Examples abound of Presidents who were unable to "hit the ground running" because of mistakes they made during the transition period. Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, for example, made early decisions to give their Cabinet secretaries primary authority over appointments to key policymaking posts within their departments. In practice, this decision meant their administrations similarly were unable to speak with a single voice in key policy areas. Confusion and even conflict resulted.

Bill Clinton declared early that he wanted his Cabinet to "look like America" and a woman to serve as Attorney General. These decisions led to speedy but sloppy, screening of the potential candidates and resulted in a series of rapid-fire embarrassments. The misguided effort known as "Nannygate" was not President Clinton's only early problem. One week after his election, he unexpectedly provoked controversy with a surprise promise to lift the ban on homosexuals serving openly in the military. Combined with the abrupt dismissal of veteran personnel from the White House Travel Office, the "growing pains" of the early months of the Clinton Administration produced months of backpedaling and, in the case of Travelgate, years of investigation, criticism, court battles, and conflict. For a while it seemed as though the new Chief Executive from Hope, Arkansas, would never recover.

Ronald Reagan, by comparison, strode into office insouciant and self-confident because he had a vision and clear plans for his Administration. Thanks to advance planning with a handful of his key advisers, Reagan entered the White House knowing exactly how his team would fill the key posts, how they would instruct their principal appointees, which positions would be filled and in what order, and which policies his Administration would push first.

Each of Reagan's three visits to Washington during the transition period furthered a specific objective. First, he met with the outgoing President; then he toured his future living quarters; and finally, he familiarized himself with important players in what distinguished historian Richard Neustadt calls the "Washington community." This community included the very people who would be working--and at times fighting--with key administration staff. By Inauguration Day on January 20, Reagan was ready. Just as important, to the American people and the media he appeared ready. Analysts of all political persuasions attribute the successes he enjoyed in the opening months of his presidency to these early steps, and they often cite his transition as a model for future Presidents to follow.

Traditionally, the peaceful transfer of power from one President to another after an election is a time of great expectation. The inauguration of the President of the United States, and especially the inauguration of a new President, with all its pageantry and solemnity has become a national ritual. President John F. Kennedy rightly called it a "celebration of freedom." To those still bereft of the blessings of democracy in other parts of the world, the inauguration of the American President, in public view and before his supporters and former opponents, continues to demonstrate the greatness of America.

The 70 days between the election and the swearing-in can be heady times for the President-elect and his team. They can also be chaotic. After a long and hard-fought campaign, veterans of the effort experience both the euphoria and the exhaustion that accompany victory. Often they display an understandable hubris, believing perhaps that nothing that awaits them can be as difficult or as arduous as what they have already achieved. Historians and journalists believe this arrogance was one of the underlying causes of Kennedy's miscalculation in the Bay of Pigs incident and prompted Clinton's ill-conceived economic stimulus package and health care proposal.

The days and weeks immediately after the long campaign--when people are tired, stressed, ecstatic, and more than a bit confused about what lies ahead--are not the best time for a President-elect and his closest advisers to make decisions that will affect the country and world for years to come. Yet, in an atmosphere conducive to error, they must make many such decisions and in quick succession. Presidents who either delay decisions on critical matters or act in haste will be sowing the seeds of future frustration.

Richard Nixon, for instance, who was unsure in the final weeks of his campaign that he would be elected, had a slow and awkward start to his Administration. Jimmy Carter planned for the transition, but much of this planning was done in a vacuum only to be unearthed after the election, when the campaign staff--upset that they had not been consulted--began to focus on the transition.

Sometimes Presidents handicap themselves by placing a premium on fulfilling the promises of government "reform" they made during the heat of the campaign. Clinton, for example, pledged to reduce the size of the White House staff. Mindful that the press would be keeping count, members of his team often made cuts they later regretted.

To help the next American President prepare for a successful transition, The Heritage Foundation brought together alumni and observers of nine presidential administrations--spanning a period of nearly 50 years--for a series of discussions about what went right and what went wrong during transition periods and administrations past. More than 60 panelists and presenters participated in nine public forums that Heritage hosted in Washington during the fall of 1999 and spring of 2000. Among those who so generously shared their time and advice on the panels are: Theodore C. Sorensen, Counsel and key adviser to John F. Kennedy; veteran Washington journalists Michael Barone, Bob Franken, Michael Novak, Sander Vanocur, and Al Aisele; Leon Panetta, Bill Clinton's second Chief of Staff; Edwin Meese III, long-time Counsellor to Ronald Reagan and head of the Reagan transition team; Caspar Weinberger, Ronald Reagan's Secretary of Defense; Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter; Michael Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff to Ronald Reagan; Tony Blankley, Press Secretary to House Speaker Newt Gingrich; Martin Anderson, Assistant to Ronald Reagan for Policy Development; Jack Watson, Jimmy Carter's Chief of Staff; C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to George Bush; Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to Lyndon B. Johnson; Directors of the White House Office of Presidential Personnel under Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton; as well as political scientists Richard E. Neustadt, James Pfiffner, Paul Light, James Thurber, Martha Kumar, Shirley Anne Warshaw, Susan Tolchin, Colin Campbell, Stephen Hess, John Burke, and Robert Maranto.

