"Moscow's U.N. Outpost"

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"Moscow's U.N. Outpost"

November 22, 1983 27 min read Download Report

Authors: Juliana Pilon and Stanislav Levchenko

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307 I November 22, 1983 MOSCOW'S U.N OUTPOST While Washington seems unable to make the United Nations serve its own interests, the USSR has no such problem. Moscow has turned the U.N. into a valuable outpost. The Soviet Union counts on majority support for almost all of its policies, since some one hundred so-called nonaligned nations vote alongside the Soviets 84.9'percent of the time in the General Assembly It can veto unpleasant Security Council Resolutions and intimidate the General Assembly from condemning such Soviet acts as the invas'ion of Afghanistan. And it can stuff the U.N. Secretariat with Soviet KGB spies, most of whom are known to the F B I, in violation of Article 100 of the U.N. Charter.l Soviet-bloc nationals in the U.N. Secretariat, assisted by communist-bloc2 nations, and by Third World Secretariat employees have long been undermining the impartiality of the U.N. civil service, on occ asion in open defiance of U.N. personnel policies.

Former U.N. Under-Secretary-General Arkady Shevchenko, until his defection to the U.S in 1978 the highest ranking Soviet civil servant at the U.N:, reports that the Soviets scoff at the very idea that inte rnational civil servants could be impartial. He reveals that over a third of all communist-bloc nationals in the Secretariat are officers of their respective secret police under the direct guidance of the KGB. Their activities range from recruitment of Se c retariat employees, and gathering political 1 In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain fr om any action which might reflect on their position as international offi cials responsible only to the Organization Article 100, U.N. Charter).

This also includes Romania, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos and Yemen 2 information from U.N. employe es and diplomats, to using the U.N as a base for espionage activities throughout the U.S. by exploit ing the exemption granted U.N. personnel from the requirement of a U.S. government travel permit radical and even moderate) of the Third World at the U.N. belies MOSCOW'S stinginess in the U.N. Counting assessed and voluntary contributions, the USSR--including the Ukrainian and Byelorussian shares3--in 1981 paid only 4.21 percent of the costs of the U.N system.4 Of assessed and peacekeeping outlays, the Sov i et Union paid only 10.66 percent in 1980; in contrast, the U.S. paid 31.42 percent. To make matters worse, the Soviet Union is about $200 The Soviet Union's hearty support from the developing nations 1 million in arrears in its payments to the U.N I Yet t h e Soviet Union enjoys much greater support from the underdeveloped majority of U.N. members than does the far more generous United States. Among the reasons for this Soviet suc cess, particularly since 1960, are skillful "conference diplomacy effective us e --and abuse-of the U.N. machinery, as well as extensive contact with U.N. affiliated nongovernmental organiza tions (NGOs) and the media. Many NGOs are Soviet fronts or manipulated by the Soviets. To recruit backers, moreover, the USSR apparently resorts to techniques routinely used by the KGB including payment of hard cash and a variety of in-kind induce ments to U.N. employees and U.N. diplomats.

The U.N. thus has become an important tool for the USSR, an effective part of the Soviet active measures115 p rogram of disin formation coordinated from the highest levels of the Interna tional Department of the Communist Party As a former Soviet U.N. employee told The Heritage Foundation, the Soviet Mission is mobilized into about a dozen sections or referentura , which vigorously coordinate the activities of all Soviet U.N. personnel.

Secretariat personnel are even asked to write speeches for the Soviet Mission. "We cannot say no the defector told Heritage If Secretariat work doesn't get done, you get at most a r eprimand from the Secretary-General; but if you disobey the Executive of a referentura, you are a dead man Stalin succeeded in obtaining three U.N. votes for the Soviet Union.

This highly controversial matter, which may well be seen as a defeat for the U. S., has been widely discussed. For example, see John C. Etridge Library of Congress Congressional Research Service study, "Ukraine and Byelorussia in the U.N sion," November 5, 1971.

A/37/445, September 28, 1982, p. 79 Active measures," according to the F BI, include manipulation or control of the media, written or oral disinformation; use of foreign communist parties and front organizations; clandestine broadcasting; economic activities; military operations; other political influence activities Background and Arguments For and Against Expul- 5 3 I Today the USSR can count on support for most of its political agenda in the General Assembly--an agenda that spills over into.the entire U.N. system. The U.N. fulfills Stalin's intention that it become a useful t ool of Soviet foreign policy.

ESP I ONAGE The FBI long has referred to U.N. headquarters in New York as !'the spy factory R. Jean Gray, head of the FBI's New York division, which keeps an eye on the Soviet-bloc nationals in the U.N told The Heritage Founda tion that there are about 1,100 communist-bloc officials in New York. More than 260 Soviets work at the Missions to the U.N and about 250 work in the Secretariat.

