The Nicaraguan Connection: A Threat to Central America

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The Nicaraguan Connection: A Threat to Central America

February 24, 1982 37 min read Download Report
Richard Kruger
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1 68 February 24, 1982 THE NICARAGUAN CONNEC7lOM A THREAT TO CENTRAL AMERICA INTRODUCTION Nicaragua and the United States enjoyed close ties for over half a century. This relationship ended as the Carter Administra tion provided tacit support for the Sandin ista revolutionaries who ousted the Somoza government in July 19

79. The Sandinista National Liberation Front FSLN) came to Dower then, and the Carter Administration provided Nicaragua kith massive financial assistance in efforts to win their friendship. T he U.S. continued its attempts to improve bilateral relations and by the end of 1980, the U.S had become Nicaragua's single largest financial supporter.

But, in spite of this U.S. aid, the Sandinistas remained hostile to the Unjted States and suppressed d emocratic movements and dissent in Nicaragua. Most alarming, the Sandinistas have forged a Nicaraguan connection which actively arms and trains Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala. The Sandinistas have identified their government as a Marxist-Leninist regime and adopted a foreign policy aligned with the Soviet Union. The government has repressed freedom of the press, harassed the Catholic Church and increased human rights violations.

Sandinistas have created the largest military force in Central America, and now poses.a,military threat to its neighbors The Following the inauguration of the Reagan Administration, the U.S. suspended bilateral financial assistance to Nicaragua in an effort to stem Sandinista aggression within Central Amer ica.

This effort, however, has failed to pressure the Sandinistas to cease supplying military and logistical support to the guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala. In order for the U.S. to halt Nicaragua's military assistance to the leftist guerrillas in Central America, the Reagan Administration will have to reassess its current policy and develop a solid strategy aimed at ending the threats to the region posed by the Sandinista regime. 2 THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT Although t h e opposition to President Anastasio Somoza Debayle was broadly based, the armed struggle to oust him was directed by the Sandinistas (FSLN). This group, formed in 1961 by several communist activists, is named after a Nicaraguan revoulutionary nationalist h ero, August0 Cesar Sandino. The group was composed of three factions: the Marxist-Leninist Prolonged Popular Struggle GPP the Trotskyite Proletarian (TP and the Castroite Terceris tas. These three Sandinista splinter groups, which initially were plagued b y internal disputes, united in response to Fidel Castro's promise of assistance to a unified Sandinista movement.

This led to the formation of the Sandinista National Directorate incorporating the nine leading commanders of the three FSLN factions, all of whom are self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninists.

In spite of the Sandinistas' radical orientation, the vast majority of Nicaragua's democratic sectors joined efforts with the Sandinistas to depose the Somoza government. This was primar ily due to a pact (Punta Arenas) spelled out in a political platform devised by the Sandinista government in exile platform affirmed the Sandinistas' commitment to restore a consti- tutional government through "universal suffrage" for all Nicara guans; until these elections were held, the government would be composed of in d ividuals with various political ideologies. The platform also promised that the government would adopt an indepen dent foreign policy and give the private sector a major role in the economic activities of the country See Appendix I However, following the J uly 1979 collapse of the transitional Nicaraguan government headed by President Urcuyo, the nine comman ders within the Sandinista Directorate occupied key ministerial posts and maintained complete authority over the army and security f0rces.l Furthermore , these Directorate commanders appointed a majority of FSLN-affiliated members to all branches within Nicara gua's new "revolutionary" government. They also requested and received numerous advisers from Socialist bloc nations. These advisers, primarily fro m Cuba and the German Democratic Republic, have assumed prominent roles within Nicaragua's army and security forces, education, health, communication and information services This In spite of the ideological unity within the Directorate the complex inter-r e lations of its members, all of whom rule The nine commanders, the factions and positions in the government are as follows: The GPP (Spanish initials) Directorate, consisting of: Tomas Borge (Minister of the Interior), Henry Ruiz (Minister of Planning and B ayardo Arce (Propaganda Chief Proletarian: Luis Carrion (Vice-Minister of Defense), Jaime Wheelock (Minister of Agriculture and Carlos Nunez President of the State Council and Terceristas: Daniel Ortega (Junta Coordinator Humberto Ortega (Minister of Defe nse and Victor Tirado Minister without portfolio and Economic Supervisor). 3 independently as "President,'I has brought confusion and a constant struggle for power.

Tomas Borge initially emerged as the principal leader of the Nicaraguan government. Borge h as since lost considerable power to the Ortega brothers, who also are members of the Directorate: Humberto, who is Defense Minister, and Daniel, who is the Junta leader. Nevertheless, all the Directorate members continue to play a central role in the deci sion-making process within the Sandinista government.

The Directorate's subordinate five-member Junta initially contained two moderates, Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo, both appointed by the Directorate. Chamorro allegedly for health reasons and Robel o in protest at the radical Sandinista policies; the Directorate replaced them with two independent Sandinista supporters, Arturo Cruz and Rafael Cordoba Rivas.

The new three-man Junta, composed of Sandinistas Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez and tfmodera tett Rafael Cordoba Rivas, has maintained its dominant Marxist-Leninist composition and continues to take its orders form the Sandinista National Directorate Directorate member and Interior Minister Both resigned in April 1980 The Junta was reorganized in March 1981 Nicaragua's legislative body, the State Council, which Itserves as an advisory group to the Junta and the Directorate is guided and controlled by the Directorate. This chamber has always had a clear majority of Sandinista sympathizers. less, th e Sandinistas attempted to increase their ratio within the assembly by adding new members and thereby precipitated the November 1980 walk-out of its moderate members. This has given the Sandinistas nearly absolute control over the State Council formed the S andinista Defense Committees and the Sandinista Workers' Federation. Both these base organizations, under Party control, have been used as political tools to deter opposition groups. The Sandinista Defense Committees, modeled after the Cuban Committees fo r the Defense of the Revolution, were organized throughout Nicaragua as a spy network and used for mass mobiliza tions. However, these neighborhood committees have not received substantial popular support, even though Nicaraguans must go through them to ac q uire food subsidies and to obtain drivers licenses. The Sandinista Workers' Federation, formed to incorpor ate the Nicaraguan working class into a central labor movement affiliated with the FSLN, has about 60,000 members. Nevertheless, Nicaragua's two ind e pendent labor movements, with memberships approaching 40,000, have rejected any affiliation with the Sandi- nista Party, thus creating friction between these independent unions and the Sandinistas Nonethe To gain further control over Nicaragua, the Direct o rate In a recent Wall Street Journal article, businessmen from the town of Esteli were quoted as saying, Itwe were all duped,1f describing how they are discriminated against by Sandinista leaders in obtaining credit and foreign currency from the national i zed banking system. "If I though for one minute that the Sandhi4 stas would turn the country into another Cuba, I never would have given them my house to use as a base during the war said a local grocery store owner.2 the democratic opposition circles whi ch now includes the Nicara- guan Democratic Movement, the Social Christian Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Conservative Party. particular, tensions have grown in anticipation of the electoral process scheduled for 19

