Heritage Foundation Leadership for America

Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom Chapter 1: Taking the Offensive Download PDF

After a long day of arduous negotiation in the midst of one of the many crises that erupted during the Cold War, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan engaged in the following exchange:

KISSINGER: You know, one respect in which all the humanitarians and liberals and socialists were wrong in the last century was when they thought that mankind didn’t like war....They love it.

CALLAGHAN: Most of us like it for a day or two, but there is a handful who like [sic] it forever.

KISSINGER: That’s right. It doesn’t mean that the humanitarians were wrong, it just means that life is harder than we thought....

CALLAGHAN: I don’t know what sort of an age we’re passing through or going to pass through, but historians like yourself ought to give us a rundown on it sometime and tell us how you think this next half century is going to look.

KISSINGER: I’ll tell you ... I’m glad I’m not going to be running part of it. It’s going to be brutal.1

Facing today’s threat of global terrorism, these words seem all too prophetic; they provide another reminder that—in some fundamental ways—the security challenges of the twenty-first century are little changed from those of the twentieth century. Evil is still with us and likely always will be. We also face Kissinger’s dilemma. Ignoring evil will not dissipate its force. Complacency will only allow it to grow. An enemy that is allowed to take the initiative uncontested will sooner or later find a way to win. Kissinger and Callaghan were right: The evil ones will often get the confrontation they want, because someone must stand and stop them.

The Cold War was a constant struggle that required, at times, taking the offensive. Yet taking the battle to the enemy was a chancy affair. The threat of nuclear war always made such decisions dangerous. However, even without the specter of mushroom clouds, such choices should never be taken lightly. Even in the best of times, they are always measured in national treasure sacrificed and young lives lost. Nevertheless, there are times when the battle must be joined. The lesson of the Cold War is that when you take the offensive, make sure you do it right.

No one appreciated the challenge of the offensive better than the woolly-haired professor from Harvard with a baritone voice and German accent. Of all the warriors who wielded the weapons of the Cold War, none stand out more starkly than Henry Kissinger, President Richard M. Nixon’s National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. Kissinger managed a unique achievement; he was vilified by both the far left and the radical right. “They broke the mold after Kissinger,” President Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of State, George Shultz, once quipped.2 Most Kissinger haters would probably respond, “Well, thank God for that.”

Most of the criticism directed at Kissinger concerned how and when to go on the offensive. Détente (the Nixon/Kissinger version of containment that looked suspiciously like a repackaged version of Roosevelt’s “open spheres”) was, according to Kissinger, “under attack by liberals for being excessively focused on military security....”3 While the left assailed Kissinger as a warmonger, neoconservatives were unhappy as well: They wanted a more muscular response to engage the Soviet military head on.4 Kissinger, in contrast, believed that the United States, exhausted after Vietnam, stood unready for major military confrontations. Instead, he felt if the Nixon Administration could turn the Cold War from a military arms race into competition over trade and ideas, the United States would outpace the Soviets and recapture the lead.

Perhaps he was right. Kissinger always argued that it was the strategic pause after Vietnam that laid the groundwork for U.S. resurgence during the Reagan years. It took eight years of rebuilding the military under Reagan to make the U.S. military a force to be reckoned with once again. It should come as no surprise that America turned the corner in the Cold War only after it recharged its batteries and went back on the offensive.

In part, Kissinger earned the ire of both the far right and the distant left because he refused to base his foreign policy on ideology alone. He stuck with an old-fashioned, pragmatic view of international affairs known as “realism.”5 In fact, John Gaddis, the distinguished American diplomatic historian, always found a whiff of Kennan’s thinking, a marriage of Princeton and Harvard, in Kissinger’s approach to the Cold War.6 In Kissinger’s world, power is all that matters. States remain in ceaseless competition. Conflict is inevitable. States collide because they are rational actors, constantly working to ensure their national security by maximizing power in relation to other states, driven by the unending quest for security. States not only want power, they need power before they can influence anything.

Scholars continue to debate how well Kissinger practiced the art of power politics.7 Still, the core of his ideas—the cautionary reminder of the value and limits of power—is worth remembering for the long war. It is important to do what is right, but you can only do what is right when you have the means and will to prevail.

The Case for the Offensive Tool Kit

Few subjects regarding war engender more controversy than how to take the offensive. Sadly, these squabbles often reflect more passion than reason. True to form, the foreign policy debates about the next steps in the global war on terrorism center on style rather than substance. Arguments abound about whether the United States should rely on international organizations (like NATO) and accords (such as the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty), or preemptive measures8 and unilateral action, or if we should depend on military troops, law enforcement, or diplomacy. These speculations are simply fodder for cable news pundits, editorial page writers, and candidate stump speeches. In truth, we will employ all of these means and try to use them when they best suit the task at hand—just as we did during the Cold War. That is one of the advantages of being a great power: You have options.

The complex nature of global security also demands multiple, flexible instruments. In honesty, America has a fair amount of potential enemies. The threat of transnational terrorism is clear enough. Bookstores are suffering from terrorist book overload, minutely detailing the dangers of the new terrorism.9 This danger requires little elaboration. Yet states also matter, and dealing with foreign states in the twenty-first century will be no easy task. In the future, there will be three kinds of nations that cause the United States trouble: aggressors, enablers, and slackers.

Aggressors. Though the United States has an overwhelming preponderance of power, it cannot ignore the possibility of being the target of another state. An enemy unable to match conventional American military power might instead attack vulnerable targets on U.S. territory. For example, a state might strike the American homeland as part of an anti-access campaign, attacking or threatening targets within the homeland to prevent the deployment of U.S. forces. Indeed, a state might sponsor terrorists to undertake these acts.10

There are numerous historical examples in which weak states have inflicted defeat on more powerful adversaries.11 In the future, as in the past, lesser states may perceive failings in a strong state that could be exploited at acceptable risk. Ever since the end of the Cold War, there has been much discussion about identifying and exploiting America’s potential weaknesses.

