strategies from the sea with attacks by greater numbers of conventionally armed sea-launched cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawk, now deployed on surface ships and submarines With advanced rad a r and communication systems, NATO commanders will Using information transmitted by JSTARS and other surveillance systems 6 I European and joint U.S.-European weapons also figure in Competitive Strategy plans. One example is the Modular Standoff Weapons Sy s tem MSOW an air-launched conventional cruise missile being developed by U.S British, West German, Italian, and Spanish companies. Like many of the deep-strike weapons, MSOW is expected to hcorpor te stealth technology making it nearly invisible to Soviet a ir defense radar. Competitive Strategies calls for the widespread use of stealth on missiles and on manned aircraft to enable NATO weapons to survive formidable Warsaw Pact air defenses Advanced Warheads The next generation of warheads, or munitions, will give NATOs deep strike weapons specialized capabilities to attack targets difficult to destroy.

Such targets include hardened command posts and storage sites buried underground, airfields that cover a wide area, and tanks, mobile artillery, and other mobile targets that currently are difficult to track and destroy with long-range missiles.

Already under development are autonomously guided warheads known as brilliant, or self-guided munitions. Typical is the Sense and Destroy Armor Munition SADARM A single guided artillery shell would release a swarm of SADARMs over a target like a Soviet tank formation. Each SADARM would drop by parachute, searching the ground with its sensors for a tank, which it would attack by firing a small but lethal projectile An ar t illery shell armed with SADARM should be able to destroy about fifteen tanks for every one destroyed by a conventional artillery shell Smart and Dumb Weapons. Competitive Strategies advocates also support a Pentagon program to develop what are known as fu e l-air explosives, conventional bombs that use an explosive aerosol mixture so powerful that they could accomplish the same missions as small nuclear warheads advanced expensive munitions such as SADARM and cheaper but less accurate dumb weapons such as st a ndard artillery shells and mines. It recommended in general that the Pentagon scale up its plans for purchasing advanced munitions. In selected cases it also recommended buying more of some standard weapons, particularly mines ff The Competitive Strategie s Task Force on Europe sought the best mix of 7 Barbara Amouyal, Stealthy MSOW Features May Put Program in the Black, Defense News, October 24 8 Institute for Defense Analyses estimate 1988, p. 4 7 QUESTIONS ABOUT COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES 1) Will Competitive S trategies be effective militarily Not all military analysts who have looked closely at the battlefield impact of advanced technology weapons agree that they will have as rapid or decisive an effect on the military balance as the Competitive StrategiesTask Force believes. Deploying advanced conventional weaponry, for example, would spur Soviet countermeasures, many of which would be cheap and effective.

The sensors on such weapons as SADARM can be deceived by electronic means, decoys, or smoke. They also ca n be thwarted if their intended targets remain close to cover under trees or next to buildings. Command and control systems like JSTARS can be jammed, or the aircraft carrying them can be engaged directly? In fact, Soviet military planners already are pre p aring to introduce tactics that could counter some of the weapons that are part of what is referred to in Moscow as the coming revolution in military affairs.1 The outcome of this revolution is uncertain. The Soviet Union has proved its ability to bring n e w technology quickly from the laboratory to the battlefield. Example: In the mid-1980s the Soviet Union deployed tanks equipped with reactive armor, which stops incoming anti-tank missiles with a small explosion that deflects their warheads. This surprise Soviet deployment rendered obsolete#rtually all of the NATOs high-tech hand-held, anti-tank weapons 2) Will Competitive Strategies cost too much?

Initial reports cited a cost of between $15 billion to $60 billion over six years to deploy the military syst ems used in the Competitive Strategies war games. Later Pentagon estimates raised the cost to between $20 billion and 25 billion per year above currently anticipated Pentagon budgets, and perhaps higher Even if these costs were spread out among NATO allie s they still could consume between 5 percent and 10 percent of annual Alliance-wide defense spending, a high share of which would have to be borne by the U.S.

According to one member of the PentagonsTask Force on Europe, the key to Competitive Strategies s uccess is fielding advanced weapons quickly and in high numbers before Moscow can respond. Barring a political shift that would permit major increases in U.S. and allied defense budgets 9 The author thanks Stephen Biddle of the Institute for Defense Analy s es for his insights into some of the military problems associated with Competitive Strategies. Biddle points out that some of these problems will be overcome and the balance between offense and defense will shift over time 10 See, for example, Philip A Pe t ersen and NotraTrulock 11, A New Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins and Implications, Sfmregic Review, Summer 1988 11 See Robert R. Ropelewski, Soviet Gains in Armor/Antiarmor Shape U.S. Army Master Plan,Amedkoms Journal International, February 1989 l2 For earlier estimate, see Roos and Schemmer, op. cit p. 1

14. For later estimate, see Barbara Amouyal New Cost, Validity Expected to Dampen Fever for Competitive Strategies, Defense News, January 16,1989 p. 8 8 however, the money for this expensive rapid deployment of advanced weapons will have to be taken from e xisting weapon programs If this is not done carefully, it could create new vulnerabilities as it addresses others. If tank production were sacrificed, for example, NATO might not have an adequate line of defense if Competitive Strategies weapons did not w o rk as anticipated. Competitive Strategies advocates claim that their comprehensive planning approach will avoid cutting into military strength by scaling back only those weapons that are unnecessary or not cost-effective So far however, they have provided few details 3) Will the military services accept Competitive Strategies Competitive Strategies has been controversial inside the Pentagon.