85. This process, the Sandinistas claim will take place only to affirm their role as the leaders of the revolution because the FSLN has already been chosen as the "van guard" of the Nicaraguan people. In the Wall Street Journal article, a foreign diplomat saw the future o f the electoral process in this manner: lithe nine (the nine-man directorate of the Sandinista Liberation Front that controls the country) aren't about to share power with anybody for a long, long time." These comments, along with the Sandinistas! llfrater n alll relations with the Soviet bloc, have placed Nicaragua's planned elections in doubt Friction has developed between the Sandinista government and In Esteli's experience perhaps best illustrates the reason for the widespread disaffection with the new go vernment. Some 70 percent of Nicaraguans want free elections which have been postponed by the government and 64 percent feel that their lives have not improved since 19

79. These poll results were published in October 1981, by Nicaraguals only independent news- paper La Prensa. ment, zim prohibited publication of such polls without prior government approval.

The paper was harassed by the Sandinista govern SANDINISTA FOREIGN POLICY Since July 1979, the Sandinistas have developed particularly close ties with Fidel Castro, who has provided Nicaragua with at least 5,000 and possibly as many as 10,000 Cuban advisors. The close working relations between the Nicaraguan and Cuban govern ments have been highlighted by frequent top-level consultation In addition, th e Sandinistas have assumed a Cuban-style 'Inon aligned" stance within the Third World, supporting t?le Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, while condemning the U.S. military presence in South Korea as llimperialism.ll By October 1979, Nicaragua had already e stablished diplomatic relations with Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslova kia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Vietnam, Mongolia, North Korea Lynda Schuster Fading Dreams Wall Street Journal, January 15, 1982.

Italy's daily newspaper I1 Tempo, on Ju ne 27, 1981, reported that Fidel Castro had made some forty secret trips to Managua since the July 1979 Sandinista victory. 5 Kampuchea (Heng Samrin and other communist states. Yet despite the presence of Soviet advisors in Nicaragua, it was not until mid - October 1979 that the Soviet Union sent a delegation headed by Yurii I. Volskii, Soviet Ambassador to Mexico, to establish Soviet-Nicaraguan diplomatic relations. While in Managua, Ambas sador Volskii transmitted Leonid Brezhnev's desire "that ambassa dor i al relations between our countries be restored following the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence and support for the national liberation movements of all peoples.Il4 Five months after establishing relations with Moscow, the Sandinistas sent a high - level mission to the Soviet Union led by Directorate commanders Humberto Ortega, Tomas Borge, and Henry Ruiz. While in the USSR, the Sandinista delegation issued a joint communiquell with their Soviet hosts denouncing the Israeli occupation of all Arab te r ritories and calling for the "legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.11 Not surprising ly, the Sandinistas, whose ties to the PLO date back to the 1960s, opened an office for the PLO in Managua with the status of embassy. This feeling o f camaraderie between the PLO and the Sandinistas was expressed by the PLO Ambassador to Nicaragua Marwan Tahbub, in an interview on January 5, 1982, when he said ties between the PLO and Nicaragua are based on revolutionary principles and the fact that t h e two peoples have struggled for their independence and against imperiali~m The Soviet-Nicaraguan joint communique went on to condemn Itthe campai gn launched by the imperialist and reactionary forces aimed at subverting the inalienable right of the peopl e of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.Il Nicaragua, character istically, abstained from the overwhelming United Nations vote condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, the most intriguing development during the Sandinistasl USSR visit wa s the signing of a party-to-party agreement in the form of a IIJoint Communique1I on March 22, 1980 between the Soviet Communist Party and the FSLN formal communist parties. Such an action usually only takes place between rate this In June 1980 only two mo n ths after the Soviet tour, Directo- member Tomas Borge led a delegation to North Korea. During tour, Borge declared to his North Korean hosts that The Nicaraguan revolutionaries will not be content until the imperialists have been overthrown in all parts o f the world. The imperialist United States should not believe that they are able to rule South Korea permanently We stand with the forces of peace and progress, which are the socialist countries. Our 4 5 Soviet Delegation Visits, Diplomatic Relations Esta b lished Managua Domestic Service 0400 GMT, October 19, 1979 PLO Ties with Nicaragua Barricada in Spanish, January 5, 1982, p. 8. 6 strategic goal is clear, our principles are clear, too 6 The Sandinistas's anti-U.S. stance was reiterated by Daniel Ortega d u ring his address commemorating the first anniversary of the Sandinista revolutionary victory in Managua on July 19, 1980 During this ceremony, attended by Cuba's Fidel Castro and Grenada's Maurice Bishop, Ortega outlined his government's position on forei gn policy issues. This stance included condemning 'Iimperial- ismi1 and calling for an end to Itthe blockade of the heroic Cuban people and the unconditional [U.S withdrawal from the Guantanamo Naval Base."

Itliberation movementsi1 in El Salvador and Namib ia, and also praised the Libyan-backed Polisario Front country's support for Itthe reunification of Korea" and for the llrightll of Puerto Rico to "self-determination II He concluded his address by making reference to the upcoming U.S. elections and denou n cing "Mr. Reagan, who with his Grand Old Party has become a great witch-hunter delivered a speech in which he announced that Nicaragua was a part of the "Marxist camp Ortega affirmed Nicaragua's solidarity with the He expressed his On August 25, 1981, Dir e ctorate Member Humberto Ortega Ortega claimed that without Sandinism one cannot be Marxist-Leninist, and Sandinism without Marxism-Leninism cannot be revolution- ary. Because of this they are indisolubly united, and therefore our moral force is Sandinism, our political force is Sandinism and our doctrine is Marxism-Leninism.8 Following the Sandinista rise to power President Carter immediately released aid that had been approved for the Somoza government but suspended by his Administration. Bilateral aid fl owed generously in the next eighteen months, rising to $170 million by the end of 19

80. In addition to bilateral aid, the U.S. voted for all loans to Nicaragua within multilateral institu- tions, of which the U.S. government is the single largest share ho lder. Just five months after the Sandinistas took power, the World Bank and the International Development Association lent $30 million to Nicaragua. This was followed by another $30 million as a World Bank loan in June of 19

81. On January 14, 1982, the World Bank approved an additional $22.8 million to the Sandinista regime financial institution support in nineteen months than the Somoza government received in nineteen years.

