What Happened in 2002

Since September 1l, 2001, Russia's track record of cooperation with the United States has been mixed. On one hand, it has allied itself with the United States in the war on terrorism. On the other, it has also worked diligently to water down the new U.N. Security Council resolution on Iraq and continues to build a nuclear reactor in Iran.


After the terrorist attacks on America, Putin supported the United States against al-Qaeda and its state sponsor, the Taliban in Afghanistan. He overruled senior officials in order to allow the U.S. military to deploy troops and overfly Russian territory; Russia then supplied and trained Northern Alliance forces and permitted the re-supply of U.S. forces in Afghanistan through its ports and railways, greatly cutting the costs of the campaign. Putin also allowed the United States to build infrastructure in Georgia and Central Asia. The level of intelligence sharing between the United States and Russia in this campaign is unprecedented. Finally, Osama bin Laden's taped remarks that the attack on civilians at a Moscow theater in October was part of his jihad against the West confirmed Moscow's belief that Persian Gulf terror masters were behind acts of terrorism in Russia and elsewhere.

Putin also muted his country's objection to U.S. abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and toned down protests against the enlargement of NATO during the alliance's Prague meeting last November. The Baltic States and the former Warsaw Pact countries of Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia are now members of the European alliance. The May 2002 creation of the NATO-Russia Council had buried the legacy of the Cold War.

Moscow and Washington, however, differ fundamentally on Russia's relations with China, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. In the debates over the U.N. Security Council resolution on weapons inspections, Russia opposed language that would have authorized the use of force against Iraq. Baghdad recently claimed that it might sign a $40 billion, 10-year trade agreement with Russia. Moscow announced plans to sell five more nuclear reactors to Iran in addition to the one currently being constructed in Bushehr, even as Iran's leaders made it clear that they intended to acquire nuclear weapons and Iran continues to build and test ballistic missiles with increasingly long range. And North Korean leader Kim Jong-il visited Russia in August 2002 and met with President Putin in Vladivostok.

In June 2002, Moscow sided with Beijing at the U.N. Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in opposing the deployment of space-based missile defenses, which the United States is considering. The suggested Sino-Russian draft treaty would obligate the parties "not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner." Such a treaty, if not vetoed by the United States, would limit U.S. capacity to defend itself from ballistic missile attacks.1

Moscow's ties to rogue states are driven primarily by economic motives, as Russia seeks to profit from oil and gas deals, arms sales, and the recovery of billions in outstanding Soviet-era debt. The Bush Administration should work closely with Russia in 2003 to develop alternative policies for dealing with rogue states that would not threaten regional or global security or U.S. interests.

What to Do in 2003

Joint programs with Russia and the Eurasian countries should be based on the understanding that their common interests lie in enhancing global security and economic development, not in support for rogue regimes. In 2003, Washington should:

• Seek Russia's collaboration on the political architecture for a post-Saddam Iraq. Iraq must be disarmed. Should Saddam Hussein be removed from power, the Administration should make clear that it will support the recognition by the new Iraqi government of the $7 billion to $8 billion that Iraq owes to the former Soviet Union. In St. Petersburg, President Bush said that the United States recognizes Russia's economic interests in Iraq. Some Russian forces could participate in policing Iraq, and some Russian companies could help rebuild it.
• Establish areas for closer cooperation with Russian and other intelligence services in the region for fighting terrorism. This could include joint intelligence operations to penetrate al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in order to identify and intercept their sources of funding and weapons. Such operations also could involve Russian intelligence networks in the Muslim world.
• Declare as a terrorist group the radical Islamist wing of Chechen separatists that is responsible for the recent hostage crisis in Moscow. Washington should also support Russia's request that the Chechen extremist leaders be extradited from their Middle Eastern havens. At the same time, the United States should encourage Russia to consult with the moderate wing of the Chechen separatists, who are not tied to international terrorists, to find ways to stop the war without compromising the territorial integrity of Russia. The United States, together with the European Union and Muslim countries, should provide humanitarian assistance to Chechen refugees.
• Request that Russia terminate its nuclear projects in Iran, such as the Bushehr reactor. Washington also should ask Moscow to terminate the training of Iranian nuclear engineers and scientists at its universities and nuclear facilities. In exchange, the Administration should offer to authorize the safe storage of spent nuclear power station fuel from U.S.-built reactors in Russia, which could provide $10 billion over the next 10 years to its nuclear energy ministry, MinAtom. Tens of thousands of MinAtom workers would then be ensured employment, and Russia would be compensated for the loss of revenue from Iran.
• Encourage Soviet-era debt reduction by the West in exchange for Moscow's improved security for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related technologies. Moscow must accept agreed-upon, quantitative, transparent, and verifiable measures to secure Soviet-era WMD arsenals as envisaged in the Nuclear and Terrorism Threat Reduction Act (S. 2478), the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (S. 2545), Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation as spelled out in H.R. 3836, and the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 2002 (H.R. 4624).
• Work with the Russian Federation to ensure an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program. While Moscow may hope to partake in North Korea's economic recovery, the Kremlin shares American concerns about Pyongyang's WMD program; it is showing willingness to play a mediator role in pressuring North Korea to cease its dangerous programs.
• Expand oil and energy ties with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. As envisaged in H. Con. Res. 482, loan guarantees from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank and Trade Development Administration funding could be used to conduct feasibility studies on developing the Eurasian oil and gas resources, pipeline, and port infrastructure. The goal would be to lessen U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern oil by increasing the flows from the Russian-Eurasian region. Oil companies from the region that comply with U.S. corporate government and accounting standards should be allowed to access U.S. private-sector investment to expand their exports to global markets.
• Authorize the extension of non-discriminatory treatment (normal trade relations) for the countries of Eurasia, with the exception of the dictatorships of Belarus and Turkmenistan. The first step for Congress is to "graduate" the countries seeking normal trade relations from the restraints of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618).2 This relic of the Cold War was passed when the Soviet Union was severely limiting emigration. Graduating the Eurasian states from its restrictions, as S. 168/H.R. 1318 would do in the case of Kazakhstan, could be accomplished by attaching an amendment to any trade legislation. Linking the waiver of Jackson-Vanik to World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations violates the legislative intent and contradicts U.S. foreign and security policy goals in the war on terrorism.

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

EXPERTS