All aggressors are not equal. Size matters. However, the danger from lesser states, even very weak ones, should not be underestimated. National security analyses tend to treat these lesser countries—which predominantly run in a band from central Asia through Africa—as invisible entities. They focus instead on regional powerbrokers.12 Ignoring the threat of lesser states is shortsighted. In the current global system, even the poorest nations can be formidable international actors. Poor countries have demonstrated the potential for offensive action by focusing limited resources on military forces, state-sponsored terrorism, or the development of weapons of mass destruction. For example, Sudan, a very poor country, maintained an extensive chemical warfare program for many years.13 Emigration also contributes to weak states’ power. Ethnic diasporas create international networks that provide income, intelligence, and political activism.14 All aggressors might not be equal, but they may all be dangerous.

Enablers. “Enablers” are countries willing to facilitate transnational terrorism, share intelligence, or proliferate weapons or weapon technologies to those who, in turn, might threaten the United States. Enablers might be driven by one, or a combination of several motivations. For example, they could be engaged in some form of regional competition with the United States, or they might support terrorism or weapons proliferation to further their own interests, such as selling ballistic missile technology to shore up a cash strapped economy.

An enabler state could well be a country that elects to support strikes on America even when not engaged in a direct conflict of interest with the United States. In the 1980s, for example, Libya emerged as a hotbed for planning attacks against American interests, even though there was virtually no direct regional conflict between the two powers.15 For over twenty years, Lebanon (with strong backing from Syria and Iran) has been the base for Hezbollah, which has both conducted and supported attacks against Americans.16 From 1991–1994, the government of Sudan also allowed its territory to be used as a base for planning strikes against American targets.17 Throughout the 1990s, Belarus continued to sell arms and provide training to Iraq.18 After September 11, Liberia and Burkina Faso allegedly harbored al-Qaeda operatives for cash bribes.19

As with aggressor states, enabler nations do not necessarily have to possess great resources to represent a significant security risk. Only three years ago, few would have predicted that the United States would go to war in Afghanistan, one of the world’s poorest nations. Al-Qaeda, however, with the cooperation of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, turned a virtually destitute country into an effective platform for directing attacks on the United States.20

Slackers. “Slacker” states are nations with lax laws or enforcement means which unintentionally allow transnational terrorist groups to operate within their borders or permit state (or non-state) groups to obtain weapons or support illicitly from the private sector. Even friends can aid enemies. Relaxed immigration laws and customs enforcement, lax enforcement of nonproliferation regimes, the illicit use of monetary instruments, and the transfer of dual-use technologies that have either commercial or weapons program uses are problems endemic to America’s allies, as well as other nations.

Slacker states might be countries that lack the legal systems, oversight mechanisms, and law enforcement assets to combat terrorism or weapons proliferation. There is little evidence to suggest, however, that poverty alone breeds terrorists or weapons proliferators. There are, for example, many poor states that do not harbor transnational terrorist groups that might threaten the United States.21 On the other hand, even nations with the resources to reduce global threats may leave security gaps unaddressed for a variety of cultural, religious, political, or diplomatic reasons. Canada, for example, has strong humanitarian traditions, which have led it to establish the most generous asylum system in the world. In turn, terrorist groups bound for the United States have infiltrated Canadian borders under the guise of legitimate refugees.22

In a future in which America will have to deal with an unpredictable witch’s brew of transnational terrorists, aggressors, enablers, and slackers, it should come as no surprise that there is no cookie-cutter solution for taking the offensive. Many of the measures taken will fall far short of war. Different problems will need different solutions. The priority should now be making sure the toolbox is full, so that we have the options we need when we need them.

The genius of fighting a long war is the ability to prioritize—knowing which tools have to be replaced, refurbished, or replenished first. At the center of America’s offensive means are three key capabilities—strategic intelligence, military force, and interagency operations. These are the prerequisites. All the other instruments of a great power build upon them. Equipping these three assets for the long war has to be a top priority.

Strategic Intelligence—The Case for Responsible Reform

Getting strategic intelligence wrong can have terrible consequences. Based on bad information and forged documents, an American President sent U.S. troops into harm’s way in a distant land on a mission that had no hope of success. That President was Woodrow Wilson. Based on clumsily forged documents, Wilson, believing the Russian Revolution of 1918 was being directed by the German General Staff, ordered U.S. forces to seize the Siberian railway. The operation was a disaster. It was only in 1956 that a distinguished diplomatic scholar revealed the fraud that started it all. The scholar? George Kennan.23

We can do better—and we have to. Intelligence is America’s first line of defense in the war on terrorism, but the current intelligence network is not the right instrument for the challenges of the twenty-first century. The U.S. needs intelligence agencies that are as facile in dealing with shadowy transnational gangs as they are in countering conventional enemies. The only problem is that this is simply not the kind of intelligence community that the United States has today.

The Cold War Shapes the Intelligence Community

When Kissinger traded a desk at Harvard for an office in the West Wing, U.S. intelligence focused on the threat of the Soviet Union, the possibility of war in Western Europe, and support for the ongoing conflict in Southeast Asia. These threats shaped the way in which information was collected and analyzed by the various members of the intelligence community (IC). (See Appendix 5.) After the early 1990s, the primary threat to the United States shifted from the Soviet Union to terrorism. However, the infrastructure of intelligence collection and analysis did not—and still has not—changed from its Cold War roots.

Two major developments shaped intelligence policy and infrastructure in the 1960s and 1970s. The first was the development of technical means of intelligence collection, such as U-2 spy planes and photoreconnaissance satellites such as CORONA.