Says Gray The Soviets seem to prize quantity They also prize quality. The FBI estimates cons ervatively that about 30 percent of Soviet U.N. employees are skilled KGB officers. The !'heavies are in the Missions, particularly since 1978, all their work being coordinated by Vladimir Kazakov, a Deputy to USSR's Permanent Representative, U.S. educate d Oleg Troyanovsky.

Whether KGB officers or not, however, Soviet and other communist-bloc Secretariat employees are widely believed to be involved in intelligence related activities. Dr. Igor S Glagolev, staff director of the anti-communist Association for Cooperation of Democratic Countries, reported in a confidential bulletin to the Association in March 1982 When I lectured at the Soviet Mission at the U.N. as a Soviet representative in the 1960s, and later attended secret reports of the Soviet members o f the U.N. staff I learned that the main job of these staff members was espionage and subversion of the U.S. A medium-rank KGB officer (usually a colonel) who occupies the post of an assistant to the U.N. Secretary-General practically controls the whole st aff of the U.N.

The work of all U.N. connected diplomats and U.N. civil servants from the communist-bloc countries is coordinated regu larly in the Mission's ltcells'f--meetings where Mission diplomats and Secretariat employees receive specific instructions regarding the ir activities, behavior, and role in the overall plan of ideological warfare. Intelligence activities are the highest priority.

One of the main aspects of Soviet espionage activities in New York, according to Arkady Shevchenko, is the electronic moni torin g of Americans' telephone conversations. This is directed primarily from the Soviet mansion in Glen Cove, New York, which is full of electronic spying equipment. Key targets are the defense related firms on Long Island 4 Since U.N. Secretariat employees c a n travel freely anywhere in the U.S.--in cars bearing U.S. license plates--FBI officials confess that it is practically impossible to monitor all their activities. Shevchenko explains that Soviet KGB agents in the Secretariat take advantage of this privil e ge to conduct high technology esp'ionage operations very frequently. The FBI is also aware of extensive contacts with llillegalsll--Soviet or communist bloc nationals who are in the U.S. with false documents or under false pretenses. Senior U.N. Secretari a t officials have told The Heritage Foundation that many of the Russian I'translatorsl' and Ifinterpreterslt call in Ilsickll (with certificates from Soviet doctors) and thus come and go without supervision It is assumed that during these absences they are engaged in espionage activities.

According to FBI officials, the main role of Ildiplomat spiesi1 is not direct spying but recruitment, which involves besides traditional KGB techniques6--a whole spectrum of methods designed to identify individuals in the U.N. system willing to offer information and help in exchange for money, jobs, promotions and other services, such as health care in the Soviet Union gifts, vacations, even political influence. Shevchenko laughingly reports that he was approached on sever a l occasions by individuals from Third World countries asking for I1loansit in return for cooperation with the KGB. Some of these people, he says, are still in the U.N. Secretariat A significant tool in the USSR's recruitment efforts is access to the files of all U.N. employees through the U.N. Personnel Department. "The Department is heavily infiltrated by the KGB at the highest levels,If says Shevchenko. The files are supplemented by personal data collected through well-coordinated activities supervised b y the Soviet Mission.

PROPAGANDA From the outset, the USSR understood the potential propaganda significance of the U.N.7 When the U.N. was being organized Josef Stalin told a large secret Communist Party meeting do not need the U.N. What we need is a stage from which we can express any opinion we want." This view appears more prevalent today than ever. Now, as U.S. Permanent Representative Jeane Kirkpatrick notes, the Soviets virtually "shape the international political agenda Ifwe See John Barron, KGB Tod ay Digest Press, 1983).

See the "Top Secret" Report by the National Security Council of March 30 1948, since published in Foreign Relations of the United States 1948 Volume I, General; The United Nations (Washington, D.C U.S. Government Printing Office, 19 76 pp. 545-550; also pp. 551-564 and passim The Hidden Hand (New York, New York: Reader's 5 Colonialism, Racism, and Agqression The picture the Soviet Union is trying to create in the U.N is seductively simple The struggle in the international arena betwe e n the forces of socialism and democracy and the forces of aggression and imperialist reaction is also taking place at the U.N I8 Among the most effective propaganda tools for the USSR is the IICommittee of 24 now 25 established in 1961 to implement the So viet sponsored declaration on the "Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoplesvf of 19

60. Although by 1960 some 1,500 million of the roughly 1,600 million colonial peoples from the end of World War I1 had already won their freedom, the Soviets seized the opportunity to create for themselves a pro- freedom image.