Predictably the most vociferous opposition comes from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Traditionally, the Chiefs and the a rmed services bureaucracies have opposed innovative programs that threaten established funding priorities and budgetary procedures. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General Robert T. Herres, has insisted that recommendations of the Co m petitive Strategies Council be channeled through the Pentagons official planning and budgeting process, which is heavily influenced by the bureaucracies of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.13 Doing this in effect would give the Joint Chiefs of S taff a veto over Competitive Strategies proposals. Pentagon civilian planners involved in Competitive Strategies argue for more independence from the military services 4) Will Gorbachev doom Competitive Strategies Changes in the Soviet Union and in East-W e st relations cloud the future of Competitive Strategies. Competitive Strategies rests on the assumption that the Soviet economy is not advanced enough to produce the next generation of high-technology weapons at reasonable cost. Should Gorbachevs economic reforms succeed, this assumption could prove incorrect. Or the West might provide Moscow with the capital and technology that the Soviet leadership needs to modernize its military capabilities. Europe and Japan are heading down this road, providing Moscow with huge no-strings-attached loans, known as untied loans, and increased access to advanced technology through popular joint ventures with Western firms.14 Further, Gorbachevs new thinking in military and foreign affairs already has paid him high pol&kal dividends in the West, whatever its ultimate military significance. Even such conservative European-leaders as Britains 13 See Broder, op. cit. and U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclea r Systems, hearings on Competitive Strategies, testimony of General Robert T.

Herres 14 See Roger W. Robinson and Leon Aron, Western Economic Security, in Charles L. Heatherly Ad Burton Yale Pines, eds Mandate for Leadenhip 111: Policy Sfmtegies for the 19 90s (Washington, D.C The Heritage Foundation, 1989 pp. 520-5243 15 For an analysis of the affect of new thinking on Soviet military writings see Stephen M. Meyer, The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachevs New Political Thinking on Security, International Se c urity, Fall 1988, p. 124 9 Margaret Thatcher question whether Moscow continues to present a serious threat to Western security.16 If Gorbachev carries through on his promises of force cuts and follows up with a conventional arms control agreement, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain political support for Western defense spending particularly for the expensive conventional weapons recommended by the Competitive Strategies Task Force RECOMMENDATIONS The Competitive Strategies approach to defens e planning is basically sound. Yet the questions raised deserve serious examination. Bush and Cheney should recognize and publicly endorse the principles of Competitive Strategies. But they should order further refinement of the concept and then its execut ion to ensure that Competitive Strategies gives the West a cost-effective edge over the Soviets on the battlefield.

Bush and Cheney should Revive the Competitive Strategies Council within the Department of Defense If the Competitive Strategies Council is n ot reconstituted in the Cheney Pentagon, valuable work already completed will be lost and an opportunity squandered to improve Pentagon planning. Competitive Strategies is too valuable an initiative to be permitted to expire with the change 'in Administra t ions Give the Pentagon's Competitive Strategies Council a limited but independent role in the Pentagon's Planning, Programming and Budgeting PPBS) process The objective of Competitive Strategies is a dispassionate analysis of the U.S.-Soviet military comp e tition, unclouded by military service or other bureaucratic interests. For this, the Competitive Strategies Council needs an independent voice within the Pentagon. Competitive Strategies recommendations thus should be given directly to the Defense Resourc e s Board (DRB the Pentagon's top civilian-controlled, decision-making body instead of channeling them through the official planning process of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as suggested by General Herres. The DRB could use Competitive Strategies reports to ide n tify military requirements that the services may have missed or neglected for bureaucratic reasons. Example Competitive Strategies has identified a need for more mines that can be dropped from planes, a program with potential military effectiveness, but w h ich is not favored by the Air Force 16 See Howell Raines, Thatcher's Visit: Glasnost in Action New Yo& Ernes, April 3,1989, p.6 10 Direct the Pentagons Competitive Strategies Task Force on Europe to address questions about cost and the effects of potentia l Soviet counter-measures first attempt to apply Competitive Strategies to U.S. force planning. Its results, therefore, should not be considered conclusive. The Task Force should continue working; its next phase should focus on 1) The costs and potential s a vings of deploying advanced conventional weapons. Pentagon officials have cited wildly inconsistent costs for deploying the advanced weapons recommended by the Competitive Strategies Task Force and only vague information on how the program might save mone y by cutting some existing programs from the budget.TheTask Force must resolve cost questions and make this information publicly available before detailed decisions can be made on which weapons to buy and in what quantities 2) The long-term impact of poten t ial Soviet countermeasures.The Soviet Union is sure to take measures in response to Competitive Strategies including changing tactics and employing decoys and other deceptive measures to blunt U.S. advanced conventional weapons. They also will build their own advanced weapons, even at high cost.TheTask Force has evaluated the impact on U.S. and NATO weapon requirements of some potential countermeasures, but a more complete evaluation is necessary. This should be undertaken as a long-term, ongoing assignmen t of theTask Force on Europe Avoid neglecting tank and battlefield nuclear weapon deployments in a rush to equip U.S. and NATO forces with advanced conventional weapons.

