

The Third  
Anglosphere  
Century

The English-Speaking  
World in an  
Era of Transition



# The Third Anglosphere Century

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World in an  
Era of Transition

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# Introduction

IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS, a new term, “Anglosphere,” has appeared more and more frequently in political discourse and the media.<sup>1</sup> The term has been used as shorthand for “the English-speaking nations,” or the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada (or any combination thereof), as they act jointly in international affairs.

Though roughly accurate, use of the term “Anglosphere” in this manner masks a more extensive and more complex phenomenon. The Anglosphere is a discrete entity composed of the English-speaking, common law-based political communities, cultures, and peoples. The Anglosphere is not a single political entity, but is held together by the bonds of the Internet, communication, and commerce; facilitated by

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<sup>1</sup> James C. Bennett, *The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-First Century* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

low-cost intercontinental transportation; and sustained by the flows of information, products, capital, and people that are thereby created.

The Anglosphere is more than the sum of its parts. It is continually evolving, becoming more densely networked and more self-aware. Ranked on various economic, military, political, and social criteria, the members of the Anglosphere stand at the top. Indeed, for their size, they often dominate both their industrialized and non-industrialized neighbors.<sup>2</sup>

But the rise of the Anglosphere has been masked by globalization in both the 19th and 20th centuries. The Anglosphere exists within a wider “civilsphere”: the total set of nations, peoples, and cultures that are modernized or modernizing. In addition to the Anglosphere nations, a number of other nations and cultures are increasingly participating in the complexities of the world market economy, developing their own paradigms of representative constitutional government and civil rights, and forming

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<sup>2</sup> William Lewis, *The Cousins' Wars: Wealth, Poverty, and the Threat to Global Stability* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

their own voluntary mechanisms of cooperation and association.

Within the sphere of civil societies, individuals are free to form their own webs of association and to create institutions—commercial, religious, nongovernmental, and noncommercial. The state, no matter how large or powerful it may be, acts primarily as a referee and assistant to individuals and to civil society, not as an end in itself. Furthermore, family, ethnic, and other inherited ties are expressions of affection and identity rather than prisons that inexorably determine life's course at birth.

By steering between the Scylla of an overwhelming state and the Charybdis of family cronyism, civil society brings freedom, individualism, prosperity, and peace to nations that develop it. In other parts of the world, ancient and modern forms of bondage brought and continue to bring stagnation, corruption, misery, and strife.

During the long wars of the 20th century, civil societies had to make a number of compromises when choosing allies against competing authoritarian and totalitarian societies and ideologies. Stronger civil societies embraced

their less advanced allies and were able to work through their shortcomings. Many other corrupt, crony-based, and authoritarian societies were tolerated and supported as a lesser evil in the fight against totalitarianism. Some nations with incomplete transitions to civil society were even accepted as equals in our councils.

But in the decade and a half following the end of the last major totalitarian superpower, fault lines within the civilsphere have developed. Globalization may have become a worldwide phenomenon, but it has been far from uniform in its successes.

Even among the ranks of the developed nations, some forms of civil society are proving to be far more adaptive than others to the challenges of our current era. These challenges include riding the accelerating wave of technological and organizational innovation, minimizing the ensuing social disruptions, preserving traditional liberties in the face of novel circumstances, maintaining social cohesion and order during a period of increased worldwide immigration, and developing the cultural self-confidence to defend civil society

from internal self-doubt and external assault by fanatical ideologies and religious sects.

In meeting all of these challenges, English-speaking nations and peoples have enjoyed significantly better success than have other strong civil societies. Herein, circumstances begin to distinguish the Anglosphere from the rest of the civilsphere. In many areas, such as productivity and employment, the gap between the Anglosphere and the rest of the civilsphere is increasing, despite conscious efforts on the part of other nations to address the disparity.<sup>3</sup> In other areas of national power, such as defense and security, some nations have adopted self-deluding excuses for inaction.

All of these differences are notable, yet policy circles of the major English-speaking nations have yet to apply the historical and intellectual tools necessary to understand them. Dealing with the consequences of a gap between the Anglosphere and the rest of the civilsphere requires new strategies and policies. The following pages will sketch the unique characteristics of the wider Anglosphere, identify the causes

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

and consequences of these characteristics, and suggest policy directions for the United States and other English-speaking nations that are based upon these characteristics.

*James C. Bennett*

*November 2007*

## Executive Summary

THE LESSONS LEARNED since the end of the Cold War suggest that culture and the institutions that culture influences are major factors in the relative successes of nations. Within the wider set of developed nations, a smaller group of nations with particularly strong civil societies have demonstrated particular success, both economically and politically. Most of these, and all of the large, heterogeneous ones, are English-speaking, common law-based nations. Now research from a wide variety of fields is drawing a newer and clearer picture of why the English-speaking world set the course of both the industrial and democratic revolutions and why it continues to lead in many categories in the increasingly rapid technological evolution of the 21st century.

Taken together, these results suggest that the old picture of development—a foreordained

march of all humanity through different, defined stages toward a destination that all will someday reach—is false. Undeveloped nations, it would seem, are everywhere alike; however, each developed nation achieved development in its own fashion.

The English-speaking world's own path, from its roots in England to its extension into North America, Australasia, and elsewhere, was not, contrary to the claims of various triumphalists, due to any specific virtue—ethnic, religious, or otherwise. Nor was it due to any particular vice, as the historical Anglophobes and current-day Americophobes suggest. It is most likely the result of a long train of circumstances, geography, and other factors and the determination of long generations of English-speaking people to preserve and extend their distinct variety of civilization.

The implications of this emerging point of view are numerous in both the foreign and domestic policy spheres. The first implication is that closer cooperation among the principal English-speaking nations, as well as international structures to make such cooperation happen, are the lowest-hanging fruit available

to the U.S. and its Anglosphere cousins in the foreseeable future. A proactive policy of extending and deepening free trade agreements, common economic areas, and special ties in defense and defense procurement, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand would render immediate benefits.

Extending such regimes to the United Kingdom (U.K.) and, where appropriate, Ireland should be a U.S. policy goal, recognizing that Britain and Ireland are currently prevented by their European Union (EU) ties from accepting many of the benefits that such regimes might bring. India, not an Anglosphere country *per se* but heavily influenced by Anglosphere ties, should be a particular focus of U.S. policy in Asia. Although friendly ties and an open trading relationship with China remain desirable, India's lead in democracy, common law jurisprudence, and increasingly widespread use of English suggest that a special relationship between the United States and India is both possible and desirable.

The United States' long-standing encouragement of European integration and of U.K. membership in the European Union has been

a miscalculation, and one that is in danger of backfiring badly in the areas of trade and defense cooperation. The U.S. has been placed in the awkward position of aligning itself with the most anti-American elements of the British political spectrum on this issue and setting itself against the most naturally pro-American elements. Similarly, the U.S. has long tended to deal with its English-speaking allies in multilateral fora and structures—often regional—whose primary effect is to permit third nations to play one against the other to the disadvantage of both the U.S. and its allies.

Domestically, an Anglospherist analysis leads to a reaffirmation of American self-confidence and identity and to a rejection of multiculturalism and the politics of guilt. However, identity should be understood in a manner much closer to the way the Founders—particularly Jefferson, Franklin, and Adams—saw it rather than the subsequent European-style nationalist formulations of the later 19th century. This view stresses the continuity of American culture and the English traditions of liberty, stretching back through the Glorious Revolution, Magna Carta, the tribal assemblies of the

Anglo–Saxons and their ancestors and understood by the Founders through their familiarity with Montesquieu and their own common law legal and constitutional traditions.

In the debate over immigration, an Anglo-spheric analysis emphasizes assimilation and the learning of English and the political values of the English-speaking world. In education reform, it demands a negation of the guilt narrative, which stresses the unexceptional use of slavery in early America, by emphasizing the unique and exceptional role of the English-speaking world in the systematic eradication of slavery worldwide (most recently retold, for example, in the film *Amazing Grace*.)

Finally, the Anglospherist viewpoint has implications for the ongoing libertarian–traditionalist debate in conservative circles of the English-speaking world. The traditionalists view modern capitalism much as Churchill saw democracy: “the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” In other words, the creative destruction that Joseph Schumpeter correctly perceived in capitalism is viewed with suspicion and as a solvent of the traditional, Burkean ties.

Libertarians, especially those of the otherwise-opposed Randian and Rothbardian schools, are in some senses the modernists of the Right, celebrating what the traditionalists deplore. These thinkers celebrate the idea of modernity as a revolution severing the bonds of oppressive tradition.

Both views are, in fact, incorrect. There never was any great break in the English-speaking world between the modern, individualist present and a communalist, traditionalist past. To the contrary, the Anglosphere has always been individualistic in the anthropological sense. Individualism is an Anglosphere tradition, but it is an individualism exercised within a particular cultural and legal framework, and that is best protected by respecting those traditions. Communities are networks of individualists that draw their strength from willing and negotiated cooperation. Any Anglosphere politics that is to protect both the community and the individual needs to recognize the long roots of both. The Anglospheric understanding of America allows us to celebrate our freedom and enterprise within an accurate historical framework. It provides nothing less than a deeper

and truer basis for a refounding of American patriotism.

# The Anatomy of the Anglosphere

WHEN WINSTON CHURCHILL WROTE his *History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, his definition of the subject matter was simple and mainly straightforward.<sup>1</sup> The “English-speaking peoples” were the inhabitants of the British Isles, their descendants in the colonies they settled (America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), and a limited number of those foreign immigrants to these colonies who had assimilated into their cultures.

Today the definition is far more complicated. Churchill’s definition still constitutes the core of the Anglosphere, but the number and variety of immigrants to Anglosphere nations

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<sup>1</sup> Winston Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples* (London: Cassell and Company, 1956–1958).

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is now far greater than in Churchill's time, and the degree of assimilation varies widely from country to country and source to source.

However, the most notable difference between Churchill's time and today is the rise of what might be termed the "New Anglosphere," which includes the old Anglosphere's former colonial possessions. The English language is in transition, changing from a status marker for post-colonial elites to a much more widely spread and rapidly growing phenomenon.<sup>2</sup> An English-speaking workforce now interfaces with the world economy through the software and offshore call center industries. This phenomenon is often viewed as "offshoring" in the First World: a matter of Internet economics driving down wages through international competition. Yet it is also a cultural phenomenon. The offshore worker becomes a cyber-immigrant to the Anglosphere, a process by which the values of the Anglosphere flow back, encouraging social transformation in the home country.

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<sup>2</sup> Peggy Mohan, "Is English the Language of India's Future?" *Seminar*, No. 545 (January 2005).