Under the label of llcolonialism,lf the U.S South Africa and Israel have ever since been routinely castigated by the USSR at the U.N.--even though the U.S itself a former colony, ha s always supported decolonization, as has Israel As for South Africa, its role in Namibia pales beside the USSR's genocide in Ukraine or its annexation of the Baltic States--yet the label of llcolonialismff is never applied in these contexts is part of an elaborate, and successful, effort to legitimize support for Soviet backed insurgents in South Africa.lo Thus the Special Committee Against Apartheid is virtually run by the Soviets.ll According to Arkady Shevchenko, during his tenure as Under-Secretary-Ge n eral, many speeches of the Committee's Generally, the Soviet engineered campaign against tfracismll 8 9 10 11 Great Soviet Encyclopedia (New York: Macmillan, Inc 1981 vol. 18 P. 707 To recognize once again the colonialist nature of the Soviet Union, on Ju l y 26, 1983, President Reagan sent a statement to U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar charging that the Soviet Union violates these nations' right to self-determination. In the Memorandum Concerning the Decolonization of the USSR submitted to th e 35th General Assembly by the Ad Hoc Committee Consisting of the World Councils of Byelorussians Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Turkestanians, and Ukrainians in October 1980, there is an excellent summary of the Soviet policy of Russification and colon ization.

See the entire hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate on "The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa," March 22, 24, 25, 29, an d 31, 1982, Volumes 1 2 (Serial No 5-97-101 Its 18 members are: Algeria, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian SSR. 6 N i gerian Chairman were written by the Soviet front organization, the World Peace Council. Vladimir Kravetz, currently a Vice Chairman of the Committee, is a Ukrainian national who, according to knowledgeable U.N. diplomats, orchestrates the Committee's anti -apartheid activities and pro-SWAP0 propaganda.

The U.N. offers an excellent forum for the Soviet Union's well-organized support for the "national liberation movements1' in general In order to bestow legitimacy upon that support, the concept of Ilaggressio nll has been molded for selective use in referring to Western opposition to national liberation movements as defined by the Soviet Union. Polish or Hungarian freedom fighters never are mentioned, nor is there ever reference to communist military intervent i on A KGB ttjournalistll M. Lvov (a pseudonym) wrote in the Soviet publication New Times that 'Ithe USSR acted in full conformity with the decisions of the U.N. when over many years it gave moral and material support to the Angolan people.Il But he condemn e d Western nations who "joined efforts in an onslaught against the newly-emerged African state the West of Itaggression in the precise sense of the definition of aggression adopted by the U.N.t112 He accused Indeed, the concept of ilaggressionll is used to emphasize the dichotomy between the peace-loving socialist states and the imperialist Itcolonialist and racist" nations within the U.N system. In these efforts, the USSR does not even shirk from comparing Israel to Hitler's Germany--as did Aleksei Kosygin on June 13, 1967.13 Then in August 1983, the Soviet Union was the loudest U.N. voice in condemning Israel at a conference on '!The Unholy Alliance between South Africa and Israeltt for its alleged I1racismtt in the occupied territories l4 In fact, sponsor ing the Conference were three Soviet-front organizations, including the World Peace Council.

USSR was seeking a Western walkout from the Conference so that it could appear as the only friend of the Arab-African bloc members of that bloc complain in private that the Soviet Union's campaign against Israel detracts from other Third World problems and they question MOSCOW'S motives in the anti-Israeli campaign It seemed apparent to those present that the Yet Disarmament, Peaceful Coexistence, and Development T h e Soviet Union has long proclaimed its commitment to disarmament, but many scholars have doubted MOSCOW'S motives.15 l2 New Times, January 1976, p. 5 l3 U.N.G.A. Official Records, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Plen. 1526 l4 For an excellent analysis of the history, and the context of the Soviet role in the U.N.'s campaign against Israel, see Moses Moskowitz, The Roots and Reaches of United Nations Actions and Decisions Alphen aan den Rijn: Sitjthoff Noordhoff, 1980 in particular Chap. VI, "The Racial Eq uation pp. 131-153.

Stanford political scientist Alexander Dallin, for example, points to MOSCOW'S "uncanny ability to make sweeping and appealing proposals while l5 7 Despite a well-known record of opposition to meaningful disarma ment measures,16 as well as repeated violations of arms control agreements, the Soviet Union continues to capitalize on its allegedly strong commitment to disarmament as part of its propa ganda campaign.