The weapons recommended by the Competitive StrategiesTask Force on Europe can help NAT O improve its defensive capabilities. To what degree will depend largely on the battlefield performance of the new technologies and the effectiveness of Soviet countermeasures. Given these unknowns even Competitive Strategies can not guarantee NATO an air t ight conventional defense. NATO therefore still will need to invest in armored forces and battlefield nuclear weapons to protect the West if advanced technology weapons do not perform well as expected. The need for NATO to hedge its bets through continued investments in the basic tools of warfare means that it probably will not be possible to deploy all Competitive Strategies weapons as quickly as theTask Force on Europe may have envisioned The report of the Competitive StrategiesTask Force on Europe is ju s t the Establish a NATO-wide Competitive Strategies Council Last summers Pentagon war simulations left no doubt that Competitive Strategies works only if adopted by all or most of the NATO allies.To help NATO move toward this, a NATO Competitive Strategies Council should be established, perhaps within the framework of NATOs Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS CAPS is an experimental NATO planning system organized last year to help coordinate NATO weapons 11 I development and procurement. A NATO Com p etitive Strategies effort will help the Alliance improve the military return on its defense investment by reducing duplication in national weapon programs and encouraging each ally to focus its military efforts on what it can do best. Competitive Strategi e s also could be used to encourage the European allies to accept a greater share of NATOs defense burden. Competitive Strategies could be used to decide which military missions are best for each ally, in light of its geography and military strengths.This m i ght imply a U.S. focus mainly on air and maritime power, and the Europeans accepting more responsibility for providing ground forces on the West German central front.The Europeans also should be asked to share equally the costs of developing and deploying advanced conventional weapons and command systems Use Competitive Strategies to design better arms control negotiating strategies.

Competitive Strategies identifies weapon programs that improve U.S. and NATO military capabilities. These weapons, understan dably, then should not be bargained away in arms control negotiations except in exchange for serious Soviet concessions that improve U.S. and allied security. One Competitive Strategies ,weapon, the land-based conventionally armed cruise missile, was nego t iated away in the 1988 INF Treaty, which was intended primarily to ban intermediate-range nuclear forces. The U.S. should use Competitive Strategies to protect research and weapon programs that give the U.S. and its allies a competitive edge over the Sovi e t bloc. One example is the conventionally armed sea-launched cruise missile, which would be used under a Competitive Strategies doctrine to strike accurately such land targets as ports and airfields at great distances from U.S. naval vessels.The U.S there f ore, should be cautious in agreeing to limits on these systems as part of a possible U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms ReductionTreaty (START Formulate a NATO-wide strategy for using capital and technology transfers to the Soviet bloc in ways that advancewestern interests and do not jeopardize the Wests edge in military technology.

Technology is oneof the Wests most critical competitive advantages over the Soviet Union.The West weakens its own defense by sharing militarily applicable technology with Moscow or mak ing loans that the Soviets can use to buy this technology for the West.Therefore, the U.S. should resist efforts by the European allies to weaken restrictions on high-technology trade with the Soviet bloc. These restrictions are maintained by the Coordina t ing Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM the Western organization that monitors trade with potentially hostile countries. At the NATO summit next month, Bush should press U.S. allies to adopt more restrictive policies on untied loans to the So viet Union and Eastern Europe.

Loans to these countries should be tied to specific non-military projects. In return for this assistance, the West should require economic liberalization and political reforms in the Soviet bloc 12 CONCLUSION Competitive Stra tegies is a new Pentagon policy-planning strategy that offers great potential for improving U.S. defenses. Competitive Strategies finds ways for the U.S. to take full advantage of inherent American military strengths while fully exploiting Soviet weakness e s. In practice this often means fielding advanced weapons that cannot be countered easily or cheaply by Moscow. Yet Competitive Strategies is a relatively new approach to defense planning, and some serious questions have been raised about its costs and lo ng-term military effectiveness.

Reinvigorating Competitive Strategies. Finding answers to these questions and further developing this promising new planning approach will require high-level Pentagon support for a strong Competitive Strategies program.

Geo rge Bush and Defense Secretary Richard Cheney should instruct the Pentagon to give the program this support. They also should reinvigorate the Competitive Strategies initiative by making the Pentagon's Competitive Strategies Council a permanent body and g i ving it an independent role in the Defense budget process. The Council'sTask Force on Europe should continue to refine its approach to conventional defense, focusing more closely on issues of cost and long-term military effectiveness. U.S. allies should b e brought into Competitive Strategies planning.The lessons of Competitive Strategies also should be applied to arms control and strategic trade so that policy in these areas does not undercut the U.S. advantage over Moscow in military technology.

Cheney an d others involved in Competitive Strategies should realize however, that it carries risks and that even the most sophisticated new conventional weapons cannot guarantee NATO an airtight conventional defense. The U.S. and NATO cannot neglect needed investm ents in armored forces and modernized nuclear arsenals in a rush to deploy advanced conventional weapons.

Principle of Planning. The most important element of Competitive Strategies is not a shopping list of weapons, but the principle that the U.S and its allies must learn to plan more effectively and adapt more quickly in the fast-paced military competition with the Soviet Union.Their inability to do so has long been a critical weakness that Moscow has exploited in pursuit of its own competitive strategy.

