What Happened in 2002

The Bush Administration became increasingly focused on disarming Iraq after September 11 underscored the nation's vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The President denounced Iraq as part of the "axis of evil" in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union Address because of Baghdad's long record of supporting terrorism and determined efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The President warned that the United States would take unspecified action to prevent Iraq from re-emerging as a threat to security.

The Administration escalated the pressure on September 12, 2002, when the President spoke before the United Nations and threatened to take military action--unilateral if necessary--if the U.N. did not enforce Security Council resolutions long violated by Iraq. Baghdad pledged to accept U.N. inspectors on September 16 to deflate rising international pressure for a more assertive U.N. Security Council resolution. The United States sought a tough resolution that would give inspectors a stronger mandate to conduct intrusive inspections on an unfettered basis and authorize the use of military force if Iraq failed to comply.

The Administration's diplomacy was strengthened by the October 11 passage of legislation in Congress authorizing the use of military force against Iraq if it continued to shirk its disarmament obligations. But U.S. efforts to put more teeth behind U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 were resisted by France and Russia, which sought to dilute the terms of a proposed Anglo-American resolution and require another Security Council vote to authorize the use of force. In the end, the Security Council unanimously passed a compromise: Resolution 1441 on November 8 threatened "serious consequences" if Iraq again blocked inspections.

Under the terms of the new resolution, Iraq's disarmament is to be accomplished under an enhanced inspection regime conducted by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Baghdad announced on November 13 that it had accepted the resolution and would cooperate with the inspectors. The first inspectors arrived on November 25, 2002; their initial report is to be submitted to the U.N. Security Council by January 27, 2003.

What to Do in 2003

Washington cannot permit Saddam Hussein to make a charade of Iraq's disarmament obligations as he did from 1991 to 1998. Inspections are worth doing only if the inspectors have a strong mandate from the U.N. Security Council to do their jobs on an "any time-any place" basis, free from interference. The White House therefore should:

• Make sure that the new inspection regime is stronger and more intrusive than previous U.N. inspections thwarted by Baghdad. Inspections address the symptoms but not the cause of chronic confrontations with Iraq. The root of the problem is the nature of the regime, not its weapons. Given Iraq's long history of terrorism, the United States and its allies cannot allow such a dangerous regime to attain the most lethal weapons. As he has done in the past, Saddam could feign cooperation while clandestine work continues on the prohibited weapons at concealed sites in Iraq or in countries such as Libya or Sudan. Even if Saddam surrenders all his banned weapons, Iraq could reconstitute its weapons programs in months, if not weeks, after the inspectors left. It has the scientists, the knowledge, and the technical base to regenerate prohibited weapons programs and the oil money to buy what it cannot make.
• Prepare for extensive military operations in Iraq if Baghdad again defaults on its disarmament obligations or reconstitutes its WMD programs after inspections end. The Administration is committed to giving Iraq one last chance to comply, but it must be prepared to take military action if Baghdad fails to comply with its disarmament obligations. Even if Baghdad does accept a reinvigorated inspections regime, Washington should extend its strong support to the Iraqi opposition to help lay the groundwork for Saddam's overthrow. Ultimately, the only way to be certain of removing weapons of mass destruction from Iraq is to remove Saddam's rogue regime from power.

If the United States is forced to fight a war to disarm Iraq, it should try to replace the present regime with a broad-based representative government that will pose no threats to U.S. interests, Iraq's neighbors, or the people of Iraq. While the Iraqis should determine the precise form of government for post-war, post-Saddam Iraq, Washington should set out the parameters for an acceptable accord on its formation. To give all major Iraqi religious and ethnic groups a stake in the success of a pro-Western Iraqi government, the United States should encourage the Iraqis to adopt a decentralized federal system.2 Such an outcome would offer the best opportunity for building a stable and peaceful post-war government that respects the human rights of its people and contributes to regional peace and security.

James Phillips is a Research Fellow in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

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