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886 Maxh 4,1992 INTRODUCTION I I believe government is too big and it costs too much I George Bush, February 12,1992l Few taxpayers would disagree with George Bushs contention that the federal gov merit is demanding far too much of Americas resources. But what few taxpayers know and Bush seems to be among them, is that federal domestic spending has grown molrt under his watch than under any other Administration. Office of Management and Budget Directar Richard Darman apparently has failed to make Bush awm of the magnitude of this spending gmwth. And because of the policy blunders of Bushs ecu nomic advisors, above all the blunder of the 1990 budget agreement, federal domestic spending is gmwing at record levels and already has consumed the often-promised I divided Taxpayers should be wary of the tax and budget plans now being debated on Capitol Hill, Bushs included. None of these plans addresses the real fiscal crisis facing Amer iCa: profligate spending. Any tax and budget plan that ignores the rampant growth in federal domestic spending should be declared hsponsible Competing Budget Plans;The Administration claims that its budget plan will con trol the oved pwth of federal spending while, over t he next five years, dhxting 25 billion in additional defense cuts to a modest tax cut for middle-America. The Democrat plan is reported to make even stiffer cuts in defense spending over the next five years while dkting most of these savings to new donies tic spending. Demo crats are undecided as yet whether to use the remainder of these defense savings for middle-class tax relief or for deficit reduction.
I 1 Quotea in Ann Dmay, president Formally Enters Race, The Wushbgton Post, February 13,1992.
Yet both the White House and congressional leaders are playing fast and loose with I the facts. Both plans leave unchecked the explosive growth of domestic spending WEAD IN THESAND BUDGETING For two years the White House has refused to face the facts abou t the explosion of federal spending. To justify its.economically suicidal decision to raise taxes in fall 1990 at the onset of the recession, the White House had to claim that the budget agree ment at least cut spenig?This.wasmot true then; It has Wn-less true every month since then. The budget agreement accelerated rather that restrained new spending.
Trapped in layer upon layer of misinformation about actual spending growth, the IWhite.House.has.ended up.deceiving itself Here are a few basic facts about B ushs domestic spending record about which the Resident himself is psumably unaware. The statistics and figures used below deal only with the growth in m or structural domestic spending. Thus they exclude the one-time costs of the savings and loan (Sa) bai lout and net interest costs on the federal debt2 Therefore, these one-time costs cannot be used to explain away the ex plosion in spending.
Fact: When he signed the October 1990 budget agreement, Bush agreed to raise taxes in exchange for serious controls on spending. But the first two fiscal years of the 1990 budget agreement, 1991 and 1992, marked the third and second largest one year incmises respectively in domestic spending in history after adjusting for inflation.
Fact: If the Administrations propose d current budget is enacted, inflation adjusted annual domestic spending in fiscal 1993 will be $169 billion higher than the last Reagan budget four years ago. Worse yet, this increase is 70 percent higher than the twelve-year 99 billion increase in real annual domestic spending that occurred under Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.
Fact: During the entire twelve years under Pmidents Carter and Reagan domestic spending me a total of 17 percent after adjusting for inflation. By contrast, Bush will in-e domestic spending by 24.5 percent in just four years in office.
Fact: Bush has reversed the course of the Reagan revolution. Under Reagan, domes tic spending was cut from 14.8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in fiscal 1981 to 12.2 percent in fiscal 19
89. Under Bush, domestic spending has soared from that 12.2 percent of GDP in fiscal 1989 to 14.6 percent in fiscal 19
93. Under cmnt Office of Managementand Budget (OMB) projections, domestic spending will remain well over 14 percent of GDP through fiscal 1997 percentage point decline in defense spending as a share of GDP between fiscal 1989 and 19
97. Domestic spending, however, is projected to increase by two percentage points as a shaxe of GDP during the same period, spending the peace dividend dollar for-dollar Fact: The peace dividend already has been spent. The Bush budget projects a two 2 Smd Domestic Spending is computed by submting the following spending categories fromTotal Federal Outlays: National Defense, Net Interest, International, and Depo sit Insma 2 Fact: According to current budget 'projections, the total eight-year increase in do mestic spending above the inflationme will be $1.3 trillion .under Bush.from.fiscal years 1989 to 19
97. By contrast, the cumulative eight-year spending increas e above in flation under Ronald Reagan was 58 billion UNPRECEDENTED SPENDING BINGE Under Bush, White House domestic policy has been a continuing disaster. The worst debacle was hisxcceptance;at the advice of Darman,*of the huge 1990 tax increase which eff ectively endorsed an unprecedented increase in domestic spending.