Jay P. Kosminsky Policy Analyst 13 698 April 6, 1989 THE COMPEXITIW SIRATEGIES CONcEpTr GWING THE US. A BAITLEFIELD EDGE INTRODUCTION NATOs commander General John R. Galvin estimates that, if the Warsaw Pact invaded Western Europe today, United States and allied forces within two weeks would have to use nuclear weapons or suffer defeat. This is the horrifying dilemma confronting U.S. military commanders. A new planning concept developed by the Pentagon, however, called Competitive Strategies, could streng t hen NATOs conventional defense greatly over the next decade and consequently reduce the risk of nuclear war determining which forces the U.S. and its allies should buy and how they should be deployed and used in combat. The basic premise of Competitive St r ategies is straightforward: structure U.S. and NATO forces so that Western strengths compete against Soviet weaknesses. In practice this often means fielding weapons that exploit Western technological superiority in ways that cannot be countered easily or cheaply by Moscow. Example: radar evading stealth technology can make U.S. planes and missiles virtually invisible to Soviet air defense radar. Countering U.S. stealth aircraft with more and new kinds of air defense systems could cost Moscow tens of billi o ns of rubles Competitive Strategies is a Pentagon policy-planning strategy for Sophisticated Weaponry. A Task Force of the Competitive Strategies Council, a Pentagon advisory group established by former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, applied the Com p etitive Strategies method to the conventional (non-nuclear) defense of Europe and tested its recommendations through computer war games. It discovered that, by using Competitive Strategies guidelines, NATO could deploy forces by the mid-1990s that would b e far more capable than they are now of withstanding a Warsaw Pact assault.The new NATO force would include sophisticated electronic surveillance and communication systems and accurate long-range missiles for striking deep behind enemy lines at military co m mand posts and even tanks during his presidential campaign. Still the idea has critics within and outside the Pentagon.They allege that the Competitive StrategiesTask Force did not pay sufficient attention to potential high costs or possible Soviet respon ses.

The strongest critics within the Pentagon have been the Joint Chiefs of Staff who question Competitive Strategies on these grounds and also because they fear that Pentagon civilian planners will use the concept to challenge the military services' decision s about which weapons to buy.

Despite this criticism, Competitive Strategies is a sound idea, which could improve U.S. and NATO defense. As a new method, however, it needs refinement. What is very important, moreover, is that a place be found for it in the Pentagon bureaucracy. Bush and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney should proceed with Competitive Strategies and improve the program. They should Revive the Competitive Strategies Council within the Pentagon. The Council has been in limbo since Defense S ecretary Carlucci decided to put Competitive Strategies on hold during the final weeks of the Reagan Administration. Cheney should resurrect the Council and define clearly its role in defense policy Give the Competitive Strategies Council a limited but in d ependent role in the Pentagon's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System PPBS), the bureaucratic procedure by which the Defense Department decides which weapons to buy. The Council should provide advice on weapon procurement directly to the Pentagon's t op decision-making body, the Defense Resources Board (DRB However, Competitive Strategies should supplement the existing planning process of the military services, not substitute for it.

This review should ask whether the Soviets could counterTask Force recommendations with new military tactics and new weapons of their own.

The review also should analyze in detail the costs and potential savings of Competitive Strategies Continue to field strong armored forces and battlefield nuclear weapons, since even th e advanced weapons advocated in Competitive Strategies cannot guarantee NATO an airtight defense. Because of these other priorities in the defense budget, some of the expensive Competitive Pentagon Opposition. George Bush endorsed Competitive Strategies 1 Review the work of the Competitive StrategiesTask Force on Europe 1 See John M. Broder Joint Chiefs Held Trying to Scuttle Plan Backed by Bush Los Angeles 7imes December 10,1989, p. 28 2 Strategies programs will not be able to move as quickly as theTask F o rce on Europe may have envisioned Establish a NATO-wide Competitive Strategies Council within the framework of the NATO Conventional Armaments Planning System CAPS CAPS is a NATO program that helps coordinate allied weapons development and procurement dec i sions. A NATO-wide Competitive Strategies effort perhaps anchored within the CAPS framework, would improve the military return on NATOs defense investment by reducing duplication in national weapon programs and encouraging each ally to focus its military e fforts on what it does best Use Competitive Strategies to design arms control negotiating positions Competitive Strategies identifies weapons that can improve U.S and NATO military performance. One of these, the land-based conventionally armed cruise miss i le, was traded away in the 1987 intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which banned ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between roughly 300 and 3,400 miles. If Competitive Strategies had been part of the NATO planning proces s , the military requirement for a ground-launched conventional cruise missile would have been evident, and this mistake might not have been made Formulate a NATO-wide strategy for using capital and technology transfers to the Soviet bloc in ways that advan ce Western interests and do not jeopardize the Wests critical edge in military technology. Advanced technology is the Wests primary competitive advantage over the Soviet bloc.

The West needs a well-considered strategy for restricting the transfer of milita rily significant technology to the Soviet Union and its allies in ways that do not jeopardize Western security. This strategy could include specific demands for political and economic liberalization in exchange for economic assistance from the West WHAT I S COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES The concept of Competitive Strategies is not new. About two and a half thousand years ago, Chinese general and now legendary military philosopher SunTzu advised: Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over wh i ch it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing Through Competitive Strategies, Pentagon planners have attempted to apply SunTzus maxim in a comprehensive and disciplined way to U.S. defense policy 2 SunTzu he Art o f War (New York Dell Publishing, 1983 p. 29 3 A need for more competitive thinking among American strategists was recognized in the late 1960s by Andrew Marshall, who since 1972 has directed the Pentagons Office of Net Assessment, responsible for evaluatin g the U.S.-Soviet military balance. Marshalls idea has been that the U.S. could gain an edge in the long-term East-West military competition by capitalizing more effectively on such natural competitive advantages as advanced technology and efficient and pr oductive economic performance?

West include powerful navies and well-trained troops capable of taking the initiative in battle. By contrast, Soviet competitive advantages over the U.S are short lines of transportation and communication to its allies in Eas tern Europe and numerical superiority in such key elements of offensive land warfare as tanks and artillery.