Due to the successful use of technical platforms during the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. intelligence became increasingly focused on obtaining photographic “hard intelligence.” Furthermore, technical means of intelligence collection were ideally suited to gathering information about large-scale troop movements, as well the location of military bases, industrial plants, and missile silos—the primary targets of Cold War intelligence. As a result, priority for national intelligence collection shifted toward satellites and other electronic collection means and away from more traditional agent-based human intelligence (HUMINT).

At the same time, resources dedicated to HUMINT were severely cut back. The most dramatic reductions were in the area of overt intelligence— material collected from open (unclassified) sources (often through State Department and other analysts at U.S. embassies around the world) by personnel knowledgeable in local language and conditions. These reports address not only military threats, but also a range of cultural, economic, political, and social issues.

The second major development during this period was the formation of a multi-agency IC. As the U.S. government shifted toward electronic and photographic intelligence collection technologies, new agencies emerged to manage them. Over time the number of intelligence agencies proliferated, and coordinating and integrating their activities became increasingly problematic.

Although the National Security Act of 1947 gave the Director of the CIA (in his role as Director of Central Intelligence, or DCI) the overall responsibility for coordination of U.S. intelligence, he was given no direct control over the resources, personnel, or budgets of other agencies. Juggling competing priorities, differing corporate cultures, and smoothing over the inevitable inter-agency rivalries was (and remains) a difficult task.

The Cold War offered enough lessons that U.S. strategic intelligence was, even then, a flawed instrument. For example, when the United States discontinued research and eliminated its capabilities in offensive biological warfare in the 1970s, Soviet offensive biological and chemical warfare efforts accelerated. Believing the United States was continuing a covert bio-weapons program, the Soviets developed an impressive arsenal of biological and chemical weapons—including diseases that could destroy crops and ballistic missiles tipped with smallpox-dispensing warheads capable of killing millions of people. Research and production involved virtually every component of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Though these weapons have since been destroyed, concerns remain that unaccounted seed stocks of pathogens (or the scientific knowledge used to produce these weapons) might become available to other enemies. An even bigger problem is that the Soviet Union, the number one target of U.S. strategic intelligence, established its bio-weapons and America never knew of their existence.24

The Threat of Terrorism

Even though terrorism, especially Soviet-sponsored terrorism, was a concern during the 1970s and 1980s, it remained a secondary priority for U.S. intelligence until after the collapse of Communism in the early 1990s.25 The bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 came as a surprise to the IC, which initially believed the bombing to be the work of an “ad hoc” terrorist group. However, soon after the bombing, the name Osama bin Laden began appearing in intelligence reports. Al-Qaeda was specifically recognized as a serious threat to U.S. national security as early as the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa. While the threat of transnational terrorism was widely recognized by the IC and policymakers, virtually no initiatives were taken to address the deep-seated limitations of U.S. strategic intelligence that made it an inadequate instrument for meeting this threat.

Although the terrorist threat was known and understood in the 1990s, spending on national security went down during that decade, which affected both counterterrorism and intelligence. With limited resources, there were other intelligence failures, such as foreknowledge of the sarin gas attacks in Japan. At the time of the attack, the Aum Shinrikyo cult was “simply not on the radar” because there were not enough intelligence analysts to research potential Asian terrorism.

Post-Cold War Strategic Intelligence Successes and Failures

At the center of the shortfalls of the IC is a CIA that lacks the resources and organization to adequately perform its mission. It has long been the job of the CIA to do two things—steal secrets and analyze information. It is failing the nation on both counts. The CIA failed to provide accurate information on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in both Gulf Wars, underestimating the threat in 1991 and overestimating it in 2003. The Directorate of Operations is locked into old business practices, focusing on the recruitment of agents by deskbound operatives in embassy offices and relying too much on intelligence (without independent corroboration) provided by foreign governments.

Concerning the analysis of information, the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI) fails to produce analysts who are nationally and internationally recognized experts. The current system does not reward analytic expertise in a given field; rather, it recognizes management ability. The DI has placed too much emphasis on “competing with CNN,” in that it focuses on small, tactical pieces of information, as opposed to looking at the broader picture.

Reforming the Intelligence Community

Prior to 1981, with few exceptions, attempts to “reform” the U.S. intelligence community (such as the Church Commission) were punitive measures used more to limit permissible activities than to improve the collection and analysis of intelligence. These reform proposals usually came in the wake of ethically questionable, sometimes illegal, operations by members of the IC.

Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan, explicitly delineated the duties and responsibilities of the various members of the IC. For the first time, the roles and missions of agencies and individuals were clearly defined. However, EO 12333 did not resolve the long-standing problem of the DCI’s inability to directly control other elements of national intelligence. The FBI, the Departments of State, Energy, and Treasury, the National Security Agency, and other Department of Defense (DoD) elements all maintained control over their own budgets, personnel, and resources.

Perhaps the most often proposed reform subsequent to EO 12333 has been the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with direct control over the entire IC. Proponents argue that having a DNI would allow the Director of the CIA to concentrate on running his own agency and allow for greater integration and coordinated direction of the IC. Additionally, the DNI, acting as the President’s principal intelligence advisor would be able to provide independent, unprejudiced assessments of the analysis conducted by the IC. This would help address the shortfalls cited by Congress in the collection of information about Iraq’s weapons production programs throughout the 1990s.26 Congress finally followed through and created the DNI in law in December 2004.

At the same time, it would be mistake to stop at just creating the DNI. There are also good arguments for consolidating the polyglot of 15 current agencies and restructuring organizations like the CIA in order to break down the cultural and institutional barriers that have prevented the effective sharing of information. In addition, the United States must rebuild its human capabilities to collect and analyze intelligence, as well as exploit cutting-edge technologies to gather, distribute, and evaluate information.27

Dark Secrets

Finally, at the same time, we will no doubt have to improve our ability to conduct counterintelligence—finding enemy spies within the ranks of our law enforcement and intelligence services. Anyone who thinks this is a trivial problem should remember Robert Hanssen. Hanssen was a model FBI agent, in charge of counterintelligence operations at the Bureau, finding out the identities of people who were spying on the United States. It was the most secret and sensitive work in the agency. Hanssen was considered an expert in the field. The only problem was that he was working for the other side. Arrested in February 2001, it was later determined that Hanssen had spied for the Soviet Union for well over a decade. As an authorized user of highly classified computer systems, Hanssen was able to employ various means for stealing sensitive data, including encrypted floppy disks, removable storage devices, and a Palm handheld device. The Soviet used some of the information to capture and kill American agents. Hanssen used part of his Soviet pay to buy presents for his stripper girlfriend.

