Recommendations

• Preparedness missions. Within the sphere of preparedness, DHS’s regional offices should have four key missions: (1) facilitating regional planning, (2) organizing regional exercises and training, (3) help­ing states and local communities to prepare for catastrophic events, and (4) coordinating critical infra­structure protection.
• Key partnerships. The regional offices should work in partnership with state, local, and private author­ities in their regions to identify critical gaps in preparedness and critical infrastructure protection. The offices should communicate these needs to those in DHS who are responsible for allocating homeland security grants rather than wield policymaking and grant-making responsibilities themselves.
• The point of contact. To build the nation’s ability to respond to catastrophic events, DHS’s regional offices need to be the point of contact between DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD) (and, specifi­cally, U.S. Northern Command, known as NORTHCOM), and the states for joint DOD–DHS contin­gency planning.
• A national plan. When the impact of a disaster overwhelms the ability of a state government to respond and it becomes necessary for the regional office to participate in the response, it should do so as part of an integrated, functional approach that follows the National Response Plan (NRP). The regional offices should enable the development of a strong federal incident management structure.
• Coordination. The regional field offices should be capable of improving information sharing and other forms of coordination among the states, the private sector, and federal officials in Washington.
• The final contingency. Regional offices should help to establish regional evacuation plans that consider both the back-end capacity necessary to facilitate a regional evacuation and the needs of destination jurisdictions. Each regional office should provide a forum for the federal, state, and local governments, the private sector, NGOs, and other stakeholders to develop and exercise these plans.

II. Organization

Findings

• Federal assets should not be regionalized. A plan that regionalizes all federal emergency-prepared­ness and response assets will divert focus from incident management, reduce the effectiveness of other entities within DHS, and disrupt disaster response at a time when DHS continues to wrestle with the dif­ficult and complex task of integrating all of its components. By the time catastrophe strikes, a clear pro­cess for “pulling down” the full complement of federal capabilities and resources must be ready and available. The focus needs to be on building a strong incident management system within DHS and throughout the federal government. The federal government’s incident management system should be built to facilitate regional responses.
• Emergency support functions are inadequate for regional planning. There are currently 15 emer­gency support functions (ESFs) within the National Response Plan. Most of these ESFs reflect a narrow view of federal assistance to state and local governments during crises. When a catastrophe strikes, the federal government must provide the assistance that states and municipalities actually need, regardless of whether this assistance fits neatly into one or another ESF. Federal support to state and local govern­ments under the NRP should be provided according to missions rather than ESFs.
• The lack of uniform credentialing hobbles interagency coordination. Currently, no standards exist for credentialing response personnel across jurisdictions. Further, the definition of “first responder” does not encompass all of those who may be critical to an effective response and need immediate access to the disaster area. As a result, verification of identification, affiliation, and expertise cannot be accom­plished rapidly during a crisis. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12, which requires secure, uniform credentials across the federal government, is a good first step. So far, no similar or com­plementary requirement exists at the state and local level.
• Professional development standards are lacking. The nation lacks a professional development and education system for homeland security professionals. As required by the Goldwater–Nichols Act, the Department of Defense established a professional development model based on education, assignments, and accreditation. Homeland Security needs a similar professional development process. In addition, Goldwater–Nichols institutionalized the concept of “jointness,” achieving greater cohesion, agility, and responsiveness through inter-force planning and cooperation. This mindset is necessary for successful leadership within DHS and state, local, and private emergency management.
• Regional offices must have sufficient stature to carry out their role. The DHS elements that work best—that have the highest morale and thus the greatest effectiveness—are those that combine promi­nent stature with sufficient authority to carry out their missions. The directors of the new organizations that have been successful have had significant authority and latitude from the start, and their charters clearly articulated that authority with respect to the departments and agencies with which they interact daily.