These New Anglosphere nations are almost entirely former British colonies, notably India; but they also include that former American possession, the Philippines. It is worth noting that in the 2006 Pew Global 16-Nation survey of public attitudes toward the U.S., the Philippines had the highest pro-American rating—higher, even, than in the U.S. itself.<sup>3</sup> India is one of the few nations that have become more pro-American in the past six years. Given the fact of a billion Indians and 100 million Filipinos, it behooves America to pay attention to its state of relations with these nations.

The cultural interpenetrability created by widespread use of the English language offers opportunities well beyond what might be reasonably expected in, say, China. What makes India and China different is that in India, English has become more than just a useful foreign language. Indian English is an Indian language, used at home as well as at work or in the legislature. It is, in fact, one of the

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<sup>3</sup> Pew Global Attitudes Project, *U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative*, May 23, 2006, at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247> (April 16, 2007).

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things that binds the Indian union together, and its use, once primarily a status marker for the elite, has spread rapidly through the lower classes. Private English schools in India have proliferated. English-language knowledge has become a path to social advancement, mainly through Internet and other telecommunication industries.<sup>4</sup>

An India that is increasingly fluent in English, linked by a growing tide of emigration to the core Anglosphere nations, creates a more intimate relationship between India and the Anglosphere than had existed before. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck famously opined that the most important reality of the 20th century was the fact that the United States spoke English. He was right. It is also possible that the most important fact of the 21st century will be that India increasingly speaks English.

The anatomy and architecture of an Anglosphere in which Indians, Africans, and other non-traditional English-speaking peoples play a significant role has not been con-

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<sup>4</sup> Mohan, "Is English the Language of India's Future?"

sidered to any significant degree. Without a doubt, these non-traditional English speakers will have an impact.

At the same time, conventional ideas, based on past history, as to what policies such people will pursue may be highly misleading. The same communications revolution that makes it possible for non-traditional English speakers to communicate directly and on wide scale with the Anglosphere bypasses their traditional political and media elites. As the increasing pro-American sentiments of India indicate, attitudes of the future generations may surprise their elders, political leaders, and the rest of the world.

# The Riddle of the English-Speaking World: Anglosphere Exceptionalism and Continuity

THE IDEA THAT THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING world is distinct from other developed-nation cultures is not new. A century ago, it was a fairly commonplace observation, and one that had centuries of tradition behind it. But as Continental Europe, Japan, and East Asia developed economically and became more competitive, the United Kingdom experienced relative industrial and financial stagnation, and such ideas increasingly looked obsolete. Britain's quick recovery of its economic position under the rather basic reforms of the Thatcher era changed some minds on the matter, and as the entire Anglo-

sphere began to pull away from its economic and military competitors, the need for a broader historical explanation returned.

Such an explanation is part of a larger puzzle gradually being solved by historians, particularly historical sociologists. While intellectually fascinating in its own right, this puzzle has wider and more immediate implications. The remarkable pattern of contemporary Anglosphere exceptionalism has been noted in such disparate fields as economics and law without any reference to (or apparent knowledge of) new explanations of English continuity and exceptionalism developed in recent historical essays and books.

Modern theories of Anglosphere exceptionalism as established by historical sociologists require an explanation. Given the historical evidence for the continuity of British institutions, it appears that the explanation must be sought in a 1,500-year-old root. While Western civilization as a whole may look to the Greeks and Romans for inspiration, common law countries must also look to the humble shire reeves in southeast England for the origin of their modern sheriff. Current Anglosphere

exceptionalism, combined with the new wave of research and thought concerning the continuity of Anglosphere institutions, paints a powerful picture that has deeper implications for present-day policies. Contemporary events have added some urgency to this historical research.

#### CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANGLOSPHERE

Is Anglosphere exceptionalism a statistical anomaly, or is it merely the accumulation of centuries of undeserved good luck? Does it have a historical basis? Regardless of the source, it most certainly has a contemporary significance.

Even today, more than two years after the deadly attacks on the London underground and months after an even more ambitious assault on transatlantic air traffic was narrowly thwarted, an intense sense of shock can be felt in England. If a generation of young Muslims—English-speaking, cricket-playing, and seemingly thoroughly modern—can produce a network of fanatics who are capable of playing soccer with their non-Muslim neighbors one day and planting bombs to murder them the next, what is the

future for the shire reeve and all he represents? “They have learned from us how to play, how to dress, and how to talk,” Britons may think, “but we seem to have taught them nothing of our identity or our values.”

The shocking facts of the London bombings have provoked a self-examination of British identity, British values, and what it means to be British, and similar questions will have to be answered in all of the Anglosphere countries as they face the challenges of what promises to be a protracted and difficult war against radical Islamic terrorism. Old narratives about what it means to be American or British or even English-speaking are taken for granted and are no longer explicitly taught. This pattern of forgetfulness is evident not only in Britain, but also in Australia, in Canada, and now even in the United States. Nations that have the most diverse citizenry on the planet, claiming a bewildering array of religious and cultural beliefs, seem willing to let the sheriff’s deputy merely get on with “putting the cows back in the pasture,” so to speak, when faced with these challenges.

The explicit roots of community and civil tradition became invisible to the post-World War II generation, but historians can now highlight their significance. The Anglosphere faces challenges beyond a few stray cattle. A reconsideration of the first principles of Anglosphere exceptionalism from the vantage point of the 21st century is overdue.

One way to reach a better understanding of these questions is to look back over the history of England and then look outward across the world to communities that share the British heritage. To begin with, the previous century's explanations of English exceptionalism do not hold water. Various attributed to ethnic, racial, religious, or a nebulous cultural superiority, these past explanations for English success have been stripped away by critique and advancing scientific knowledge.

Ethnic explanations—the idea that the offspring of Hengist and Horsa were somehow endowed with superior intelligence, character, or will—fail for many reasons. The first critique takes note of the highly varied genetic contribution of England since Anglo-Saxon times. Daniel Defoe lampooned the idea of a “true-

born Englishman” as “in fact a fiction...A metaphor invented to express/A man a-kin to all the universe.”

### A UNIQUE SOCIETAL TEMPLATE

Recent DNA evidence has shown that a substantial core of the British population has a genetic commonality going back over 13 millennia and a surprising cousinage to the pre-Indo-European Basque population of Europe.<sup>1</sup> Throughout its history, Britain has seen waves of settlers arriving and intermingling with this ancient stock. Its daughter nations, and particularly America, have been enormously successful in maintaining the unique template of its society and culture while integrating waves of immigrants, both voluntary and involuntary, into that template. This strongly suggests that the unique strengths of Anglosphere society lie in the template rather than in the materials that it organizes.

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Weale *et al.*, “Y Chromosome Evidence for Anglo-Saxon Mass Migration,” *Molecular Biology and Evolution*, Vol. 19 (2002), pp. 1008–1021, abstract at <http://mbe.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/19/7/1008> (April 16, 2007).

The religious argument is equally incorrect. Lord Salisbury, one of the most ardently Tory and Anglican Prime Ministers of 19th century Britain, dismissed the “Protestant work ethic” thesis in a succinct observation: What explained Catholic Belgium’s prosperity and work ethic? The new scholarship of British continuity shows that pre-Reformation Catholic England managed to be both very English and very Catholic. Historians and sociologists must therefore set their sights back beyond the Reformation for an answer to the riddle of British exceptionalism.<sup>2</sup>

How did a smallish island on the periphery of Europe, not overly endowed in learning or virtue, prosper and flourish in pre-industrial times? What would lead Britain to serve as the veritable forge of modernity? Why do its offspring nations outpace and out-innovate, rather than simply mimic, their counterparts and

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<sup>2</sup> See Alan Macfarlane, *The Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property and Social Transition* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1988), and James Campbell, *The Anglo-Saxon State* (London: Hambleton & London, 2003).

neighbors around the globe? This is “the Riddle of the English-Speaking World.”

The answer can be found in new research into Anglo-Saxon and medieval England.<sup>3</sup> England was much more individualistic and market-oriented than contemporary Continental societies. England’s forms of feudalism, monarchy, and constitutionalism were quite different from continental norms. They grew increasingly different as the Continent abandoned medieval constitutionalism and adopted a resurgent Roman civil law. As the Continental powers became military-bureaucratic administrative states,<sup>4</sup> England’s medieval regime shifted into a representative limited government. The shape of English-speaking political and social culture has therefore been distinct

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<sup>3</sup> Macfarlane, *Origins of English Individualism*, and Alan Macfarlane, *Marriage and Love in England: Modes of Reproduction 1300–1840* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1987).

<sup>4</sup> Brian Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), and Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

and continuous over the past 1,500 years. Today's American sheriff is a descendant of the Old English shire reeve. The National Guardsman harks back directly to the Anglo-Saxon militiaman.

### CONTINUITY OF CULTURE

New research into American history and that of other Anglosphere colonies demonstrates the continuity of culture in transoceanic settlement. Historian David Hackett Fischer has documented how the differing regional British origins affected American “streams of settlement” and determined regional cultural diversity in early America.<sup>5</sup> These regional cultures were carried across the continent, and their distinctions became the basis of internal divisions in American culture and politics that have survived to this day.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

<sup>6</sup> Kevin Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000); Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Routledge, 2002); and

An emerging school of thought on the American colonial period envisions a “transatlantic constitution” joining Britain, America, and the West Indies into a transatlantic space united by common law and a system for appealing decisions that ran unbroken from colonial courts to the Privy Council in London.<sup>7</sup> The post-Revolutionary American practice of “judicial review” can be considered a reinvention of the pre-Revolutionary practice of reviewing colonial laws for “repugnance to the law of England.”<sup>8</sup> After the American Revolution, the need to maintain a close economic relationship between Britain and America led to the adoption of judicial review in a series of cases suppressing populist impediments to British investment. Britain has, after all, been America’s principal foreign source of capital since 1607,

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Michael Barone, *Our First Revolution: The Remarkable British Upheaval That Inspired America’s Founding Fathers* (New York: Crown, 2007).

<sup>7</sup> Daniel Hulsebosch, “A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the Atlantic World, and the Origins of Judicial Review,” *Chicago-Kent Law Review*, Vol. 74 (2006).

<sup>8</sup> Mary Bilder, “The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review,” *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 116 (2006).

and solutions to legal problems needed to be acceptable to both parties.<sup>9</sup>

Thus, the new picture of the Anglosphere emerging from recent research turns many of the intellectual and academic stereotypes of the past hundred years on their heads. The idea that there are inevitable stages of history through which all societies transition, as if on iron rails, is unsustainable.