The simple fact is that as we succeed in sharing information more effectively among federal, state, and local agencies, there will be more opportunities to steal, sell, trade, or give away America’s secrets. Intelligence reform will have to think through better ways to protect what we know. The problem is that right now no one is really in charge. No one is ensuring that best practices and lessons learned are being shared. No one is looking at the gaps and vulnerabilities across the web of systems used to exchange information. This will require an organized national effort—not just a part-time job for a few agents at the FBI. It is a job that has to be done to the highest standards, respecting the legitimate privacy and liberties of American citizens, while not allowing the enemy to get away with murder.

Rethinking how we conduct counterintelligence, as well as rebuilding the human side of intelligence, using technology, and reorganizing the intelligence community all have to be on the table. Responsible intelligence reform cannot be reduced to a bumper sticker or a single initiative, such as creating a DNI. It will require years of focused effort to build the IC we need for the long struggle with terrorism.

The Military: Sharpening the Point of the Spear

War is not the answer. Sometimes, however, it is the best of bad choices. A great power that lacks the capacity to defend itself is not a great power. It is a target, an invitation to aggression. In large part, Kissinger embraced détente because the United States had poor options. The Nixon Administration took office at the nadir of America’s military might, an unprecedented weakness matched perhaps only by the armed forces funded by Truman before the Korean War. On both occasions, America had a “hollow” force—insufficient resources to provide for sufficiently trained and experienced troops, new equipment, and ongoing operations.28

Dumb Ideas for Our Time

During the Cold War, American strategy fell short most often when it lacked the military capacity to back up its policies. That is a lesson worth remembering. The number one priority for the future must be ensuring that we provide the Pentagon sufficient resources to do the big three: maintain an adequate, trained and, ready force; purchase modern equipment; and conduct its tasks around the world. We are in danger of going back to the Kissinger-era hollow force if we don’t get the balance of investments right.

Clearly, today’s U.S. military is either under-resourced or incorrectly structured to handle the missions that are being asked of it. Here is an example: In the summer of 2004, America had about 3 million men and women in uniform. Yet we are having a tough time keeping 160,000 of them in Afghanistan and Iraq. You do the math.

The problem is not that the military is too small. It is simply structured to fight the last war in the last century. The result? Too many troops in the wrong uniform, in the wrong places, trained in the wrong skills, who are subsequently of questionable value to the war on terrorism.

Yes, our military is overstretched. Washington needs to do something about that. Yet many of the ideas being floated by pundits and policymakers are simply wrongheaded. Three particularly dumb ideas come to mind.

Dumb Idea No. 1: Don’t Depend on Citizen-Soldiers. Ever since 9/11, the Pentagon has used the military reserves29 in numbers unprecedented since the Korean War. Critics see this as a failure, viewing citizen-soldiers as the military equivalent of couch potatoes. “Dragging them off to war proves we don’t have enough troops,” the Pentagon’s detractors argue.

They’re wrong. Using the reserves really means that the system is working. We keep a large pool of reserves exactly for moments like this when we need to rapidly expand. We will likely need them again after the current crises abate. The future is more likely to resemble a sine curve (with the need for troops whipsawing up and down) than a steady-state straight line.

The problem is not that we are sending citizen-soldiers to fight our wars. The problem is that we can’t send more. The Pentagon tapped only a portion of the reserves. Additional call-ups will be limited, at best, because few of the remaining units have the skills and equipment needed. Much of the reserve force was created during the Cold War to fight World War III. Therefore, we still have lots of armor and artillery units to fight pitched battles on the German plains, but few trained to chase bin Laden in the Afghan hills or police the streets of Iraq. If we had a more usable reserve force, we could rotate more troops overseas.

Dumb Idea No. 2: Bring Back the Draft. This idea is unsuitable for so many reasons it is hard not to conclude that it is suggested just to scare people. Conscription made sense during World War II. America had 10 million in uniform— almost the entire draft-age male population. There is no need anything near those numbers today. A draft would be little more than a lottery for the unlucky.

Worse, a conscript army with, say, two years of mandatory service would be less skilled, less cohesive, and more expensive, because the services would constantly be training and replacing the ranks. Germany has this kind of army, and Germans think it is totally unsuitable. They are exploring ways to create an all-volunteer force based on the U.S. model.

Dumb Idea No. 3: Add More Troops. Permanently swelling the ranks of the military by tens of thousands is not the answer. Permanent increases bring all the baggage of a 20-year career; big-ticket items like housing, medical care, and retirement. When Iraq ramps down, the armed forces will have more troops than they need. If all those troops were “regulars,” the Pentagon would either have to keep them all aboard—shouldering needless expense—or launch a disruptive and costly downsizing. Too large a military will take us right back to the hollow force, with too few resources to train, equip, and employ the available troops.

The Better Idea

There are better long-term solutions to ensuring the force we need for the long war. To bridge the capabilities gap, the United States should focus its military resources on missions that are vital to the nation. Specifically, it must field a force capable of: fighting the immediate war on terrorism; fighting with little or no warning in unanticipated places; maintaining adequate capability to deter aggression against America’s interests and allies; and contributing to homeland security. This is what we should do.