The fairest way to measure the Administration's spending habits compared to those of-previous Administrations is to-focus on- core domestic-spending This is spending on domestic programs exc luding inkrest pay ments on the debt and the costs and revenues associated with the S&L bailout. Care do mestic spending best re flects the underlying growth in the size of government; SBiL costs and revenues are ex cluded because they represent a short-t erm one-time expense which is unconnected to long-term govern mental growth trends.
The figures below have been calculated fnnn the Administration's own data in The Supplement to the FYI993 Budget.
All figures have been adjusted far inflation into 1991 co nstant dol larsusin OMB'SOwn deflators. Spending figmsfar future years include spending 5 Chart 1 Increase in Annual Domestic Spending During Presidential Term Billions of Constant 1991 Dollars A r20011 150 100 SO 0 I I Carter Reagan Reagan Bush (4 marl) (lrt Term 2nd Term 4 mare Note Increase represents difference In spending between lest year of term and the lest year of previous president.
Excludes SBL bailout end net interest costs.
Herltage Datachart I 3 He& the terms "constant" ot "real" refer to f
m% adjusted for inflation and the tenns "current" or "nominal" refer to not adjusted for inflation. Unless ohenvise noted all spending figures are in constant 1991 dollars 3 changes proposed in Bushs fiscal 1993 budget but not yet en acted by Congress Bud get Fiasco When he signed the October 1990 budget agreement, Bush claimed that he-agreed to raise taxes in ex change for serious controls on spending.
But less than one year after the ink was dry Bush signed bills that hiked domestic spend ing by 74 billi on after adjusting for in flation this is the sec ond largest single-year increase in us. his tory. Obviously, the 1990 budget agree ment did not cut or even slow domestic spending as Bush and congressional lawmak ers promised, and as Bush, apparently, st i ll Chart 2 The Bush Binge: Domestic Spending Has Grown More Than Under Carter, Reagan Combined Percentage Increase in Domertic Spending 25 20 15 10 su 0% Carter Reagan Carter and Burh (4 Vbarr) (8 yeara) Reagan (4 mars 12 Ybarr Not& increase represents ov erall increase In domestic spending over full term of presidency, in conatant 1991 dollars.
Excludes S8L bailout and net interest coats.
Horltago Datachart believes that it does. Instead it dramatically incnad spending growth when com pared to spending ra tes that occd under the pvious rules governed by the Gramm As a consequence of the 1990 agreement, inflation-adjusted domestic spending will Rudman-HOllingS Act incnase more in the first four years under Bush than in any other four-year period in U.S. his t ory. As Chart 1 shows, the historical comparison of domestic spending growth under Bush with the spending rates of other Presidents is-striking. In constant dollars, Reagan hiked annual domestic spending by only $26 billion in eight years from $663 billio n in fiscal 1981 to $689 billion in fiscal 19
89. By contrast, at the end of Bushs fourth year in office annual domestic spending will be $169 billion higher than when Reagan left ofice. Bush thus has incmased domestic spending six times as much in four ye ars as Reagan did in eight 4 For mon infarmation:on the speclfu: OME data tab& used to compute the figunx in this paper, see the Appendix 4 SPENDING INCREASES EXCEED CARTER AND REAGAN COMBINED During the twelve years under Presidents Carter and Reagan dom e stic spending me by a total of 17 percent after adjusting for inflation. By contrast, as Chart 2 shows, in Chart 3 Back to Spending as Usual Domestic Spending 'by -Presidential Term Blllions of Constant 1991 Dollars $1000 1 800 800 1969 1976 1983 1990 199 7 Bprnding Projrotlona In Burh'r Flocrl 1993 Budget Notr: Domestic spending totals exclude interest payments on the national debt ana SBL bailout costs. Hrrltago Datachart Chart 4 Reversing the Reagan Revolution Domestic Spending as a Share of GDP I I 1969 1976 1983 1990 1997 Bprnding Projrctlonr In Burh'r Flaoal 1993 Budgot Notr: GDP = Gross Domestlc' Product. Domestlc spending excludes SBL bailout and net interest costs. Hrrltags Datachart 5 Bushs first four years in office, real domestic spending has inc reased by 24.5 percent.