The concept of Ilpeaceful coexistencell is a well-honed Soviet code word. A ccording to a recent monograph on the U.N. by G. K Shakhnazarov, president of the Soviet Political Science Association Itpeaceful coexistence must not be confused with the simple concept of peace.It It is rather a tool which Itcreates the prerequisites fo r the freer development of the class str~gg1e.I The U.N. is seen as a crucial forum from.which the Soviets can create these prerequisites For example, an interesting aspect of the Soviet disarmament campaign, with special appeal to the Third World, is the n otion that world economic development is impeded by the money diverted in the West to arms production that the West must be blamed for Third World poverty and must implicitly, make amends--in particular, by endorsing the New International Economic Order ( N IEO which is shorthand for global redistribution of wealth along Marxist lines.18 occasion to tampering with statistics In 1976, for example two Brandeis University economists, Anne P. Carter and Peter A The impression is In its effort to support NIEO the Soviet Union resorts on Petri, found their study on The Future of the World Economy altered bv the Soviet assistant director of the Economic and Social Af?airs Department of the U.N. Secretariat, Stanislav Menshikov. The Americans charged that Menshikov c h anged the statistics of their study to show much higher potential growth rates and a rosier economic situation, should an International Economic Order be implemented, than their data originally indicated.lg Menshikov has since returned to the USSR THE USS R , THE U.N AND RADICAL MOVEMENTS At the U.N radical Third World nations do much of the Soviet Union's work. The main Soviet proxies are Vietnam, Laos, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, and others whose allegiance to resisting the type of specific controls or inspection arrangements that other Dowers have deemed essential Alexander Dallin. The Soviet Union at th/U.N New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 70.

For a brief yet comprehensive history, see A Chronology of U.S. Arms Reduction Initiatives, USICA, April 1982.

Cited in Intelligence Digest, January 20, 1982.

Fo r insights into the history of NIEO, see USA vol. XIX, Sept. 30, 1975 No. 14 by U.N. scholar Alice Widener. For a critique of NIEO, see William L. Scully, "The Brandt Comission: Deluding the Third World," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 182, April 30 , 1982.

Business Week, July 20, 1981 l6 l7 l8 l9 a Singaporets Second Deputy Prime Minister S. Rajaratnam, for example, charged on March 10, 1983, that the nonaligned movement was witnessing its own slow-motion hijacking by the Soviet Union.

He cited Afgh anistan and Cambodia as examples of how MOSCOW~S friends, although a minority in the movement, had thwarted the wishes of the majority. Arieh Eilan, recently retired as ambassa dor extraordinary at Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explains that the n o naligned movement in turn influences the U.N.: Itthe U.N.'s agenda is determined, to a considerable extent, by that the Soviet Union is automatic. The Congo, India, Iraq, Mali Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia and Tanzania also can usually be counted upon to s u pport the Soviet Union in U.N. committees. In general, the strikingly pro-Soviet voting pattern at the U.N. con firms Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's boast that Soviet proposals invariably get extensive support in the U.N.tt20 The Soviet Unionts i nfluence among the nonaligned nations which Soviet President L. I. Brezhnev declared, on September 5 1973, to be the !'natural alliestt of the socialist countries reached a peak in 1979 when its proxy, Cuba, gained leadership. Yet only Burma was moved to r esign because of.Cubats ruthless attempt to radicalize the nonaligned movement.22 Besides the nonaligned, the Soviet Union works closely with the Organization of African Unity (OAU particularly since 1965 when the General Assembly invited the Secretary Ge n eral of the OAU to attend sessions of the U.N. as an observer. 'In 1974, the General Assembly extended a "blanket invitation to observer status...to all national liberation movements recognized by the OAUtt (Res. 328O[XXIX which solidified the cooperation between the OAU and the Soviet dominated Committee of 24, especially in 2o Report by Andrei Gromyko, "On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," June 17, 1983, OVP 1617, p 4. A table of the voting pattern of nonaligned nat ions illustrating percentage of agreement with the USSR at the 36th session of the General Assembly 1981, appears in Juliana Geron Pilon, "Through the Looking Glass: The Political Culture of the U.N 206, August 30, 1982, pp. 18-19.

See also Arieh Eilan The Soviet Union and] Conference Diplomacy Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No 21 Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1981, p.