Maintain Robust Defense Spending. Defense is not cheap. The 2004 defense budget weighed in at over $400 billion. That’s about right. Some Members of Congress entertained the idea of either cutting defense (at least modestly) to help rein in ballooning federal spending or taking money from some important programs to fund other programs that are more popular. However, cutting defense spending now is both unnecessary and dangerous. According to estimates by the individual services, even with recent defense budget increases, the Pentagon has $12.2 billion in unfunded priorities.30 Maintaining adequate funding is essential to avoiding the hollow force syndrome.

End Nonessential Deployments. At last count, the United States still had over 3,000 troops on peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. This translates into 9,000 persons dedicated to that mission. For every soldier deployed, one is recovering from deployment and one is preparing for deployment. Ending this unnecessary deployment would significantly reduce the stress on the force by adding 9,000 soldiers to the rotation base. Likewise, ending other nonessential missions would put more troops at the Pentagon’s disposal for real missions.

Put More Troops in the Foxhole. The U.S. military maintains bases and forces overseas that are largely a legacy of the Cold War. Likewise, many of the active and reserve units here at home are governed by personnel and mobilization policies and arrayed in organizations that are, in fact, designed to fight the last war. The Pentagon has been trying to change. For instance, the generals in Washington acknowledge they could right-size our force structure in Europe and Northeast Asia by consolidating commands and bases, freeing as many as 40,000 soldiers. The Pentagon could hire civilians or contractors for more administrative positions. By some estimates, this change alone might put as many as 300,000 more troops in the field. Encouraging the Pentagon to follow through on initiatives that will make greater numbers of the force more usable is just good common sense.

Continue with Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). BRAC is a process that requires the Department of Defense to identify unnecessary facilities that can be closed. It also requires the Administration and Congress to review and approve the recommendations. BRAC is important because closing unneeded bases will free resources and forces for higher priority uses.31

Transforming Transformation

Not only is it important to make sure we have the right size military for the long war, it is equally important that we have a military capable of doing the right tasks. The old adage “that every problem looks like a nail when all you have is hammer,” pretty much says it all. The Cold War military was a hammer. This long war needs a lot more appliances.

Expanding the toolbox will be tough. “Transformation” was the Pentagon’s new buzzword after the Cold War. No one agreed on what it meant, but every general and admiral wanted some.32 At the most basic level, the term meant providing a new set of military capabilities fundamentally different from those used during the Cold War. The tough problem was deciding exactly what those capabilities would look like. Not surprisingly, the first answer from the services was that the stuff they were already thinking about was transformational—and it should probably be paid for at the expense of some other service’s budget.

With more than a decade of the post-Cold War behind us, there does appear to be a shift in transformation rhetoric in the halls of the Pentagon; talk of moving away from change for the sake of change to transforming to the military needed for the many kinds of missions that will be required of our troops in the twenty-first century. Thus, appropriately, there is much effort going into things that do not fit a single service paradigm, such as ballistic missile defense, space operations, better information systems, more special operations forces, and unmanned aerial vehicles. These are all hallmarks of the new military coming out of the Pentagon—and the Pentagon needs to keep at it.

Still, there is cause for concern. There is one very big gap in the military’s transformation plan. Its ability to perform post-conflict operations is deeply flawed. The difficulties that the U.S. military and other coalition forces have experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the consternation expressed in the Western press and the court of public opinion should come as no surprise.

There is legitimate cause for complaint. The shortfalls in how the United States and its allies approached the challenges of post-conflict operations run deeper than the debate over policies, the justification for the war, the number of troops committed to the occupation,33 and the resources available.34 The truth is that the military is least good at the fight for peace.

Should we be able to do better? Yes. This not to argue that we need more military forces for peacekeeping or nation building. Given the global demand for U.S. forces, America should not be deeply involved in peacekeeping or peacemaking missions. We should save great power forces for great power missions.35 Nation building should also be avoided. It is not an appropriate task for the military. It should come as no surprise that America’s greatest contribution to nation building, the Marshall Plan, had no military component.36

Post-conflict operations are another matter. If the United States has to go in and rip out a terrorist sanctuary or rogue regime, we need to make sure when we are done the weeds do not grow back.

Rhythm of Habits

We may not conquer countries very often, but when we do, it is in our strategic interest to get it right. Yet if our military is consistent in any of its failures, it is in its incapacity to think deeply about anything other than winning battles. Winning battles is important, but winning wars is more important— and winning the peace is part of winning the war.

However, most generals don’t get it. According to Antulio Echevarria, a well-respected Army historian and national security analyst, the American way of war rarely extends “beyond the winning of battles and campaigns to the gritty work of turning military victory into strategic success.”37 The troubles in Afghanistan and Iraq may merely offer the most recent cases in point.

Among the traditions, experiences, preconceptions, and routine practices that determine how the military wages the fight for peace, the most powerful force shaping its thinking is a “tradition of forgetting.” The services—particularly the Army—have a long record of conducting various kinds of peace missions. Traditionally, however, the armed forces concentrate on warfighting and eschew the challenges of dealing with the battlefield after the battle. The Army’s experience and knowledge about peace operations have never been incorporated into mainstream military thinking in any major, systematic way. For example, the official report about U.S. participation in the occupation of the Rhineland after World War I noted that “despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, and elsewhere, the lesson seemingly has not been learned.”38 When the military got ready for the occupations in Europe and Asia that marked the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, they started over once again. One of the first acts was to dig out the report on the Rhineland occupation. The missive introducing the report that spoke of not learning lessons of the past must have come as cold comfort.

Despite their many failings, U.S. occupations in places like Germany and Japan eventually accomplished their missions, giving truth to Churchill’s famous conclusion that after Americans have tried everything else they will do the right thing. So it was in the early Cold War years. However, the Pentagon then largely forgot the lessons once again and continued to reinvent solutions each time it faced a new peace operation: Fighting the battles of the Cold War remained the military’s overwhelming preoccupation.