Overall the Sandinistas received more international UP1 wire story, Tokyo, June 9, 1980 Junta Member Ortega's Address," Managua Domestic Service 1750 GMT, July 19 1980, FBIS Nicaragua Admits: It Is Really Marxist 0 Estado De S. Paulo, October 10, 1981 7 8 7 Despite this aid, Fidel Castro, during the Sandinistas first anniversary cel e brations in Managua, criticized the U.S. for not providing sufficient funds to Nicaragua. Administration came into office and the State Department provided evidence demonstrating the Sandinista government's involvement in assisting the Marxist-Leninist gu e rrillas in El Salvador, was U.S. bilateral aid to Nicaragua curtailed Only after the Reagan The U.S. policy of authorizing no new aid projects to Nicara gua and curtailing the ongoing aid programs which the Sandhi stas have termed as I'interventionism, bl a ckmail and Yankee economic aggressioni1 has had little effect been undermined by the multilateral lending institutions and Mexico, Libya and the USSR have offered Nicaragua increased financial assistance at favorable terms. This recent expansion of financ i al aid to Nicaragua has included a $100 million loan from Libya, over 70 million in loans from the multilateral lending institutions and a $50 million loan from the Soviet Union. The USSR has also given Nicaragua a $16 million grant to purchase agricultur a l machinery and delivered 20,000 tons of wheat. Czechoslovakia has expressed its solidarity with Nicaragua through an agreement of a 30 million loan for 1982 20 million financed under generous conditions, will go for the building of three textile factorie s and the other $10 million will be for the purchase of machinery and equipment for the mining industry and the installation of machine shops. Such actions have undoubtedly hindered U.S. efforts to pressure the Sandinistas to stop their military assistance to the forces in Central America and to halt their attempts to militarize Nicaragua The suspension of aid has NICARAGUA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP The Sandinista government, with the assistance and supervision of at least 5,000 Cuban advisors (of whic h 1,800 to 2,000 are military advisors), and several hundred East German advisors, has built up the Nicaraguan armed forces announced by the Sandinista leadership in the summer of 1980 will increase the size of the army until it reaches 50,000 members. To d ate, the Sandinista army has expanded up to an estimated 25,000 active soldiers, and 20,000 well-trained reserves, who can be called up at any time. This is well over 400 percent larger than the former Somoza National Guard, which ranged from 8,000 to 10, 0 00 active and reserve members. This is more than-twice the size of Guatemala's 17,000-man army, which traditionally has been the largest army in Central America. the Sandinista government has organized a IIPeople's Militia currently numbering 50,000, and d esigned to eventually incorporate 200,000 persons. This has already made Nicaragua's security apparatus much larger than the security forces of the four remain ing Central American countries combined. The size of the army is even more remarkable when one c onsiders that Nicaragua has only 2.6 million inhabitants, or 13 percent of the 19.6 million people of Central America The militarization effort In addition to its army, 8 To enhance Nicaragua's military capabilities still further the Sandinista government has acquired sophisticated arms from several Communist bloc nations and France. Sandinista officials, including Directorate member Jaime Wheelock, have recently acknow ledged the acquisition of new armaments, including approximately one hundred model T-54 and T-55 Soviet-made tanks and surface-to air missiles. U.S. State Department officials disclosed that additional military equipment reaching Nicaragua included large quantities of automatic weapons, some of which are being supplied to the guerrillas in E l Salvador and Guatemala.

Military assistance from the West has been initiated through a secret agreement between France and Nicaragua, which was signed in December and revealed on January 7, 19

82. The $15.8 million sale, labeled as "purely defensive equipmenti1 by the French Foreign Ministry's office, consisted of two Alouette 3 helicop- ters, a pair of coastal patrol boats and a dozen military trucks.

Not disclosed in the original report was t he inclusion of shoulder fired rocket launchers. The rocket launcher, a bazooka-like weapon, has become a favorite of guerrillas around the world because it can knock out armored vehicles or reinforced buildings from a distance. These are similar to the o nes used by Salvadorean guerrillas in a recent attack on the Ilopango Air Base, which destroyed six U.S. UHlH, or Huey, helicopters on loan to El Salvador and six French-built fighter jets.

Claude Cheysson, the French foreign minister, defended his ,govern ment's sale by asserting that Nicaragua will avoid communist allies only if they find help in the West. U.S. officials de- scribed the French position as lInaive.'l Though complaints were voiced by Secretaries Weinberger and Haig, and an official com- pla i nt was registered by U.S. Ambassador Evan Galbraith in Paris, French officials, nevertheless, said the U.S. reaction was not as strong as they had e~pected There are reports indicating that the Sandinista government has lengthened its airfields on the Atl a ntic coast at Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas to handle fighter jets In April, the Nicara- guan coast-to-coast highway will be finished, connecting two existing highways to the Pacific coast. This project of 426 kms has some 200 Cuban and 100 Nicaraguans wo r king on it, using heavy equipment which has been brought from Cuba U.S. intelligence reports that Vietnam has agreed to supply Marxist Nicaragua with approximately 1,000 aircraft that would turn the country into a major Soviet-proxy air force bastion. U.S . -made M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers captured from Leftist rebels in El Salvador, have U.S. serial numbers indicating France Reportedly to Sell Rockets to Nicaragua The Washington Post December 28, 1982 Intelligence Digest, Weekly Review, November 25, 1981 lo 9 they were captured by the North Vietnamese forces when South Vietnam was conquered in 19

75. Nicaraguan pilots are being trained in Bulgaria, Cuba and other Communist bloc nations.

These facts, along with already documented evidence of Sovi et-made MIG-23 aircraft in Nicaragua, raise serious security problems for the Hemisphere. Should the full quantity of 1,000 aircraft ever reach Nicaragua from Vietnam, Nicaragua will have-the capability of militarily dominating Central America.