27. K. P. Misra, "Burma's Farewell to the Non-Aligned Movement Asian Affairs, February 1981, p. 53 22 9 activities related to South Afric a and Namibia. In May 1977, for example, the Committee of 24 sent N. Neytchev, a representative from Bulgaria, to address a IIWorld Assembly of Peace Builders in Warsawll on the need to support national liberation movements (A/AC 109/ PV. 1078 The intimat e relationship between the Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has recently been docu mented.23 In the U.N the PLO helps Soviet efforts to paint a cohesive picture of imperialism and colonialism by including Israel with the U.S. in its attacks on Western Ilaggression.l124 Secretariat The U.N. Secretariat employs a large number of Third World nationals apparently recruited by the KGB. According to former Under-Secretary-General Shevchenko, KGB agents offer various inducements in exch a nge for cooperation. Usually, however recruitment is not necessary in the case of radical Third World nations. The Soviet Mission, he says, simply asks the respective government to glintervenell with its national s) to I1cooperate1' with a Soviet employee in the gathering of information or sabotaging a report to suit the Soviet Union's purposes.

Perhaps the most notable recent example of a sabotaged report is the U.N. investigation, started in 1981, of Soviet biochemical warfare activities in Afghanistan a nd surrounding regions. It was overseen by U.N. Under-Secretary General Ustinov who used bureaucratic inertia and delaying tactics to stall and smother the investigation for many months. In February 1982, the U.N. group of experts finally obtained some ey ewitness testimony medical findings, and physical evidence of biological warfare.

This information had been quietly shelved (some say, suppressed by Ustinov until it was leaked to the Wall Street Journal on June 7, 19

82. To date, the U.N. has done little to analyze the use of chemical warfare in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union despite ample evidence uncovered by reliable sources.25 THE USSR AND MODERATE THIRD WORLD AND WESTERN NATIONS Marxist.ideology suits the USSR well in its efforts to win over modera te Third World and liberal or left-wing Western sup 23 24 Raphael Israeli, ed., PLO in Lebanon, Ch. V, "The Communist Bloc Con nection" (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983).

See Jeane J. Kirkpatrick's speech on October 18, 1982, in Toronto Canada, befor e the International Meeting of B'nai B'rith and her speech on October 16, 1983, addressing the Washington Hebrew Congregation, for analyses of the U.N.'s campaign against both the U.S. and Israel.

See James R. Phillips, "MOSCOW'S Poison War--Update ,I1 Th e Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 208, September 3, 1982 25 10 port.26 Soviet success in gaining Third World support at the U.N. is not due to diplomatic skill but to the intrinsic seductiveness of Marxist ideology (particularly its opposition to bou r geois ex ploitation, which translates into Ilcolonialist oppressionll and--perhaps even more important--to Ifmilitary realities meaning Soviet military coercion. Other diplomats concur, but believe the recently improved diplomatic style of Sovkets in both the Missions and the Secretariat enhances their efforts to fraternize with representatives of moderate nations. To those efforts are added lavish entertainment at the Soviet Mission, and persistent llcultivationll of friendly diplomats. Soviet Under-Secre t ary-General Viacheslav Ustinov told The Heritage Foundation that he has more contact with Third World nationals than he does with the Soviet Miss ion An Indian diplomat told The Heritage Foundation that the The sheer barrage of Soviet inspired propaganda d isseminated through the U.N. has caused Western nations to become exhausted exasperated, or possibly intimidated into silence. The result is, in the words of John Lenczowsky, Director of Eastern European and Russian Affairs at the U.S. National Security C ouncil Ildynamic Finlandization,Il illustrated by the poor record of Western support for the U.S. in the General Assembly--a mere 60 percent average for 1982.

SUBVERSION OF THE SECRETARIAT DeDartment of Public Information (DPI The DPI's functions have grow n significantly in the past Despite the provision in General Assembly resolution decade 13 (I) of February 13, 1946, Annex I that DPI Ilshould not engage in 'propaganda,'Il it has on occasion done just that. Former Under-Secretary-General Shevchenko stres s es that the DPI plays a crucial role in the Soviet Union's disinformation campaign The whole Department is mobilized.i1 head of the External Relations Division. Shevchenko identifies Mkrtchyan as a KGB colonel; in fact, the post has been held by a KGB col onel ever since a Soviet national was placed there in 19

68. Among the division's main functions is the dissemination of U.N. material to the 63 U.N. Information Centers throughout the world The principal Soviet national in the DPI is Anatoly Mkrtchyan 26 According to Dr. Devendra Kaushik, Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, "the Leninist assumption of interdependence and complementarity of socialism and anti-imperialist struggles for national liberation f o rms the core of the overall Soviet view of the Third World Devendra Kaushik, in The Non-Aligned World Jan.-Mar 1983, p. 76. 11 A new function of the External Relations Division is fol lowing developments in member states that are "relevant to the work of t he U.N." This could be of considerable use for the Soviet Union in its efforts to gather political intelligence particularly from distant or small Third World nations where Soviet presence might be limited. Although U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de C uellar is trying to restrict the circulation of such information, there seems little chance of preventing the Soviets from obtaining it Arkady Shevchenko, as well as some DPI staff members, point out that the Soviet Union is skillful in using Third World na tionals in DPI. Notable among them is Mkrtchyan's Principal Officer, Samir Sambad, who is also Chief of Information Services.