Arguably, America’s military after the Cold War has a better appreciation for its post-conflict responsibilities. It could not forget these missions entirely because they had become a fact of life in the post-Cold World disorder. On average, the U.S. military has conducted an operation related to peacekeeping, peacemaking, or post-conflict occupation every two years since the end of the Cold War. With the Soviet menace gone, there was greater pressure to employ U.S. forces for a range of operations, which the Pentagon termed “military operations other than war.”39

Yet it is not clear that the military internalized the requirements for post-conflict operations. In 1995, the Pentagon produced its first joint doctrine for military operations other than war.40 The U.S. Army established a Peacekeeping Institute at its Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. These initiatives left much to be desired. They paid scant attention to specific post-conflict operations—arguably the most difficult and strategically important of all the peace activities that military forces might be called upon to undertake.41 Even the term “operations other than war” was problematic, implying a range of military tasks less strategically important than warfighting and grouping post-conflict operations (essentially an extension of the warfighting mission) in with a plethora of tasks that included everything from peacekeeping to helping out after hurricanes.42

There was also little special recognition that the military’s two most recent major postwar operations in Panama (after Operation Just Cause) and Kuwait (after the first Iraq War) were both deeply flawed.43 For example, Lieutenant General John Yeosock, who was given initial responsibility for overseeing operations in Kuwait in 1991, recalled that he received virtually no assets or planning assistance for the task. Yeosock recalled that he had been handed a “dripping bag of manure” that no one else wanted.44 Operations in Iraq today appear different only in scale and duration. Initial assessments of U.S. military operations in Iraq suggest that the military failed to follow its own doctrine or to learn from past experiences. Halting efforts at rebuilding Iraqi security forces and controlling arms in the country offer two examples of this.45

Rather than figure out how to best win the peace, the military always tried, insofar as possible, to make post-conflict missions mirror traditional military activities. For example, during World War II, the military staff planning process for military government operations was virtually identical to the procedures for planning battles. Today, the staff process for planning operations other than war remains very similar to the combat planning process, encouraging leaders to use very similar techniques and procedures. An approach to post-conflict activities that mirrors combat can result in the misapplication of resources, inappropriate tasks and goals, and ineffective operations.

The military also insisted on shoehorning combat units into postwar tasks. In post-World War II Europe, Army tank battalions and artillery brigades were ill-suited to the conduct of occupation duties. Most troops lacked training in many critical security tasks such as conducting investigations, arrest, detention, search and seizure, interrogation, negotiation, and crowd control. It was not until months after the occupation began that the Army began to field constabulary units that were better designed to conduct a range of security tasks.46 The U.S. constabulary forces served successfully, but were soon disbanded and replaced by conventional military units more appropriate to the tasks of fighting Cold War battles. As result, when the military tried to conduct similar types of operations as part of their counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam, the results were pretty abysmal until nearly the end of the U.S. involvement—when General Creighton Abrams restructured units and operations specifically for the tasks.47

Today, U.S. combat units are still structured in much the same manner as they were during World War II. The United States has no forces specifically organized and equipped for post-conflict missions. Although the U.S. military has developed training programs and tactics for postwar duties, these were mainly provided for follow-on forces. Much as during World War II, the initial occupation troops were the same forces that conducted the combat campaign and that had to learn the skills of occupation on the job.

New Military Capabilities and Competencies

If we agree that the military is poorly prepared to conduct post-conflict missions— and that these are important tasks to get right—then developing these capabilities must become part of the transformation plan. That will require a deliberate strategy on the part of the Pentagon.

Suitable post-conflict forces can come from three places. First, a nation can have allies with suitable units to conduct the mission for them. Second, nations can reorganize and retrain traditional combat forces as units better prepared to conduct occupation duties. Third, nations can maintain forces specifically designed to spearhead an occupation.

A great power should be able do all three, using its abundance of resources to gain maximum flexibility to approach post-conflict operations and tailor the best force for the mission. Thus, the United States should do more to build up the capacity of its allies. It should also do a much better job converting forces for post-conflict duties and learning the lessons of current operations. Finally, it should build organizations and supporting programs specifically designed to conduct post-conflict duties.

Meeting the third requirement is undoubtedly the most difficult. Creating the right set of capabilities will require a set of initiatives that cut across the armed forces’ education processes, career professional development patterns, acquisition programs, and organizations. Therefore, the following might be added to the military’s transformation plan.

Reform Military Education. The skills needed to conduct effective post-conflict tasks require the right combination of “hard power” (the means to provide security) and “soft power” (not only the capacity to understand other nations and cultures, but also the ability to work in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment). These are sophisticated leader and staff proficiencies, required at many levels of command.

In the present military education system, however, much of the edification relevant to building these attributes is provided, if at all, at war colleges to a relatively elite group being groomed for senior leader and joint duty positions. This model is wrong on two counts. First, these skills are needed by most leaders and staffs in both the active and reserve components, not just an elite group within the profession. Second, in the United States this education comes too late in an officer’s career. Virtually every other career field provides “graduate level” education to members in their mid-20s to mid-30s. Only the military delays advanced education until its leaders are in their mid-40s. We need to educate more leaders, earlier in their careers.

The armed services also need special schools specifically designed to teach the operational concepts and practices relevant to post-conflict missions. The services already have advanced schools (such as the Marine Corps’ School for Advanced Warfighting) for instruction in the operational arts at their staff colleges. These courses train the military’s finest planners. The curriculum in these courses should be expanded to include post-conflict missions.

Restructure Commands. Overseas commands should be reorganized to include interagency staffs with specific responsibility for developing post-conflict contingency plans in the same manner that current operational staffs plan for warfighting contingencies. In the event of war, the post-conflict interagency group can be attached to the operation’s joint force commander to provide the nucleus of an occupation staff.