Recommendations

• Think broadly. Regional offices should focus on the anticipated needs of state and local governments and the private sector during a crisis. The NRP groups the 15 ESFs into four broad categories: emer­gency services, infrastructure support, human services, and community recovery and mitigation. Fed­eral assistance to state and local governments during crises should focus on these categories and should cut across all agencies and areas of government rather than focusing on narrowly drawn ESFs or single agencies.
• Leadership. The President should appoint, and the Senate should confirm, a director of each DHS regional office. These directors should have experience in state and local governance, emergency pre­paredness, and management. Five years of each type of experience should be required, although the President should have the ability to waive this requirement in extraordinary circumstances or in the interests of national security. Regional directors should be trained and qualified to act as Principal Fed­eral Officials (PFOs), who lead the federal response to a crisis under the National Response Plan. Ideally, regional directors will have studied homeland security issues at the proposed National Homeland Secu­rity University. Regional directors should report to the Under Secretary for Preparedness in DHS.
• Staffing. Regional offices should employ no more than two dozen people. Staff positions should be filled on a two-year rotating basis by DHS personnel, state and local government personnel, NGO employees detailed to DHS, and private-sector specialists and leaders who have been trained and accredited through a National Homeland Security University. As necessary, and upon appropriate back­ground checks, staff from outside DHS should be afforded security clearances. Rotations would provide critical experience to future public officials and leaders in these fields, as well as promote interagency and intergovernmental cooperation.
• Wide integration. Each DHS regional office should integrate all relevant federal agencies. In addition to DHS employees, each DHS regional office should include representatives from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Coast Guard (USCG), the National Guard, and NORTHCOM. It might also be prudent to include liaisons from other federal entities, such as the Department of Trans­portation (DOT), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Veterans Affairs, for input on issues like evacuation planning, law enforcement during crises, and the use of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), respectively. DHS regional personnel and Federal Emergency Man­agement Agency (FEMA) regional personnel should closely coordinate their activities. DHS’s regional offices should, at least initially, be positioned together with current FEMA offices.
• An asset plan. Each regional office should have a position responsible for developing a comprehensive inventory of federal, state, local, and private-sector assets that would be available in the region during crises. This officer should also be responsible for developing and implementing, in consultation with all participants, plans and mechanisms to accept assets from the private sector and NGOs as well as con­tingency plans for when assets and capabilities become unavailable—e.g., DOD assets that have been sent into the field.
• Private information. To encourage the private sector to share information on its vulnerabilities, Con­gress should consider indemnifying companies from liability for sharing certain types of information and should direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop procedures for sector-specific Infor­mation Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) to protect proprietary information from competitors.
• Professional development. As Congress and DHS consider establishing a National Homeland Security University, DHS should implement a Goldwater–Nichols-like approach to training and professional development for homeland security professionals. Regional office personnel should be graduates of a program in the National Homeland Security University or a program recognized by the National Home­land Security University and accredited by the Department of Homeland Security. Advancement to senior civil service positions in DHS should require a rotation through a regional office and, potentially, detailing to other levels of government or the private sector.