The fruit of these forums and other activities are presented here. In sum, they can be summarized as eight keys to a successful presidency. They are offered in the general order that the next President and his transition team are most likely to pursue in structuring the executive branch and establishing a policy agenda. Each chapter addresses different types of questions that a new President must face, and the key steps he should take to answer them effectively.

1. Achieving a Successful Transition: What needs to be done? When, where, and by whom should each step be implemented?

2. Running the White House: How should the White House be organized? What system can be put in place to efficiently handle the steady flow of people and paper? Who should have access to what? Who should have what authority?

3. Staffing a New Administration: How do you find the best people for the key positions? For that matter, how do you determine what the "best" is? What priorities should be set by filling the key posts? What management system will assure the President that the administration will further his own goals?

4. Turning the President's Agenda into Administration Policy: How will the White House interface with Cabinet departments and independent agencies? Where should policy be made?

5. Enacting a National Security Agenda: What vision does the President have for America's role in the world? What criteria should be used to select a National Security Adviser? How should the President, the National Security Adviser, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense interact?

6. Working with Congress to Enact an Agenda: How can the President ensure a desired program will become law? How do you facilitate smooth inter-branch relations?

7. Managing the Largest Corporation in the World: What are the President's primary managerial duties? How can the President ensure that his directives flow through the entire federal bureaucracy?

8. Building Public Support for the President's Agenda: How is a message developed, transmitted, and used to reinforce support among principal actors?

Heritage called on many experts--people who have "been there and done that," for better or for worse--to offer their advice to the next President and his administration. Although they sometimes disagreed in what to emphasize, most agreed on substance and the fundamentals of what a President should do.

For example, the panelists agreed that it is never too early for a presidential candidate to begin transition planning. He should designate a single individual to quietly undertake the arduous task of putting together the architecture to effectively transfer power from the current administration to the new one. This person must be somebody who has worked closely with the President in the past and who enjoys his full trust and confidence, and who understands the importance of people in implementing policy. Preferably, it is someone who also has connections in the Washington community.

Though some consider transition planning to be a modern phenomenon, Presidents have engaged in it since the days of George Washington. Rather than a sign of overconfidence or bravado, transition teams are a necessary management tool that spell the difference between success and failure in the first days of the new administration. Yet, among modern Presidents, only Ronald Reagan had the foresight to begin planning early. Many others, in retrospect, undoubtedly wish they had.

One piece of advice often repeated at the Mandate for Leadership 2000 forums was the importance of paying attention to those minor details that, if ignored or handled badly, could cause serious heartburn for some time. Tom Korologos, who handled Senate relations for Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, noted for example that "the big things kind of take care of themselves. Those little things kill you." One "little thing" that took on an importance far beyond anyone's expectations was a refusal by one of Carter's senior aides to give Speaker of the House Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill additional inaugural tickets at his request. Washington insiders still regale in recalling that O'Neill, for the next four years, referred to the aide, Hamilton Jordan, as "Hannibal Jerkin."

As Leon Panetta observed, "lessons which are so obvious in this town [Washington] are never learned and everybody has to kind of reinvent the wheel." Incoming administrations tend to repeat the mistakes of past administrations because they lack the institutional memory that provides continuity to corporations, universities, and other great institutions during leadership changes. The purpose of this volume is to provide that institutional memory, to give the next President of the United States practical advice on how to achieve success. There are no silver bullets or magic pills in this book--only the accumulated wisdom of dozens of Washington veterans who have the ribbons and battle scars to prove it.

History shows that Americans benefit when presidential transitions run smoothly. When a new President is able to articulate clearly his vision for America; when the White House and Congress establish a good working relationship, even if they disagree on legislative and policy details; when the right people are selected for the right administration jobs; and when the President's team understands his priorities and has a plan for doing "first things first," then every American will profit.

This book is about success and failure, not policy or politics. We hope the wisdom gleaned from the experience of those who have walked the Pennsylvania Avenue walk will help the next U.S. President to avoid the kinds of unnecessary mistakes that have plagued past administrations, and we wish him every success.

--Alvin S. Felzenberg