In addition, the joint force command should include a general-officer deputy commander who would oversee the work of the planning group and assume command of the post-conflict occupation force. These staffs and command positions could provide a series of operational assignments for the career development of a cadre of officers specially skilled in post-conflict duties.

Establish New Organizations. Special post-conflict units could be assembled from existing National Guard and Reserve units, including security, medical, engineer, and public affairs commands. Since many of the responsibilities involved in postwar duties are similar in many ways to missions that might be required of homeland security units, these forces could perform double duty, having utility both overseas and at home.48

Rethink Equipment Needs. The military also needs a more robust and integrated acquisition program—a “systems” approach to post-conflict missions that includes more aggressive development of non-lethal technologies, capacities to rapidly equip and interface with domestic security forces, and support for the reconstruction and protection of governance and other critical infrastructure. Indeed, the military might consider establishing a “future security system” acquisition program under a lead-system integrator responsible for developing a range of technologies applicable to post-conflict and domestic support missions.

Beyond Goldwater–Nichols

Another persistent rhythm of habit is the armed forces’ penchant for largely eschewing integrated interagency operations (activities involving more than one federal agency), as well as ignoring the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The result is that most operations lack cohesion, flexibility, and responsiveness. During the Cold War occupations, the military closely followed its tradition (as much as possible) of divesting itself of non-combat tasks. Traditionally, the services preferred to establish a “firewall” between civilian and soldier activities to prevent civilian tasks from becoming an overwhelming drain on military resources.49 As a result, there was scant cooperation between the Pentagon and other federal agencies or NGOs.50

Post-Cold War operations also reflected chronic difficulties in coordinating military activities with outside agencies.51 Prospects for better performances in Iraq did not bode well. As a result of U.N. sanctions, NGOs had little presence in the country, no accurate assessments of needs, and no logistical or support base. Lacking good intelligence about the country’s internal conditions, the CIA, the State Department, and the Department of Defense were at odds about how to best deal with political and humanitarian concerns. Without a coordinated, integrated planning effort, miscues, mistakes, and disputes seemed inevitable.

Official U.S. accounts of cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan give little indication of the chronic tensions that have marred American operations in the past. It is not clear how candid these assessments might be.52 It is perhaps too early to pass judgment on these operations, but persistent reports of disagreements between the Departments of State and Defense and complaints by the Red Cross that military authorities were unresponsive to the organization’s findings about the treatment of Iraqi prisoners that offer cause for concern.

Interagency cooperation during post-conflict operations is not the only troubling trend. Nor is achieving cooperation between agencies just an issue for the Pentagon. The integration of U.S. activities overseas has always been problematic.53 The obstacles to effectively getting agencies to work together are legion.54

The limitations of government cooperation might be acceptable in another long war, but not in this one. The global war on terrorism will require unprecedented integration of military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and other international security instruments.

Additionally, the offensive component will need more than just cooperation inside the beltway. It will require working together in the field as well. That is a particular problem: Bureaucrats in Washington are always suspicious of cooperation among their underlings who are forced to work together in the far-flung corners of the world. They are concerned that on-the-scene decisions made by subordinates will set U.S. policies, rather than being mandated by the decision makers. Overcoming this paranoia and empowering our nation’s representatives to work together must become an imperative.

The Unified Command Plan

The centerpiece for accomplishing this reform could be a radical restructuring of the Pentagon’s Unified Command Plan (UCP). Established during the Cold War to allow the DoD to manage global military operations, the UCP has become another relic of the last war that we may no longer need. This is ironic, given that it took most of the Cold War to get it right. It was Eisenhower who insisted on establishing regional commands to manage far-flung military activities. In another defeat by the entrenched constituencies defending service prerogatives, the initial command setup did not allow the regional commanders (called CINCs) to have much authority.55 It was not until 1986 with the passage of the Goldwater–Nichols Act that the CINCs gained full authority over their commands. The law worked. In fact, by the end of the Cold War, CINCs (now called combatant commanders), became so powerful that some felt they began to overshadow all the other instruments of foreign policy.56

After the Cold War there was considerable discussion about reorganizing the UCP. A protracted debate ensued about how to shift the regional commands from countering Soviet power to providing global military support to a variety of missions in a systematic and coordinated manner.57

One proposal included creating an “Americas Command” that would place the entire Western hemisphere under a single regional command. As late as 2000, a report commissioned by DoD recommended establishing a separate command with oversight of North America. Both foreign policy and domestic issues caused the proposal to be shelved. There was concern that Mexico, which maintains a strict neutralist foreign policy while seeking close economic ties with the United States, might object to being included under a U.S. regional security umbrella. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) remained sensitive to domestic concerns that the new command could be perceived as impinging on civil rights, as well as on state and local government responsibilities for public safety.

Within a week of the September 11 terrorist attacks the proposal was back on the table. The Joint Chiefs recommended the establishment of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). The emerging requirements to fight a global war on terrorism clearly overrode previous reservations. As currently established, NORTHCOM is tasked with the land, aerospace, and maritime defense of the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, parts of the Caribbean, and the Atlantic and Pacific waters (out to 500 miles).

As a result, today the world is divided into five commands with regional responsibilities (North America, South America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia), four functional commands that control special operations, space, nuclear, and transportation forces (as well as overseeing joint training and experimentation.)

Even after the creation of NORTHCOM, all the commands were given responsibilities in the war on terror. The Central Command (CENTCOM) is running support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The European Command (EUCOM), also responsible for parts of Africa, is supporting counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa. The Pacific Command (PACOM) is providing counterterrorism training and support to a number of countries, including the Philippines. PACOM also provides defense and civil support to Hawaii and U.S. territories. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conducts a variety of counterterrorism-related missions in Central and South America.