III. Authorities

Findings

• The law is not the problem. Generally, current legal authorities are sufficient to create a robust regional structure for DHS, to integrate that structure with state and local governments, and to carry out the preparedness and critical infrastructure protection missions discussed in this report. (This report does not address legal issues concerning operational regional response to a catastrophic inci­dent.) Federal and state emergency authorities are very broad, and the government’s power to act is broadest in times of crisis. However, planning processes must be sufficiently robust to make good use these authorities.
• Gaps exist in authorities for public–private coordination. Existing authorities are insufficient to allow meaningful private-sector integration into preparedness efforts. This is especially important for private-sector providers of critical infrastructure services, such as communications, energy, health care, food, and essential commodities. Currently, no legal system exists for creating or maintaining an inven­tory of such assets.
• HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 adequately articulate executive branch policy. HSPD-5 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer the National Incident Management System—a common approach and process to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from incidents—and the National Response Plan, which dictates when a Principal Federal Official will be appointed to oversee and coor­dinate the federal response to “Incidents of National Significance.” The responsibilities and policies articulated in HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 are entirely consistent with the recommendations of the White House and House of Representatives reports on Katrina.
• Interagency coordination at the regional level is still insufficient. Four years after 9/11, interstate regions continue to struggle with regional assistance arrangements and effective integration of federal and out-of-state resources. Federal first-responder grant programs are intended, in part, to foster regional coordination and cooperation, but much more needs to be done. Regional coordination and cooperation maximize the effectiveness of scarce preparedness funds, eliminate duplication of effort, and build effective preparedness and response networks by integrating federal, state, and local assets. Mutual-aid agreements, regional coordination plans, and interstate compacts such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact facilitate regional coordination and reduce legal risk.
• No clear federal authority exists to evaluate and report on regional and interagency preparedness activities. While state and metropolitan regional grants provide a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of preparedness activities at those levels, no one produces independent assessments of the effective­ness of regional planning and interagency preparedness activities that include the federal govern­ment’s activities.

Recommendations

• Unify authorities. HSPD-5 should be implemented with the assistance of the joint regional structure to standardize incident management processes and create effective federal, state, and local unity of com­mand and operations in complex situations.
• State and local clarity. State and local officials should ensure that they clearly understand the scope and depth of their legal authority to respond to incidents. Clear documentation of these governments’ pow­ers is important in preparedness planning.
• Effectiveness. Congress should establish a Special Interagency Inspector General (SIIG), modeled on the Special Inspector General for Iraq, who would evaluate the effectiveness of interagency regional pre­paredness activities, including federal grants and regional exercises. The SIIG would report to the sec­retaries of the relevant federal agencies, including DHS, DOD, and HHS. The SIIG should work with the Inspectors General (IGs) of these departments on preparedness-related activities. SIIG personnel should be accredited homeland security professionals with suitable experience and education, and IG person­nel from relevant departments should rotate through assignments in the SIIG. During crisis response, the SIIG should be authorized to serve as the IG for evaluating the effectiveness of the response.
• The private sector. Authorities must be modified to allow better information sharing between govern­ment and the private sector, to allow private-sector experts and leaders to rotate through regional pre­paredness structures, and to permit private-sector entities to participate as full partners in regional preparedness efforts. Authorities must also contemplate private-sector access to incident sites for response, restoration, and recovery as well as standardized training and credentialing of private-sector responders. At the same time, these changes must not jeopardize the ability of corporations to partici­pate in open and fair contracting processes.
• Coherent authorities. Congress should examine whether existing authorities, including current laws and systems within government agencies, such as relating to quarantine, are sufficient to respond to pandemic outbreaks and acts of bioterrorism and whether federal authorities conflict with or comple­ment state and local authorities in each region. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the regional directors should assess, in consultation with all participants, the coherence of federal, state, and local authorities within each region and the consistency of authorities between contiguous regions.

IV. Resources

Findings

• Federal funding should focus on building effective regional response capabilities.The post-9/11 rush to build state and local governments’ capacity to respond to terrorism was understandable, but this approach will not build the national system of integrated federal, state, and local capabilities needed to protect the nation over the long term. Instead, funding should be risk-based and address all catastrophic hazards.
• DHS is not adequately funded to establish regional field offices. Regional offices cannot be estab­lished with existing appropriations and full-time equivalent employees (FTEs). DHS will need addi­tional appropriations to establish and staff regional field offices. To facilitate interagency and intergovernmental cooperation, DHS should have sufficient funds to provide for the education, training, accreditation, and salaries of all personnel in the regional field offices, including personnel from other agencies, other levels of government, and the private sector.
• The DHS regional framework can save money and increase efficiency by identifying redundancies and promoting consolidations across geographic boundaries. The July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security called for enhanced cooperation among actors at the various levels of government and in the private sector to avoid duplication and improve the integration of scarce national homeland security assets. Obvious candidates for improved integration include information technology systems and administrative activities, but other areas—such as communications networks and equipment pur­chasing—offer additional opportunities for savings.
• Interoperable communications are essential for multi-jurisdictional incident response.Ultimately, regionally interoperable communications networks are essential for effective regional disaster response. As well, larger communications networks provide substantial efficiencies of scale.