England never had a “peasant agricultural stage” in Continental European fashion. In fact, the English have been remarkably individualistic, market-oriented, and willing to be bound by contract-based agreements and social structures as far back as written records exist.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, archeological evidence suggests that these patterns stem back from at least the time of Anglo–Saxon settlement of England in the 5th century; James Campbell’s work, for example, takes note of the large volume of silver coinage found in Anglo–Saxon sites, indicating a much more market-oriented economy in

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<sup>9</sup> Hulsebosch, “A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority.”

<sup>10</sup> Macfarlane, *Origins of English Individualism*.

England than on the Dark Age Continent.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, nuclear families, living apart from either set of parents, as opposed to extended, multi-generational households, seem to have dominated English domestic patterns as far back as can be determined.<sup>12</sup>

Rather than being a response to the Protestant Reformation and the Industrial Revolution, these “modern” social patterns of marriage and property management are, in fact, part of the explanation of why the Industrial Revolution had its origins in England. Similarly, the pattern of the Reformation in the British Isles, with its unique set of churches—Anglican, Methodist, Congregationalist, Presbyterian, and Quaker—was apparently a product of this unique English sociology rather than its cause.

### IMPORTANCE OF GEOGRAPHY

Geography does seem to have played a part in shaping English, British, and then Anglosphere exceptionalism. The sea brought Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, and Norman

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<sup>11</sup> Campbell, *The Anglo-Saxon State*.

<sup>12</sup> Macfarlane, *Marriage and Love in England*.

invaders to the British Isles. Britain's English Channel "moat" shaped all the states that established themselves on the island. Once the English learned how to build and maintain a navy,<sup>13</sup> they were able to enjoy a unique balance of proximity and distance from the rest of Europe. The island had easy access to trade on the Continent but was distant enough (via tricky Channel crossings) to be insulated from the Continent's cycles of dynastic and religious wars. As a result, the countryside maintained a continuity of state administration, law, adjudication, property titles, and a generation-by-generation accumulation of wealth that provided a unique combination of security and prosperity unmatched in pre-modern times.<sup>14</sup> Can any other nation point to a Domesday Book, which records towns, villages, and watermills still standing a thousand years later?

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<sup>13</sup> Nicholas A. M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 600–1649* (London: Penguin, 2004), and *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain 1649–1815* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004).

<sup>14</sup> Alan Macfarlane, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

Britain's unique geography allowed it to escape the need for the centralized bureaucratic states created by its Continental counterparts during the military revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries. England had no need to create mass conscript armies or ruinous, expropriatory taxation.<sup>15</sup> Instead, its social structure continued to evolve from medieval constitutionalism to a system with limited Crown powers held in check by the necessity for Parliamentary assent. England retained common law and actively resisted the imposition of Roman law, unlike other parts of Europe. By doing so, England was able to develop unique organizational forms such as the law of trusts, which, unlike the corporation of Roman law, was a vehicle for business and civil affairs that did not require the prior approval of the state.<sup>16</sup>

Although England, in common with other medieval European systems, used a form of corporation for city charters, universities, crown-granted monopolies, colonization companies,

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<sup>15</sup> Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, and Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*.

<sup>16</sup> Alan Macfarlane, *The Making of the Modern World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

and similar purposes, it was not the same as an everyday business structure. When English-speaking jurisdictions later adopted widespread use of the corporation in the 19th century, they already had had centuries of experience with private institutions that had corporate legal identities. These institutions were the ancient foundation of English civil society. The business laws of the English-speaking world fundamentally changed the nature of the corporation from a grant of monopoly to a general-purpose, flexible institution for carrying on business. Under the English system, forming a corporation became simply a matter of registering it rather than seeking the approval of the legislature.

Thus, both English society and societies that developed from it possessed the legal and cultural foundations for a strong civil society capable of conducting business and other activities that were regulated by law but outside of the direct control of the state. These societies remained considerably more open to social innovation and mobility than their Continental counterparts, and this difference continues to this day with practical implications in areas such as the formation of entrepreneurial companies.

## A DISTINCT POLITICAL EVOLUTION

Building on this strong base, a series of historical shifts drove a distinct political evolution in the English-speaking world. Conventional wisdom claims that the daughter-nations of Britain formed essential and distinct national characteristics early in their histories, in part as a result of the influence of frontier areas, and that the disparate population streams that subsequently immigrated to these nations caused yet more divergence from ancient English social patterns. But this view of history does not hold up under close examination of modern social patterns in the Anglosphere.<sup>17</sup> Rather, the emerging sociohistorical picture is one of an Anglosphere cultural pattern with deep roots and continuities, supporting the most diverse citizenry on the planet.

How did this pattern spread from Britain to a global network? How was this pattern replicated, and how did it ensure continuity among its member nations?

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<sup>17</sup> Frederick Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," in *Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin*, December 14, 1893.

The Anglo–Saxons settled southern Scotland at roughly the same time as England, producing a state that exhibited a pattern similar to that of its southern neighbor. In the words of James Campbell, “It is as if there was a second England, and it was called Scotland.”<sup>18</sup> Anglo–Saxon nobles fleeing the Norman conquerors found a welcome haven in heavily Anglo–Saxon-influenced Scotland. In the following centuries, the Border Reivers, meanwhile, arbitrated the similar social systems across the boundary between Scotland and England. Scottish Calvinist reformer John Knox’s decision that the Scottish church should publish its Bible in English rather than Scots placed Scotland firmly down the path of linguistic commonality with England. Stuart Scottish monarchs, from James I through Queen Anne, concluded this pattern with both a *de facto* and *de jure* political union.

The manner in which the union was accomplished was also significant. During Oliver Cromwell’s brief Commonwealth period, the English-speaking world experienced its first

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<sup>18</sup> Campbell, *The Anglo–Saxon State*.

and only comprehensive unitary state under a written constitution: the Instrument of Government. The Restoration undid this unitary state, and the period of militarily enforced centralization that followed proved very traumatic.

When the pressure of events finally drove England and Scotland to negotiate a union a half-century later, Scotland (negotiating its first Lockean bargain, as will be discussed below) was very careful to preserve the autonomy of three critical national institutions: the Church of Scotland; the educational system, including its independent universities; and its distinct legal system. This autonomy had important and unanticipated consequences.

At a time when most European states were obsessed with their role as final moral arbiter by means of state churches and their rules, the new British union did not follow suit. For example, the Church of England deemed marriage a sacrament and thus insoluble. The Church of Scotland, however, deemed it a covenant, and marriages could be made or dissolved just as any other civil contract could. The British state could enforce each ruling with equal zeal in

each jurisdiction, but it could hardly claim to be enforcing a universal moral truth in doing so.

The British state discovered, long before Continental Europe, the idea of the state as enforcer of a general framework within which moral rules might operate, but it left all but the most generally applicable moral judgments up to the individual churches and, ultimately, the individual. “Marriage was good,” it said in effect, but it no longer determined, as a state, exactly what kind of marriage was good.

The Union of 1707 created a limited but nonetheless significant model for a broader, structural embrace of toleration. Unlike the expedient “toleration” practiced under the later Stuarts, it could not be undone by a single act of Parliament. The structure of the Treaty of Union prevented any retreat from the toleration it established, creating in effect a one-way ratchet. Political rights advanced as well and were extended first to Protestant dissenters and then to Catholics, Jews, and, ultimately, all British subjects.

## A COLONIZING PROCESS

In a sense, English society started as a colonizing process. The Anglo-Saxon conquerors of England possessed more advanced agricultural techniques than those of the native Britons. Anglo-Saxon communities were able to exploit land that had remained previously uncultivated. For centuries afterwards, commercial companies of English settlers were formed to colonize lands in southern Wales and eastern Ireland, using Anglo-Saxon techniques.<sup>19</sup>

By the time the Virginia Company was formed in 1585, the economic and social template for such colonization companies had long been established, and all subsequent American ventures followed the same pattern. These colonization companies were variants of the medieval chartered corporation, similar to the trading companies or the chartered cities. All of these corporations were self-governing within the scope of their charters and included an assembly of members or their representatives.

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<sup>19</sup> R. R. Davies, *The First English Empire: Power and Identities in the British Isles 1093–1343* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

For the Jamestown colonists, it was natural to convene such an assembly in 1619. Initially, it was no more intended for the Virginia Company to be governed from Virginia than for today's administrator of NASA to have his office on the Moon; but once governance of the Company moved to the New World, the means and method of transferring and decentralizing the administration were well understood.

In the transfer, English-speaking society, in all its elaboration, expanded seamlessly across the Atlantic. The Virginians were followed quickly thereafter by the Plymouth colonists. The Pilgrims, in turn, generated the Mayflower Compact, acquiring what English colonists were expected to have: a written charter. Although the location in the New World was novel, the form and nature of their activity was highly familiar—so much so that London lawyers drawing up the Virginia Company and subsequent charters treated them as routine legal matters.

The contrast with other European colonial experiences could not be greater: Spain and France were obsessed with administrative control from the center and the prevention of any

vestige of local autonomy.<sup>20</sup> Even the Dutch, who had a highly developed system of local and provincial self-government at home, had great trouble transplanting even rudimentary administrative machinery to New Amsterdam or the Cape of Good Hope. They never managed to replicate in their settlements the sophisticated representative institutions that flourished at home. It took 134 years from the arrival of the Dutch for the first court beyond Cape Town to be formed, even though settlement by that time had expanded well beyond it.<sup>21</sup>

Some of the Continental struggle with decentralization was due to the rigidity of Roman civil law. English-speaking frontier communities often had a few lawyers ride in with copies of Blackstone in their saddlebags. Along came the first storekeeper, and then the Methodist circuit-rider. Before long, a county or territory would be set up. Judges and sheriffs would be

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<sup>20</sup> Claudio Véliz, *The New World of the Gothic Fox: Culture and Economy in English and Spanish America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

<sup>21</sup> Noel Mostert, *Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa's Creation and the Tragedy of the Xhosa People* (New York: Knopf, 1992).

appointed or elected. Juries would be convened. English-speaking society had long ago created a do-it-yourself polity-generating toolkit that required, at best, only the vaguest blessing of distant authority. With it, the English-speaking peoples were able to create a vast and dispersed cultural space inhabited by a wide variety of self-governing communities.

Within this common cultural space exists a diverse group of regional and national communities, each with substantially distinct and persistent cultural characteristics that stem primarily from diverse regional origins in the far-from-homogeneous British Isles.<sup>22</sup> These cultural communities can be thought of as forming the fabric of the Anglosphere.

### BURKEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE LOCKEAN BARGAIN

At the base of the Anglosphere are what might be termed Burkean communities: gradual accretions of networks of civic association and shared understandings. In turn, these Burkean communities are tied together by wider Lock-

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<sup>22</sup> Fischer, *Albion's Seed*.

ean bargains: conscious, collective negotiations between widely disparate communities for the purpose of forming yet larger entities that subsequently accumulate their own ties of narrative. The British Union of 1707 was the first of these. The subsequent American, Canadian, and Australian unions give concrete examples of how the English model was elaborated.

Using this new historical perspective, we can see that none of the nations of the English-speaking world ever fit the Continental European ideal of the nation-state: all speakers of one language encompassed within a single border. Only during the brief stretch from 1707 to 1776 were all English speakers united in a single state structure. The unwillingness of that state's ruling circles to negotiate a Lockean bargain among its parts, as Benjamin Franklin and others sought, led to the dissolution of the "transatlantic constitution."

The American union followed the model of the British union. A provisional union was created in 1776; extended inadequately enough, through the Articles of Confederation after the Revolution, to spur the convening of the Constitutional Convention in 1787; and finally,

after intense debate and ratification by nine of the original 13 states in 1788, made permanent when the Constitution went into effect in March 1789.

The new American union followed the template of the British union in several key respects.<sup>23</sup> In particular, it barred the federal government from any role as ultimate enforcer of a particular ethical or religious vision, excepting only that which was implicit in the common law. The First Amendment's separation of church and state explicitly extended the logic of the British Treaty of Union to the multiple religions in America (although churches established by the individual states did continue into the 1830s). The American state, like the British, rejected the European concept of what Michael Oakeshott calls the "enterprise state": one that has empowered itself to determine the optimum "moral and proper" way of life for its people and to impose that vision upon its citizens.<sup>24</sup> Instead, the American union accepted

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<sup>23</sup> Barone, *Our First Revolution*, and Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars*.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (New York: Oxford University Press,

the implicit values of the British union, made them explicit, and declared them universally applicable.

Britain and its other national children, including America, came to think of a nation in a way that was quite distinct from the Continental vision. In Europe, Burkean communities—coherent communities bound by a network of associations, blood ties, common sentiment, and shared history—would be considered the single element necessary to form a nation-state. Small differences in language, such as those between Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian, were considered sufficient justification for separate nations on the Continent.

But the great unions of the Anglosphere encompassed several, and usually many, Burkean communities. What tied these unions together originally was the Lockean bargain: the conscious, negotiated, and debated agreements among the various Burkean communities to tie their fortunes together. The reasons for doing so were generally pressing: national

security, economic advantage, and common projects, particularly transportation projects.

- **The British union** was a bargain based on mutual security against a Jacobite restoration, the creation of a wider economic space, and the financial relief of Scotland from the burdens of the Darien fiasco, which had threatened to bankrupt the Scots both individually and collectively.
- **The American union** promised mutual security against encircling European colonies on all sides and offered the prosperity of a common economic space. Transgressions against this space by protectionist member states were the immediate cause of the Constitutional Convention, which assumed the states' Revolutionary War debts and established programs for badly needed navigational aids and post roads.
- **The Canadian union** was fueled by the need to organize Canadian defenses against a United States whose power

was vividly demonstrated during its Civil War. It also reflected the need to create a more proactive common economic space to offset the growing economic attraction of America. The union made possible the financing of a transcontinental railroad in order to keep western Canada from joining the United States.

- **The Australian union** promised a better defense against German expansionism in Papua and Samoa and against the rising power of Japan after the Sino-Japanese War. The Australian union abolished intra-colonial trade barriers in order to increase economic activity and, as in the case of Canada, allowed the financing of a trans-Australian railroad.

The driving force of Anglosphere states has typically been a conscious union: a pragmatic bargain over mutually useful items. This fact is sometimes offered up polemically as proof that one or another of the Anglosphere's unions is "artificial" and therefore unequal to an "or-

ganic” nation-state. Linda Colley’s deconstruction of the making of the British state<sup>25</sup> and Tom Nairn’s derision of the United Kingdom as “Ukania”<sup>26</sup> are two examples. This line of argument, however, needlessly accepts the idea of the *European* nation-state as some sort of universal standard. Over time, each of these Anglosphere unions subsequently developed ties of emotion as well as ties of agreement. Through shared experience, particularly the shared sacrifices of war, Lincoln’s “mystic cords of memory” appeared in all of these nations. Lockean bargains thereby acquired Burkean resonance.

### DURABLE FABRICS

Surprisingly to some, this cross-woven construction of Burkean warp and Lockean woof has created remarkably durable fabrics. Each of the Anglosphere unions has weathered bitter wars against powerful totalitarian foes, as well as internal dissensions that tore other, sup-

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<sup>25</sup> Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992).

<sup>26</sup> Thomas Nairn, *After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland* (London: Granta, 2000).

posedly “organic” states apart. Furthermore, the Anglosphere unions remained remarkably free of totalitarian parties of the sort that cropped up in almost every other industrialized nation. Rather than measure Anglosphere states against a foreign ideal that is alien to it, we would do better to understand the real nature of the powerful and effective social forms that we have created.

Though the Anglosphere state has avoided developing along the lines of the Continental enterprise-state model, it has hardly been an ideal *laissez-faire* state. The English, in particular, achieved an end to internal violence far earlier than their Continental rivals did, and this paved the way for a relatively strong administrative state that offered access to the enforcement of property rights that was more widespread and adjudication of disputes much further down the social scale than Europe offered. After Sir Isaac Newton’s currency reforms at the end of the 16th century, the English could mobilize resources at half the cost of their Continental competitors. Samuel Pepys’s administrative reforms had already created a Navy that was capable of exploiting this cheap

financing: a powerful institution whose equipment needs fostered the emergence of the 17th century's industrial revolution.<sup>27</sup>

This pattern of vigorous but limited state action continues: The Anglosphere has never hesitated to use state power on a case-by-case basis. Hegel said that the state scarcely existed in America. By this, he meant the European-style enterprise state, which was the only kind of state he knew. Yet Anglosphere states have often been effective at “enterprising.” When the need has arisen (usually the need for national defense), they have been able to create a long series of remarkably effective institutions sponsored, financed, or sometimes operated by the state. These works range from the Royal Navy dockyards to the Erie Canal to the Tennessee Valley and Columbia River dams, which provided electrical power needed for the development of the atomic bomb in World War II. The latter, interestingly enough, have now become the sites of choice for the massive server farms of the Information Age. In each case, these

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<sup>27</sup> Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*.

state projects transformed the landscapes and economies of the Anglosphere.

Recent historical research, then, suggests that Anglosphere exceptionalism is real. It is the result of a number of unique historical circumstances and turns of events. In response to these events, social forms and mechanisms were created that harnessed human intelligence, skill, and enterprise to solve the problems of material scarcity and effective defense against both internal and external threats. And these mechanisms operated in turn by harnessing what the economist-philosopher F. A. Hayek called emergent phenomena, or what James Surowiecki has called the “wisdom of crowds.”<sup>28</sup>

England and its daughter polities took the sophisticated market mechanisms of the Renaissance, which came to England via the émigré financiers of London’s Lombard Street,<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> See James Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies, and Nations* (New York: Doubleday, 2004).

<sup>29</sup> Rodney Stark, *The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success* (New York: Random House, 2005).

and combined them with elements of the proto-representative institutions of medieval constitutionalism, such as Parliament and corporate self-governing assemblies, as well as institutions of the English common law. The result was three informational products.

- The new, more sophisticated mechanisms of the resulting market economies, such as bond markets and, later, stock exchanges, drew on the distributed and emergent wisdom of the sum of the market participants to produce a superior informational product: a national or even worldwide price for a commodity.
- Similarly, the representative institution of a regularly elected legislature chosen from competing parties produced another superior informational product: the informed assent of those elements of society whose willing cooperation maximized the national political will. The political elements were drawn at first from a relatively

- small pool but over time grew to include all adults.
- Finally, the common law system created a third and complementary informational product: a consensus of fairness and justice in the society, as summarized in the corporate wisdom of the English bench and later in the printed body of reported precedents and verdicts reached by jurors within common law courts. Again, the jury pool was drawn initially from a relatively narrow base but eventually expanded to include adult citizens as a whole.

In each case, these informational products were vastly superior to those derived by the top-down fiat of the bureaucratic states of the Continent. Unlike the fixed prices of European state monopoly corporations, the royal decrees of absolute monarchies, or the rulings derived from an autocratically imposed corpus of civil law, decentralized decision-making enabled the English state to enjoy sustained advantages.

Three centuries of such mechanisms (for these mechanisms began to acquire real sophistication toward the end of the 17th century) have led to what is now the sophisticated institutional set of the Anglosphere. Other societies, particularly the strong civil societies of Northern Europe and Japan, have copied or evolved similar mechanisms, but they have not copied or evolved the entire set. This appears to be the underlying explanation for the persistent exceptionalism of the Anglosphere.

# The Anglosphere Distinction: Why It Matters

ENGLISH IS NOT ONLY THE LANGUAGE of a diverse set of developed and developing nations. It has become the *de facto* language of globalization. The great majority of educated, globally engaged people in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa have some fluency in English. Many have near-native abilities. Why, then, should the linguistic abilities of Americans, Britons, or Indians give them more than a modest advantage in a globalized world? Is it an advantage readily overcome by a bit more investment in English-language classes in Guangzhou and Grenoble?<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Rafael La Porta *et al.*, "Trust in Large Organizations," *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings*, May 1997; reprinted in Partha Dasgupta and

Recent research suggests that being English-speaking and common law-based is more reliable than geography, ethnic makeup, or traditional development criteria as a predictor of national status and behavior.<sup>2</sup> Ranked on productivity per capita, the English-speaking nations stand distinctly ahead of other developed nations. Among them, the United States ranks first and stands in a class by itself. Canada, with productivity equivalent to 81 percent of that of the U.S., is second.<sup>3</sup> (Interestingly enough, Canada is approximately 22.3 percent French-speaking, which suggests that English-speaking Canada may be almost equal to the U.S.; but Canadian productivity data are not broken out by home language, so such a supposition cannot be easily verified.<sup>4</sup>)

Even more remarkable, in ranking developing nations, former British colonies retain-

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Ismael Serageldin, *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, at [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html) (April 16, 2007).

<sup>4</sup> Lewis, *The Cousins' Wars*.

ing common law and English as a widespread language have done significantly better than their counterparts colonized by other European powers.<sup>5</sup> Even when they share the same geographical attributes and ethnic backgrounds (Indonesia and Malaysia being the canonical examples), the distinction persists.