According to the theory of Competitive Strategies, investment in military forces should be designed to push the East-West military competition int o areas in which the U.S. has the advantage. Marshall cites investment in the U.S. strategic bomber fleet, including such planes as the B-52, B-lB, and radar-evading B-2 stealth bomber, as a good example of a successful Competitive Strategy. He argues tha t , by continually adding new planes and cruise missiles to the U.S. arsenal over the past three decades, the U.S. has forced Moscow to invest heavily in such purely defensive weapons as anti-aircraft missiles. Over the years this investment has been expens ive for the Soviet Union, and at the same time, it is less threatening to the U.S. than Soviet investment in tanks, ballistic missiles, or other offensive weapons.

Pentagon Task Forces. Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was impressed with Marshall s ideas about competitive thinking and in May 1987 established a Competitive Strategies Council and Steering Group within the Pentagon, headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense WilliamTaft IV.Two months later a Competitive StrategiesTask Force headed by Depu ty Under Secretary of Defense Dennis Kloske was created to recommend how the U.S and NATO could defend Western Europe better with conventional weapons.

In September 1988, the Task Force presented its classified findings4 to Secretary Carlucci, and the outl ines of the report were made public. A second Task Force has been considering new ways in which the U.S. could use conventional weapons to threaten Soviet territory in the event of war. It has-completed most of its-work, but its conclusions have not yet b e en released Pressing the U.S. Advantage. Other competitive advantages enjoyed by the 3 Authors discussion with Andrew Marshall. For a summary of Marshalls Views, see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Procurement a n d Military Nuclear Systems testimony of Andrew W. Marshall, March 2,1989 4 See John G. Roos and Benjamin F. Schemmer, Revolution in NATOs Conventional Defense Looms from Competitive Strategies Initiative, Antied Forces Journal Zntemationul, October 1988, and John D. MO~~TOCCO Pentagon Officials to Push Ahead on Competitive Strategies Doctrine, Aviation Week and Space Technology October 3,19

89. Additional information on EuropeanTask Force Report was provided to the author byTask Force officials 4 COMPElrIT IVE STRATEGIES AND THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE Competitive Strategies came to public attention with the release of Dennis Kloskes EuropeanTask Force findings, which proved controversial within and outside the Pentagon.TheTask Force concluded that NATO c o uld reverse Moscows military advantage in Europe by deploying weapons based on advanced technologies that the underdeveloped Soviet economy could produce only at enormous cost, if at all. These include sophisticated electronic surveillance systems to loca te such critical targets as tanks and command posts deep in enemy territory and accurate new long-range weapons to attack them.

Massive Soviet Numbers. TheTask Force began its work by identiMng Soviet strengths and weaknesses in Europe and exploring ways f or NATO to offset the strengths and capitalize on the weaknesses. Soviet military superiority in Europe is based on massive numerical advantages in offensive weapons: even if Mikhail Gorbachev carries out the force cuts he announced at the United Nations o n December 7,1988, the Soviet Union and its allies will retain advantages over NATO of roughly 2 to 1 in tanks; 2.5 to 1 in artillery; and 3 to 2 in fighter aircraft? Further, the Soviet Union continues to produce modern tanks at a rate of roughly 3,400 p e r year -four times U.S planned production for fiscal 1990, and enough to replace all the tanks cut by Gorbachev in about a year and a half weaknesses. The Task Force found that Moscow lags significantly behind the West in such advanced military technologi e s as sensors, microcircuitry, and miniaturization. These technologies are critical components of the new generation of advanced weaponry now beginning to reach the battlefield.The Task Force also found that, once NATO begins to field these advanced weapon s , new Soviet weaknesses will be created. Example: Soviet command posts and tanks will become more vulnerable to attack even far behind the battlefront. Survivable command posts are critical to the Soviet ability to coordinate its attacks, and tanks are th e heart of Moscows offensive strategy.

With these targets more vulnerable to attack, NATOs chances for successful defense would increase dramatically.

New NATO Systems. The advanced weapons that theTask Force proposes for this mission now are beginning to enter service with U.S. and allied military forces. According to theTask Force, by the mid-1990s enough of The Soviet force posture in Europe, however, also has inherent 5 For an excellent assessment of how these advantages have grown over the past two d ecades, see Anthony H.

Cordesman, Alliance Requirements and the Need for Conventional Force Improvements, in Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson, Conventional Amis Control and the Security of Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp 88-

89. Ratios in text derived from official NATO figures in Enhancing Alliance Collective Sexurity,A Report of NATOs Defense Planning Committee, December 1988 6 See General John R. Galvin, The NATO Alliance: A Framework for Security, Washington Quarter Winte r 1989, pp. 85-94 5 these systems can be deployed for NATO to make a qualitative leap in its conventional defense capabilities. These new systems include New Radars and Communications Systems be able to locate targets deep behind enemy lines and communicat e this information fast enough to order rapid attacks against them by precision long-range weapons.The nerve center of this system will be the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS an airborne radar now being tested by the Army and Air F orce, which would spot and track tanks and other moving targets at long range and transmit this information to field commanders Also urged by Competitive Strategies advocates are sophisticated electronic warfare systems to jam and confuse enemy radars and communication systems. An example is the Integrated Electronic Warfare System under development for the Air Forces radar-evading stealth Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF a fighter aircraft expected to enter service in the mid-1990s.

Super-Accurate LongRange Non-Nuclear Missiles these non-nuclear weapons will be able to strike deep behind enemy lines destroying much of an adversarys fighting force even before it reaches the battlefront.These systems also will attack Warsaw Pact air defenses to clear the skie s for NATO aircraft and will strike key communications posts to disrupt the Soviet chain of command.

