

30. Global War on Terrorism

IF the United States is to prosecute the global war on terrorism effectively, it will need unprecedented integration of its military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and other national security instruments.

by James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.

Recommendations

1. Scrap the Pentagon's Unified Command Plan in favor of an inter-agency structure better suited to the long war against transnational terrorist networks and other 21st century national security missions.

Approved by the President, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) prescribes high-level command arrangements for operational forces on a global basis. After the Cold War, there was considerable discussion about reorganizing the UCP. A protracted debate ensued about how to shift the regional commands from countering Soviet power to providing global military support to a variety of missions in a systematic and coordinated manner. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the proposal was reconsidered, and the emerging requirements of fighting a global war on terrorism overrode the previous reservations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended (and the President established) the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to address security issues in North America. This significant, albeit reluctant, step still left unresolved the fundamental question of how the Pentagon would address the emerging security requirements of the 21st century, virtually all of which would likely require responses using all the instruments of national power, not just military force.

To prosecute the global war on terrorism effectively, the United States will need unprecedented integration of its military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and other national security instruments. Civilians and members of the armed forces must be able to work seamlessly both at home and abroad. To achieve this integration, the Unified Command Plan needs to be replaced with a plan that focuses on coordinating interagency operations instead of military ones.

There is still a need for permanent military commands under the direction of the Pentagon; however, the number of combatant commands should be reduced to three. In Europe and Northeast Asia, the United States has important and enduring military alliances, and there is a continuing need to integrate the U.S. military commands with them.

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To this end, the European Command (EUCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM) should be replaced by a U.S.–NATO command and a U.S. Northeast Asia headquarters. NORTHCOM should remain as the military command responsible for defending the United States.

In addition, three “Joint Interagency Groups” (InterGroups) should be established to link areas of concern related to national security missions, such as transnational terrorism; transnational crime (e.g., piracy and drug and human trafficking); weapons proliferation; and regional instability. The InterGroups should be established for Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, and Central and South Asia, with each InterGroup assigned a mission specific to its area. The Latin America InterGroup should focus on drug, human, and arms trafficking; counterterrorism; civil–military relations; and trade liberalization. The Africa–Middle East InterGroup should focus on counterterrorism, weapons proliferation, economic development, fighting AIDS and other infectious disease, peacekeeping training and support, transnational crime, and civil–military relations. The Central and South Asia InterGroup should concentrate on counterterrorism, weapons proliferation, training police forces, anti-piracy measures, civil–military relations, transnational crime, and fighting AIDS and other infectious diseases.

2. Strengthen U.S. public diplomacy organization, coordination, and strategy. In 1999, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was merged into the U.S. Department of State, where senior managers carved up its functions and dispersed them among the State Department’s geographic and functional bureaus. Foreign broadcasting was placed under a new, independent Broadcasting Board of Governors. Thus, public diplomacy lost its leadership and organizational integrity just before the September 11 attacks.

On July 29, 2005, the Senate confirmed Karen Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. As a close adviser to President George W. Bush since he was governor of Texas, she should have his backing to advance needed reforms, but her task will be daunting and limited to fixing one part of the larger public diplomacy effort. To strengthen America’s waning communications capabilities, the White House and Congress therefore should (1) strengthen State Department public diplomacy by providing adequate authority and resources; (2) streamline foreign broadcasting to ensure better coordination with global public diplomacy and development goals; (3) integrate efforts across the government by appointing a high-level coordinator and establishing an independent foreign polling center; (4) create a public diplomacy doctrine and global strategy, developed by lead public diplomacy actors; and (5) abolish domestic access limits on public diplomacy products contained in legislation dating from the 1940s.

In the Middle East, the current regional priority for public diplomacy, the U.S. government should (1) promote regional and local media initia-

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tives to counter the growth of militant Islamic extremism; (2) support educational alternatives to help open minds through American schools, adult education and training, and enhanced exchange programs; and (3) engage local opinion leaders to ensure that they have enough facts to counter misperceptions, distortions, and disinformation about U.S. desires to encourage peace, prosperity, and partnership in the region.

3. Help developing countries join the fight against terrorism by promoting free trade agreements, ensuring that foreign assistance programs do not perpetuate bad policies, and better organizing U.S. efforts to offer technical security assistance. The United States should be the global leader in pushing for more robust global economic growth and better global security. Achieving both goals requires promoting economic growth in the developing world. The United States should (1) aggressively pursue free trade agreements; (2) target assistance toward developing countries with good governance to ensure that foreign aid does not perpetuate policies that retard growth and development; (3) expand technical assistance programs to focus on security programs; and (4) create one-stop shops for security assistance and coordination.

Leaving half the world behind in the war against terrorism would be a serious mistake. U.S. strategy recognizes that engaging with emerging economies is a critical task in America's global operations. As part of the effort to establish and sustain programs that will support this effort, the Administration and Congress should make the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) the centerpiece of U.S. foreign assistance efforts. It is the only initiative that, over the long term, offers the promise of adequately addressing the challenges of promoting the structures and institutions that are necessary to support economic growth and helping countries to generate the revenue they need to invest in security measures.

Facts and Figures

■ The Unified Command Plan, the military's current global command scheme, was set up to fight a worldwide war with the Soviet Union. It is a relic. Regional military commands such as the European Command should be abolished.

■ Changes in the military alone are not enough. Transforming all the instruments of national power to better address 21st century challenges must be a priority for Congress.

■ Congress has passed modest increases in public diplomacy funding, increasing appropriations for educational and cultural exchanges from \$200 million to \$400 million. However, the \$1.2 billion annual budget for public diplomacy is not much larger than the \$1 billion spent annually

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during the 1990s and is clearly insufficient, particularly when compared to the need for more exchanges and balanced U.S. international broadcasting around the globe, not just in the Middle East.

■ More recently, the DOD has let contracts worth \$300 million over five years to private firms in the Washington, D.C., area to write news stories, produce television commercials, and develop Internet pop-up ads to improve foreign public views of the United States.

■ By focusing on rewarding good performers, donor nations can help to encourage policy reforms that are associated with increased economic growth and development and reduce chances that aid will be squandered. An example of this approach to aid is the Millennium Challenge Account.

■ The MCA makes assistance available only to countries “that govern justly, invest in their people and encourage economic freedom” as determined by their performance on 16 specific indicators. If a country bests the average in at least half of the indicators in these three general categories, it becomes eligible to receive MCA grants. Failure to meet that standard excludes the country from consideration for that year.

■ The United States and other donor nations have spent over \$2.3 trillion on bilateral and multilateral development assistance (in 2003 dollars) since 1960 to help poor countries attain economic growth and prosperity.

This chapter can be read online at issues2006.org/waronterror.

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Additional Reading

The Right Honorable Charles Clarke, M.P., “Contesting the Threat of Terrorism,” *Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 902*, October 21, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/hl902.cfm.

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Paul Rosenzweig, and Rebekah Robblee, “Winning the Long War: A Study Guide for Understanding the Public Policy Challenges of the War on Terrorism,” *Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 4*, September 8, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/sr04.cfm.

Stephen Johnson, Helle C. Dale, and Patrick Cronin, Ph.D., “Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy Requires Organization, Coordination, and Strategy,” *Heritage*

Foundation Backgrounder No. 1875, August 5, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1875.cfm.

James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig, *Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Liberty* (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2005), at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/the-long-war.cfm.

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., “Missions, Responsibilities, and Geography: Rethinking How the Pentagon Commands the World,” *Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1792*, August 26, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1792.cfm.