Taken together, recent studies on values and culture,<sup>6</sup> productivity,<sup>7</sup> development,<sup>8</sup> and political liberty<sup>9</sup> all point to a single conclusion: The English-speaking, common law-based societies of the world stand apart from all others. Of the world's top 20 universities, all but one are in the Anglosphere.<sup>10</sup> When the results

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<sup>5</sup> La Porta *et al.*, "Trust in Large Organizations."

<sup>6</sup> Ronald Inglehardt and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

<sup>7</sup> Lewis, *The Cousins' Wars*.

<sup>8</sup> La Porta *et al.*, "Trust in Large Organizations."

<sup>9</sup> Ronald Inglehardt, Rafael La Porta, and Lawrence Harrison, *The Central Liberal Truth: How Politics Can Change a Culture and Save It from Itself* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

<sup>10</sup> "Academic Ranking of World Universities: Top 500 World Universities (1–100)," at [http://ed.sjtu.edu.cn/rank/2006/ARWU2006\\_Top100.htm](http://ed.sjtu.edu.cn/rank/2006/ARWU2006_Top100.htm) (April 16, 2007).

are adjusted for population size, the results are even more revealing: Almost all of the world's prosperous and/or freest nations with population sizes over 5 million are part of the Anglosphere. This suggests that there is something about English-speaking societies that permits them to be both large and free.

As might be expected, the economic and technological performance of the Anglosphere is reflected in its military capabilities. However, the exceptionalism of the Anglosphere presents itself in other ways as well. The principal Anglosphere nations (most notably the United States) have the most robust set of defense capabilities. They are more likely to spend a higher percentage of GDP to pursue effective military capabilities and are more willing to use them. They also maintain a high degree of interoperability among themselves in equipment, procurement standards, training, doctrine, and a shared military corporate culture.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Thomas Durrell Young, "Cooperative Diffusion Through Cultural Similarity," in Emily Goldman and Leslie Eliason, eds., *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003).

One example of the results of this commonality is the December 2004 tsunami relief effort in Asia. U.S. and Australian forces began combined operations immediately, joined quickly thereafter by Japanese forces. Canadian troops followed with water purification and emergency response teams. The interoperability of all of these forces is not surprising. They have, after all, practiced combined operations for decades.

What was interesting was that when Indian forces joined the effort, they also worked well with Anglosphere forces, despite the lack of combined operations experience during the previous 50 years. This interoperability is due partly to the use of English in the Indian Navy, but it also reflects the institutional culture of the Indian Navy, which has its roots in the British Royal Navy.

As will be discussed below, an explicit Anglospherist policy in the areas of defense procurement and technology transfer—especially decisions about international participation and technology transfers, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, that are currently underway—is of immediate relevance. The conflict between

Anglosphere lines of cooperation and alternative ideologies must be resolved.

The simple fact is that the U.S. trusts its core Anglosphere allies with critical defense information to a degree that is not possible with other allies or friendly foreign nations. However, Britain's commitment to pan-European defense programs and the growing enmeshment of British and European aerospace and defense capabilities create a risk of inadvertent technology transfer. A formal Anglospherist policy on the part of both the British and American governments would definitively resolve such issues.

Intelligence-sharing is a particularly close example of intra-Anglosphere cooperation. One of the few inter-governmental organizations to be formed on a purely Anglospherist basis is Echelon, a highly classified signals-intelligence program run jointly by the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

The full value of this area of cooperation is, by its nature, unknown. Many British politicians, initially skeptical of the "special relationship," have modified their position when taking a Prime Ministership. "Seeing is believing," as

the saying goes, and perhaps the full value of Echelon and similar Anglosphere programs is seen only when politicians reach positions where they are fully capable of appreciating the effect on their nation's security.

# Where We Stand: A Nation-by-Nation Survey

## THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Of the core Anglosphere nations, other than the United States, the United Kingdom is the largest, both in the size of its population and in the size of its economy. It is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a nuclear power with an effective deterrent force, and a key member of NATO. It also has been a leading contributor of military forces behind the U.S. in every military action the U.S. has participated in since Vietnam; at the start of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, British forces made up a third of the total invasion force.

The U.K. is a member of the G-8 economic group and has the world's fourth-largest economy. In addition, the U.S. and the U.K. have

been the largest single investors in each others' economies for over a century. In fact, Britain has been the biggest foreign investor in the U.S. since before the American Revolution.

For several centuries, U.S.–U.K. relations have been the core intra-Anglosphere relationship. Even within the closest periods, however, good relations have been strained by episodes such as the Suez intervention of 1956, the early phase of the Falklands war in 1982, and the present tensions over U.K. participation in post-war Iraq.

U.S.–U.K. tensions are inevitable precisely because so much is at stake in this relationship. Anglosphere commonality does not alter the fact that both the British and American unions are separate states and therefore have their own interests that will come into conflict, at least occasionally. Balanced against this is the consideration that both nations have so much in common. Both are Anglosphere nations. There is an ongoing, shared interest in our common civilization that rises above shared interests as developed nations, as democracies, or even as members of Western civilization. The challenge of U.S.–U.K. relations lies in creating

systemic mechanisms and drawing on useful commonalities to mediate, whenever possible, differences and to provide counterbalances to conflicts of interest when they do occur.

The first goal in dealing with these challenges should be to decouple U.S.–U.K. issues from multilateral fora involving non-Anglosphere nations. The United Nations in particular stands in the way of effective resolution of U.S.–U.K. issues. This organization can drag in other national interests that are tangential to those of the U.S. and U.K. Third parties may attempt to play U.S. against U.K. interests (or *vice versa*) to the detriment of all.

Specifically, the U.S. should avoid trying to address U.S.–U.K. issues within the context of U.S.–European Union relations. Ever since World War II, U.S. foreign policy has favored European integration and has strongly encouraged British participation in a united Europe. Both aspects of this policy have been fundamentally mistaken, but the latter has been particularly so. The theory had been that a united Europe would be less likely to drag the United States into another world war and that internal free trade in Europe would build prosperity and

create freer trade with the United States. It was also felt that Britain's presence in the councils of a united Europe would constitute a favorable, pro-American voice.

In reality, it was not the European Union but NATO that preserved peace in Western Europe. The threat of a NATO Article Five response from a nuclear power was rather more of a deterrent than any "expression of concern" from the European Commission. The customs union *did* stimulate free trade among Continental nations, particularly given the high protectionist tariffs previously prevalent, but the global free trade process of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, now the World Trade Organization, or WTO) was almost as effective at lowering barriers and opened the doors of free trade not only in Europe, but worldwide.

The high volume of intra-European trade and the benefits of standards harmonization for those involved in such trade, as well as the common background of institutions and structures among continental Europeans, made the unification program attractive to core European countries such as France, Germany, and Italy.

The funding of infrastructure development and the freedom of labor movement made membership lucrative to southern Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Greeks. After 1989, membership in the EU also held out to Eastern Europeans the prospect of inclusion in the free world and the hope that they would never again fall under Russian domination.

But for the United Kingdom, the benefits of European membership were fewer, and the costs higher, than they were for any other member. The price of membership had been high, particularly the abandonment of traditional Commonwealth trade partners who stood outside the walls of European tariffs.

Continental states, even before the unification process began, were primarily intra-European traders. The U.K. had traditionally been a global trader, and despite 40 years of European membership, it still is. As part of membership in the EU, the U.K. was obliged to “harmonize” with European standards on almost all aspects of its industrial and commercial life. This expensive process improved the U.K.’s ability to sell in European markets but made it more difficult to produce goods for its traditional trade

partners—particularly the United States and members of the Commonwealth.

Ease of movement to and from other Commonwealth nations—probably the single most popular benefit of the Commonwealth for ordinary Britons—was ended. The benefits of being able to move freely to Toronto, Sydney, or Auckland and take a readily available job there with minimal paperwork were replaced by the highly theoretical benefit of moving to Dusseldorf or Lille and trying to find an often scarce job there.

The Europeanist goal of ultimately amalgamating European nations into a single federal state with a common identity and a set of common legal, economic, and administrative institutions might be feasible among Continental nations. However, the Anglosphere background of the United Kingdom suggests that for the U.K., such a state would require the imposition of a system foreign to it.

Furthermore, joining such a system would degrade rather than enhance the U.K.'s civil society, endanger its re-energized global competitiveness, and push it further away from close and mutually beneficial relations with the

U.S. Were this program and its desired results placed before the U.K. electorate as a referendum, or even as a main plank of some party platform, it would be rejected out of hand. As a consequence, each step of European integration has been presented to the electorate as merely a free-trade measure, justified on the grounds of economic development and job creation.

In the past decade, the Europeanist agenda has had its profile raised within the U.K. political scene through two proposed initiatives: the inclusion of the U.K. in the European Monetary Union, which would require abandoning the pound for the euro, and the adoption of the proposed European Constitution. Given the level of unhappiness in the U.K. regarding European integration, the Blair government agreed that a referendum would be held on both of these initiatives. Polls indicated that each of the issues would likely face defeat, possibly by a large margin.

Former Prime Minister Blair and his Chancellor of the Exchequer (finance minister), Gordon Brown, now Prime Minister, hedged this position by announcing that a referendum on the euro would not be held until economic

indicators were favorable. The “five tests” needed for adoption of the euro are loosely enough defined that they could be considered simply as one test: “the likelihood of victory at the polls.” The criteria were never met, and the British government has indefinitely suspended the issue of U.K. membership in the single currency. Similarly, a referendum on the European Constitution, facing equal or greater skepticism at the polls, was conveniently delayed until the French and Dutch referenda. The subsequent failure of the Constitution to pass in those two countries rendered the question moot.

Given particularly the Anglosphere history of the U.K., the objections of U.K. Euroskeptics are valid. On the whole, accelerated integration, even more than the current constraints of EU membership, would have a negative impact on the United Kingdom.

U.S. policy toward the U.K. must take into account the fact that the bulk of the population is hostile or indifferent to European integration. The portion that favors integration is resigned to the idea that it is inevitable, motivated by the fear of job loss, or influenced by anti-American sentiments. Ironically, by officially encouraging

further European integration, the U.S. alienates one of the most pro-U.S. elements of British public opinion while aligning itself with the most anti-American elements.

The current U.S. Administration has been heavily influenced by the position of former Prime Minister Blair, who has been conspicuously pro-American, adhering to unwavering support for U.S. policy in Iraq even at the cost of his Prime Ministership. At the same time, he has been a strong supporter of European integration and has sought opportunities for both the U.K.'s entry to the single currency and ratification of the European Constitution. Blair has essentially been spending the goodwill earned with the Administration on shoring up support in Washington for European integration.