Measured either as a percentage increase or in constant dollars, domestic spending will increase mm in four years under Bush than in the previous twelve years under Demo crat and Republican psidents.
True, according to the future s pending rates projected in the Presidents current bud get proposal, spending will not increase as rapidly between fiscal years 1993 and 1997 as it did during Bushs first four years in office. But even if Bush is re-elected and spending rises at the rates p rojected in his cumnt budget, real domestic spending will have increased by-37 percent bythe end of his eight years in office. This is more than twice the combined rate that Carter and Reagan achieved in twelve years. Bush, more over, routinely has acquie s ced to congressional pressure to hike domestic spending more~than=was-proposed~in-his-own-budgets Thus -in-reality, domestic spending is likely to increase more rapidly over the next four years than the President projects Reversing the Reagan Revolution. T hmughout the liberal heyday of the 1970s, do mestic spending grew at frantic pace In the 1980s Ronald Reagan called a halt to this spending explosion. Although Reagan was unable actually to cut total domestic spend ing, he did reduce the rate of growth si g nificantly. Under Bush domestic spending quickly has returned to the explosive growth rates that characterized the liberal, free spending 1970s, as Chart 3 shows. The special interests again dominate, and Washing ton is back to business as usual. Accordin g to the figures presented in Bushs own bud get, which am likely to be an underestimate, real domestic spending growth between fiscal 1989 and fiscal 1997 will exceed any eight-year period in U.S. history DOMESTIC SPENDING AS A SHARE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOM Y Another way of looking at spending growth is to examine the total share of the economys resources consumed by domestic spending programs; i.e., domestic spend ing as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP as shown in Chart 4.
Under Reagan domestic spending was cut from 14.8 percent of GDP in fiscal 1981 to 12.2 percent in fiscal 19
89. If the spending trends established under Reagan had been continued under Bush, domestic spending would have fallen to 11.5 percent of GDP by fiscal 19
97. As a percentage of GDP this level would have marked the same commitment of national resources to domestic spending as in fiscal 1974.
Under Bushs watch, however, domestic spending has soared from 12.2 percent of GDP in fiscal 1989 to 14.6 percent in fiscal 19
93. Under current OMB projections do mestic spending will remain well over 14 percent of GDP through fiscal 1997.
Bush thus dramatically has reversed the come of fiscal responsibility established by Reagan. In his first four years alone Bush will have eff ectively erased nearly all of the gains in slimming government achieved by Reagan THE PEACE DIVIDEND HAS ALREADY BEEN SPENT Another mt of the 1990 budget agreement is that it spends the peace dividend.
The hijacking of the peace dividend by Washington spe cial interests can be seen clearly by looking at domestic and defense spending as a percentage of GDP. Accord ing to the projections in the Pmidents budget, defense spending will fall from 5.9 per cent of GDP in fiscal 1989 to 3.6 percent of GDP in fiscal 1997-a decrease of 2.3 per 6 cent of gross domestic product. By-fiscal 1997 defense spend ing as a share of GDP will be at its lowest point since before World War II riod, domestic spend ing will increase from 12.2 percent of GDP to l4.4 percent of GDP an increase of around 2.2 percent of GDP. Thus as Chart 5 shows, the savings from the peace divi dend will be diverted to increasing domestic spending as a share of GDP.
The situation is even worse when these changes are com pared in constant dol lars rather than as a percentage of GDP.
According to the Presidents fiscal 1993 budget real annual de fense spending will During this same pe 6 45 3 Chart 5 The Peace Dividend: Already. Spent Decline in Defense..Spending as a of GDP Fiscal 1989-1997 Increase in Dom estic Spending as % of GDP Fiscal 1989-1997 3 I I I I I Not GDP Gross Domesllc Product. Domestic spending excludes the S8L beilout end net interest cosls.
Horltago DatoChart fall by over $90 billion dollars from fiscal 1989 to fiscal 19
97. Over the same ei ht years annual domestic spending will increase by some $254 billion in real term3 Not 5 At fifft glance. these two methods of analysis may seem conmdictory. That is, the disparity in consrant dollar changes between domestic spending 254 billion) and d efense spending ($92 billion) during this period, appear not to support the equal two percentage point change in GDP for both domestic (up two percentage points) and defense spending down two percentage points).Ihe disparity can be explained as follows Al l figures are in 1991 constant dollars.)The 254 billionmstant dollar increaSe in annual domestic spending has two parts. First, a portion of this fiw 1 14 eumomy between 1989 and 1997.Ihe remaining $140 billion represents the added spending which increased domestic spen& as a share of GDP.The decrease in annual defense spending as a share of GDP through 1997 also has two prrrts. To keep pace with the growth in the economy, an increase of $54 billion in defense spending would be needed during this period Obv iously it will not be spent. Instead real annual defense spending will fall by $92 billion.
