Where We Stand: Our Principles On Addressing Security in Asia

The numerous bilateral attempts to deal with North Korea, including the 1994 Agreed Framework, have proved ineffective. Any necessary preconditions for future reduction of tensions with North Korea must include North Korea’s complete, irreversible, and verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program.

North Korea’s proliferation behavior threatens not only Northeast Asian stability, but also global security. Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its declaration in 2003 that it possessed nuclear weapons, and its deteriorating economy all increase the potential for exporting the technologies and materials needed to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Without a viable and functioning economy, Pyongyang has chosen to dedicate its international trade to dangerous and illegal activities, such as arms sales, counterfeiting, and drug and human trafficking. Since August 2003, the six-party talks involving the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea have produced three rounds of discussions with little apparent progress toward the ultimate goal of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. North Korea announced in September 2004 that it had turned plutonium from 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods into weapons, and it has not yet returned to the next round of talks. A number of international agreements based on the bilateral framework have failed to curb North Korea’s aggressive nuclear behavior. Lack of pressure and binding enforcement regimes remains at the center of the standoff.

Managing the rise of China as a major world economic and military power and guiding its political evolution toward democracy will be America’s single greatest challenge in this century. The March 2004 re-election of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian demonstrated that formal separation from China has become a mainstream sentiment in Taiwan’s political debate. Meanwhile, an increasing stridency in Chinese military threats since the Taiwan election has injected an urgency into efforts to deepen U.S.–Taiwan defense coordination. Responding to this new situation in the Taiwan Strait, the Bush Administration now recognizes that the emergence of a new Taiwanese national identity and the evolution of a vibrant democracy on Taiwan are in stark contrast with the idea of “one China.”

The Bush Administration has shown a new willingness to be blunt with the Chinese on the Taiwan issue.When Beijing issued a statement on May 17 warning the Taiwanese to “rein in the horse on the brink of the precipice” or face “their own destruction by playing with fire,” White House spokesman Scott McClellan shot back that “threats to ‘crush’ Taiwan or drown it in a ‘sea of fire’ have no place in civilized international discourse.” If the Bush Administration is privately saying the same things to the Chinese that it says publicly to Congress, the message is getting through to Beijing that the conceivable circumstances under which the United States would not come to Taiwan’s aid are very few indeed.

The threat that tension between India and Pakistan might escalate to nuclear war remains foremost among American concerns in the region. The nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have made the region’s security dynamics a matter of great concern, and stable, constructive relations between India and Pakistan advance U.S. interests. The cease-fire between India and Pakistan, however, has lasted nearly a year and shows no sign of breaking. It began on November 25, 2003, and has permitted the resumption of farming close to the Line of Control and has stemmed the flow of refugees fleeing the periodic artillery duels and terrorist infiltrations. India and Pakistan are discussing a gas pipeline across the border and the resumption of cross-border bus services. Many other economic and political agreements are possible as long as the cease-fire holds.

Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is critical to the national security interests of all countries in Asia as well as the United States. Failing to control the proliferation of these weapons threatens not only regional security, but also regional stability.

In Southeast Asia, the most effective tool against terrorists is good law enforcement. Improving law enforcement and reforming judicial systems can change the face of the war and help lead to the end of terrorism as a major international problem.

The war on terrorism has made Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, more central to U.S. strategy. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice described Southeast Asia as “a very important front” in the war on terrorism. It poses a serious threat not only to economic prosperity, but also to stability.While several countries in Southeast Asia, such as Singapore and Malaysia, have made considerable individual progress in combating terrorism, cooperation and coordination among Southeast Asian states is still episodic.As a result, overall performance within the region is less effective than it could be. Weak law enforcement is the principal deficiency.

Congress has increased appropriations for military and police training in the region.When President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo visited Washington in May 2003, the White House announced a broad series of initiatives to aid the Philippines in its fight against terrorism. This included almost $100 million in military and economic assistance. Additionally, President Bush designated both Thailand and the Philippines as major non-NATO allies, thereby allowing them greater access to American defense equipment and supplies and substantially increased assistance to Indonesia’s law enforcement institutions.

A North Korean “freeze” of the Yongbyon facility will be inadequate to gain concessions from the United States and should not be accepted as a temporary measure. The common goal of the participants in the six-party talks is a permanently nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and the process must begin with the North Korean commitment to abolish all its nuclear weapons programs. Only then should the United States take steps to ease the political and economic isolation of North Korea.

The Administration should conduct a thorough review of its “one China” policy—at least internally—to resolve the stark contradictions between Taiwan’s democratization and China’s continued repression. The Administration still has no idea of how to define the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait, and only a vague idea of its strategic objectives in the Western Pacific or how China and Taiwan fit into them. If the existing confusion in China policy is to be cleared up, these issues must be clarified within the bureaucracy.

The United States should urge its allies in Asia and Europe, including Asian countries that are not currently members of the Proliferation Security Initiative, to adopt immediate measures to curtail North Korea’s proliferation of WMD, missiles, and other arms.

Although there is no reason for American policymakers to get involved in resolving the Kashmir dispute, there is good reason to encourage both sides to settle their differences peacefully and make a joint declaration that they will not use force to resolve the territorial dispute.

Anti-terrorist funding must be focused on the security organizations actually fighting terrorism. Military aid to Southeast Asia may have political or operational objectives, but as long as the primary objective is combating terrorists, security assistance to Southeast Asia should be focused on law enforcement development.

In the 2004 budget, Congress again amended the prohibition on training police to grant the State Department greater flexibility, but that amendment does not end the ban. Congress should completely repeal the police training prohibition and instead issue guidelines that address human rights and democracy-building concerns. The President should issue a presidential directive on law enforcement development.Under the current circumstances, law enforcement training may meet the needs of an individual agency or congressional constituency but still not meet American national security goals. The President needs to designate one agency to lead the law enforcement development effort.