Another critical aspect of the U.K.–European Union relationship that affects the U.S.–U.K. relationship is defense procurement. Prime Minister Blair encouraged U.K. defense companies to enter into partnerships with key EU players on defense procurement policy. This has further integrated U.K. defense corporations, many of which deal in more advanced technology than their Continental counterparts

do, into joint production programs. It has also committed British forces to the use of equipment that reduces their interoperability with U.S. forces.

### **CANADA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND IRELAND**

The internal structure of the core Anglosphere has a fascinating complexity, and one of the potential axes of alignment is that of the larger state—smaller state regional pair. Thus, Britain and Ireland, the U.S. and Canada, and Australia and New Zealand constitute regional pairs, each being unified politically (or, in Australia/New Zealand's case, almost united) at one point and then separated—in some cases by violent struggle. In each, the smaller partner has found close trade relations and some aspects of union with the larger partner to be desirable but also has harbored resentments and concerns about being swallowed and assimilated by its larger partner.

**CANADA.** If Britain is the largest and most powerful of the core Anglosphere states, Canada is geographically the closest to the United States and the most visibly similar to it cultur-

ally. Despite this proximity and similarity—or possibly because of them—it is often one of the Anglosphere states furthest from the U.S. in terms of policy alignment.

Canada is unique because of the presence of a large, genuinely non-Anglosphere segment of its electorate: Quebec, which its inhabitants consider a distinct, French-speaking nation. Canadian politics are driven by the external question of the pace and terms of potential integration with the U.S., as well as by the internal relationships among the country's various parts: not only Quebec, but also Canada's anomalous chunk of the Red Anglosphere,<sup>1</sup> Alberta.

**AUSTRALIA.** Australia's politics is at heart driven by the long-term issues brought on by its geographical position a few hundred miles south of oil-rich, Islamic, and increasingly radical and unstable Indonesia and, further north, China. Australia's support of East Timor's independence made it a target of radical Islamism. Australia's politics are further complicated by civil unrest in its "near abroad" of Papua New

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<sup>1</sup> See Chapter 5, "Relations Among the Core Anglosphere Nations: Emergence of the Network Commonwealth."

Guinea and the small island states of Melanesia and Polynesia.

Much of Australia's foreign policy, which seeks close alignment with the U.S. and friendly relations with the U.K., may indeed be due to genuine sentiments of kinship and friendliness, but it is also underpinned by the security needs of a country of less than 25 million people that is surrounded by neighbors, some nuclear-armed, that are not inherently friendly and whose populations are counted in the hundreds of millions.

**NEW ZEALAND.** New Zealand experienced substantial economic disruption from the severing of its trade ties with the U.K. at the time of the latter's entry into the European common market. This strained what had been one of the tightest intra-Anglosphere relationships. Its once-close defense relationship with the U.S., forged in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, for the past several decades has come under similar stress.

Unlike Australia, New Zealand has no immediately pressing security threat, and the largely symbolic issue of nuclear weapons on visiting U.S. warships became a pretext for

withdrawal from U.S.–Australian–New Zealand treaty relationships. However, New Zealand has contributed small but effective military contingents to the Afghan theater and continues to cooperate closely with the other Anglosphere powers in intelligence matters.

The principal intra-Anglosphere issue facing New Zealand today is economic, particularly in its relations with Australia. In addition to a wide set of institutional links across the otherwise dividing Tasman Sea, there are constant discussions on how to deepen those links, including the possibility of currency or even political union. Former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, one of the fathers of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), has proposed Australian and New Zealand membership in NAFTA, sparking an even more vigorous debate.

**IRELAND.** The Republic of Ireland's relation to the rest of the Anglosphere has a complexity that matches its troubled history. Ireland never completely replicated the unique domestic sociology of England, maintaining instead an uneasy and unequal mix of native Celtic institutions and transplanted English forms.

For centuries, English colonists and Irish locals had been evolving their own fusion, but that slowed to a near-halt as a result of the Reformation in Ireland, which discouraged intermarriage and rendered the Catholic Irish politically suspect to the English state. The 19th century experiment with political union and Catholic emancipation might have worked had it been implemented earlier and more wholeheartedly, but the verdict of history seems to have been that such a course was too little, too late. The Irish war of independence and the subsequent Irish civil war created a state that for a long time was poor, suspicious of Britain yet economically dependent upon it, politically neutral during World War II and the Cold War, and preoccupied with the question of Northern Ireland.

Much of this changed in the past generation, however, when the access to new markets brought on by EU membership and the adoption of low tax rates sparked an economic boom. Ireland has enjoyed an extended period of prosperity as corporations have first swarmed into rural areas to build manufacturing facilities and then built corporate offices in Dublin.

Ireland's Anglosphere characteristics—fluency in English, common law courts, and the lack of an overweening state—were critical to this success.

Ireland continues to maintain its political neutrality and its devotion to European integration, even participating in the European currency union. However, its ability to maintain a substantially lower rate of corporate taxation is a constant irritant to the European political system, and European politicians are now more frequently raising the specter of “tax harmonization,” which would force Ireland to raise its taxes and allow the Europeans to avoid lowering theirs. This threat eventually could force Ireland to reassess its inward ties with the Continent *vis-à-vis* its external ties to the vast Irish emigrant population—the “Hibernosphere” within the Anglosphere.

For each of these nations, an Anglospherist approach and a Network Commonwealth, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, promises a means of lifting key relationships out of the problematic and uncomfortable bilateral frameworks of the past. Australia and New Zealand, Canada and the United States, and even the

United States and the United Kingdom might find their relationships somewhat more comfortable in a loose but wider set of structures, free from the complications of meeting the needs of non-Anglosphere nations with quite different social, legal, and economic systems.

# Relations Among the Core Anglosphere Nations: Emergence of the Network Commonwealth

AS NOTED, THE ANGLOSPHERE is a common cultural area with a diverse set of historical, or Burkean, communities. Four great unions have formed among these communities, and these unions are considered the basic internal divisions of the Anglosphere. However, their very diversity and the deep continuity between the original founding communities and their offspring around the world create another axis along which the Anglosphere is divided.

Since the U.S. presidential elections of 2000, commentators have begun to speak of “Red” and “Blue” states, with Red states being Republican and conservative and Blue

states being Democrat and liberal. Other commentators have further distinguished “Purple” states, in which political populism and social conservatism result in an electorate that swings between parties on an issue-by-issue basis. Winning political coalitions in America typically involve mobilization of the Red or Blue core populations and the striking of an issue-based alliance with some or all of the Purple electorate.

As David Hackett Fischer, Kevin Phillips, Walter Russell Mead, and Michael Barone have demonstrated,<sup>1</sup> these qualities of Red, Blue, or Purple correlate well with the geographic distribution of the social, religious, and regional seed populations from the British Isles out of which these communities developed. Since the same communities that seeded the U.S. also seeded the rest of the core Anglosphere, it is

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<sup>1</sup> See Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America*; Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars: Religion, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America*; Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*; and Barone, *Our First Revolution: The Remarkable British Upheaval That Inspired America's Founding Fathers*.

possible to extend the Red, Blue, and Purple analysis through the Anglosphere at large.

The distribution of the various social, religious, and regional elements of the British Isles around the wider Anglosphere has been uneven.

- A large part of the Red Anglosphere resides in the U.S., although it extends north into Alberta, isolated parts of the Maritime Provinces, and Ontario in Canada and south into the West Indies. These regions exhibit many of the same mixtures of religious orientation, social conservatism, and economic populism that characterize the American Red states. Red outliers include segments of the Northern Ireland electorate and possibly Queensland in Australia.
- The Blue Anglosphere is found in areas analogous to Blue areas within the United States: large urban areas, coastal areas, and regions where the population is dependent on inter-ethnic, inter-generational, inter-regional,

or inter-class state transfers. Thus, in the U.K., it is found in the London, Birmingham, and Manchester urban areas, as well as the transfer-dependent areas of northern England, Wales, and Scotland. In Canada, it is found in Toronto, Vancouver, parts of Quebec, and the Maritime Provinces. In Australia, it is found in the major coastal, urban areas.

- The remaining areas of the Anglosphere are Purple and can be expected to vote in either direction, depending upon the issue under consideration.

The uneven Red–Blue–Purple distribution across the Anglosphere is a permanent feature and one that is not likely to change drastically in the future. This reality was an impediment to broader Anglosphere union when it was suggested in the 19th century, and it remains an impediment in the 21st century. The pattern of shared and distinct cultural values argues that intra-Anglosphere relationships will remain close but will never be equivalent to a purely domestic political sphere. This makes it unlike-

ly that the English-speaking world would form a political union on the model of the EU.

### FROM SOLAR SYSTEM TO NETWORK COMMONWEALTH

Current Anglosphere relationships might be compared to those of planets within a multiple-star solar system. The multiple suns and their planets swing around each other in a complex and often-changing relationship, yet they never fall out of gravitational attraction with each other or cease to affect each other's orbits. The current high level of anti-Americanism in Britain is worrisome, but it is also both unlikely to mark a permanent shift out of the Anglosphere orbit and likely to recede under different circumstances.

For this reason, Anglosphere nations need something that is more structured than the relationship used by randomly related nations but short of full union or common nationhood. They need to form a Network Commonwealth.

The concept of a Network Commonwealth describes the political forms that will arise in an era of increased global interconnection. "Network Commonwealth," in this usage, describes

the sum total of the web of international organizations, associations, and special-purpose entities formed among a group of nations with substantially more commonalties than mere geographical propinquity. Civil societies today tend to be coterminous with national boundaries, or with some subset of societies within a national boundary.

A Network Commonwealth is the result of conditions that permit the multitude of ties that characterize strong civil society to spread and take root across national boundaries. The goal of a Network Commonwealth is to facilitate the growth of interconnected civil society across boundaries. This goal is pursued by creating the means to permit individuals and voluntary organizations to initiate and cultivate enterprises throughout the Commonwealth without the need for specific or prior approval of any component government.

Tools of the Network Commonwealth include free trade areas and common markets, mutual defense alliances, the mutual recognition of standards, and adoption of model commercial codes. They might also include special-purpose entities for the conduct of mutually

beneficial projects on a wider, multinational scope. What makes these tools into a Network Commonwealth is the conscious effort to develop a set of such projects among a common set of nations.

One question that arises is whether the European Union is such a Network Commonwealth. In many ways it is, particularly when it describes itself as an expression of a “common European culture.” However, the EU’s constant ambition to turn itself into a federal state belies this. Brussels’ desire for devolution from international organization to nation-state runs counter to the very idea of the Network Commonwealth.