Two weapons that will help fulfill these missions are the Armys Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS a rocket artillery battery with a range of up to almost 20 miles, and the ArmyTactical Missile System (ATACMS which also will be launched from MLRS batteries and will have a range of almost 100 miles. Both will be highly accurate and able to attack such stationary targets as airfields and mobile targets such a s tanks Weapons Entering Service. The Air Force and Navy also have weapons that have been emphasized by the Competitive StrategiesTask Force on Europe. The Task Force reportedly recommended expanding procurement of specialized missiles like the Tacit Rain bow, which is about to enter service.

This missile flies over enemy forces while its sensor homes in on the electronic signals emitted by air defense radars and coinmand posts.The missile follows these signals to their source, destroying the target. Also f iguring in Competitive Strategies is a long-range air-launched cruise missile armed with a conventional warhead.The Air Force is considering building this missile, which could be launched at distances up to 1,000 miles to attack rail yards, bridges, or ot h er key targets in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe.The Navy could support Competitive Strategies from the sea with attacks by greater numbers of conventionally armed sea-launched cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawk, now deployed on surface ships and s u bmarines With advanced radar and communication systems, NATO commanders will Using information transmitted by JSTARS and other surveillance systems 6 European and joint U.S.-European weapons also figure in Competitive Strategy plans. One example is the Mo d ular Standoff Weapons System MSOW an air-launched conventional cruise missile being developed by U.S British, West German, Italian, and Spanish companies. Like many of the deep-strike weapons, MSOW is expected to incorporate stealth technology making it n early invisible to Soviet air defense radar? Competitive Strategies calls for the widespread use of stealth on missiles and on manned aircraft to enable NATO weapons to survive formidable Warsaw Pact air defenses.

Advanced Warheads The next generation of warheads, or munitions, will give NATOs deep strike weapons specialized capabilities to attack targets difficult to destroy.

Such targets include hardened command posts and storage sites buried underground, airfields that cover a wide area, and tanks, mobile artillery, and other mobile targets that currently are difficult to track and destroy with long-range missiles.

Already under development are autonomously guided warheads known as brilliantyYy or self-guided munitions. Typical is the Sense and Destroy Armor Munition (SADARM A single guided artillery shell would release a swarm of SADARMs over a target like a,Soviet tank formation. Each SADARM would drop by parachute, searching the ground with its sensors for a tank, which it would attack by firing a sm all but lethal projectile. An artillery shell armed with SADARM should be able to destroygabout fifteen tanks for every one destroyed by a conventional artillery shell.

Smart and Dumb Weapons. Competitive Strategies advocates also support a Pentagon progra m to develop what are known as fuel-air explosives, conventional bombs that use an explosive aerosol mixture so powerful that they could accomplish the same missions as small nuclear warheads advanced expensive munitions such as SADARM and cheaper but les s accurate dumb weapons such as standard artillery shells and mines. It recommended in general that the Pentagon scale up its plans for purchasing advanced munitions. In selected cases, it also recommended buying more of some standard weapons, particularly mines The Competitive StrategiesTask Force on Europe sought the best mix of I 7 Barbara Amouyal, Stealthy MSOW Features May Put Program in the Black, Defense News, October 24 8 Institute for Defense Analyses estimate 1988) p. 4 7 QUESTIONS ABOUT COMPETITI W STRATEGIES 1) Will Competitive Strategies be effective militarily Not all military analysts who have looked closely at the battlefield impact of advanced technology weapons agree that they will have as rapid or decisive an effect on the military balance a s the Competitive StrategiesTask Force believes. Deploying advanced conventional weaponry, for example, would spur Soviet countermeasures, many of which would be cheap and effective The sensors on such weapons as SADARM can be deceived by electronic means , decoys, or smoke. They also can be thwarted if their intended targets remain close to cover under trees or next to buildings. Command and control systems like JSTARS can be jammed, or the aircraft carrying them can be engaged directly. In fact, Soviet mi l itary planners already are preparing to introduce tactics that could counter some of the weapons that are part of what is referred to in Moscow as the coming revolution in military affairs.1 The outcome of this revolution is uncertain.The Soviet Union has proved its ability to bring new technology quickly from the laboratory to the battlefield. Example: In the mid-1980s the Soviet Union deployed tanks equipped with reactive armor, which stops incoming anti-tank missiles with a small explosion that deflects their warheads. This surprise Soviet deployment rendered obsolet5yrtually all of the NATOs high-tech hand-held, anti-tank weapons 9 2) Will Competitive Strategies cost too much Initial reports cited a cost of between $15 billion to $60 billion over six ye a rs to deploy the military systems used in the Competitive Strategies war games. Later Pentagon estimates raised the cost to between $20 billion and 25 billion per ear above currently anticipated Pentagon budgets, and perhaps higher! Even if these costs we re spread out among NATO allies they still could consume between 5 percent and 10 percent of annual Alliance-wide defense spending, a high share of which would have to be borne by the U.S.

According to one member of the PentagonsTask Force on Europe, the k ey to Competitive Strategies success is fielding advanced weapons quickly and in high numbers before Moscow can respond. Barring a political shift that would permit major increases in U.S. and allied defense budgets 9 The author thanks Stephen Biddle of t h e Institute for Defense Analyses for his insights into some of the military problems associated with Competitive Strategies. Biddle points out that some of these problems will be overcome and the balance between offense and defense will shift over time. 1 0 See, for example, Philip A Petersen and NotraTrulock 11, A New Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins and Implications, Strategic Review, Summer 1988 11 See Robert R. Ropelewski, Soviet Gains in Armor/Antiarmor Shape U.S. Army Master Plan,AnnedForces Journal International, February 1989 12 For earlier estimate, see Roos and Schemmer, op. cit., p. 1

14. For later estimate, see Barbara Amouyal New Cost, Validity Expected to Dampen Fever for Competitive Strategies, Defense News, January 16,1989 p. 8 8 however, th e money for this expensive rapid deployment of advanced weapons will have to be taken from existing weapon programs If this is not done carefully, it could create new vulnerabilities as it addresses others. If tank production were sacrificed, for example, NATO might not have an adequate line of defense if Competitive Strategies weapons did not work as anticipated. Competitive Strategies advocates claim that their comprehensive planning approach will avoid cutting into military strength by scaling back only those weapons that are unnecessary or not cost-effective So far however, they have provided few details 3) Will the military services accept Competitive Strategies Competitive Strategies has been controversial inside the Pentagon.