The Direct orate Defense Minister, Humberto Ortega, pointed out during a June 4, 1981 press conference that We [Sandinistas are strengthening our defense, and we are prepared to operate tanks, to operate planes, cannon and different kinds of weapons."ll While the Sa ndinistas claim that their military build-up is intended for defense only, observers maintain that the closest nation capable of posing a direct military threat to Nicaragua is Mexico, a country supportive of the Sandinista revolution.

The most serious con cern to Nicaragua's Central American neighbors is not military inferiority, but rather the assistance the Sandinistas have been providing to the insurgency movements in El Salvador and Guatemala. This assistance, which has been documented by the U.S. Depa r tment of State and reaffirmed by Sandinista defectors, has included training guerrillas and supply ing them with logistical support, personnel, weapons and ammuni tion.12 In addition, Nicaragua has become a strategic transfer location for Cuban troops ent ering El Salvador to assist that country's Marxist-Leninist guerrillas.13 Thus, Central American nations fear that Nicaragua has become Cuba's center for subversion in Central America.

Guatemala is planning to triple its armed forces this year to 60,000 me n "to combat communist subversion more effectively according to General Manuel Benedicto Lucas Garcia, Army Chief of Staff, who pointed to the apparent threat posed by Nicaragua's goal of a 200,000-man militia and 60,000-man army In order to achieve this goal, a strict military draft and recruiting campaign has been planned in Guatemala.

NICARAGUA'S FALTERING ECONOMY During the Sandinistas' two years in office, the Nicaraguan government bureaucracy has expanded at a rate that threatens to l1 l2 Alma Guille rmoprieto, "Nicaraguan Tells of Arms Efforts The Washington Post, June 5, 1981 Communist Interference in El Salvador, Documents Demonstrating Communist Support of the Salvadoran Insurgency U.S. Department of State, February 23, 1981.

Rowland Evans and Rob ert Novak Bridge Over the River Lempa," The Washing ton Post, October 19, 1981 l3 10 bankrupt the country's economy government is highlighted by eight ministries formed in the aftermath of the revolution and a rapidly expanding security and military appar atus. Consequently, the government's budget in creased by over 250 percent in 19

80. To meet the financial requirements for the enlarged budget, the Sandinistas have re scheduled payments of the country's foreign debt, increased the monetary supply, restru ctured the tax system and have become increasingly dependent on foreign financial assistance The growth of the Sandinista Early in 1980, the Sandinista government renegotiated payment of their inherited foreign debt held by the international private finan cial community in order to halt the outflow of foreign exchange.

Sandinista government would resume payments of its foreign debts in 19

86. Similarly, the Sandinistas were granted a five-year period of grace on interest payments of this debt observer pred icts that this debt will have to be renegotiated in 1986 to avoid default The terms of this negotiation stipulated that the A financial The Sandinista policy of increasing the country's money supply has created an abundance of currency which increased inf l ation and caused a scarcity of consumer products. This policy has had a severe impact among Nicaragua's poor; the cost of 'food products has more than doubled since the Sandinistas assumed power. The 30 percent wage increase decreed by the Sandinistas for Nicaragua's rural poor population was offset by a rural inflation estimated at over 60 percent.14 In July 1981 Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega conceded that inflation had consumed the wage increases and concluded that to attain the anticipated minimum wag e for the poor, "we must first increase productivity.1115 Although recognizing the need to increase productivity, the Sandinista policies have restrained economic growth In 1980, the Sandinistas restructured Nicaragua's tax law in order to acquire a larger number of contributors and increase progression of the tax system tax to set up an unemployment fund by directly taking the yearly employee salary referred to as "Christmas bonus from all Nicara guans earning over 1,500 cordobas per month (U.S 150 at the o fficial exchange rate financial resources, external fundina sources have made available The Sandinistas also imposed a Besides these policies devised to increase the government's over $1.3 billion to the Sandinistas -since of this foreign assistance, the Sandinista July 19

79. In spite government's deficits l4 Christopher Werner Nicaragua's Fortunes Have Diego Union, May 3; 1981 Daniel Ortega Address Managua Radio Sandino Begun to Pinch The San 1652 GMT, July 4, 198 1 FBIS. 11 have been increasing as a result of a combination of government expansion costs and a reduction in productivity from a fundraising tour to Libya and the USSR, imposed a "state of national economic and social emergency" to alleviate the governme n t's financial crisis. This decree outlawed strikes and prohibited unauthorized price increases by imposing a one to three year prison sentence for those individuals violating these measures. Under the law, someone can be "arrested on suspicion of "economi c sabotage," which includes the publishing of economic data affecting "state security.ll government to cut its budget by 10 percent, reduce its food and transportation subsidies by 10 percent, impose a 30 to 100 percent tax on all imports classified as lux u ry items and freeze all of its hiring l6 Despite this decree, the Sandinista government bureaucracy has already drained a large portion of Nicaragua's work force incorporating them into the army or other government-affiliated organizations. This has been p articularly troublesome for Nicara gua's agricultural productivity, where a labor shortage became critical after the Central American migrating farmers refused to work in Nicaragua during harvest season tional source of agricultural labor in Nicaragua was sparked by the declining value of the cordoba, currently worth less than 40 percent of its official rate. The labor shortages coupled with the Sandinistas' mismanagement of expropriated private sector operations have reduced Nicaragua's output creased by approximately 50 percent since the Sandinistas assumed power export earning crops, cotton and coffee, has shrunk drastically.

Furthermore, both of these crops, representing 50 percent of Nicaragua's export income, have been affected by declining market pri ces. Output within the country's third largest export source the cattle industry, has also diminished due to the massive slaughter and export of livestock during the revolution. Other agricultural products primarily for domestic use. Sugar, rice, beans an d corn, which Nicaragua had previously exported or at least attained self-sufficiency, are now in such short supply they have been imported In September 1981, Daniel Ortega, upon returning to Nicaragua The decree also ordered the This cutoff of a tradi In f act, the country's vital agricultural harvest has de The cultivated area of Nicaragua's two most important Thus far, the Sandinista exmomiations of Drivate sector operations have given the Nicaraguan government control of over 50 percent of the country's e conomic activity. Although continu ing-to nationalize private sector operations, the Sandhistas have in certain instances returned run-down farms to the private l6 Nicaragua Junta Declares State of Emergency The Wall Street Journal September 11, 1981. 12 sector after the deterioration of some of these businesses under government control. However, the government has not issued new land titles to anyone. The Sandinistas have kept banking, insur- ance, and mining operations under government control.