The EU attempts to be inclusive in that it must incorporate all European nations that fit its definition. It is exclusive in that it excludes any states but those that fit its definition. For instance, Australia and New Zealand may be as “European” as Britain or Spain, but because of the EU’s obsession with geography, they are not eligible for membership. However, the EU is rigid in that its institutions must apply to all of its parts, and exceptions are seen as something to be minimized and eventually eliminated.

## ADVANTAGES OF A NETWORK COMMONWEALTH

Consider the ideal of a Network Commonwealth as applied to the Anglosphere nations.

- **It would not be inclusive** because it would be open to all English-speaking, common law nations but would not consider itself obliged to convince all eligible members to affiliate;
- **It would not be exclusive** because it would not necessarily exclude nations that don't fit all its criteria so long as their affiliation made sense; and
- **Membership would not be rigid:** In fact, it would be made up of a series of networks and organizations with differing memberships. Ireland, for example, might choose to join trade or movement-of-people regimes but would probably not participate in a joint defense structure.

In short, everything the EU sees as a problem is seen by the Network Commonwealth as a desirable feature. The EU ideal of “ever closer

union” does not apply to the Anglosphere Network Commonwealth, in which all formal ties would be incremental, open-ended, and case-specific, with no particular “end state” in mind. A Network Commonwealth would be globe-spanning and unconcerned with geography.

The ongoing information revolution places more of the value of objects of commerce into the software that designs them, defines them, and controls their manufacture. As manufacturing becomes increasingly automated and utilizes smaller and smaller manufacturing facilities, physical distance becomes less important in trade. As a consequence, cooperation in complex design efforts becomes increasingly important. Much of the effort spent by the EU on harmonization of physical standards and integration of manufacturing across the Continent will be obsolete long before it will have repaid the costs of implementation.

A global Network Commonwealth of the English-speaking nations would place emphasis on the formation of flexible networks for both commercial and nonprofit purposes. In doing

so, it would reap greater rewards than the EU with a far lower cost of implementation.

#### AN ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO?

A few words should be said about a more extreme but not entirely implausible scenario. For three decades, both Quebec and Scotland have had separatist parties. In Quebec's case, the separatist party has dominated the provincial government several times and has actually held referenda on a vaguely formulated "sovereignty-association" option, the last of which failed only narrowly. In Scotland's case, the nationalist party has promised to hold such a referendum, and recent polls show that a majority in both England and Scotland supports dissolution of the union. In both countries, it is not impossible that their respective unions might be dissolved within the next five to 10 years.

If both unions *were* dissolved at roughly the same time, an interesting possibility might exist. A number of times in the past five years, Web sites and organizations have advocated a Commonwealth Union—a loose federal union of the states, provinces, and kingdoms of the U.K., Australia, Canada, and often New

Zealand. This idea has died on the vine in the past, since such drastic realignments of large national structures would require a great deal of political support. Even with separatist parties, both Canada and Britain continue to sail on with little prospect of dissolution.

However, were this to happen, a federal union of the Australian states, Canada minus Quebec, and England proper would be an interesting possibility. The rest of Canada would gain an alternative to absorption into the U.S., Australia would gain an organic connection to a globe-spanning power and an instant nuclear deterrence capability, and England would gain access to a road out of the European Union. (Various EU politicians have stated that the parts of a dissolved United Kingdom would have to reapply for membership individually.)

The result would be a power larger than Germany or Japan, with the world's second-largest economy. And if this union inherited Canada's treaty obligations, as it presumably would, it would also inherit NAFTA membership and NORAD military cooperation, which almost constitute a Network Commonwealth in and of themselves.

Such an alignment remains less than likely, but it does demonstrate that the concepts of the Anglosphere and the Network Commonwealth constitute a powerful and flexible toolkit that the peoples of the English-speaking world could use to build their future.

## What Now? An Anglospherist Agenda

HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH on the Anglosphere will not, by itself, lay out the blueprint of a new political agenda. At a minimum, emerging research may serve to correct reasoning that rests on historical or social science assumptions that no longer hold water. John Maynard Keynes famously held that the common sense of today's businessman is merely the opinion of some "defunct economist."<sup>1</sup> Yet Keynes is now the defunct economist, and his common sense is shown to be merely the opin-

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<sup>1</sup> "Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist." John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (London: Macmillan Press, and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1936), Chapter 24.

ion of even more anciently deceased historians and social scientists.

The new understanding of ourselves, our societies, and the wider world around us that is brought by understanding the history of the Anglosphere suggests an agenda different from that of any existing political school or movement. In general, this new understanding is more consistent with the sentiments and outlook of the English-speaking world's conservative parties. Conservatives see Western civilization and, within it, the English-speaking world as a positive force in history that has helped to rescue humanity from a life of mere subsistence, toil, and predation. Because of it, people can dream of and achieve prosperity, longevity, productivity, freedom, and independence from the cruelties of random fate.

Such accomplishments should be seen as a good thing. They are not merely the playing out of inevitable iron laws of history, as Marxist philosophy would claim. They are the fortuitous workings of a specific and unique set of historical circumstances. We cannot assume that modern institutions would have arisen elsewhere had they not begun in England and

America. We live in the world England made, as Claudio Véliz put it,<sup>2</sup> and cannot assume that any other culture would have made a world anything like the one we know.

This new understanding of history also differs from a particular type of Tory thought that, like Marxism, assumes that England once dwelt in a cozy *gemeinschaft* world of jolly peasants living in a traditional, non-market society. Materially poor but spiritually happy, these folk experienced the Industrial Revolution and modernity as an irrevocable break with a traditional world that somehow needs to be restored by government fiat. This nostalgic Toryism and its American variants are the mirror images of Marxist historiography—and just as wrong.

An Anglospherist viewpoint serves as a corrective for these errors and has implications for the ongoing libertarian–traditionalist debate in conservative circles of the English-speaking world. The traditionalists view modern capitalism much as Churchill saw democracy: “Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those

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<sup>2</sup> See Véliz, *The New World of the Gothic Fox*.

other forms that have been tried from time to time.”<sup>3</sup> In other words, the creative destruction that Joseph Schumpeter correctly perceived in capitalism is viewed with suspicion by traditionalists as a solvent of the traditional, Burkean ties. Traditionalists see modernity as a force that, while beneficial in many respects, wounded Western society and created a yet-unmet need for a resolution or healing of these Burkean ties.

On the other hand, libertarians, especially those of the otherwise-opposed Randian and Rothbardian schools, are in some senses the modernists of the Right, celebrating what the traditionalists deplore. These thinkers celebrate the idea of modernity as a revolution severing the bonds of oppressive tradition: *écrasez l'infame* (“Crush the Infamous”—i.e., the Church) is a comfortable slogan for them.

Both views are, in fact, incorrect. There was never any great break between the modern, individualist present and a communalist, traditionalist past within the English-speaking

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<sup>3</sup> Speech in the House of Commons, *The Official Report*, House of Commons, 5th Series, Vol. 44, November 11, 1947.

world, although there were periods of disruption, occasionally or locally severe. To the contrary, the Anglosphere has always been individualistic, dwelling primarily in nuclear families apart from the husband's or wife's parents and not subject to their authority after the age of consent. Land is viewed as an asset to be bought and sold rather than as a sacred patrimony. Lawyer-hating yet litigious, citizens of the Anglosphere are jealous of local independence but willing to volunteer or heed the militia call-up when threatened by the foreign foe. They stand on their ancient constitutional rights, whether Magna Carta or Fifth Amendment, in the face of the sheriff. They are enterprising, profit-maximizing, devoted to their religious communities, suspicious of foreign ways, but quick to ape the latest French novelty.

Citizens of the Anglosphere have been this way in most respects for 1,500 years, and there is a great deal of reason to believe that many of these traits will be in evidence in some form or fashion 1,500 years from now, regardless of whether the English is spoken in Middlesex, Mars, or both places. Individualism is an Anglosphere tradition, but it is individualism

within a particular cultural and legal framework and is best protected by respecting that framework. Communities are networks of individualists that draw their strength from willing and negotiated cooperation. Any Anglosphere politics that is to protect both the community and the individual needs to recognize the long roots of both.

The Anglosphere is also a useful framework for viewing and assessing other nations. Membership in it is a better predictor of a nation's prospects and likeliness to cooperate usefully with the U.S. than are other, more common considerations such as geography. The U.S. government should therefore:

- Make a formal commitment to cooperation with other English-speaking, common law-based nations that at least matches its commitment to hemispheric cooperation or its support for intra-European cooperation;
- Consider sponsoring ties with other English-speaking nations as a category that are at a level similar to its ties

- with the Pan-American Union or the Council of Europe; and
- Review its existing intergovernmental Anglosphere links, most particularly in intelligence-sharing, and consider elevating its executive agreements in such areas to the status of a formal treaty organization similar to NATO, with a council and a legislative assembly.

Unlike the British union, America did not establish a single legislative function, but instead left the state legislatures separate and sovereign over those functions not delegated to the union. However, unlike previous models (particularly the Dutch one that is so familiar to English-speakers), the American Constitution created a strong, unified military command at the national level. This model was followed later by the Canadian and Australian unions.

Karl Marx famously observed that philosophers seek to understand the world, but the point is to change it.<sup>4</sup> How does the An-

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<sup>4</sup> “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.” Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*, 1845, Thesis 11.

glosphere viewpoint establish a policy agenda? There are several critical differences with conventional wisdom.

- Since being an English-speaking, common law–using nation is a significant predictor of economic dynamism, political success, and ease of interface with the American economy, the U.S. should make it a priority to enhance economic, political, and defense ties with such nations, both bilaterally and collectively.
- The U.S. should not require English-speaking, common law–using nations to mediate their relations with the U.S. through regional or multilateral blocs, including Anglosphere nations with different cultural and structural identities such as India.
- Achievement of developed-society status is not an automatic product of inevitable historic forces. This status is the difficult and problematic extension of a unique phenomenon within different societies and requires situ-

ation-specific approaches. The U.S. should rethink how it approaches development aid and nation-building, set realistic expectations, and work with each country on a case-by-case basis. It appears that undeveloped nations are everywhere alike but that each developed nation has achieved development in its own manner.

- The U.S. should rethink its approach to multilateral organizations and programs, particularly free-trade area agreements, to take into account differences between the various member states. One-size-fits-all agreements are useful in inverse proportion to the sociocultural differences among the members. NAFTA is a particularly appropriate example.
- The particular characteristics inherited from Anglosphere culture are at the heart of this country's past, present, and future successes. Domestically, the U.S. should judge all foreign and domestic policy proposals by the yardstick of whether their effects

would be to strengthen or weaken civil society, the radius of trust of domestic cultures, and the effect on the cohesion of the Union. The definition of “family” for immigration-sponsorship purposes should be the classic Anglosphere definition—spouse, children, and parents—rather than the extended-family definitions of other cultures. Multiculturalism and bilingualism should be abandoned, and assimilation and learning of English should become national policies. America’s Anglosphere and common law heritage should be explicitly affirmed in school curricula. American Founders such as Jefferson, Franklin, and Adams emphasized the roots of the Constitution and Bill of Rights in Anglosphere history. This outlook should be reaffirmed.

