

THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT: REALISM OR DETENTE?

by Representative Jack Kemp

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. We meet on the eve of a U.S.-Soviet pre-summit. It is a moment of great hope and opportunities, but also an epic moment of choice regarding the central drama of the twentieth century--the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. American must continue to step forward and lead the world toward greater freedom and a more secure peace or risk throwing away an historic chance that may not come again to make nuclear war obsolete.

Ladies and gentlemen, only a few years ago the United States was retreating in the world and the Soviets were advancing. The faith of our allies was shaken, while lesser nations were divided between following the Soviet model or simply hedging their bets. Worst of all, our own leaders sounded an uncertain note. Some even wondered whether we had not begun an irreversible decline.

Today, there is no question that President Reagan is right when he says freedom is on the march. Through a national rededication, we have begun to prove once again that, under God, we are the masters of our destiny. Across the globe, anti-communist insurgencies are spreading, Third World countries are rejecting socialism and turning to democratic capitalism, and our rebirth of freedom has borne fruit in a technological revolution that is sweeping the West, making us more productive, more prosperous, more powerful, ever more free.

High technology is also transforming the nature of warfare. How fortunate we are to have a President, Ronald Reagan, who saw that America's genius for technology could bring alive a vision of a Strategic Defense Initiative to eliminate the threat of nuclear missiles and nuclear war.

We owe Ronald Reagan an enormous debt. It was he who broke the pattern of his predecessors, exposing the falsity of moral equivalence by describing the foremost challenge of our day from a ruthless, dangerous enemy. It was he who had the courage of his conviction that

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our freedom, our prosperity, the very future of our Judeo-Christian civilization rest ultimately not on diplomatic accommodation, but on clear-eyed determination, not on concessions, but on courage, not on summits, but on strength--economic strength, military strength, above all, what Churchill called the strength of our liberal values.

All this we owe him. And we must stand united behind our President as he prepares to sit down with the most powerful representative of the Soviet empire. The President is preparing for a summit where he will be under pressure to reach some accommodation with the Soviets. I want to explain today why, in my view, we need a strategy of realism, and why that strategy depends less upon signing treaties than upon understanding the character, objectives and capabilities of the Soviet Union, and what we must do to ensure freedom prevails.

The problem begins in Congress. Only days before the President is to depart for Iceland, House Democrats would straitjacket him on major strategic issues, and insist on their own version of arms control: unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty, a one-year nuclear test ban, a continued ban on anti-satellite testing, a freeze on SDI spending. The Democrats are trying to legislate in Washington what the Soviet Union would like to win at the negotiating table. The President should veto the Continuing Resolution and not accept any arrangement with the Democratic leadership that compromises his position at the Iceland summit.

A greater concern is our being constrained by a foreign policy establishment that long ago succumbed to the allure of detente: summits for the sake of summits alone and agreements that would legitimize communist powers as equal guarantors of peace, when in reality they remain the principal threat to peace.

But the notion of detente--that we can manipulate Soviet behavior through diplomatic concessions, special economic benefits and cultural and scientific exchanges--is rooted neither in historical experience nor the practice of diplomacy. Who can identify where Western generosity ever translates into Eastern restraint, for example, an end to persecution of Soviet dissidents and Jews; or explain Soviet aggressiveness, apart from some unconvincing ideas about Soviet paranoia; or show one instance where diplomacy has hindered the system Alexander Solzhenitsyn described as consumed by a malevolent desire for world domination that impels it to seize ever more lands?

Not surprising, then, that it was we, not the Soviets, who became enmeshed by the allure of detente into an ever-tightening web of unrealistic expectations, disadvantageous arms control agreements, commercial ventures that armed and modernized the Soviet war machine, shrinking defense budgets, congressional strictures on the President's authority to protect our security, and an erosion of our national will.

Put simply and clearly, the question is this: Has the defense of freedom and the preservation of peace been better served by a U.S.-Soviet relationship based on detente or on realism? Examine briefly the four major phases of detente in the post-war period--1945-1948; 1953-1956; 1959-1961; 1972-1979--and we see striking parallels. Each phase began with a U.S. bid for better relations and ended with a major act of Soviet hostility. Each led to significant losses for the West; each led to significant gains for the East: Detente I opening with the summit of Yalta, and ending with the blockade of Berlin. Detente II opening with Ike's invitation after the death of Stalin and ending with the invasion of Hungary. Detente III opening with the spirit of Camp David and ending with construction of the Berlin Wall. Detente IV opening with the SALT I agreement and ending seven years and nine new pro-Soviet regimes later with the invasion of Afghanistan.