GROWING S ANDINISTA OPPOSITION Nicaragua's economic crisis, coupled with the governmentls radical policies, have generated mass dissatisfaction with the Sandinista regime groups: the Catholic Church, the independent media, the private sector, democratic circles and the vast majority of the Atlantic coast population. These groups previously assisted in deposing the Somoza government, but now see their country drifting toward a totalitarian state under the control of "Soviet imperialism.Il This opposition has. emanate d from several Nicaragua's powerful Catholic Church, under the leadership of the Archbishop of Managua, Miguel Obando y Bravo, has vehement- ly criticized the leftist trend of the Sandinista government a Latin American Episcopal Congress (CELAM) meeting in Bogota Colombia, on November 16 1981, Archbisop Obando y Bravo stated the Nicaraguan government is governed by Cubans and not by the junta. He charged that key positions in the Nicaraguan government were occupied by men close to Fidel Castro and that the r egime is totalitarian and Marxist-Leninist. His remarks were not reported in the American media, but were picked up by several international wire services including Agence France Press In January of this year, during a press conference in New York, the Ar c hbishop stated that the IINicaraguans no longer believe in the Sandinista Leaders and added "there is no doubt that the governments of Nicaragua has good relations with the governments of the Soviet Union and Cuba I1 At Responding to a decree by Pope John Paul 11, the Archbishop requested members of the clergy, such as Father Miguel DIEscoto to resign from their posts in the revolutionary junta and return to their apostolic ministry. Father DIEscoto (Nicaragua's Foreign Minister) together with other church m en who hold government positions answered the Archbishop's request with a joint statement affirming their "unbreakable commitment to the popular Sandinista revolution in loyalty to our people, which is the same as saying, in loyalty to the will of God. We will continue in whatever place our presence might be necessary.lIl8 Shortly afterwards, during his June 1981 visit to Italy, the Archbishop of Managua declared "that after two years of hope, our revolution is drifting toward Marxism according to the Cuba n l7 l8 El Diario de Hoy, December 1981, San Salvador.

James Nelson Goodsell, "Nicaraguan Priests Told 'Quit Politics The Christian Science Monitor, June 22, 1981. 13 model advisors in Nicaragua, whom he claims "are among us with an arrogant attitude" in s pite of the country's "economic difficul ties."lg For his criticism of the Sandinistas, the Archbishopfs Sunday mass, aired on television for many years, was suspended.

Furthermore, Archbishop Obando y Bravo was labeled as "the princi- pal force of the co unterrevolution" by Father D'Escoto in an interview published in the Mexican publication El Periodico gua's most widely circulated and only independent newspaper, Prensa, led to the paper's closure for forty-eight hours in July 1981."O La Prensa has been c losed down by the Sandinista govern- ment many times since for publishing ttcounterrevolutionary't material. DfEscoto (he is no longer addressed as Father) visited the Soviet Union in December 1981 in an official capacity on behalf of the Nicaraguan gover n ment. He began his visit in Leningrad and stated I am arriving on an official visit with the objectives that through this visit the friendly and fraternal ties with this noble government and between the people of Nicaragua and the Soviet Union be strength e ned more and more Archbishop Obando y Bravo also criticized the Cuban Father D'Escoto's interview, which was republished in Nicara I believe that especially for Nicaraguans, and also for any knowledgeable person, being in Leningrad is a kind of pilgrimage . One feels that one has come to a holy land, where the people have heroically defended their gains I am talking about the 900-day siege and also of the fact that this city is the birthplace of the Soviet revolution. Thus, one is moved, as I was moved It i s a beautiful way to start a visit to this great nation, through Leningrad.

Finally, he charged that No one but the United States interferes in the internal affairs of the Central American state, where a people's revolution is going on.

North American imp erialism, once used our territory for the invasion of Guatemala and Cuba It has been ended now. The United States can no longer use us against fraternal Latin American countries. Nicaragua does not want to be a puppet.21 l9 21 Archbishop Says Revolution M oving Toward Marxism San Jose, Radio Reloj 1730 GMT, June 20, 1981.

Alma Guillermoprieto Struggle between Sandinistas and Press Heats Up ,I The Guardian, August 24, 1981.

Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Concludes Visit, Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT, December 14, 1981; and Moscow TASS in English, 1835 GMT, December 15, 1981 I 14 In spite of its major role in the downfall of Somoza, this newspaper has come under severe harassment and censorship by the Sandinistas, who currently.are considering cl o sing down La Prensa indefinitely. La Prensa is the only independent, non-government newspaper in Managua; its circulation of 75,000 is twice the combined total of the government-run newspapers. All three papers are administered by the Chamorro family, mak ing La Prensa the only one within their control. Recently, Pedro Joazin Chamorro Barrios, son of the newspaper's assassinated editor, charged that the Sandinistas are trying to do what the late dictator Anastasio Somoza tried to do, shut La Prensa down.

II Isn't it ironic that both Somoza and the Sandinistas are trying to do the same thing said Pedro Joaquin A number of radio news programs charged by the Sandinista government with having Ilbroadcast news harmful to the Armed Forces,I1 have been shut down in Nicaragua recently. The latest victim was Radio Mundial's progam llH~y,ll or Today. This was the fifth news program ordered off the air by the Sandinista regime since it took power in 1979 parties, the Democratic Coordination, protested the government's a ction calling it a violation of the "Nicaraguan people's right to be informed.Il A coalition of four anti-government The Sandinistas have also harassed and intimidated other opposition groups such as the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement.

This movement, incorporating a large sector of non-Marxists who helped overthrow Somoza, has become increasingly critical of Sandinista policies leading toward Soviet domination of Nicaragua.

This group, which had been unable to receive government permission to hold a party mobilization since mid-1980, was finally granted Sandinista approval to hold a rally on March 15, 19

81. However, this rally was cancelled on March 14 by the movement's leader, former Junta member Alfonso Robelo, after a Sandinista youth group ransacked t he Nicaraguan Democratic Movement's headquarters stoned homes belonging to members affiliated to it, attacked people distributing leaflets for the rally and then threatened the rally with more violence. Directorate member Tomas Borge who granted permissio n for this party event, laid the blame of the violence on the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement for I1provokingi1 the people with counterrevolutionary views.22 Sandinista authorities detained Robelo and confiscated his passport as he attempted to flee Nicarag ua.

