What Happened in 2002

The most important developments in NATO in 2002 have been the acceptance of new members from the former Soviet bloc and the adoption of a plan to mobilize a rapid deployment force for out-of-area missions.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks energized the Bush Administration into putting forth an ambitious agenda to reconfigure NATO, the linchpin of America's commitment to European security.1 Much of the Administration's agenda met with diplomatic success and became the common alliance position. A robust enlargement of the alliance has brought in seven new members (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), and a carefully limited NATO-Russia Council embodies the alliance's closer ties with post-Soviet Russia and the end of the Cold War hostilities that had led to its creation.

The single most underreported story to emerge in the wake of September 11, however, is the non-use of NATO in the counter-terrorist response. The Europeans' unwillingness to spend adequate budgetary resources on common defense made direct NATO involvement unlikely. In terms of cost-benefit analysis, when it came to fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Pentagon determined that it was simply not worth working through the cumbersome NATO decision-making structure to add Europe's limited capabilities to its own.

To remedy this imbalance, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld formally suggested a rapid reaction force at the NATO defense ministers meeting in Warsaw in September 2002, and the Administration ambitiously promoted the idea at the Prague summit in November. The rapid deployment force proposal allowed the European allies to re-involve themselves in the sharing of common alliance risks in the future. It became clear that the NATO allies must go out-of-area together or out of business.

What Must Be Done in 2003

America should work to rebuild NATO into an alliance that is (1) more politically and strategically flexible for the new security environment and (2) at least marginally interoperable so that the allies have the technical ability to fight together at roughly the same operational level, with the Europeans contributing more to the effort.

To achieve this goal, the Administration should:

• Make clear that following through on the Prague agenda is the last, best chance for NATO to reform itself to remain relevant. The European allies should realize that failure to adopt the entire package of Prague reforms could lead many policymakers to view NATO as a spent force rather than as the cornerstone of the U.S.-European alliance. Moreover, it could lead the White House to engage European countries only on a case-by-case and bilateral basis. Forceful language may be necessary to impel any wavering allies to swing behind the Prague agenda.
• Gain the Senate's consent for treaty revisions made at the Prague summit. The vast majority of the revisions in NATO's founding document--the 1949 Treaty of Washington--concern the accession of the seven new members into NATO. The Senate should vote its overwhelming consent to reassure Europeans of America's continued commitment to the continent as well as to express its support for the broader Prague agenda.

John C. Hulsman, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in European Affairs in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

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