A IlLebaneseIl Director of the U.N. Information Center in Beirut until about a year ago, Sambad has been identified as a covert member of the PLO.

Among the DPI's chief functions is its radio broadcasting service. The Soviets are strategically placed ther e, with Arkady Chapayev heading the European Unit, and Gleb Kossov as Chief of the Pamphlets Unit. According to a high DPI official, Soviet attempts to slant some DPI material require 'Iconstant vigilance."

Some DPI publications, notably United Nations To day 1981 (Sug gestions for Speakers)--produced by the External Relations Division--show a clear Soviet tilt. That issue refers to Afghanistan without mentioning either the Soviet invasion or the General Assembly's censure. Kampuchea is dealt with in three paragraphs without even mentioning the Vietnam assault. On the other hand, ten pages are devoted to the Middle East and seventeen to South Africa and Namibia. DPI head Akashi reportedly had llconveyed his dissatisfaction at the lack of balance in some of the contents1' of that booklet and has ordered it to be rewritten but no recall is on record.

Office of the Under-Secretary-General for the Security Council and Political Affairs This is the title of the highest-ranking Soviet employee in the U.N. Secretar iat, currently Viacheslav Ustinov, a seasoned diplomat with extensive experience in Africa he considers himself to be a truly impartial civil servant, he told The Heritage Foundation Well, of course, we bring with us our ideology, our friends, our beliefs .

The Soviet Under-Secretary-General has gone to great lengths to block the advancement of people who fail to cooperate with the USSR. In 1981, for example, Martin Robinson, an experienced employee next in line to the directorship of the Outer Space Divisi on was denied promotion by his Soviet superior, then Under Secretary-General Mikhail Systenko. Although a U.N. panel on personnel practices found in Robinson's favor, he was not promoted until the U.S. threatened not to participate in the 1982 UNISPACE co n ference in Vienna. Now retired, Robinson told The Heritage When asked whether 12 Foundation that standing up to his Soviet superior was no easy task 1 can understand how many cannot do it. For me it was a matter of principle to push my case adding that 'l it is scan dalous that the U.N. permits this kind of thing to go on."

Upadhya, has been denied promotion for several years on political grounds. Flouting U.N. recommendations and rules, Ustinov con tinues to engage in remarkably elaborate maneuvers designe d to keep Upadhya in 'ISiberia a term used by U.N. employees to describe a position of little or no meaning, reserved for employees who do not cooperate politically with their communist-bloc bosses).

Under Ustinov's direction is the Center Against Aparthe id, one of the principal organs of hardcore Communist propaganda against South Africa and its Western trade partners. Arkady Shevchenko notes that, while Under-Secretary-General, he ob jected to the Soviet orchestration of the Center's activities.

Shevche nko also accused the Center's Chairman, Enuga Reddy of working in consort with the KGB. Currently the principal Soviet hand at the Center is Alexander Baichorov of the Center's Publicity, Assistance, and Promotion section of the International Branch A Nep alese employee in Ustinov's department, Shail Kumar The Center engages in a vigorous disinformation campaign, elements of which were recently exposed in a succinct booklet produced by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled Fact v.

Fiction. The booklet ch arges that one U.N. report, Document A/AC 15/L.491 of May 22, 1978, contains about two dozen false allega tions, among them that 88 branches of German firms supply conven tional military goods to South Africa. According to the Federal Republic of Germany, the list of companies originated in the Soviet bloc, and is fraudulent; it includes, for example, a perfume factory, an insurance company, and other nonmilitary enterprises.

But Western efforts at refuting misinformation are expensive especially consideri ng the barrage of "fiction" produced by the Center at a cost of over $3 million a year. Included in that budget, according to one Under-Secretary-General, is a heavy Ifsubsidyll of the World Peace Council (WPC). The WPC, a Soviet front, awarded its highes t honor on March 30, 1983, to Center Chairman Reddy and to the Chairman of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, A. Y. Maitama-Sule.

Office of Personnel Services The Soviet Union always opposes the concept of a genuine professional civil service by blocking permanent appointments in favor of temporary assignments--not in keeping with the U.N.