Recommendations

• State grants. Congress should reduce or eliminate the minimum allocations for state homeland security grants stipulated by the USA PATRIOT Act.
• Funding.Regional offices should be federally funded. The offices would fulfill the federal responsibility of coordinating preparedness and play a critical role in helping states to develop the kinds of capabilities needed to participate in a national catastrophic-disaster response system. Regional offices should receive direct appropriations for joint exercise programs (which should be federated and require as little prep­aration for use as possible), contingency planning, operations centers and communications, training facilities and programs, and continuity of operations.
• Shared responsibility. Federal funds cannot meet and should not be expected to meet all of the nation’s homeland security needs. Public safety is a shared responsibility; states, counties, cities, and other units of government are responsible for providing staff, equipment, and services. Federal funds should be a last resort in a crisis after local and state resources are exhausted. Grants from Washington should encourage the development of specific capabilities and should ensure effective integration of federal, state, and local assets in order to construct a true national capacity to conduct domestic counterterror­ism and disaster response.
• Interoperability. Communications interoperability should be regionally based to ensure the functional integration of all resources and responders across regions. Communications networks can and should cross organizational and governmental boundaries.
• Accountability.Congress should establish and fund the Special Interagency Inspector General’s office.
• Assets. Congress should appropriate funds for DHS to regionalize assets, where appropriate, to improve incident command in support of regional response.

The Way Forward

Regional preparedness is critical. The cost of failing to implement a regional framework is too high to delay any longer. The price of delay can already be measured in terms of lives lost. The path forward, however, is marked by complexity and riddled with potential pitfalls and stumbling blocks.

We know this complexity first-hand. Within this task force, the full membership concurred on the findings and recommendations published in this report, but our views do vary on the role of the regional field offices in incident management and response. It will take time for the homeland security community to reach consensus on those issues, but that is no reason to put off the important steps that can be taken today. Improving regional preparedness is the first step for and the main mission of regional DHS offices. The recommendations put forward in this report represent a consensus approach that will rapidly improve the nation’s disaster preparedness in a manner that is prag­matic, cost-effective, and consistent with federalism.

(The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute intends to expand on the views presented in this report in a subsequent publication. The opinions expressed in that publication will be those of its authors alone and not necessarily those of the authors of this report.)

The Way Forward

Regional preparedness is critical. The cost of failing to implement a regional framework is too high to delay any longer. The price of delay can already be measured in terms of lives lost. The path forward, however, is marked by complexity and riddled with potential pitfalls and stumbling blocks.

We know this complexity first-hand. Within this Task Force, the full membership concurred on the findings and recommendations published in this report, but our views do vary on the role of the regional field offices in incident management and response. It will take time for the homeland security community to reach consensus on those issues, but that is no reason to put off the important steps that can be taken today. Improving regional preparedness is the first step for and the main mission of regional DHS offices. The recommendations put forward in this report represent a consensus approach that will rapidly improve the nation’s disaster preparedness in a manner that is pragmatic, cost-effective, and consistent with federalism.

(The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute intends to expand on the views presented in this report reporting a subsequent publication. The opinions expressed in that publication will be those of its authors alone and not necessarily those of the authors of this report.)

The Task Force

Task Force Members

James Jay Carafano, The Heritage Foundation

Sharon Cardash, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University

Frank Cilluffo, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University

Alan Cohn, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP

Chris Hornbarger, United States Military Academy

Laura Keith, The Heritage Foundation

Alane Kochems, The Heritage Foundation

Jan Lane, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University

Edwin Meese, III, The Heritage Foundation

Seth M.M. Stodder, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP

Richard Weitz, Hudson Institute