The Nicaraguan Permanent Human Rights Commission headed by Jose Esteban Gonzalez has become a target of frequent acts of intimidation by the Sandinista government. This group, used extensively by the Sandinistas during the rev olution when it recorded human rights violations committed by the Somoza govern In October 1981 A1 Kamen Sandinista Mob Action Thwarts Rally by Opposition The Wash ington Post March 16, 1981. 15 ment has, since July 1979, become an increasingly unacceptab l e annoyance to the Sandinista government. Since the Sandinistas assumed power, the Commission has revealed that summary executions torture, harassment of the press and of opposition political groups, confiscation of private property and deportation are co m mon human rights violations perpetuated by the current Nicara guan government. During his European tour, Jose Esteban Gonzalez reported that Nicaraguan jails still hold eight thousand Ilprisoners of conscience.Il For his remarks in Europe, Gonzalez was ar r ested upon his return to Nicaragua early in 1981 and released only after the Venezuelan government exerted economic pressure on the Sandinista government organization known as the Superior Council for Private Enterprise (COSEP has constantly complained ab o ut the radical policies pursued by the Sandinistas creating a lack of confidence in the country's political and economic future, elements vital for private investment. For such criticism, members of the Nicaraguan business community, who played an essenti al role in overthrowing Somoza's government through its crippling strikes," have been branded as ilcounterrevolutionarieslf exploiting the masses for which they have been persecuted by the Sandinista security forces.

This persecution includes the assassina tion of the vice president of COSEP, Jorge Salazar, who was shot to death by government security forces minutes after Salazar had presided over a COSEP meeting. The government justified the murder by calling him a Since this incident, some 20,000 business men, technicians, and professionals have fled from Nicaragua.

Understandably businesses have suffered dramatic decreases in productivity ing Humberto Ortega's statement that the Sandinista government could in a matter of hours,Il take over everything that Ifthe bourgeoisie still possesses.11 of egregious economic mismanagement, and the Sandinistas' Ildoctrine of Marxism-Leninism for the country's deepening economic crisis.

The Sandinista government quickly reacted to this letter; by midnight of the same day, state security forces arrested four COSEP leaders in their homes for Ifviolation of the economic and social emergency law seven months in jail on October 30.

They were Enrique Dreyfus President of Higher Council for Private Enterprise, Benjamin Lanzas , President of the Chamber of Construction, and Gilbert0 Cuadra, President of the Federation of Nicaraguan Professionals. Similar sentences were handed down to three other businessmen who fled into exile in Venezuela and the U.S. This left the private sec t or of Nicaragua leaderless, and with few anti-Sandinista individuals willing to assume such a risky role. Under continued international pressure, the Sandinistas finally released the COSEP leaders on February 14 business executives to announce that the se ntences had been commuted He is now in exile in Venezuela.

Nicaragua's private sector, organized under an umbrella On October 20, 1981, COSEP published an open letter criticiz The letter accused the government Three of those arrested were sentenced to Dani el Ortega called together 250 16 EAST COAST DISSENSION Nicaragua's Atlantic region inhabitants, in the true spirit of August0 Cesar Sandino who was ideologically opposed to Marxism Leninism and any type of foreign military presence in his country have rej ected the Cubans and through them the Sandinista government.

Although the Atlantic region of Nicaragua covers one-third of the country's territory, its population of three indigenous communi ties the Miskitos, the Sumos and the Ramas barely reach 200,0

00. Shortly after the Sandinistas came to power, they opened an office in Managua incorporating leading members of these three communities under the name of Misurasata.

Tension began building between the Atlantic region's inhabi tants and the Sandinistas over the arrival of Cuban teachers doctors and military advisors early in 19

80. The local people started to voice concern and disapproval over the growing military presence in the region, the lessons taught by the Cuban teachers and the incompetence of the Cuban doctors In February 1981, the Sandinistas arrested Miskito leader Stedman Fagoth along with thirty-two other leaders of Nicaragua's Atlantic community. This led to violent incidents inflicting casualties among the region's local, Sandinista and Cub a n populace.23 Since this episode, as many as 20,000 Miskitos, Ramas and Sumo Indians including Fagoth, have fled across,the Nicaraguan border into Honduras. The Miski- tos' dissatisfaction with the Sandinistas were heard in Washington during mid-1981 when Fagoth arrived in the United States to plead for assistance against the communists in his country. Fagoth's requests were not answered by the Administration. February 1982, he returned to the U.S. and presented new charges against the militia of the Sandh i stas, alleging human rights violations. (See Appendix 11 In In early January of this year, reports that Nicaraguan troops had crossed the border into Honduras and had murdered up to 200 Miskito Indians of the 20,000 who have fled into Honduras prompted a f ormal complaint from Honduras' foreign relations secretary Colonel Cesar Elvir Sierra. He cited eyewitness reports that the Nicaraguan troops killed at least 200 Miskito Indians around New Year's Eve, and that in the days prior to and following the incide n t Nicaraguan patrol vessels had seized several Honduran fishing vessels in Honduran territorial waters. Nicaragua's Foreign Affairs Minister Miguel d'Escoto denied the incident and charged that rightists who were followers of the late President Anastasio S omoza had attacked Nicaraguan border patrols and killed 150 Nicaraguan soldiers. in~estigation Both reports are still under 23 24 Shirley Christian Discontent Grows on Nicaragua's East Coast The Washington Post, August 26, 1981 Elvir Sierra Lodges Complai n t Against Nicaragua Buenos Aires LATIN in Spanish 1855 GMT, January 8, 1982; (Reuters) Wire Story from Tegucigalpa January 4, 1982; Managua, Nicaragua, January 16, 1982; and (Reuters) Wire Story. 17 Repression against also been reported. On order of St. A q nes, who the clergy in the Atlantic region has January 13, 1982, three sisters of the worked in Puerto Cabezas, and two Capuchin brothers worki6g in Waspan, were taken to Managua and were expelled by the Sandinistas On January 16, Interior Minister Tomas B orge admitted the incident had been inappropriately handled and stated that the clergy could return to Nicaragua released a statement concerning the incident on January 25 hoping that similar incidents would not occur to the remainder of the missionaries a nd "God's people on the Atlantic coast.'I Unconfirmed reports of five Moravian ministers jailed in the region by the Sandinista militia and accusations of orders to capture. and kill remaining Moravian ministers are under investiga- tion which was not rep o rted by the press, is also under investigation.25 The Bishops Conference An incident of assault on a Catholic bishop last October MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SANDINISTAS The Sandinistas have encountered their strongest opposition from two militant org anizations, the Nicaraguan Democratic Front and the National Liberation Army. Both groups have formed major guerrilla networks to carry out military operations against the Sandinista government and their communist advisors.