Charter. A high level U.N. official admitted that he felt llyou cannot trust the Soviets with confidential information Yet the Soviets have constant access to the files of all U.N. employees 13 One of the crucial functions of the Soviets in the Personnel Department, according to Arkady Shevchenko, is to secure employ ment in exchange for cooperation with the KGB for people in disfavor with their own governments, wh o therefore have difficulty getting jobs at home. A former head of the Personnel Department told The Heritage Foundation that recruitment of Third World nationals in the Secretariat probably goes on all the time, but not in a systematic manner.Il When aske d whether the U.N investigates cases of illegal influence of Secretariat.personne1 he answered: "The Disciplinary Committee is very lax. You have to kill someone before they even look into a problem." Although the official felt that the Soviets have a limi ted influence on the Secretariat itself, he did not discount the importance of Secretariat personnel to the Soviet Union for its own broader political purposes.

INFI LTRAT I ON An analysis of Soviet and communist-bloc posts in the Secretariat reveals a pattern of strategically located personnel.

Among the most significant is the p ost of Special Assistant to the U.N. Secretary-General, Iftraditionally KGB" according to Shevchenko. The current incumbent, Gennadi Yevstafliev, is well situated to intercept even confidential letters to the Secretary General, which he can then pass on t o the Soviet Mission described by one Western diplomat as !'thick and clumsy is known to former colleagues as a seasoned KGB officer with extensive experience in Japan Although Yevstaf 'iev Another crucial Soviet post in the Secretary-General's Executive O ffice is the Deputy Chief of Protocol, currently Alexander S. Taranenko. In his function, Taranenko handles matters of ceremonial symbolism, has access to information re garding visits of diplomats, and is privy to sensitive U.S security arrangements.

Alth ough Senior Adviser to the USSR Mission .Sergey Nikolayevich Smirnov denied to The Heritage Foundation that Soviet Secretariat employees pay any part of their salaries to the USSR, the practice is well known for espionage and assorted active measures, thi s illegal practice renders the Soviet employees of the Secretariat more dependent upon their home government than are their Western colleagues.

Arkady Shevchenko, for example, received only 1,000 a month--a mere fraction of his actual salary--supplemented by various Ilperks."

A division of the Secretariat that has recently been a focus of controversy is the U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations TNCs because of blatantly illegal activities by the highest Soviet functionary there, Assistant Director of t he Information Analysis Division Ralph Tsvilev. On July 20, 1983, Tsvilev suppressed the Annex of a Center report, which proved the coopera tion of several communist-bloc countries with the West, hence Besides providing the USSR with additional cash 14 su p porting to the inclusion of communist commercial enterprises among the TNCs. By opposing inclusion of that report, the USSR insured that the restrictive and punitive TNC code of conduct is applied only to Western TNCS Another significant Secretariat depar tment from the perspec tive of the Soviet Union is the Office of Legal Affairs.

Codification Division is headed by Valentin Romanov of the USSR who, according to Shabtai Rosenne, former Israeli representative to the U.N manipulates rules during sessions of the U.N. com munist dominated Legal Committee, thereby ignoring speakers instructing selected diplomats on how to use procedure to their advantage, and intimidating some diplomats when politically desirable Its RELATIONSHIP WITH U.N. CONNECTED GROUPS NGO s Early in the history of the U.N the Soviet Union under stood and manipulated the rules governing the U.N.'s relationship with nongovernmental organizations (NGOS At present, several Soviet-front groups routinely llsponsorll NGO conferences in coopera tio n with such U.N. units as the Center Against Apartheid, and their proceedings are subsequently adopted by the U.N. and widely disseminated by the DPI.

Among the hundreds of NGOs affiliated with the U.N several are recognized Soviet fronts The Afro-Asian Pe ople's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO Though the NGO list cites AAPSO's headquarters in Geneva, it is actually based in Cairo. Officially coordinator of the "national struggle of the peoples of Africa and Asia AAPSO is closely connected with the World Pea c e Council and totally controlled by the Soviets. the USSR One of its Deputy Chairmen is Mirza Ibragimov of Its New York Representative is Laura Pasternak The Christian Peace Conference (CPC The FBI is aware of the close connection between the CPC, head qu artered in Prague, and the World Peace Council. Its political 27 28 Press Release USUN 57-(83), July 25, 1983.

