What Happened in 2002

On December 13, 2001, Pakistan-based terrorists attacked India's parliament, killing 14 people. In response, Indian artillery units shelled suspected terrorist structures in the Pakistan-controlled part of Kashmir. Throughout 2002, both countries deployed heavy troops to their common border and brandished the nuclear option.

In October 2002, U.S. intelligence officials concluded that Pakistan had provided North Korea with the gas centrifuges that are integral to Pyongyang's illicit uranium-enrichment program, which North Korea recently admitted it was in fact pursuing. Islamabad has since promised to cease proliferation of nuclear and missile technology.

What to Do in 2003

India and Pakistan need to resolve the Kashmir issue themselves, and on mutually agreeable terms. The United States should encourage--but not mediate--such an agreement, because Washington cannot afford to be distracted from its top priority, the war on terrorism. Regarding U.S.-India and U.S.-Pakistan relations, the United States should:

• Strongly encourage India and Pakistan to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Nuclear brinkmanship complicates their intense disputes and increases the likelihood, as well as the consequences, of a political miscalculation.
• Make it clear to Pakistan that further proliferation of nuclear and missile technology is unacceptable and will result in immediate and dire consequences. Washington has chosen not to punish Islamabad for selling centrifuges to North Korea because of its strong support for the U.S. war on terrorism and its promises to discontinue proliferation activities. Should Pakistan resume proliferation, the United States must take steps to punish it.

Southeast Asia1

ACTION: Convince Southeast Asian countries that combating terrorism is in their national interest, and use U.S. counterterrorism assistance to encourage regional cooperation and local solutions.

The Issue in Brief

Since September 11, 2001, Southeast Asia has become the second front in the global war on terrorism. Several terrorist groups either affiliated with or sympathetic to al-Qaeda are present there and employ violence to try to establish fundamentalist Islamic theocracies. Individually, most of the countries in Southeast Asia have made progress in combating terrorism, but cooperation and coordination among the states is sporadic. Terrorist groups exploit this weakness, seeking refuge in the countries least committed to fighting terrorism, which until recently included Indonesia. As The Economist notes, the impetus to deal with the problem stems from the public outrage that follows a violent attack, but that subsides quickly.2

It is vigilance that will defeat terrorism. A criminal approach to terrorism--identifying and punishing the perpetrators--is not enough; deterrence and preemption are the best solutions.

What Happened in 2002

Several major incidents highlighted the prevalence of international terrorism in Southeast Asia in 2002. In January, Malaysian and Singaporean authorities arrested 28 members of Jemaah Islamiah, an al-Qaeda cell whose stated goal was to establish a fundamentalist Muslim state from parts of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In June, U.S.-trained Philippine troops rescued an American hostage from the Abu Sayyaf group, which had eluded authorities for months. On October 12, a car bomb exploded outside a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, killing over 200 people--almost all of them foreign tourists.

What to Do in 2003

U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia should be designed to help, not overshadow, local solutions and regional cooperation. Specifically, the United States should:

• Design counterterrorism assistance to encourage Southeast Asian countries to focus on building coordination and cooperation with their neighbors. Additional assistance should be approved for countries that visibly demonstrate a long-term commitment to combating terrorism.
• Emphasize the consequences of inaction. Using the tragic bombing in Bali which killed so many Australians as an example, the Administration should make it clear that turning a blind eye to extremism will only lead to greater tragedy.

Dana R. Dillon is Senior Policy Analyst for South and Southeast Asia.

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