Thus the total decrease in spending below the amount needed to keep pax with the economy will be $146 billion per year. Annual defense spendings fall as a share of the economy 146 billion by 1997) thus nearly matches domestic spendings gain in the economy 140 billion billion, represents the increase in spending which would occur if domestic spending grew at the same rate as the one dollar of these defense cuts will be used for deficit reduction; not one dollar will be returned to Americans as tax relief. Instead every $1.00 of defense cuts is scheduled to be matched by $2.76 of new domestic spending.
The actual if not intended, effect of both the 1990 budget agreemen t and Bushs pro posed fiscal 1993 budget is a massive diversion of defense resources directly into new domestic spending. And now.#berals would like to break the firewall between de fense and domestic spending. This would permit them to cut defense spendi n g even more to pay far even greater increases in domestic spending. But few taxpayers and journalists understand that &e peace dividend has already been spent once and that the liberals IE now pushing for spending it a second time 81200 $1000 8800 600 400 200 so THE LEGACY OF TWO PRESIDENTS A final way of examining spending growth is the total spending increase above the te of inflation during a Presidents term. This can be done by determining what the tending levels would have been if spending had grown n o faster than the rate of gen al inflation, and then determining how much actual spending exceeded these levels.
As Chart 6 shows, adding together all eight years of the Reagan Administration, do estic spending exceeded inflation by $58 billion. If the fou r years of Bush Adminis Chart 6 Total Eight Year Growth in Domestic Spending Above Inflation Bllllono of Constant 1991 Dollars 58 billion S8L bailout and net interest costs. Heritage Datachart Ronald Reagan Fiscal 1881-1989 George Bush Fiscal 1989-1997 No t e: All figures are in constant 1891 dollars. The figures represent the total elght-year Increase In dornestlc spendlng. Bush flgures Include future spendlng levels proposed in the Presidents FY 1893 budget, and exclude 6 Ibe 6rewaU provision of the 1990 b u dget agreement sepnUe8 defense and domestic spending.This rule prevents new spending cuts in ane category fiwn being used for new spending increases in the other. HOW OMB OBSCURES PROFLIGATE SPENDING tration spending are added to the proposed spending lev els through fiscal 1997 domestic-spending will exceed inflation by $1.3 trillion. Thus Bush is promising to in crease domestic spending 22 times more than did Ronald Reagan.
The recent behavior of White House budget advisors indicates a determined effort t o bbscure this record explosion of domestic spending. OMB officials, such as Director tichad Dannan; routinely rely-on fivetechniques tohide oi avoid reality 1) rate-in-total-federal. spending- over themext -fi~e-years..Indeed.o~er.the OMB oflicials consi s tently emphasize the relatively flat future growth five-year period, total spending will increase on average by 2.8 percent per year in nominal terms. However, this slow growth can be explained almost entirely by real cuts in defense spending during the s a me period. According to Bushs proposed fiscal 1993 budget, defense spending will fall in real terms from roughly $274 billion in fiscal 1993 to about $239 billion in fiscal 1997-a real cut of nearly $60 billion. Naturally, as defense shrinks as a share of all spending, domestic spending can grow by an equal or greater amount of this cut without greatly raising the overall level of total federal spending OMB consistently uses the highly fluctuating costs-and eventual asset sale revenues-of the S&L bailout t o hide the true increase in domestic spending. At fmt these costs are very high, and act to raise the total level of domestic spending growth. But as the bailout nears completion, the costs fall, and so too does the rate of overall domestic spending. Unini t iated tax payers, and some journalists, thus never know that the short-term rise and fall of the S&L costs mask the fact that core domestic spending is soaring Then, of course, as the government sells the assets thatit acquired when it took over many fail e d financial institutions, OMB uses these profits to conceal, or offset, inneases in domestic spending. Rather than counting asset sales as revenues, OMB counts them as negative outlays or offset ting receipts, thereby artifkially reducing future domestic spending figures.