For an incisive analysis of the USSR's attempts to gain special status for nongovernmental organizations, particularly the World Federation of Tr ade Unions and other left-leaning or communist controlled groups, see Harold Karan Jacobson, The USSR and the U.N.'s Economic and Social Activities (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963 especially pp. 22-31 15 guidelines are mainly pr o vided by Moscow. CPC delegations are actively involved in meetings of the Special U.N. Committees on disarmament and racism. Philip Oke, who is located at 777 U.N. Plaza--a building that houses a number of religious NGOs Its New York representative is Dr I nternational Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL The IADL was founded in 1946 through Soviet fronts in Europe. Igor Blishchenko, one of the IADL's Secretaries, is closely associated with the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party's Cen t ral Committee. Its President is a French communist, Joe Nordmann. Moscow also has other high-level posi tions in IADL. Its New York representative is Lennox S. Hinds International Organization of Journalists (IOJ Headquartered in Prague, the IOJ is profou n dly influenced by the Soviets. Out of eight Secretaries, six are from the Soviet Union or a communist-bloc country. Its Secretary-General, Jiri Kubka is from Czechoslovakia. New York representative: Joe Wacker Women's International Democratic Federation ( WIDF Headquartered in Berlin, WIDF is one of the most active Soviet fronts. Most of its leaders are Soviet or communist-bloc nationals.

Its New York representative is Vinnie Burrows World Federation of Democratic Youth (WE'DY Headquartered in Hungary, the WFDY supports Soviet policy, includ ing Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party has direct links to most of the leaders of the WFDY. Its New York repre sentative is Daniel Rosenbe r g World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU Its President, Sandor Gaspar, is a member of the Hungarian polit buro. Headquartered in Prague, the WFTU is totally controlled by the International Department of the Central Committee. New York representative is Er nest de Maio Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF Headquartered in Switzerland, WILPF cannot be considered to be a direct Soviet front organization. It does, however, collaborate actively with the WPC.

Fehrer Its New York representativ e is Dr. Elizabeth World Peace Council (WPC WPC is the main Soviet front at the U.N. are provided directly by the International Department and its Its policy guidelines 16 president, Romesh Chandra, an Indian communist, is an important agent of influence Wpc representatives are active in a large number of U.N. conferences, where they have the .opportunity to disseminate Soviet propaganda material tive is philosophy professor Howard Parsons.

Its New York representa Press According to a knowledgeable Western correspondent, the number of communist media personnel at U.N. headquarters is about two dozen. Little of what they do is coverage of U.N. activities for dissemination in media at home; rather, their material is sent to the home countries to provide poli tical briefings to the leaders.

One of the principal attractions of the U.N.'s location in New York, however, is Soviet access to Western journalists publishers, and other media personnel. Although American journalists are by no means considered easy prey to sophisticated Soviet disinformation agents, active measures29 are nevertheless promoted with some success.

CONCLUSION The Soviet Union's use of U.N. headquarters in.New York violates both the spirit and the letter of the U.N. Charter.

Aside from the h igh proportion of secret service agents it places in the Secretariat (about one-third of U.N. employees are from the communist bloc) who are reportedly involved in recruitment of Third World U.N. personnel through financial and in-kind induce ments, the S o viet Union also attempts to manipulate the U.N machinery by exploiting the DPI for propaganda purposes, using access to the personnel files as well as the promotion mechanism to manipulate individuals for Soviet political ends, turning sections of the Sec retariat such as the Center .Against Apartheid into Soviet bases of operation, suppressing information that does not suit its propaganda purposes, even I'doctoringl' economic statistics.

What can be done about Soviet misuse and ab use of the U.N The U.S. and its allies should oppose in the strongest terms every Soviet attempt to compromise the impartiality of the Secretariat. They should insist, for example, that permanent Secretariat assignments replace temporary ones whenever pos s ible 29 Curiously, the sole public use by the Soviets of the term "active measures"--which refers to broad Soviet attempts to influence public opinion--ever found by the FBI appeared in a Soviet report to the U.N. of May 5, 1981, distributed by the DPI 17 Reports of cooperation with governments by Secretariat employees-in violation of Article 100 of the U.N. Charter-should be investigated and punished All cases of employee harassment and discrimination on political grounds should be vigorously opposed by W e stern.members Soviet violations of U.N. procedures--misuse of rules altering documents, stalling reports, manufacturing statistics should be condemned The FBI should be reinforced to enable it to cope with the large number of Soviet-bloc diplomats. The U. S. should attempt to reduce the size of the Eastern bloc and other communist missions in New York The U.S. should press for U.N. recognition of the indepen dence of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine.

Were the U.N.Is level of integrity higher, the Soviet Union might have been ousted from the General Assembly long before South Africa. Instead, the USSR has coopted the U.N. and turned it into an outpost for its campaign of Itactive measuresnn against the West perhaps can salvage some of the principl es originally lauded as U.N. and international standards Consistent and effective exposure of Soviet tactics Juliana Geran Pilon, Ph.D. Policy Analyst Prepared with the assistance of Stanislav Levchenko.


Juliana Pilon

Policy Analyst

Stanislav Levchenko