In all these periods, too many people would not listen and would not see. Today, too many in Congress and in the State Department still will not listen and will not see. In Jeane Kirkpatrick's words, they do not want us to notice that the Soviet empire has spread from Europe to all continents except North America. They do not want to talk about Soviet violations of Yalta, Helsinki, SALT I and II, and the ABM Treaty. They refuse to understand the significance of the Soviet Union's strategic buildup, and the war they are waging against their own people: the Sakharovs, Vladimir Slepak, Ida Nudel, Vladimir Feltsman, and thousands of others.

And because they will not face the truth, we have witnessed a sorry spectacle: the President having to struggle not only with Congress but with his own Administration to prevent them from abandoning the Contras; the State Department dragging its feet on aid to Jonas Savimbi and the Afghan Freedom Fighters, but pushing for economic aid to pro-Soviet dictatorships in Africa and military aid for the communist regime of Mozambique; faltering responses to the shoot-down of KAL 007 and the murder of Major Nicholson, and the forced return by the U.S. of Seaman Medvid. And most recently, acceptance of Soviet demands that an innocent American journalist be ransomed for a high-level Soviet spy, and that Soviet KGB and GRU agents at the U.N. be permitted to stay--all for the single-minded purpose of preserving the process of diplomacy.

Lately the press has reported much about new progress in various arms control negotiations. These are hopeful words, but I am concerned that what is called progress be progress toward a stable peace, not toward an illusory detente that becomes a springboard for Soviet superiority.

The Soviets expect the meeting at Reykjavik to determine whether or not there will be a new arms control agreement. That is their definition of a summit--arms control Soviet-style. What the Soviet

Union means when they talk about ending the arms race is to end the acquisition of arms by the United States.

But the President knows what must be a real agenda for peace. The Iceland summit should be about Soviet Jewry, about Helsinki violations, about Afghanistan, about Soviet-sponsored subversion throughout the world--and, yes, about prospects for real, equitable and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, with a clear American declaration that no limits must be placed on deployment of SDI.

But before signing any new agreements with the Soviets, they must honor the old ones. Soviet cheating, as President Reagan has reported to Congress, has been persistent, pervasive, and systematic. They have selectively violated arms control agreements to achieve significant military advantage.

I am not making a case against treaties. I am making a case against the Soviets' failure to comply with treaties.

To sign new agreements while the Soviets refuse to honor existing agreements would only demonstrate we lack the will to insist on compliance. It would only encourage the Soviets to believe they could violate new treaties with impunity.

Unfortunately some in the West have accepted the Soviets' narrow, self-serving agenda.

Yet reaching an agreement is not a necessary condition to having a summit. A summit is not a synonym for high-level arms control negotiations. Signing an arms control agreement is not a measure of a summit's success or failure.

Indeed, success in Iceland might best be achieved by the President's walking away from any arms control deal that does not measure up to his own rigorous standards. Take the recently concluded Stockholm Agreement as an example of what to avoid.

The Conference on Disarmament in Europe dealt with making sure nations understand the significance of military activity, a type of "confidence building." One element of those discussions concerned the question of how states might react if they see military activity of which they were not notified in advance. The Soviets agreed that there should be a challenge inspection provision, allowing the concerned states to go in and see for themselves what was going on. But the Soviets insisted that the challenged state provide the planes and crews that would fly the inspection team around.

Now, as you might reasonably expect, the U.S. delegation said no, that does not make sense. There would be far too great an opportunity for the Soviets to mislead the inspection team. They could fly off

course, or they could arrange for the aircraft to break down. So the U.S. countered that the challenging state should supply the aircraft. The Soviets refused.

Then a compromise was suggested by some of the West European participants. Why not use neutral planes and crews? We agreed. But again, the Soviets refused.

The Conference was at an impasse. So the United States accepted the Soviet position. The Soviets waited--and won.

The result is a little like issuing a search warrant, then giving the criminal control over how and where the search is conducted. It ensures you will find nothing. It tells the criminal he can safely hide anything he wants. It tells the criminal you are not serious about enforcing the law.

Verification procedures such as the Stockholm formula undercut serious verification efforts in other arms control negotiations. Already, the Soviets are suggesting that the challenge inspection procedures worked out at Stockholm might be adopted in other areas. And no wonder.

Those who take arms control seriously must be critical of these kinds of agreements. Those who do not take arms control seriously--who ignore the need for verification and enforcement--are the ones most eager for agreements, most willing to make concessions like the one that broke the impasse at Stockholm and engineered this setback.

And there is something strangely jarring in seeing free nations sign an agreement, purportedly to build confidence, at the very time an innocent American journalist was being held hostage in a Soviet prison.