Predictably, the most vo ciferous opposition comes from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Traditionally, the Chiefs and the armed services bureaucracies haGe opposed innovative .programs that threaten established funding priorities and budgetary procedures. Vice Chairman of the Joint Ch i efs of Staff Air Force General Robert T. Herres, has insisted that recommendations of the Competitive Strategies Council be channeled through the Pentagons official planning and budgeting process, which is heavily influenced by the bureaucracies of the Ar m y, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.13 Doing this in effect would give the Joint Chiefs of Staff a veto over Competitive Strategies proposals. Pentagon civilian planners involved in Competitive Strategies argue for more independence from the military ser v ices 4) Will Gorbachev doom Competitive Strategies Changes in the Soviet Union and in East-West relations cloud the future of Competitive Strategies. Competitive Strategies rests on the assumption that the Soviet economy is not advanced enough to produce t he next generation of high-technology weapons at reasonable cost. Should Gorbachevs economic reforms succeed, this assumption could prove incorrect. Or the West might provide Moscow with the capital and technology that the Soviet leadership needs to moder n ize its military capabilities. Europe and Japan are heading down this road, providing Moscow with huge no-strings-attached loans, known as untied loans, and increased access to advanced technology through popular joint ventures with Western firms.14 Furth e r, Gorbachevs new thinking in military and foreign affairs already has paid him high political dividends in the West, whatever its ultimate military ~ignificance Even such conservative Europeair leaders as Britains 13 See Broder, op. cit. and U.S. House o f Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, hearings on Competitive Strategies, testimony of General Robert T Herres 14 See Roger W. Robinson and Leon Aron, Western Economic Security, in Charles L. Heatherly and Burton Yale Pines, eds Mandate for Leadenhip III: Policy strategies for the 1990s (Washington, D.C The Heritage Foundation, 1989 pp. 520-528 15 For an analysis of the affect of new thinking on Soviet military writings see Stephen M. Meyer , The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachevs New Political Thinking on Security, International Security, Fall 1988, p. 124 9 Margaret Thatcher question whether Moscow continues to present a serious threat to Western security.16 If Gorbachev carries through on his promises of force cuts and follows up with a conventional arms control agreement, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain.politica1 support for Western defense spending particularly for the expensive conventional weapons recommended by the C o mpetitive Strategies Task Force RECOMMENDATIONS The Competitive Strategies approach to defense planning is basically sound. Yet the questions raised deserve serious examination. Bush and Cheney should recognize and publicly endorse the principles of Compe titive Strategies. But they should order further refinement of the concept and then its execution to ensure that Competitive Strategies gives the West a cost-effective edge over the Soviets on the battlefield.

Bush and Cheney should Revive the Competitive Strategies Council within the Department of Defense If the Competitive Strategies Council is not reconstituted in the Cheney Pentagon, valuable work already completed will be lost and an opportunity squandered to improve Pentagon planning. Competitive Str ategies is too valuable an initiative to be permitted to expire with the change in Administrations Give the Pentagons Competitive Strategies Council a limited but independent role in the Pentagons Planning, Programming and Budgeting PPBS) process.

The objective of Competitive Strategies is a dispassionate analysis of the U.S.-Soviet military competition, unclouded by military service or other bureaucratic interests. For this, the Competitive Strategies Council needs an independent voice within the P entagon. Competitive Strategies recommendations thus should be given directly to the Defense Resources Board (DRB the Pentagons top civilian-controlled, decision-making body instead of channeling them through the official planning process of the Joint Chi e fs of Staff as suggested by General Herres. The DRB couldme Competitive Strategies reports to identify military requirements that the services may have missed or neglected for bureaucratic reasons. Example Competitive Strategies has identified a need for m ore mines that can be dropped from planes, a program with potential military effectiveness, but which is not favored by the Air Force 16 See Howell Raines, ThatchersVisit: Glasnost in Action? New Yo& Ernes, April 3,1989, p.6 10 Direct the Pentagons Compet i tive StrategiesTask Force on Europe to address questions about cost and the effects of potential Soviet count er-measures first attempt to apply Competitive Strategies to U.S. force planning. Its results, therefore, should not be considered conclusive. Th e Task Force should continue working its next phase should focus on 1) The costs and potential savings of deploying advanced conventional weapons. Pentagon officials have cited wildly inconsistent costs for deploying the advanced weapons recommended by the Competitive StrategiesTask Force and only vague information on how the program might save money by cutting some existing programs from the budget.TheTask Force must resolve cost questions and make this information publicly available before detailed decisi o ns can be made on which weapons to buy and in what quantities 2) The long-term impact of potential Soviet countermeasures. The Soviet Union is sure to take measures in response to Competitive Strategies including changing tactics and employing decoys and o ther deceptive measures to blunt U.S. advanced conventional weapons. They also will build their own advanced weapons, even at high cost. The Task Force has evaluated the impact on U.S. and NATO weapon requirements of some potential countermeasures, but a m ore complete evaluation is necessary. This should be undertaken as a long-term, ongoing assignment of theTask Force on Europe Avoid neglecting tank and battlefield nuclear weapon deployments in a rush to equip U.S. and NATO forces with advanced convention al weapons.