Democratic Front claims to have over 2,000 armed individuals organized into cells throughout Nicaragua. This'group is made up primarily of civilians who opposed and fought Somoza and have now grown disillusioned with the Sandinista regime. The National Liberation Army is an anti-communi st guerrilla network composed primarily of former lower rank guardsmen, who along with their collaborators within Nicaragua, have carried out raids against Sandinista posts.

These guerrilla organizations propose to destabilize and depose the Marxist-Lenini st Sandinista government and, if success- ful, install a true democracy in Nicaragua. Although both groups have harassed the Sandinista regime, their forces are much smaller and weaker than the huge, well-equipped army of the government. Also it should be noted that this military opposition only arose in response to repressive Sandinista actions The Nicaraguan U.S. POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA During the Carter years, American policy attempted to build friendship with the Sandinistas. To this end, the Carter Ad m ini- stration, which had assisted in deposing the Somoza and Urcuyo governments, offered financial and diplomatic support to the 25 Borge Says Deported Priest, Nuns, Can Return Paris AFP in Spanish 0315 GMT, January 22, 1982; Bishop's Communique, Managua R adio Sandino in Spanish, 1200 GMT, January 25, 1982. 18 Sandinistas the U.S. had delivered to the Sandinistas $170 million in bilateral aid, and, according to Arturo Cruz, had become Nicaragua's "main sourcell of financial assistance the U.S. voted for al l loans to Nicaragua within the multilateral lending institutions comments about the United States from the Sandinistas In fact, Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega revealed his rationale for demand- ing U.S. financial assistance in May 1980 by claiming By the end of President Carter's term in office In addition to bilateral aid Yet this aid failed to prompt favorable What Nicaragua knows is that when we were fighting against Somoza, the USSR was supporting the Nicaraguan people And now we have relations with t he Soviets and they are seeking ways to help us They are seeking ways to have the United States pay us for the great harm they have done us One must note that this is a historic debt that the U.S. Government owes to the Nicaraguan people.

Only after the Re agan Administration came into office and provided evidence collected by the Carter Administration demon strating the Sandinista government's involvement in assisting the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in El Salvador, was U.S. bilateral aid to Nicaragua termi n ated. The U.S. policy to stop authorizing new aid projects to Nicaragua and curtailing the on-going aid programs, which the Sandinistas have termed as 'linterventionism blackmail and Yankee economic aggression,Il has been ineffective In yet another attemp t initiated in August 1981 Thomas Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, went to Managua and offered to resume U.S. bilateral aid to Nicaragua if the Sandinistas would cease furnishing the Salvadorean guerrillas with military supp lies.

Enders proposal, and continue to offer military support to the guerrillas in Central America challenge, the United States will have to devise a tougher policy The Sandinistas ignored the In order to meet the Sandinista U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES The overall U .S. policy toward Nicaragua should attempt to halt the Sandinistas' military assistance to the guerrilla forces in the Central American region, slow down Nicaragua's militariza- tion efforts and ultimately change the fundamental character of this Marxist- L eninist regime into a genuine democracy emerging out of a free, pluralistic society. This can best be achieved by a four-pronged policy economic pressure against the Sandinista regime by withholding 1) Economic pressures: The United States should exert 26 "Daniel Ortega Saevedra, Direct Line," Managua Radio Sandino 0200 GMT, May 30, 1980. 19 U.S. support within the multilateral lending institutions for all loans to Nicaragua. to receive "soft loans" from the Inter-American Development Bank, in which the U. S . has a tacit veto power. Similarly, this policy would make it tough for Nicaragua to attain loans from other multilateral institutions such as the World Bank the Reagan Administration should totally terminate all U.S. bilateral aid programs to the Nicara g uan government and encourage Western European and Latin American nations, particularly Mexico, to do likewise This would make it difficult for Nicaragua In addition 2) Arms interdiction: To diminish the arms movements out of Nicaragua, the United States s h ould provide El Salvador with effective detection equipment equipment requested by President Duarte in October 1981 to spot night flight operations between Nicaragua and El Salvador should train and provide the Salvadorean Navy with gun ships to control t h e arms and guerrilla smuggling through the Gulf of Fonseca. In addition, it should provide equipment and training to set up a Central American surveillance task force with rapid reaction capability to seize the smuggled military supplies going to El Salva d or, Honduras and Guatemala on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. This surveillance team would also ensure that stockpiles of weapons in Costa Rica are destroyed or removed from that country since it has no army. If the arms flow cannot be curtailed by t hese means, then serious consideration .should be given to a naval blockade on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. This naval blockade should be in cooperation with naval forces from Honduras, Panama, Venezuela, and Mexico, together with other Latin American navies willing to participate in stemming the tide of weapons 3) Promoting democratic groups: The United States should also exploit the Nicaraguan population's growing disenchantment with the Sandinista government by supporting all of the Nicaraguan oppos i tion groups with a democratic orientation not be lifted until the Sandinistas open up the political system to allow the participation of all parties government is not established in Managua, as promised by the Sandinistas in their initial political platfo rm, the U.S in coordination with its Latin American allies, should offer clandes- tine support to Nicaragua's anti-Sandinista militant forces.

Only by supplying them with weapons and other provisions for guerrilla warfare can the opposition effectively cha llenge the Sandinista regime if its repressive policies continue carried out concerning human rights violations by the Sandinista regime towards all factions which oppose it. task force consisting of members of the Organization of American States should b e sent to Nicaragua to report on human rights violations. Hearings should be scheduled as soon as possible in the U.S. Congress concerning allegations of brutality and human rights abuses perpetrated by the Sandinista militia, particularly against the Misk i to population in the Atlantic coast region This would include radar tracking It Pressure should If a constitutional 4) Human rights violations: An investigation should be An investigative 20 CONCLUSION The Nicaraguan connection, through which the Sandinis t a government supplies and supports subversive activities in Central America, makes Nicaragua's problems regional. A concentrated effort of the United States in cooperation with the OAS could mobilize the necessary forces to sever the connection and end th e political and military threat which Nicaragua now poses toward its neighbors. This joint effort should be backed by Western European countries, Japan, and all other nations which profess a commitment to democracy. The Sandinistas have brought on them sel v es regional and domestic crises through their policies. By adopting a Marxist-Leninist ideology, they have betrayed the ideals of the revolution, which were for a pluralistic government democratically elected by the people exporting guerrilla warfare, the Sandinistas are threatening the sovereignty of their neighbors.

