President George W. Bush's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kennebunkport, Maine, on July 1–2 may be the last opportunity to improve U.S.–Russian relations before the two leaders leave office in 2008–2009. In Kennebunkport, President Bush may find out whether Putin's proposal to cooperate on missile defense with the U.S. is real or a sham. The U.S. should seriously examine this offer because it may indicate a change in Russia's course toward Iran and provide a lever to salvage the frayed U.S.–Russia relationship.

U.S.–Russian relations have deteriorated signifi­cantly since post-9/11 cooperation in 2001–2002. While Iraq, Iran, the war on terrorism, and the Mid­dle East remain top priorities in Washington, the United States should pay close attention to a resur­gent Russia because Moscow is trying to reorder the post–Cold War global architecture, often in ways that are not in America's interests.

Moscow's Neo-Soviet Foreign Policy. Russia's foreign policy strategy is driven by military and security elites who view Russia as the direct heir to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union and who cherish its role as America's principal counterbal­ance on the world stage. Unlike the economic and business elites, the foreign and defense policy elites barely changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Russian foreign policy elites are working to revise or even reverse many of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's and Russian President Boris Yeltsin's initiatives, such as ending the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Treaty on Conven­tional Forces in Europe, recognizing the former Soviet republics as independent states, and acqui­escing to NATO enlargement. Before the most recent G-8 summit, Putin issued an unprecedented threat to retarget Russian nuclear missiles at Europe. At the St. Petersburg Economic Summit in June 2007, Putin suddenly called for revising the global economic architecture, including the World Trade Organization. This unprecedented and dangerous initiative reflects the current anti–status quo mood in Moscow.

Many Russian elites view current Bush Adminis­tration policies, such as democracy promotion, as part of a sinister plot to undermine the Putin Administration through a series of "orange revolu­tions." To a great degree, contemporary Russian rhetoric has come full circle and resembles the pre-Gorbachev Soviet agenda.

Despite the tens of thousands of Russians that have been killed by Muslim extremists in Afghani­stan and Chechnya and in terrorist attacks in Rus­sian cities, Russia remains obsessed with the U.S. as its "principal adversary." The current elites define Russian strategic goals in terms of opposition to the United States and its policies and de facto alliance with China and the Muslim world, particularly Iran and Syria. The Kremlin is reaching out to anti–sta­tus quo leaders like Hugo Chávez and views Rus­sians as culturally distinct from the West.

Today, Moscow is using its full array of modern international relations and security tools to achieve its goals: from public diplomacy and weapons sales to putting foreign political leaders on the petrodol­lar payroll, from strategic information operations that depict America as an out-of-control hyper­power and a threat to the international community to coddling terrorist organizations. In the words of one incisive observer, Russia has left the West.

What the U.S. Should Do. The image of a new Cold War may be too simplistic to describe the emerging relationship with Russia. In fact, Russian foreign policy has a distinctive late 19th century czarist tinge: muscular, arrogant, overestimating its own power, and underestimating the American adversary that it is busily trying to recreate. This policy is likely to become a self-fulfilling prophecy with dangerous consequences and a high price in treasure and ultimately in blood.

The United States does not need a new Cold War. It is engaged in regional conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the global war on terrorism, and relations with China may one day become more complicated. U.S. policymakers would do well to remember that Moscow values certainty in relations and respects power and action. Deeds, not words, are needed to send a message to the Kremlin that the U.S. and its allies will not be bullied. In light of Russia's confrontational foreign policy, the U.S. should:

• Seriously examine the Russian proposals for a joint missile defense radar station in Azerbaijan. If possible, the U.S. should use missile defense cooperation to salvage and im­prove the strategic relationship between Moscow and Washington.
  
  
• Bolster relations with pro-Western regimes in the Persian Gulf. Only by maintaining a secu­rity umbrella in the Gulf can the U.S. exert greater influence than Russia in the region. The Department of Defense should provide military and security assurances to Gulf countries against Iran and expand cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
  
  
• Build bridges to potential Russian allies to pre­vent the emergence of anti-American blocs and expand relations with key emerging markets.
  
  
• Create a global coalition of energy consumers to oppose oil and gas cartels and to apply market principles to the natural gas industry. Unless buyer solidarity is translated into action, energy consumers and economic growth will suffer worldwide.
  
  
• Continue dialogue and cooperation with Russia on matters of mutual concern to demonstrate to Russian elites that the U.S. has much to offer Russia.
  
  
• Reach out to the people of Russia through a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy via the Internet, international broadcasters, visitor pro­grams, and exchanges to debunk the myth that the U.S. is hostile to Russia.

Conclusion. After a 20-year hiatus, Russia is forcing its way back onto the global stage as an adversarial actor. It is flush with cash, bolstered by a market economy, and expects respect, recognition, and influence. Washington decision-makers can no longer afford to take Moscow for granted and must design better strategies to cope with this renewed geopolitical challenge in Eurasia.

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Michael Belinsky, an intern at The Heritage Foundation, contributed to the prepara­tion of this study.