The weapons recommended by the competitive StrategiesTask Force on Europe can help NATO improve its defensive capabilities.To what degree will depend largely on the battlefield performance of the new technologies and the effectiveness of Soviet countermeasures. Given these unknowns even Competitive Strategies can not guarantee NATO an airtight conventional defense. NATO therefore still will need to invest in armored forces and battlefield nuclear weapons to protect the West if advanced technolo g y weapons do not perform well as expected. The need for NATO to hedge its bets through continued investments in the basic tools of warfare means that it probably will not be possible to deploy all Competitive Strategies weapons as quickly as theTask Force on Europe may have envisioned The report of the Competitive StrategiesTask Force on Europe is just the Establish a NATO-wide Competitive Strategies Council.

Last summers Pentagon war simulations left no doubt that Competitive Strategies works only if adop ted by all or most of the NATO allies.To help NATO move toward this, a NATO Competitive Strategies Council should be established, perhaps within the framework of NATOs Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS CAPS is an experimental NATO planning syst e m organized last year to help coordinate NATO weapons 11 development and procurement. A NATO Competitive Strategies effort will help the Alliance improve the military return on its defense investment by reducing duplication in national weapon programs and encouraging each ally to focus its military efforts on what it can do best. Competitive Strategies also could be used to encourage the European allies to accept a greater share of NATOs defense burden. Competitive Strategies could be used to decide which m ilitary missions are best for each ally, in light of its geography and military strengths.This might imply a U.S. focus mainly on air and maritime power, and the Europeans accepting more responsibility for providing ground forces on the West German centra l front The Europeans also should be asked to share equally the costs of developing and deploying advanced conventional weapons and command systems Use Competitive Strategies to design better arms control negotiating strategies Competitive Strategies ident i fies weapon programs that improve U.S. and NATO military capabilities. These weapons, understandably, then should not be bargained away in arms control negotiations except in exchange for serious Soviet concessions that improve U.S. and allied security. O n e Competitive Strategies weapon, the land-based conventionally armed cruise missile, was negotiated away in the 1988 INF Treaty, which was intended primarily to ban intermediate-range nuclear forces The U.S. should use Competitive Strategies to protect re s earch and weapon programs that give the U.S. and its allies a competitive edge over the Soviet bloc. One example is the conventionally armed sea-launched cruise missile, which would be used under a Competitive Strategies doctrine to strike accurately such land targets as ports and airfields at great distances from U.S. naval vessels.The U.S therefore, should be cautious in agreeing to limits on these systems as part of a possible U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms ReductionTreaty (START Formulate a NATO-wide strat e gy for using capital and technology transfers to the Soviet bloc in ways that advance Western interests and do not jeopardize the Wests edge in military technology Technology is one of the Wests most critical competitive advantages over the Soviet Union.T h e West weakens its own defense by sharing militarily applicable technology with Moscow or making loans that the Soviets can use to buy this technology for the West.Therefore, the U.S. should resist efforts by the- European allies to weaken. restrictions o n high-technology trade with the Soviet bloc. These restrictions are maintained by the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM the Western organization that monitors trade with potentially hostile countries. At the NATO summit next mo nth, Bush should press U.S. allies to adopt more restrictive policies on untied loans to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Loans to these countries should be tied to specific non-military projects. In return for this assistance, the West should require economic liberalization and political reforms in the Soviet bloc 12 CONCLUSION Competitive Strategies is a new Pentagon policy-planning strategy that offers great potential for improving U.S. defenses. Competitive Strategies finds ways for the U.S. to tak e full advantage of inherent American military strengths while fully exploiting Soviet weaknesses. In practice this often means fielding advanced weapons that cannot be countered easily or cheaply by Moscow. Yet Competitive Strategies is a relatively new a pproach to defense planning, and some serious questions have been raised about its costs and long-term military effectiveness.

Reinvigorating Competitive Strategies. Finding answers to these questions and further developing this promising new planning approach will require high-level Pentagon support for a strong Competitive Strategies program.

George Bush and Defense Secretary Richard Cheney should instruct the Pentagon to give the program this support. They also should reinvigorate the Competitive Strate gies initiative by making the Pentagons Competitive Strategies Council a permanent body and giving it an independent role in the Defense budget process. The Councils Task Force on Europe should continue to refine its approach to conventional defense, focu s ing more closely on issues of cost and long-term military effectiveness. U.S. allies should be brought into Competitive Strategies planning. The lessons of Competitive Strategies also should be applied to arms control and strategic trade so that policy in these areas does not undercut the U.S. advantage over Moscow in military technology.

Cheney and others involved in Competitive Strategies should realize however, that it carries risks and that even the most sophisticated new conventional weapons cannot gu arantee NATO an airtight conventional defense. The U.S. and NATO cannot neglect needed investments in armored forces and modernized nuclear arsenals in a rush to deploy advanced conventional weapons.

Principle of Planning. The most important element of Co mpetitive Strategies is not a shopping list of weapons, but the principle that the U.S and its allies must learn to plan more effectively and adapt more quickly in the fast-paced military. competition with the Soviet Union. Their inability to do so has lo ng been a critical weakness that Moscow has exploited in pursuit of its own competitive strategy Jay P. Kosminslq Policy Analyst 13

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