From fiscal 1994 to fiscal 1997 OMB uses over $100 billion of these receipts to hi& real increases indomestic spending OMB is likely to blame its record spending growth on the recession. This ar gument fails because the recession cannot e xplain why domestic spending will remain over 14 percent of GDP through fiscal 19
97. This trend is clear evidence that structural domestic spending was fattened during Bushs first four years in office. During the recession ten years ago, domestic spendin g also topped 14 percent of GDP but quickly declined as a share of GDP as the economy boomed and fewer people needed government assistance OMB officials claim that they have fixed all of these problems in the future.
This is simply another attempt to focus the publics attention on the flat fu 9 ture growth rate of total federal spending. But OMB cannot have fixed these problems in the future .for-the simple-reason .that annualdomestic. spending will grow in real terms by an additional $85 billion between fiscal 1993 and fiscal 19
97. This four-year spending hike is mm than three times greater than Reagans eight-year increase 5) OMB claims that these high spending rates are due solely to runaway entitlement growth. Inde ed, the costs of a few entitlement programs are ex qhiingTet~thisdoes.not-explainwhy:domesticdiscretionary spendin is at higher real levels today than were ever achieved under Jimmy Carter. 7g If the Administrations spending rates continue through fiscal 1 997, the amount that must be raised through taxes or borrowing to pay for this spending averages nearly 3,000 per American household. American families no longer can afford such dishon esty and gimmicks. To prevent this, the Bush Administration can back a plan that will end this spending binge and return the savings to the taxpayers. Such a plan is The Her itage Foundations Prosperity Plan for AmericaT8 The Prosperity Plan cuts the rampant growth of domestic spending and especially wasteful spendin and lin k s the savings to family tax relief. This is what is called waste dividend. This pro-family spending control measure is then joined with a growth tax cut package which would unleash economic growth, spurring investment and job creation, and thus raise the real wages of American workers.
The mechanics of the plan are quite easy for every taxpayer to understand. In fiscal 1993, the plan would not allow total domestic spending to grow more than $20 billion above fiscal 1992 levels. In the fmt year, this measur e will free up a $28 billion waste dividend for immediate tax relief. In future years, the plan places total domestic spend ing, disnetionary and entitlements, under a single, or unified, spending cap.
The annual growth rate for this cap should be set will below the 6 percent annual growth rate of domestic spending projected by OMB through fiscal 19
97. The best level for this spending cap is 4 percent per year, slightly above the inflation rate, but it should be set no higher than 5 percent per year. Suc h a cap would require no cuts in benefits for major entitlement programs. Congress will, however, have to eliminate wasteful programs or refom inefficient programs. This is the waste dividend working families, in the form of a tax credit for every child. F or example, a 5 percent Q Once created, the waste dividend should be linked directly to tax relief for American 7 For mm information on how the Administration has taken advantage of taxpayers ignorance of the difference between budge$ authority and budget outlays to claim it has cut domestic discretionary spending, see: Scott A.
Hodp, The Bush Budget Audit #I, Real Incmws, Phantom Cuts, Heritage Foundation Executive Memorundm No. 322, February 10,1992 Scott A. Hodge, ed A Prosperity Plan for America-Fiscall993 (Washington, D.C The Heritage Foundation 1992).
This tenn was first mined by Tom Schatz, Acting Resident of Citizens Against Government Waste 8 9 10 spending cap can save enough money to provide a $l,0oO tax cut for every school aged child and a $1,5 00 tax cut for every pre-school child. A credit of this level would lower the typical familys tax burden to roughly the same level it was in fiscal 1975.
Such a tax cut for families would be fairer than any other plan in Washington, because it takes pork barrel and wasteful spending away from special interests and returns it to working families A 5 percent cap that gives a dollar in tax relief for every dollar cut in future spend ing is deficit neutral. However a spending cap set a 4 percent per year woul d save enough money to pay for these tax credits and commit nearly $100 billion of addi tional savings toward deficit reduction by fiscal 1997 investment and economic growth which, in turn, raises the real wages of American workers Growth measms such as cu t ting the capital gains tax rate and indexing it to inflation, expanding individual rehment accounts (IRAs and accelerating the depre ciation of capital investments a~ fair to working families because these policies raise workers real wages over time. Thes e measures are doubly fair when combined with the family tax credit, since not only will families see their real wages increase, but they will now be able to keep mure of what they earn Growth Measures. This plan must be linked to a tax cut package that wi l l stimulate CONCLUSION The greatest paradox of the Bush Residency is not that George Bush broke his sol emn pledge to the electorate not to raise taxes. It is not even that his tax increase was the greatest first-year tax hike in American history. Rather, it is that he got nothing in exchange for breaking his promise. In signing the 1990 budget agreement, with a sin gle stroke of the pen, Bush both inmased taxes and unleashed the greatest domestic spending explosion in American history.