By becoming a land base The Nicaraguan people no longer openly support the Sandinista regime free political choice through open democratic elections. The freedom of choice by the Nicaraguan p eople should be exercised on the basis of the system initially outlined by the Sandinistas when they took power. Just as international public opinion calls for the people of Poland to decide their own future, so must the international community support th e people of Nicaragua. Every other country in Central America is holding elections this year, often under difficult circumstances. The Sandinistas should do the same. Should the threat from Nicaragua remain unchecked, the United States soon will confront i t s most serious Central American security problem of the past century. The Soviet Union refuses to allow liberty to expand in Eastern Europe; the United States should at least as steadfastly oppose the growth of totalitarian regimes aligned to the Soviet U n ion in the Western Hemisphere This would be proved if the Sandinistas were to allow a Richard Araujo Policy Analyst Much of the initial research on this paper was completed by Alexander Kruger who preceded Mr. Araujo as Latin American Affairs analyst at T he Heritage Foundation.

APPENDIX I The Sandinista political platform as reissued on July 12 1979, by the provisional Sandinista government in exile 1 the part of the government junta to 1.1 Install a regime of democracy, justice and social progress in whic h there is full guarantee for the right of all Nicaraguans to political participation and universal suffrage It is based on a state organization that will be comprised of an executive branch, a legislative branch through a council of state comprised of 33 members from the nation's broadest political and military sectors an a judiciary branch 1.2 Guarantee the full exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms A political area whose main aspects include the commitment on 1.3 Organize a new army comprise d of the combatants of the FSLN the soldiers and officers who served honestly and patriotically in the face of the plans of the dictatorship and those who joined the struggle to overthrow the Somozist regime; and 1.4 Observe an independent foreign policy t h at relates our country with all nations that respect self-determination and just and mutually profitable economic relations 2. An economic area whose basic objectives, in addition to attending to the needs of the nation's emergency and reconstruc tion, wi l l pursue the following fundamental aspects 2.1 External transformation in key sectors of the economy, such as the financial system, agrarian reform, organization of.domestic and foreign commerce and the necessary changes in the rural and urban areas 2.2 s o cial property of precise extent and clearly delimited character- istics, a private area and a third area characterized by joint investment and coordinated by the public and private sectors will coexist 2.3 Creation of an office dealing with state and soci a l property and action Organization of a mixed economy in which a state area with 2.4 Compliance with foreign debt commitments and, at the same time, reorganizing and renegotiating its terms 2.5 or limitations that harm national dignity or sovereignty, the use and destination of which will be subject to the strictest control Accepting international donations not subject to conditions A-2 2.6 Substantial adjustment in the organization and operation of the private financial system with the depth and proceedin g s that are necessary 2.7 Promotion of foreign investment orientated toward playing a complementary role with domestic efforts. For this, clear lines will be established regarding its treatment, acquiring of [word indistinct industrial property and so fort h ; and 2.8 Guarantees and full respect for properties and activities of the private sector that are not directly affected by the measures set forth in this program 3. A social area whose main objective will be that of opening to all Nicaraguans the true po s sibility of improving living standards through the establishment of a policy that will tend to eradicate unemployment and that will guarantee the right to housing, health social security, efficient public transportation, education culture, sports and [wor d indistinct economic austerity in view of the state of destruction in which the Somozist regime has left the nation. implement specific action in the following social areas It will be a regime of But it is sought to 3.1 Jobs and family income 3.2 Nutritio n , which contemplates the creation of a single national health system 3.3 Education, where measures will be implemented to reform the objectives and contents of national education; and 3.4 Housing, where a true urban reform will be undertaken as emergency p rograms are implemented for the reconstruction of homes in the zones affected by the genocidal bombardments of the Somozist dictatorship; and 4. Finally, an area of institutional reorganization whose funda mental objective will be the rationalization of t he functions of the public administration, preventing an excessive bureaucracy while establishing an economic and social system that will assure the execution of the programs and projects of the Government of National Reconstruction.


82. THIS ACCOUNT IS OF INCIDENTS RECORDED FROM DECEMBER 1981 TO JANUARY 18, 1982 1. December 23, 198 1 the community of San Carlos, Rio Coco was bombed. Sixty Miskitos died and 100 were injured 2. December 26, in the city of Bluefields the Sandinistas incarcerated 30 persons. They killed a young man who spoke English for the mere fact that he would not j oin the militia.

The majority of the youth have fled into the mountains refusing to join the militia 3. December 26, in the community of Assang, the government built a military air base. They 82 Masmoras of the community 4 of which 75 are Cubans. trenches. If they do not, they will be denied food. The communi ty is living as in a prison as the military does not permit them to go out of the village captured and jailed all of the The village of San Carlos is being occupied by 150 militia They are forcing the population to dig 5 in the community of Assang they captured another 35 persons; in the community of Krasa they captured 24 persons. And in the community of Waspuc they captured 12. death except for four in the community of Leymus who were buried alive In the community of Leymus the government captured 80 persons These were all shot to 6 taking them to the concentration camp in Puerto Cabezas 7. Bilwaskarma is also a militarized zone. The hospital was closed and turned into a military fort. persons were se n t to Puerto Cabezas. Among the people captured was Barbara Diaz, daughter of the Reverend Silvio Diaz, a Moravo Minister Sandy Bay is occupied by 300 militia who captured 40 persons An unknown number of 8. In the community of Raity there are 200 militia, i n Aniwas there are 300 and in Walakitan there are another 300 9. When the communists of the FSLN discover that a Miskito Indian instead of following orders to execute other Miskitos, fires bullets into the air they bind his feet and his hands and will thr ow him into the River Coco 10 area has been deserted. All fled to Honduras: about 20 thousand Miskito Indians, among them women, children and elderly.

From the community of Siksayary to the community of Cum the


Richard Kruger