The functional commands also have counterterrorism and homeland security–related tasks. In the latest revision of the UCP, Strategic Command (STRATCOM) was tasked to integrate combatant command missile defense operations. According to recent press reports, while NORTHCOM will be responsible for directing missile defense operations in its area of responsibility, STRATCOM will act as the global integrator to ensure that activities of the theater commands support one another. STRATCOM, for example, would be responsible for ensuring the right combination of offensive and defensive means were employed to counter a missile threat that might be launched at the United States from the PACOM area of responsibility. In addition, STRATCOM provides space support (such as early warning of missile launches) to all theater commanders, including NORTHCOM. STRATCOM also has responsibility for information operations to protect computer systems from foreign attacks.

Special Operations Command (SOCOM) provides special operations forces to the regional commands for a range of missions—from direct action, to psychological operations and civil affairs, to combating terrorism. SOCOM can also conduct activities independent of the combat commands at the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense. SOCOM has always had some homeland defense tasks. It maintains a national response force to respond to special contingencies. Special operations forces have been used as “red teams” to test the security of certain installations. SOCOM has also supported designated national security events (such as the Olympics).

The Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) provides transportation and logistical support assets used by all the commands. For example, the combat aircraft flying combat air patrols over American cities after 9/11 received aerial refueling from TRANSCOM assets.

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) provides conventional forces to the regional commands, including NORTHCOM. While some combatant commands had forces assigned directly to them, Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force units within the United States remain a part of a pool of troops that can be dispatched to the regional commands as needed. JFCOM is also responsible for conducting joint force experimentation.

Beyond Commanding the World

With the exception of creating NORTHCOM—and even though the commands are already conducting some tasks in the global war on terrorism— these organizations are still structured to provide global command for the last war. In addition, although the geographic commands each contain within itself a joint interagency coordination group to organize regional activities, in practice the operations are not much better run than they were during the Cold War. Competing with each combatant commander is the ambassador within each country in the commander’s area of responsibility. The ambassador is in charge of the country team, which incorporates all civilian, military, and intelligence personnel assigned to the embassy. Combatant commanders cannot even “marry up” with the State Department at the regional level, because the regional desks in Washington cover geographical areas that do not match up with the UCP.

Given its limitations, and the fact that the Soviet empire is gone and the United States no longer has to worry about fighting a global conventional war, it is worth asking if the UCP is still necessary—and the answer is probably not. It is time to replace the UCP with a structure that better supports the nation’s national security needs. That organization should probably be based more on facilitating worldwide interagency operations rather than combat action. A new structure, the U.S. Engagement Plan (US-Plan), crafted at the direction of, and answering to, the National Security Council rather than the Pentagon, might look like the following.

Time to Replace the Plan

Combatant Commands. There is still a need for permanent military commands under the direction of the Pentagon; however, the number of combatant commands should be reduced to three. In Europe and Northeast Asia, the United States has important and enduring military alliances and there is a continuing need to integrate the U.S. military commands with them. To this end, EUCOM and PACOM should be replaced by a U.S.–NATO command and a U.S. Northeast Asia headquarters. In addition, NORTHCOM should remain as the military command responsible for the defense of the United States.

Joint Interagency Groups. In addition, three “Joint Interagency Groups” (InterGroups) should be established. Joint-Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) have already been used very effectively on a small scale to conduct counternarcotics operations in Latin America, the Caribbean, and off the Pacific coast of the United States. They incorporate resources from multiple agencies under a single command structure for specific missions. There is no reason that this model could not be expanded in the form of InterGroups to cover larger geographical areas and more diverse mission sets.

The InterGroups within US-Plan should be established to link areas of concern related to national security missions, such as transnational terrorism, transnational crime (e.g., piracy and drug and human trafficking), weapons proliferation, and regional instability. The InterGroups should be established for Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, and South and Central Asia.

Each InterGroup would have a mission set specific to its area. The Latin America InterGroup should focus on drug, human, and arms trafficking; counterterrorism; civil–military relations; and trade liberalization. The Africa–Middle East InterGroup should focus on counterterrorism, weapons proliferation, economic development, fighting AIDS and other infectious diseases, peacekeeping training and support, transnational crime, and civil–military relations. Central and South Asia InterGroup should concentrate on counterterrorism, weapons proliferation, training police forces, antipiracy measures, civil–military relations, transnational crime, and fighting AIDS and other infectious diseases.

Each InterGroup should include a military staff tasked with planning military engagements, warfighting, and post-conflict operations. In the event that military operations are required, the military staff could be detached from the InterGroup (along with any supporting staff from other agencies required) to become the nucleus of a standing Joint Task Force (JTF). Using this model, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would have been commanded by a JTF.

Functional Commands. Under US-Plan, military operations of short duration and global importance should be directed from the United States by three reorganized functional commands. These commands should also be responsible for global logistical and transportation support. The new commands should be a Strike Command, an Operational Support Command, and a Logistics and Transportation Command. Because control of nuclear weapons is such a vital mission, reestablishing a separate strategic nuclear command might be considered.

Preparing for the Future. It will take time and resources to develop the commanders, people, organizations, education, and doctrine needed to support US-Plan. There will clearly be a need for a Goldwater–Nichols II Act to provide the legislative framework—laying out the requirements, legal authorities, and resources needed to restructure how America engages with the world. This legislation will be one of the most important steps taken in improving the nation’s offensive posture. It will not only spark a dramatic change in how overseas activities are conducted, it will lay the foundation for a new kind of governance, a federal government that will be able to leverage the full capacity of its institutions through true collaborative effort; a government made up of an empowered work force that understands how to work together and has the trust, confidence, and capacity to produce better results.

The Right Tools for the Right War     

In July 2004, the congressionally chartered National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) released its final report. Included in the report were recommendations about how to respond to the future threat of terrorism. The release of the report garnered widespread media attention. Little noted in the headlines and talk shows, however, was the report’s implicit endorsement of the importance of an offensive component for the long war.58 Recognizing the need for offense is important. More important, however, is ensuring that the best tools are available to fight the long war. The United States needs better than it has. It is time to put that right.