In the past four ye ars plus the next projected four, Bush proposes to increase domes tic spending by $1.3 trillion above the rate of inflation. Washington has become almost impervious to the real needs of the American people, a taxing and spending machine running at full th rottle without a pilot. Budget Director Darman apparently has failed to supply the Resident with accurate statistics and analysis of the true budget and spending situation. Thus, rather than leading, Bush has become lost within the system.
Bush could begin to show leadership by publicly acknowledging that the 1990 bud get agreement was an unprecedented economic and political debacle. He should then remove the White House staff who promoted the deal, and take immediate steps to con trol spending and provide significant tax =lief to American families. He should not ac cept any budget plan that does not put an end to Washingtons profligate spending.
Scott A. Hodge Grover M. Hermann Fellow in Federal Budgetary Affairs Robert Rector Policy Analyst 11 Even for th e most diligent taxpayer or journalist, the federal budget can be daunting For the interested reader, Heritage scholars have untangled this document and con densed it into two attached tables. Each table displays respectively domestic and de fense spendin g in current dollars, inflation-adjusted dollars, and spending as a percent age of gross domestic product (GDP GDP figures Far those wishing gfeaterdetail, the following data set wascompiled from the Bud get of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 199 3, Supplement, February 1992 7 -Table 3.1 Part-Five,-pp..37=42).,Used-to-obtain data.on.Total.Federal. Outlays in current dollars.
National Defense Outlays and Net Interest Outlays.
Deposit Insurance Outlays composite deflator. This was then computed into constant (fiscal 1991) dollars Table 81 (Part Five, p. 97 Used to obtain data on International Outlays and Table 1.3 (Part Five, p. 17 Used to obtain the Constant Dollar (fiscal1987 Domestic Spending was computed by subtracting the following from Total F e deral Outlays National Defense, Net Interest, International, and Deposit Insurance 12 Domestic Spending by Fiscal Year: 1848-1 887 I (billions 15.1 1 19.36 13.65 14.21 16.04 15.19 18.65 20.64 22,E 26.63 34.1 8 34.14 38.31 42.50 45.37 51.38 54.71 62.44 70. 8 9 80.72 84.96 96.07 1 13.06 132.04 147.68 162.97 21 3.89 249.79 276.87 31 1.30 337.1 1 392.02 439.76 464.61 496.26 497.81 548.95 561.72 564.97 596.70 632.75 691.02 769.1 8 869.1 1 913.91 964.70 1016.61 1069.03 1 142.49 1 04.66 5.76 134.02 7.29 100.70 4.36 99.48 4.1 8 105.75 4.41 97.53 4.13 1 15.83 4.86 121.89 4.97 128.24 5.18 142.29 5.96 173.81 7.14 169.94 6.75 188.70 7.41 205.64 7.67 21 0.54 7.76 244.07 8.15 271.97 8.45 300.44 8.96 327.61 9.50 324.37 9.1 8 345.83 9.75 380.92 10.75 41 6.96 1 1.52 439.27 1 1 .56 445.81 11.61 529.65 14.16 566.84 14.66 590.64 14.42 61 8.71 14.44 61 6.65 13.86 650.35 14.82 662.82 14.83 654.08 14.87 666.24 14.96 642.76 13.47 684.27 13.82 679.83 13.31 665.65 12.69 678.54 12.41 689.33 12.24 721.58 12.66 769.18 13.67 842.99 14.82 85 8 .05 14.67 877.35 14.54 895.06 14.41 91 1.51 14.26 943.43 14.36 234.09 8.20 13 I Defense Spending by Fiscal Year: 1949-1 997 5.01 5.1 7 7.52 13.54 14.53 13.41 11.13 10.24 10.39 10.47 10.24 9.51 9.60 9.44 9.13 8.74 7.54 7.87 9.02 9.64 8.91 8.29 7.50 6.91 6. 00 5.85 5.72 5.25 5.07 4.85 4.78 5.07 5.31 5.93 6.33 6.15 6.36 6.48 6.33 6.04 5.87 5.48 4.86 5.24 4.68 4.27 4.01 3.82 14