Where We Stand: Our Principles On A Policy for Europe That Reinforces National Sovereignty

Whatever the security issue—be it tracking down al- Qaeda, Iran’s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Arab–Israeli conflict, or Iraq—the United States cannot act effectively without the support of at least some European powers. This is not to say that this is a world in which a concert of powers dominates. Regardless of the issue, the U.S. remains the first among equals. This global power reality makes it vital for America to court allies while at the same time confirming U.S. leadership.

Put simply, in no other part of the world can political, diplomatic, military, and economic power be generated in sufficient strength to support American policies effectively. The cluster of international powers in Europe—led by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland—has no parallel in the rest of the world.

The United Kingdom is likely to remain America’s paramount ally for the foreseeable future. That is why it remains in America’s fundamental national interest to help the U.K. maintain both its sovereignty and its political flexibility.

Economically, it is hard to imagine how two countries could be closer. Each country easily remains the other’s largest source of foreign direct investment. Militarily, along with France and the United States, the United Kingdom is one of only three NATO powers capable of a sustained global military presence in terms of both lift and logistics. These are the only Atlantic allies that can participate in the entire military spectrum, from high-end, technologically intricate major war fighting through low-end peacekeeping. Even beyond its vital economic ties to the U.S. and its military prowess, the U.K. has unparalleled traditional political ties with the United States. The two countries have worked intimately with one another in World Wars I and II, the Cold War, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the fight against al-Qaeda. This political affinity is the product of a common cultural heritage, a common commitment to free markets and free elections, and a common geopolitical view of the world.

A Europe in which states react flexibly according to their unique interests, rather than collectively according to some utopian ideal, best suits American interests. Clearly, a Europe exercising supranational imperatives regarding foreign and security policy could hamstring American efforts to form politico-military coalitions.

For example, if a European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy had genuinely functioned in 2003, however badly, then Belgium, France, or Greece (all states with strongly anti-American publics) could have blocked the U.K., Poland, and Italy from aiding the U.S. in Iraq. Those who wish to preserve America’s ability to pursue coalition building in dealing with security issues must therefore strenuously oppose efforts to increase the level of EU foreign policy integration. Such a process would prevent European states in a divided EU from being able to realize their national interests and to work closely with the U.S. to solve security problems.

For America’s transatlantic policy to be successful, the European Union must be evaluated warts and all, and not viewed as many Europeans might wish. The EU is collectively far weaker than its supporters proclaim: The whole is less than the sum of its parts. In the wake of the Iraq war, the EU looks economically sclerotic, militarily weak, and politically disunited. Economically, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the euro-zone area did not create any private-sector jobs during the 30 years from 1970 through 2000. Militarily, of 1.5 million soldiers available to NATO’s European members, fewer than 100,000 can actually be deployed. Politically, contrary to any number of misleading European Commission communiqués, the Europeans remain critically divided on the seminal issue of war and peace.

Over the question of what to do about Saddam Hussein’s Iraq—the fundamental issue of the past few years— one sees a complete lack of coordination at the European level. Initially, the U.K. strongly supported the United States, Germany was against any use of force whether or not the United Nations sanctioned it, and France occupied a wary middle ground, favoring intervention only if the U.N. Security Council retained a veto over American actions. It is hard to imagine starker foreign policy positions being staked out by the three major European powers.

The United States must undertake to receive concrete assurances from the European allies that NATO remains the preeminent transatlantic security organization rather than sharing this distinction with some EU fabrication, such as the European Security and Defense Policy. The operational expression of this political point is that the United States should stress that NATO must retain the first right of refusal to act in any European crisis.

In the post–September 11 era, NATO’s two-tier military division could well imperil the political viability of the alliance. If the United States continues to be the “mercenary” of the alliance while the Europeans are the “social workers,” this functional disparity will lead to a constant difference in political point of view. Such a functional and political gulf must be kept to a minimum through initiatives like the NATO Rapid Reaction Force (NRF). The Prague goals agreed to at NATO’s 2003 annual meeting were designed to increase Europe’s woeful and chronic underinvestment in military affairs, primarily through the creation of the NRF to involve European troops in high-end war fighting. The NRF is to be a quickly deployable, highly lethal, and expeditionary force, primarily staffed with European troops. If NATO is to remain viable, the U.S.must continue to press the Europeans to live up to their commitments in Prague.

The case of Iraq illustrates that there will almost always be some allies who will go along with any specific American policy initiative, even as full unanimity within the alliance becomes increasingly hard to attain. Fortuitously, in April 1999, the NATO governments ratified the CJTF mechanism, which adds a needed dimension of flexibility to the alliance. Until recently, members of the alliance had only two decision-making options: either attain unanimous agreement to take on a mission or have one or more members block the consensus that would allow such a mission to proceed. Through the CJTF mechanism, NATO member states do not have to participate actively in a specific mission if they do not feel their vital interests are involved, but their opting out of a mission would not stop other NATO members from intervening if they so desire.

Beyond its self-defense commitment, the future of NATO depends on such coalitions of the willing acting outside of the immediate European area. Such operations are likely to become the norm in an era of a politically fragmented Europe. Thus, if full NATO support regarding a security issue is not forthcoming, a CJTF, in which a subset of the alliance forms a coalition of the willing to carry out a specific mission using common NATO resources, should be America’s second preference. If this too proves impossible, a coalition of the willing outside of NATO, composed of states around the globe committed to a specific initiative based on shared immediate interests, would be the third best option. Only then, if fundamental national interests are at stake, should America act alone. By championing initiatives such as the CJTF, America can fashion NATO as a toolbox that can further U.S. interests around the globe by constructing ad hoc coalitions of the willing within the alliance in specific cases.

On August 16, 2004, as part of America’s global base realignment and closure program, President Bush called for the removal of up to 70,000 U.S. troops from Europe and Asia over 10 years in a sweeping reorganization that would better prepare the armed forces to handle post–September 11 crises. The plan calls for more troops to be deployed farther south and east within the continent, nearer the arc of instability (the Caucasus, Iraq, Iran, the Middle East, and North Africa). The ability to deploy troops quickly is a huge problem for NATO. By increasing the number of troops that can be deployed quickly, the U.S. will help to revitalize the alliance, making it relevant for the new era.