Greater scrutiny will be called for in the intermediate nuclear force negotiations, where the Soviets currently have a five-to-one numerical advantage. Certainly this is what the West Germans are counseling, judging from reports that they want to include Soviet short-range nuclear forces--the SS-21s, 22s, and 23s--in any INF deal. The Soviet insistence that we keep only GLCMs and pull out all Pershing IIs is unacceptable.

Since the United States is a Pacific power as well as an Atlantic power, any INF agreement must also take into account the security interests of our Pacific allies. We need global limits, not the artificial subdivisions the Soviets propose.

But most disquieting are reports that some in the State Department want to handle verification as a separate annex to be negotiated at a later time. What principle would the State Department

have us use them? The Stockholm solution that permits the Soviets to have the final say?

Ladies and gentlemen, effective verification of any INF agreement will require on site observation of the physical destruction of the SS-20s, 21s, 22s, and 23s, to ensure they are not simply being stored away for redeployment later. And we must be certain that production lines are shut down, so that new missiles are not secretly produced to replace the old.

The single most important foreign policy objective of the Soviet Union in the President's first term was to prevent deployment of NATO's intermediate range forces. Our allies stood firm in the face of Soviet active measures. Our deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs marked a serious defeat for Soviet efforts to split the Alliance and neutralize Western Europe. It is gravely serious now to suggest that hard-won modernization should be reversed. We must be steadfast in working for offensive force reductions, but we must never accept any agreement that would have the effect of decoupling the security of our allies from the security of the U.S.

As Prime Minister Thatcher courageously reminded us in a Joint Session of Congress, nuclear weapons in the hands of the West have been guarantors of freedom and peace. It serves us nothing to reduce nuclear weapons if in so doing we make the world safe for conventional war.

Finally, there is room for healthy skepticism about the course of the strategic arms reductions talks as well. My principal concern is that we not repeat the mistakes made earlier in SALT.

We started arms control negotiations with the Soviets with the idea of limiting both offense and defense. We ended up with a treaty banning defense, with very high ceilings on offensive forces. Now the course of negotiations seems to be moving toward smaller reductions in offensive forces and greater restrictions on defensive weapons--the opposite of what we should be doing.

At the summit in November of last year, the Soviets finally agreed to the principle of 50 percent reductions in offensive forces. It took us five years to get them to agree to 50 percent reductions; but we abandoned that in just five months. I am concerned because, once we start making concessions of this sort, we may find ourselves with the choice of accepting only cosmetic offensive reductions in order to get any agreement.

Above all, I feel compelled to speak out, in loyalty to the President, against any proposed limits on SDI deployment. It was President Reagan's courage and conviction that pierced the dark of our strategic dilemma and gave us a glimpse of a new vision for a more hopeful and peaceful future. Without President Reagan, we would have

no SDI. We would not be approaching the horizon of exciting technological expansion. We would have little hope of denying the Soviets strategic superiority.

Place the whole record of arms control efforts on the scales of freedom and peace, and it is miniscule beside the giant possibilities opened up by the President's commanding vision.

But when Mr. Reagan travels to Iceland, he will confront an implacable foe who has set as his highest priority to paralyze SDI through an American pledge of non-deployment. A failure to issue a strong declaration of America's determination to begin immediate deployment, especially if followed by the euphoria of a hastily negotiated INF agreement, could only leave SDI even more vulnerable--vulnerable to further congressional budget cuts and to the Soviets' anti-SDI campaign.

The President has stated, clearly and correctly in my view, in both his October 1985 speech to the United Nations and his 1986 State of the Union Address, that SDI must not become a bargaining chip--verifiable reductions in offensive weapons must be negotiated on their own terms; work on defensive systems must go forward.

How do we threaten the Soviet Union by defending the United States? What is wrong with a defense that can save our lives and not kill a single Russian? It is preposterous for Soviet scientists, who have been feverishly working on their defense technologies for two decades, to condemn our SDI program in its infancy, lest it become provocative and destabilizing.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is the core question: to deploy or not to deploy. It is, I believe, the single most important national security decision of the Reagan Presidency. I am convinced we must not only research, test, and develop SDI, we must deploy it as soon as possible.

First, by reason of their unprecedented military buildup, the Soviets have left us no alternative. Prudence dictates action.

Second, we have the knowledge, the technology and the resources to begin deployment now. If we allow SDI to become endlessly postponed by arms control negotiations, if we do not commit ourselves to begin near-term deployment now, I fear we may not have SDI when we need it. An SDI research program with no definite consequences for defending America and its allies within the next ten years will not be politically sustainable.

For many years, the United States embraced a doctrine of mutual assured destruction; and it was widely believed in the intelligence and policy communities that the Soviet Union subscribed to this idea as well. MAD proponents were afflicted by mirror-imaging, which held