Programmatically, the agenda outlined above would be implemented by policies in specific issues and areas.

## DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICY

An Anglospherist defense policy should address specific areas of concern in current intra-Anglosphere defense relationships, including technology transfer and, specifically, International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) issues raised by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, potential conflicts between the U.S. Global Positioning System and the European Galileo program, potential conflicts in the U.S.–Canada defense relationship, and expansion of the U.S.–Australian defense industrial relationship. Drawing India further into Anglosphere defense relations circles in line with recent Administration initiatives should also be a long-term Anglospherist goal.

Future projects should seek technology transfer, procurement, and investment regimes, either on a bilateral or a primarily intra-Anglosphere multilateral basis. The goal should be to maintain and increase the access of core Anglosphere powers to critical defense technologies and further industrial participation in U.S. defense procurement in return for maintaining common, strong third-party destination controls on any such technology.

In the case of the United Kingdom, this would require the re-establishment of a clear separation between U.K. defense industry and activity from those of non-privileged nations, including some current European partners. The U.S. would then grant full access to U.S. defense markets and related areas such as aviation and communications.

Such a defense technology arrangement should certainly include the U.K., Canada, and Australia. New Zealand membership might be predicated upon a wider renegotiation of U.S.–New Zealand defense cooperation issues. Full membership for India would probably not suit either government's agenda at present, but some form of affiliate status might evolve over time. Other nations would be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Singapore, for example, might be an early candidate for addition, at least as an affiliate.

## TRADE POLICY

An Anglospherist trade policy would concentrate initially on expanding and deepening U.S.–Canada trade with the ultimate goal of a common trading area that would eliminate

ordinary customs controls between the two nations. It would also seek to deepen trade links with Australia and New Zealand, including the possibility of expanding NAFTA to include these two countries.

There are two possible scenarios for an Anglospherist trade agenda in regard to the United Kingdom and Ireland. One assumes that the U.K. remains within the existing EU customs union indefinitely. The other envisions a scenario in which the U.K. leaves the customs union and executes a free trade agreement with the EU similar to the one that the EU currently has with Switzerland. In the former case, improved trade relations with the U.K. and Ireland would depend on negotiating a successful general Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA). This has been suggested repeatedly on both sides of the Atlantic but has never progressed very far.

The problems of advancing a TAFTA illustrate the general problems with permitting non-Anglosphere countries to become involved in intermediating intra-Anglosphere relationships. The U.S., the U.K., and Canada are ready to embrace and exploit free trade among them-

selves. However, Continental interests form an obstacle. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has again raised the possibility of freer U.S.–EU trade, but protectionist and anti-American political elements on the Continent may not permit it. If a TAFTA agenda were advanced, it would be particularly important for the U.S. to push for a “polycentric” TAFTA: a structure that is accessible to all European states regardless of EU membership. It is not in the United States’ best interest to make European states accept Brussels as the gatekeeper for free trade with the U.S.

Were the United Kingdom to loosen its ties with the EU, the United States could immediately offer a full free trade agreement. The main question would be whether it should be negotiated *de novo* or whether the most expeditious avenue would be to make the U.K. a full or associate member of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

The latter course has the benefit of leveraging an existing structure. This would allow the British to judge, by Canada’s experience, how membership would work and to understand very clearly what their rights and obligations

would be. Mechanisms such as NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration bodies, which resolve disputes between companies, would immediately become available to U.K. companies. And, of course, it would also immediately bring free trade with Canada and Mexico with no further negotiation.

On the other hand, NAFTA already suffers somewhat from being a one-size-fits-all agreement between highly disparate economic partners. British membership would subject U.S.–U.K. trade to conditions negotiated primarily with U.S.–Mexican relations in mind.

### HONORING THE ANGLOSPHERE PAST

The U.S. government should work to remove the unintentional irritations and slights brought on by neglect and forgetfulness in its relations among English-speaking nations. Higher visibility should be given to the record of our English-speaking allies. Consider, for a moment, just how long that list of allied endeavors has become: D-Day, the Pacific Theater in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq. There should

be a broader awareness of the length and depth of shared sacrifice within the Anglosphere.

The U.S. should send high-level representatives to joint commemorations of allied efforts—and should strive to organize such events—on a regular basis. There should be an annual joint remembrance of D-Day, which should include veterans of all nations present on that day. Friendly-fire incidents involving intra-Allied errors should be visibly investigated and resolved by joint bodies. Supporters of Irish Republican Army terrorism in the U.S. should be dealt with decisively, using anti-terrorist tools.

The U.S. ambassador to the U.K. should be dual-hatted as ambassador to the British Commonwealth, and the U.S. government should send observers to Commonwealth events, such as the Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings. The U.S. President should consider inviting the Prime Ministers of Canada, the U.K., and Australia to a joint meeting, which should then issue a declaration on human and civil rights, based on common law and other great statements of rights from the histories of English-speaking nations. This

declaration should take precedence over the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.

It is likely that U.S. and other Anglosphere militaries will cooperate in the field in unconventional warfare situations in the future, and it might be useful to generate a protocol on the handling of prisoners and suspects to which all Anglosphere militaries would adhere. This would stand in place of the problematic and much-abused International Criminal Court or Geneva Convention Fourth Protocol provisions, which are used by only some Anglosphere states.

## The Path Forward

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING NATIONS are one of the world's most distinctive groups of societies and collectively have been the pathfinders and agents of modernity since the Industrial and Democratic Revolutions. They were exceptional at origin, have been exceptional throughout their development, and remain exceptional today in ways that are statistically verifiable and can thus serve as meaningful predictors of future developments. The English-speaking nations, led economically by the United States, continue to increase the gap between themselves and the world's other strong civil societies in terms of productivity, innovation, and other metrics of dynamism.

These facts have consequences—and so does the failure to recognize them. Members of the American foreign policy community have tended to discount the implications of this

exceptionalism and have failed to adapt their thinking to its realities. This has led to a number of unfortunate policy turns on the part of the U.S. that need to be corrected. Making these corrections would improve America's relations with its fellow English-speaking nations, create substantial economic stimulus for both the U.S. and its English-speaking partners, and lay the groundwork for a realistic U.S. foreign policy in touch with the ideals and understanding of the Founders.

There would be rapid and positive returns from an Anglospheric focus in trade policy. The lowest-hanging fruit on the tree of trade expansion can be harvested by deepening trade relations with the other English-speaking, common law-based developed economies. The success of the U.S.–Canada Free Trade Agreement and the subsequent North American Free Trade Agreement are cases in point. Further measures for deepening U.S.–Canada economic relations—especially given the presence in Ottawa of the most pro-American government in 30 years—should be a high priority. Similarly, the limited and tentative free-trade agreement with Australia should be deepened and

broadened, and serious consideration should be given to former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's proposal to add Australia and New Zealand to NAFTA.

Obviously, extending free trade—or, better yet, a common economic area—to Britain and Ireland would be even more advantageous for all parties. Here, however, the Anglospherist direction comes into direct conflict with one of the U.S. government's most enduring misjudgments: its policy of encouraging British integration into the European Union. This policy now stands in the way of deeper economic relations with one of America's primary economic partners and, because of the growing conflict between European defense policy ambitions and traditional U.S.–U.K. defense and aerospace industry ties, threatens a critical U.S. defense and defense industry relationship.

As sentiment to reconsider U.K.–European ties grows within the U.K., the U.S. would do well to make clear that a United Kingdom with restored independence in trade policy would quickly gain a free-trade relationship with the U.S. and, if desired, NAFTA membership. Similarly, a clear separation from Eu-

ropean defense and aerospace interests with weak third-party destination controls would result in closer U.S.–U.K. defense industry integration, including easier investment in U.S. defense, aerospace, and airline companies by British capital and easier transatlantic mergers in those industries.

Additionally, the U.S. should recognize that those things that the U.S. and India share in common—parliamentary democracy, the rule of law as defined by the common law tradition, free speech and press, and the English language—are also the things that will cause India to take the lead among developing nations over the coming decades. The U.S. and India are linked by strong human and economic ties, growing defense cooperation, and a shared frontline position against radical Islamist terrorism. The U.S.–India axis will likely be a cornerstone of Indo–Pacific regional security and of a globalized world in which India plays a key role.

The Administration's recent advances in reaching out to India should therefore be broadened and deepened. However, because of India's unique history, its traditional self-

understanding as a non-aligned power, and its long-standing defense ties to Russia, as well as other factors, this relationship will require patient cultivation and must be allowed to develop and deepen at a pace set by the Indians themselves.

In the long term, the U.S. should take the lead in constructing a Network Commonwealth. This web of cooperative institutions and common social and economic spaces throughout the English-speaking world will be built from familiar components, such as trade agreements and permanent defense alliances, as well as rules governing the movement of people. Once established, the Network Commonwealth will link globe-spanning networks of common linguistic-cultural characteristics. It will have the strength and flexibility of widespread social-political networks while avoiding homogenization through distinct national narratives or the eradication of local sovereignty. Unlike the European Union, the Network Commonwealth will *not* seek “ever closer union” or uniformity among its members.

The Anglosphere Network Commonwealth will likely not be the only such organiza-

tion in the world of the future. Other communities will form their own, similar groupings. They will be following the Anglosphere into this new institutional form, just as in the past other communities have adopted parliamentary government, democratic elections, and written constitutions, all pioneered by Anglosphere communities. A global community of Network Commonwealths holds the promise of a practical and incremental means of knitting civil societies together across national boundaries in a manner that respects the historical cultures of these communities.

Thus, the Anglosphere perspective and the proposal to move toward a Network Commonwealth present an alternative path forward that is made possible by modern technology. It is, however, also a path that is underappreciated by analysts who look to the past for guidance. Rather than looking to homogenize sovereignties into regional blocs under undemocratic transnational schemes for regional or global governance, we can look instead toward a world of independent yet cooperating nations and even sub-national entities linked through

culturally and linguistically organized Network Commonwealths.

Such Commonwealths, taken together, could then form an alternative to an inherently undemocratic universal superstate. Instead, the world would be organized as a concert of civilizations, growing in their ability to act independently in most things and cooperate freely where needed.

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